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Abstract of Thesis
Negotiations between Charles I and the Confederation 
of Kilkenny lasted from January, 1643, until his death in 
January,1649, and were carried on from time to time in Paris 
and Rome as well as Dublin, Kilkenny and Oxford. Charles
required troops, arms and money to enable him to defeat
the English Parliament and the Scots: the Confederates 
desired religious freedom and political concessions. The 
operations of Charles' several agents were rarely co-ordinated; 
the Confederacy was split into factions. It is the primary 
object of this thesis to provide a full account of their 
complex transactions against the background of the war in 
England and the struggle for Catholic supremacy in Ireland.
In view of its unique, importance and the accessibility 
of numerous original sources, many of which are now in print, 
the history of the Confederation has been strangely neglected. 
The only would-be major work to have appeared. Professor T. 
Coonan’s The Irish Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan 
Revolution (1934), is partisan, weak on relations with England, 
and based almost entirely on published material. In this thesis,
use of the abundant sources available, including a number that
are unprinted, and due attention to the English side of affairs 
make it possible to reconstruct several key episodes for the 
first time and to throw further light on disputed or 
imperfectly known problems. At the same time, received views
Ill
of Charles’ methods and character and of the Confederates’ 
political inexperience, disunity, and failure to formulate 
a coherent policy are confirmed and expanded.
The machinery used in the negotiations and the parts 
played in them by Henrietta Maria in Paris, Kenelm Digby in 
Rome, and the various Royalist agents in Ireland, are described 
in detail. An attempt is also made to assemble all the 
accessible evidence relevant to the Earl of Glamorgan’s 
well-known mission, to discuss the theories put forward to 
explain his powers, and to suggest a novel and possibly 
definitive interpretation.
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Preface.
Soon after Charles I had raised his standard at 
Nottingham he realised that it might be necessary to obtain 
external aid in order to counter-balance the superior material 
resources of Parliament. As the tide of war flowed steadily 
against him, the need to obtain men and supplies became his 
paramount concern. Although he turned in desperation to the 
mainland of Europe, he pinned his main hopes on Ireland just 
as he had done in the time of Strafford when the Scots had 
challenged his supremacy.
At first, he desired simply to see the country pacified 
so that the Royalist army might be released for service in 
England, but when that army, freed by a temporary truce, 
had sailed for England only to be crushingly defeated almost 
at once, he began to rely on the Irish Catholics themselves.
Prom the Spring of 1644 until just before his death he 
continued to hope that they would intervene in England on 
his behalf. On one occasion the Confederacy despatched a 
small contingent to Scotland, where it fought with distinction 
under Montrose, but they never sent the full-scale expeditionary 
force which might have had a decisive effect on the struggle 
with Parliament. The difficulty was that Charles would not 
or could not agree to their minimum terms, while they could 
not agree among themselves.
Vlll.
The negotiations that took place were protracted, 
complex, tedious and frustrating to both sides. For Charles, 
the Marquis of Ormond was officially in sole charge, but in 
fact several agents were at work at different times and in 
different places, including Rome and Paris. Unfortunately, 
their operations were frequently at cross-purposes and thus 
the source of much misunderstanding and confusion. On the 
other side, the Confederacy was an uneasy coalition of con­
flicting interests; some wanted peace with Charles at any 
price, others desired virtual independence.
Aspects of the negotiations have been touched on^ but 
no attempt has been made to describe them as a distinct 
theme. The primary object of this thesis is to attempt 
such an account.
Despite its important place in the history of Ireland 
and its bearing on the Civil War in England, the Confederation 
of Kilkenny has attracted strangely little attention. One 
reason for this neglect - until the recent rise of a school 
of professional Irish historians - was the tendency in the 
past to overlook the special case of the Catholics in writing 
about Irish history in general, a second, that much of the 
evidence now available used to be either unknown or in­
accessible. whatever the reason, the & ontomixM?ary- 
historiah who wishes to study the Confederacy has to find 
his own way through a decade of astonishing complexity
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cranmied with events which would furnish material for any 
number of monographfes and articles, apart from several 
major works. His task is in one sense lightened, in one 
sense made more arduous,by the abundance of original sources, 
now mostly in print, which are at his disposal.
Some observations on the particular sources used in this 
thesis must now be made. At least one apologist representative 
of each of the many parties involved in the relations between 
England and Ireland has left his version of events. In 
addition there are numerous state papers, tracts, contemporary 
news reports, and the huge collections of documents compiled 
by Carte and Gilbert. The only serious deficiency is the 
absence of the official papers of the Confederacy which were 
destroyed by fire, the greater part in 1711 and the remainder 
in 1922 (Fifteenth annual report of the Commissioners of 
Public Records of Ireland,pp.648 ff.).
The Old Irish are represented by Aphorismical Discovery 
of Treasonable Faction or a Contemporary History of Affairs 
in Ireland, 1641-52, (ed. J.T. Gilbert, 3 vols., Dublin, 
1879-80), the work of an anonymous author, writing some 
time after the events he described, who appears to have 
been a supporter of Owen Roe O'Neill, and who, if not in 
the thick of things himself, was acquainted with some who 
were. In essence his work is at once a defence of Owen 
Roe O'Neill and the Earls of Antrim and Glamorgan and a
Xrumbustious attack on the New Irish and the Marquis of 
Ormond. It is not remotely objective and its chronology 
is totally unreliable. 1 noted an alarming number of 
mis-statements whenever it was possible to consult an 
unimpeachable second source. Yet the author's frankness 
is disarming and he includes many details not to be found 
elsewhere.
The Papal Nuncio, Rinuccini, speaks for himself.
The Commentarius Rinuccinianus takes the form of a 
narrative written by B. O'Perrall and B. O ’Connell 
(ed. J. Kavanagh, 6 vols., Dublin, 1949) but is in effect 
a gloss upon Rinuccini's voluminous correspondence, 
particularly with his superiors in Rome, and a mass of 
documents relating to Irish affairs. It is a work of 
immense value ; for some episodes it is the only source.
It is revealing about papal policy and papal ideas on 
church and state. It is also international rather than 
insular in outlook and helps to place Anglo-Irish relations 
in an unusually wide perspective. Naturally many of the 
letters and reports simply describe what the Nuncio has 
been doing in a manner favourable to himself. But on 
the whole the Nuncio was honest, if frequently misguided, 
and he suppressed little. Moreover, a fair proportion 
of the documents and of the letters emanating from Rome 
are critical of his actions. Volume VI of the Commentarius 
contains a valuable synopsis in English of the whole work.
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A selection of Rinuccini*s most important letters 
to his immediate superiors at the Curia was made by
G. Aiazza and translated into Italian (La Nungiatura in 
Irlanda, Firenze, 1844). Miss A. Hutton in turn translated 
Aiazza*s version into English (The Embassy in Ireland of 
Monsignor G.B. Rinuccini, Dublin, 1873). The Mission of 
Rinuccini (M.J. Hynes, Dublin, 1932) throws little light 
on the scene and indeed sometimes obscures it, It is 
useful, however, as a precis of the Commentarius^
Massari, Lean of Fermo, who was a close friend and 
devoted adherent of Rinuccini, left a highly personal 
account of the years 1645-7 (R^azione di viaggi di 
Dionisio Massari), translated into English under the 
misleading title. My Irish Campaign, and published in 
inconvenient serial form in the Catholic Bulletin  ^1916- 
1920). This is an important source because it contains 
details of Massari*s labours on Rinuccini * s behalf, 
especially of a mission to Rome which he undertook after 
the clergy had rejected the first Ormond Peace.
Nicholas who held moderate views during most
of the Confederate period, took to writing history and 
political polemics after the Restoration. ' His works 
are lively and disclose some original facts, but he was 
too concerned with arguing a case to be objective.
1. Unfortunately its publication preceded that of the
Commentarius and it cannot be used, therefore, for nurnoses 
oT' cross-reference.
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For example, The Unkind Deserter (Historical Works, 2 vor^^ 
Dublin, 1846), namely Ormond, is plainly the angry statement 
of a man convinced that a trust has been betrayed.
The Earl of Antrim, whose part in Anglo-Irish affairs 
was unique - ardent royalist, confirmed Catholic, Ulster 
chieftain -^is well-represented both in the Montgomery MSS, 
(ed. G. Hill, Belfast, 1869) and The Macdonnells of Antrim 
(G. Hill, Belfast, 1873), which, while being a historical 
account of the Antrim family, contains a number of documents 
relating to Antrim* s career, in particular to his efforts 
at the Restoration to justify his conduct during the 
Confederacy period.
The leading apologist for the Anglo-Irish, the 
*Ormondists*, was Richard Bellings whose mellifluous 
narrative of events was unearthed and edited by Sir 
John T. Gilbert (History of the Confederation and War,
7 vols., Dublin, 1882-91). Although Bellings was 
secretary of the Supreme Council of the Confederacy for 
most of its existence, he was remarkably reticent about 
political and administrative matters. It is to be 
remembered that he was writing after the Restoration as 
the friend and dependant of Ormond, to whom he submitted 
his draft for approval. The events he described may 
by then have been fading from memory and there was a 
strong temptation to reconstruct Confederate history 
chiefly as a vindication of his and Ormond*s part in it.
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Moreover, he had been able to keep by him only a 
fraction of the papers accumulated during his terms of 
office. These major defects in his narrative must be 
emphasized because historians have tended to follow 
Gilbert, who was naturally elated by his discovery, in 
assuming it to be comprehensive in scope, authoritative 
and relatively unbiased. Hov/ever, provided one is wary
of Sellings’ attitude of sweet reasonableness and the 
impression of impersonal authority he manages to convey, 
one finds him indispensable in some respects.
But in fact History of the Confederation and War is 
less important for the original narrative it embodies 
than for the enormous collection of illustrative documents 
culled from many sources by Gilbert which take up most 
of the space in its seven volumes. (This is also true 
of the Aphorismical Discovery). These documents are 
now easily accessible in the repositories to which they 
belong. Nevertheless, Gilbert made his selections with 
such skill that even to-day one seldom notices a serious 
omission from the sources that he consulted.
The National library in Dublin contains a fragment
f
of an unpublished manuscript knovm as The Y/ar and 
Rebellion begun in 1641( MB. 3 4 which appears to have 
been put together by a group of Anglo-Irish gentlemen^
1. In a preface prepared in 1867 the principal author is 
described as Nicholas Plunket. That may have been the
fentleman* s name but he could scarcely have been the same icholas Plunket who was Speaker of the General Assembly 
and for a time a supporter of Rinuccini.
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during the last two decades of the seventeenth century.
Carte had access to the whole of the original, ^ The 
Plunket Memoirs, as he described it, and prepared an abstract 
which is now among his papers in the Bodleian and has been 
transcribed and added to the fragment in the National 
Library. Thus, we have 313 pages of the original 
manuscript and 66 pages of Carte * s transcript. It is 
abundantly clear from a comparison between the abstract 
and his biography of Ormond that Carte made copious use 
of it. The authors of the manuscript sought to justify 
the conduct of the Anglo-Irish during the Rebellion and, 
more in sorrow than in anger, condemned the unjust 
treatment meted out to many of them in the Restoration 
settlement. Their narrative is useful but essentially 
a ^]!ond.o against Rinuccini and the native Irish.
Also preserved in the National Library is a manuscript 
entitled A Light to the Blind( MS.476-7),* This was 
described by Gilbert in the 3th Appendix to the 10th 
Report of the Historical MSS, Commission, and there is a 
copy of a substantial portion of it among the Carte Papers 
in the Bodleian, namely No.229 (a photostat copy of this 
copy is in the National Library). Only Book 1, which 
is an introduction, and chapters 6, 7, 8 of this work 
are concerned with the Confederate period. Yet, it 
requires attention because considerable space is devoted
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to the events surrounding the outbreak of the Rebellion 
and the inauguration of the Confederacy. Caution is 
called for since the author wrote at second and indeed 
at third hand and frequently got his facts wrong.
The Memoirs of the Earl of Castlehaven were not
l»y
published until 1680 and were frankly designedj^as 
whitewash for himself and Ormond. They are perhaps 
more revealing for the unintended glimpse they afford 
of the somewhat unsub tie manoeuvres of one who, like so 
many others, was anxious to be on the right side during 
the last act of the drama, rather than for any positive 
information they convey, although they do contain 
several details not mentioned elsewhere.
As published. The Memoirs of the Earl of Clanricarde 
(London, 1757) are of little value because the period
1643-7 is not covered. However, in 1950 the British 
Museum acquired a manuscript which turned out on inspection 
to be a missing portion of these memoirs (Add. MS.42063; 
see the short note by Robin Flower, British Museum 
Quarterly, vol.V, No.l, 1930, pp.24-5). This portion 
begins on 24 September, 1643, and ends on 5 September,
1647. It contains numerous letters to Ormond and the 
Confederate leaders and in view of Clanricarde*s leading 
role in the period is indispensable. There is a copy 
of the manuscript on micro-film in the National Library 
of Ireland.
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The Marquis of Ormond was eulogized and defended 
by Carte in his magnificent biography (Life of James 
Luke of Ormond , 6 vols., Oxford, 1851). But it is to 
be noted that the work, like the Commentarius Rinuccinianus, 
is fundamentally a skilful arrangement in narrative form 
of the original Ormond Papers - ag^emoved—i^i^aartloadP from 
Kilkenny and deposited in the Bodleian by Carte - besides 
being reinforced by a lengthy appendix of correspondence 
between Ormond and others. The drawback is that Carte 
was selective in more ways than one; many important 
documents are omitted from his appendix and it is often 
impossible in perusing his narrative to divine his sources. 
Accordingly it is essential to consult the original 
collection in the Bodleian despite its forbidding size. 
Conveniently, transcripts are to be found both in the 
Public Record Office, London, and the Public Record 
Office, Dublin, although incomplete, as well as copies of 
the whole on micro-film in the National Library.
The Ormond Papers are the only source for the official 
history of the Viceroy and the government and for Charles’ 
open relations with the Confederates. They are also 
invaluable because Ormond * s friends at court provided him 
with a racy and full commentary on ministerial intrigues 
and intentions from various points of view. And finally 
they provide the key to an understanding of the enigmatic 
character of Ormond himself.
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I examined all the documents in the collection 
described as Ormonde MSS. at Kilkenny, now deposited in 
the National Library of Ireland. It is quite obvious 
that Carte so astutely extracted the more interesting 
documents from Ormond Castle that only trivia were left 
behind. In spite of this I found several documents that 
added to my knowledge. The Calendar of MSS, at Kilkenny 
(Nev/ Series, vols. I and II, London, 1903) is to be used 
with caution for the editor sometimes omits important 
information.
Clarendon’s particular account of Irish affairs 
('An Historical Viev/ of the Affairs of Ireland - 1 have 
used the edition of 1819) is paradoxically much less 
satisfactory than his History of the Great Rebellion 
(7 vols., Oxford, 1849 ). In the first work he was
quite unashamedly defending Ormond against the onslaught 
made upon him by Bishop French. Moreover, he was not 
dealing with events personally observed but relying on 
evidence supplied by Ormond himself. In any case for such 
a temperate man he was unusually hostile to the Irish 
Catholics. Nevertheless, in several respects the work 
is valuable. For one thing, it gives., briefly, Ormond’s 
own gloss on the events in which he had taken part.
Of course, the History of the Great Rebellion is 
profoundly important both in supplementing the Ormond
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Papers and in putting^ Anglo-Irish relations in their
place which# it is salutary to be reminded-was not a
very large one.
For the period March-August, 1647, The Memoirs of
George heyburn, London, 1722, are invaluable. These
months covered the last stage of the negotiations between
Ormond and the Confederacy and but for Ley burn ’ s account
it would be impossible to do them justice. Furthermore,
it can for once be said that an eyewitness of contemporary
events reported v/hat he saw with genuine objectivity.
I experienced the greatest disappointment in connection
with the mission of the Earl of Glamorgan to the Confederacy.
(Twei'frh
The Historical Manuscripts Commission published a report
on the manuscripts housed at Badminton, seat of the Lukes
of Beaufort, the descendants of Glamorgan and inheritors
of the bulk of his papers^'ÇTwft1 f±h Rnpcrt, aud I
hoped to be able to examine them. However, in reply to
my request to do so the present Luke of Beaufort replied:
"I regret that I am not able to trace the documents 
referring to the Earl of Glamorgan, and even if they 
could have been traced, I am afraid they would have 
to be regarded as private, and not for publication.
Badminton, -,
19th September, 1957."
1. The Registrar at the Public Record Office, London, 
Miss Coates, has kindly informed me that her office haà 
no information about any movement of the papers relating 
to Glamorgan.
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This is particularly regrettable inasmuch as there is 
a serious discrepancy between the number of documents 
published by H. Dircks, Glamorgan’s biographer (The .Life 
and Times of the Marquis of Worcester, 1866), who spent 
some time at Badminton, and the number mentioned in the
H.M.C. report. It would be helpful to ascertain why 
this anomaly arose.
The Protestants in Ireland are well represented 
especially during the early years of the Rebellion.
There are accounts by E. Borlase, one of the two Lords 
Justices at the time of the outbreak, (History of the 
Execrable Irish Rebellion, 1680; Brief Reflections on the 
Earl of Castlehaven’8 Memoirs, 1682) , and by Sir John 
Temple (The Irish Rebellion, 1646). In addition there 
is an abundance of contemporary tracts; for example, one 
tract preserved in the Royal Irish Academy, Lublin, gives 
the detailed report prepared by the delegation of extremist 
Protestants that went to Oxford in April, 1644. Although 
there was little in it directly relevant to my subject.,
I found The History of the V/arr of Ireland from 1641 to 
1643 by a British officer (ed. J. Hogan, Lublin, 1873), 
a parliamentary account of the campaigns in the no±th, 
a reminder of the complexity of the general picture.
As for Charles and Court policy, material is by 
comparison thin - apart from the information provided 
by Clarendon and Ormond’s gossiping English correspondents.
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Captured papers published in the collections of Rushworth 
and Husband and in the Harleian Miscellany, The Letters 
of Charles I (ed. Sir Charles Petrie, London, 1935; 
ignoring the editor’s own bridge passages whi^ch, at least 
in so far as they concern Ireland, are a travesty of the 
sequence of events), letters exchanged between Charles 
and Henrietta Maria, documents published by V/arburton 
(Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers, 3 vols., London, 1849), 
these are the main sources.
I found the collections of tracts and news reports 
in the British Museum and the National Library of Ireland 
occasionally informative, and those in the Halliday 
Collection of the Royal Irish academy exceptionally 
useful. I examined the MSS. preserved at Trinity 
College, Lublin, only to find that Gilbert had already 
printed most of them. Even so I came across a few 
noteworthy unpublished documents. It is incidentally 
a matter of regret, shared by the present Keeper of MSS. 
at Trinity, that no record was made of which documents 
Gilbert had seen fit to transcribe. As a result, the 
researcher must decide whether to transcribe an interesting 
document himself or to examine Gilbert’s various 
publications in order to ascertain if the task has been 
done already. The most important of the documents 
gathered together by Gilbert and now preserved in Pearse 
Street Library and the Royal Irish Academy, Lublin, have
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been printed. Some of the manuscripts in the Royal 
Irish Academy are relevant to the Confederate period.
The National Library of Ireland now contains an 
important collection of micro-film copies of documents 
relating to Irish affairs drawn from many sources.
Of these several are indispensable, namely those from 
the Vatican Archives, the Simancas collection, and the 
State Archives, Paris. Documents relating to Ireland 
have also been extracted from the Additional MSS. in the 
British Museum and micro-filmed - in this case, however, 
it is perhaps more convenient to refer to the originals.
The Calendars of State Papers for England and Ireland, 
Letters and Papers relating to the Irish Rebellion (ed.
J. Hogan, Lublin, 1936) The Orrery Papers (ed. E. Maclysaght, 
Lublin, 1941) and The Tanner Letters (ed. Charles McNeill, 
Lublin, 1943) were not fruitful sources. On the other 
hand the Calendar of State Papers Venetian](ed. A.B. Hinds, 
koi^ d9Ky -7j ^ the Calendar of Clarendon State Papers 
(4 vols., Oxford, 1872-1932), the Clarendon State Papers 
in the Bodleian, to which I referred only when seeking 
amplification of a Calendar reference, and the Clarendon 
State Papers (ed. R. Scrope f»HSt T . Monkhouse, 3 vols.,
Oxford, 1767-82), contained a quantity of valuable 
material. So also did several of the reports of the 
Historical Manuscripts Commission, notably those on# 
the Portland MSS. and the Egmont MSS.
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The secondary sources for this period are inadequate.
The only work to deal comprehensively with the Confederacy 
since C.P. Meehan’s primer, The Confederation of Kilkenny, 
was published in 1862 is Professor T.L. Coonan’s The Irish 
Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan Revolution (Dublin, 
1954) , and this is a poor book. A pretentious style 
fails to conceal ignorance of the many sources available 
and numerous inaccuracies. Moreover, since it has all 
the appearance of an authoritative text, it may mislead a 
reader unacquainted with the period.
Biographies of such personalities as iSir Kenelm Digby, 
George Digby, the Earl of Glamorgan, Henrietta Maria,
Endymion Porter, Secretary Nicholas and Charles I himself 
sometimes entertain but rarely instruct. Indeed, by far 
the most informative sources _ are the articles in Irish H 
Historical Studies and the unpublished thesis of L.P. Cregan 
(The Confederation of Kilkenny: its organisation, personnel 
and history. The Registrar’s Office, the National University 
of Ireland), which contains a detailed description of the 
family background and careers of the principal confederates 
as well as a summary of the debates in the General Assemblies 
convened during the Confederacy’s existence.
Chapter I
Charles I and the Irish Catholics, 1638-42.
Y/hen he initiated talks with the Catholic Confederacy 
in January, 1643, it was not the first time that Charles I 
had hoped to use Irish troops against his Protestant 
subjects elsewhere. Previously, in 1638, he had thought 
of raising an army in Ireland for the purpose of subduing 
the Scots. Accordingly he had asked Strafford what 
military resources might be available and Strafford had 
increased the size of the army from 2,000 to 8,000 men. Air 
About the same time he had also approved a scheme proposed 
by the Earl of Antrim for recruiting a Catholic army to 
defend Northern Ireland in the'event of an invasion from
Scotland, despite Strafford’s low estimation of Antrim’s
a
3
2
character and ability. And one year later he had appointed
Antrim Lieutenant of the Western Highlands and the Isles.
On being recalled to England in September 1639,
Strafford soon came reluctantly to the conclusion that in 
view of the King’s weakness in face of the mounting
1. Vfilliam Knowler, Letters and Dispatches of the Earl of 
Strafford, London, 1739, II, pp.187-8.
2. Ibid.^ see also p.278, pp.296-7, pp.300-6.
3. G. Hill, The Macdonnells of Antrim, Belfast, 1873, app. xii, 
pp.444-6.
2.
intransigeance of Parliament it would be necessary to 
bring over the army from Ireland. The Catholic members of 
the Irish Parliament voted the subsidies required for its 
maintenance with such alacrity as to persuade Strafford not 
only that their devotion to the King was unbounded but that
contrary to all indications he personally had finally won
1 2 their favour. In both respects he exp^ggerated and indeed
they were shortly to join the pack baying for his life.
Their generosity really sprang from self-interest, for they
saw - as did the opposition in England from a different point-
of view - that the Scots could be instrumental in shattering
the royal power and placing the Irish Catholics at the mercy
of an English Parliament dominated by Puritans who had
declared their intention of extirpating the Catholic faith
from the three kingdoms. Some limitation of the King’s
powers was desirable because they hoped thereby to win more
legislative freedom for the Irish Parliament, but a limitation
so great as to give effective control to the Puritan majority
in the English House of Commons was to be prevented at all
cost. Thus, for them, as for the King, it was essential
1. C.V. Wedg#wood( The King’s Peace, London, 1955, p.32l) 
assumes this to be true on the strength of Strafford’s 
own report.
2. As on his departure from Ireland when he described the 
Irish as : "fully satisfied and as well affected to his 
Majesty’s Person and Service, as can possibly be wished 
for." Knowler, II, p.2Q3.
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that the Scottish insurrection should be suppressed.
So far and for a short time to come they worked in 
collaboration with the Protestant members. When the Irish 
Parliament assembled in October, 1640, both sides vented 
their discontent with Strafford*s administration and in 
November they decided to send a joint delegation to England 
to support his impeachment. Prom the Catholic standpoint
^ m A tHA Î irvAwV \y
this was a mistake. Without Strafford, the>\^Gatholic army 
could not be conveyed to England, and Strafford paid with 
his life for its non-appearance.
Moreover, just as they had feared, the King’s inability 
to crush the Scots threw him on Parliament’s mercy and 
obliged him to begin surrendering his prerogatives. As 
far as Roman Catholics in Ireland were concerned this was 
the writing on the wall. Sooner or later they must either 
acquiesce in the destruction of their religion or seize 
control of the government in Dublin for themselves and 
assist the King to overcome the Puritan opposition.
Por his part, the King wanted to keep an army in Ireland 
which could be used in the last resort against Parliament.
To this end he was fully prepared to grant the ’Graces’ for 
which the Irish had so long clamoured,^ as he made plain
1. Charles I to the Lords Justices and Council, April 3, 
1641, Calendar of State Papers Ireland, pp.317-22; 
see also pp.268-9.
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to a delegation representing both houses of the Irish 
Parliament which presented a list of grievances to him in 
1641. The English Parliament was equally determined to 
have the army disbanded and the penal laws rigorously enforced. 
Their policy was fortified by the fact that the King was 
compelled to communicate with the Irish through the Council 
in Dublin, the majority of whose members were prepared to 
block any measure to the advantage of the Irish Catholics.
2
Indeed, its two senior members, the Lords Justices, Parsons 
and Borlase, sympathised with Pyrn’s aims and may even have
1
1. Charles himself was fully aware that his intention to 
afford redress to the Irish was frustrated by the 
deliberate policy of Parliament ; cf. his answer to a 
declaration from the House of Commons : "if he had been
obeyed in the Irish affairs, before he went to Scotland, 
there had been no Irish rebellion; or after it had 
begun, it would have been'in a few months suppressed, 
if his directions had been observed; for if the King 
had been permitted to perform his engagements to the 
Irish agents, and had disposed of the discontented 
army beyond the sea, there is nothing more clear than 
that there could have been no rebellion in Ireland, 
because they had wanted both pretence and means to 
have made one."
Reliquae Sacrae Carolinae, Hague, 1650, l^ p. (O,
2. Of the two Lords Justices Parsons had by far the more 
compelling personality. There is no question of his 
animus against Roman Catholics and his Puritan sympathies; 
Of. Clarendon, An Historical View of the Affairs of 
Ireland, Oxford, 1819, p.1040 : (Parsons) was most 
addicted to the English rebels, and most pliable to their 
ends." Some, if not all. Irishmen were convinced that 
there was ng collusion between Parsons and the Puritan 
leaders; Bishop Ereiich, Historical Works, Dublin, 1846,
p.36; see also Richard Bellings, History of the Irish 
Confederation and the War in Ireland, ed. J.T. Gilbert,
7 vols., Dublin, 1882-91, 1, p.17.
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obeyed his directives.^ There is tenuous evidence that
Parsons wished to goad the Catholics into a desperate and
therefore ill-planned revolt so that he could have the
satisfaction of suppressing it without too much difficulty
2
and a •convenient pretext for a fresh v/ave of plantations.
Whether this was truly their object or not, the Lords 
Justices gave the impression of being determined to delay 
the granting of any graces from the Crown until Parliament
3
should be in complete command across the water. The 
author of the Aphorismical Discovery went so far as to 
claim that on the eve of the rising they deliberately 
engineered the early prorogation of the Irish Parliament
1. Though appointed Lord Lieutenant in 164-1 (Charles I
to the Lords Justices, 16 June, 1641, C.S7P.I., p.302),
Lord Leicester never set foot in Ireland.
2. Cf. A Light to the Blind (preserved in the National 
Library of Ireland), p.63: "In the Interim the Lords 
Justices and most of the Council were pleas’d at this 
Revolution and conceaveing allready an assurance of 
haveing soon all the estates of the Catholicks in the 
kingdom, after which they had been Long breathing;
did now take upon them to use the utmost of their skill 
to accomplish that dessigkn."
3. According to the Plunket-Dunne MS . (preserved in the 
National Library of Ireland), p.145, the Jlstermen
were infuriated by the rumours spread by the Parliamentarians 
and provoked by the "preposterous and designed severity 
of the Lords Justices"; cf. also "The Justices could 
easily have sent a troop or two to seize Sir Ph. 0 ’Neale 
and so have prevented all the mischief" (ibid.,p.152).
In A Light to the Blind,p.50^ plot is described to 
destroy episcopacy and the Catholics of Ireland.
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until October 21st as a means of postponing the enforc
1.
‘§ment
of the King's directive to make concessions to the Irish.
At any rate, as a result of their apparent policy a number 
of influential Catholics in Ulster, who had long been 
contemplating an insurrection, became convinced that their 
hour had struck, otherwise the English Parliament, having 
encroached further on the King's prerogatives, would 
eradicate their religion and drive them from their lands,
2
a policy aimed at rich and poor, Old and New Irish alike.
It has often been put forward as a valid reason for 
condemning the Rebellion that it took place at a time when 
the Irish were as well off as they had ever been with every 
prospect of their situation becoming better still. This is 
to overlook the fact that their independence could only 
increase in proportion as the King's strength grew weaker, 
to the gain of the opposition. Naturally they had no wish 
to benefit in the short term from this process when its 
final outcome would lead to the ascendancy of the Puritans 
in Ireland and the extinction of everything they cherished.
1. Aphorismical discovery of treasonable faction or a 
contemporary History of Affairs in Ireland, 1641-52,
5 vols.,'ed. J.T. Gilbert, Dublin, 1879-80, p.12.
There may have been something in this general allegation 
even though it was wrong in one point of detail - 
Parliament had been prorogued until November 11th and 
not October 21st. Bellings noted tentatively that the 
agents had been on their way from the King before 
Parliament had been adjourned and that^ in any case, had 
the substance of the Graces been made public there would 
have been no insurrection; Gilbert,1, p.27; see also 
the Protestation of the Anglo-Irish, 1642, ibid., p.25.
2. Of. Gilbert (Bellings), 1, p.15; Remonstrance of the 
Irish of Ulster, Aphor. Disc., pt.II, pp.451-60.
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The leading conspirators in the revolt in the North 
were Rory O ’More and Sir Phelim O'Neill, who claimed 
consistently that they were acting in the King's interest 
and with his approval. The King’s complicity has been 
the subject of much inquiry and dispute, so far inconclusive 
and likely to remain so in the absence of any convincing 
evidenced The problem is complicated by the probable 
existence of not one but two plots; one plot involving 
O'Neill and 0 'More, the object of which was the expulsion 
of the English and Scottish settlers from Ulster; the other, 
if it can be described as a conspiracy, involving the King 
himself, Antrim, Ormond, Dillon and several lords of the 
Pale, the object of which was to seize Dublin and the main 
strong-points. In fact, the King probably supported the 
second plan but had no direct connexion with the first. 
However, at some point, the two sets of plotters became 
aware of each other's intention and agreed to collaborate.
As for the King's part, this much is certain; he was 
in touch with members of the Pale nobility throughout the 
summer of I64I and could scarcely have failed to know of 
their plans to wrest power from the Puritan-dominated 
Council in Dublin. Again, when in May I64I, he assented
le The most searching inquiry into this matter was carried 
out by R. Dunlop as long ago as 1887: 'The Porged 
Commission of I64I', E.H.R.,1887, II, pp.527-33.
2. Cf. S.R. Gardiner, A History of England from the Accession 
of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War, ï603-42\
10 vols., London, 1883-4, X, pp.7-8, Note, pp.92-4.
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to the disbandment of the Irish army - the army which had 
been raised in the first place as a means of turning the 
tables on the English Parliament - and commissioned eight 
officers each to convey 1,000 troops abroad, he must have 
realised that more than half of them were friends and agents 
of Owen Roe O'Neill and likely to use the regiments so fort­
uitously placed at their disposal for another purpose.^
Still, the most damaging evidence against him, which comes
to us from Randall Medonne11, Sari of Antrim, is somewhat 
2
suspect. Antrim had married the Duke of Buckingham's
widow and perhaps,as a result, ingratiated himself at
Court. Yet, like to many of the King's proteges, though
passionately loyal, he was both unwise and ambitious, too
ready with offers of large contingents of troops for the
King's service that tended to melt away when the call sounded
for muster parade. He liked to cut a dash and found it
hard to resist exaggeration. Nevertheless, at the
Restoration, after lengthy interrogation, he was exonerated
3
from the charge of falsely maligning Charles I,
1. According to one of the authors of the Plunket-Dunne MS., 
however, the King wanted to send the army abroad but was 
hindered by the 'puritans' - p.147.
2. This would seem to have been Bellings' opinion - "Nor 
am I ignorant that persons of quallitie, to ingratiate 
themselves with the prevailing party, have given, under 
their signature, relations which involved many more, 
but I Imowe that themselves after out of remorse of 
conscience, have averred, and convinceing themselves,
doe manifeste that these stories were feigned by them." 
Gilbert, 1, p.10.
3. Hill, app.XVIII, pp.470-3.
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According to Antrim, in an account which he gave to
the Cromwellian authorities in 1650, the King had conveyed
1
a message through Thomas Bourke to Ormond and himself
requesting that the army, instead of being disbanded,
should be increased from 8,000 to 20,000 men with a view
to their use against Parliament and the seizure of Dublin
Castle. Unfortunately, this message arrived after the
army had been already dispersed. Antrim informed the King
of this and the King replied:
"signifying his pleasure that all possible endeavours 
should be used for getting togetffeier these 8,000 men, 
and that an army should immediately be raised in 
Ireland that should declare for him against the 
Parliament of England ..."
This message Antrim had passed on to some of the rebel lords who,
1. Ormond’s part in the conspiracy is obscure. Bishop 
Erench simply stated that he was in the plot to seize 
Dublin Castle, op.cit.,The Sale and Settlement of Ireland, 
p.120; see also Aphor. Disc., 1. p.12; Hickson, Irish 
Massacres of 1641> 2 vols., London, 1884, II, p.191.
On March 3rd, 1942, Ormond wrote to Sir Philip Percevall 
protesting: "... If it be proved that I gave anything
like intelligence to any rebel, or ever writ to Pale 
Lord in all my life, let me be accounted what I know 
V/ishard is, a prating false varlet." Egmont MSS., l,pt.l, 
pp.165-6. But for once it is hard to believe that Ormond 
was telling the exact truth. Cf., for example, A Light 
to the Blind, p.61: "(Ormond was) to contrive there with 
some others of his (the King’s) subjects, the best methods 
they could, for seiseing upon the Parliamentarian Justices; 
and for declareing in favour of his maiesty, against the 
Proceedings of the English Parliament. Ormond communicated 
the message to som choice catholicks and Protestants and 
after several conferences, the buisness was at last setled: 
and the 16 of November in this same year 1641, when the 
Irish Parliament was to meet at Dublin, was appointed for 
putting it in execution."
But, the author added, the Old Irish heard of it, though Ormond 
tried to conceal it.
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"fell upon it (the business) without us, and 
sooner and otherwise than we should have done 
taking it to themselves and in their own way ^
the managing of the work, and so spoiled it."
Thus Antrim’s account would convict the King of encouraging
the rising, while dissociating him from its actual timing
and the manner in which it was begun.
Whatever the King’s role, the leaders of the Northern 
Plot were busily developing their plans throughout August 
and September. Encouraging messages were received from
Dwiovv &QG-
abroad and they were in correspondence with^O’Neill.
Then in late September the news broke suddenly that the 
rising had been put off, because, it was said, the Lords 
of the Pale were unwilling to move until Dublin Castle 
had first been captured. There is evidence, however, 
that the real author of this deferment was the King himself. 
Such a suspicion certainly fits in with Antrim’s statement 
and with what might have been expected of him. The case 
against him might be elaborated as follows. His sole 
interest in Ireland was strategic; Ireland should help him 
to smash the power of the Scots. As Parliament had obliged 
him to disband Strafford’s army, he egged on the Irish 
Catholics to seize power on his behalf and furnish him 
with a Catholic army in its stead. However, the moment
1. Hill, &pp. XIV, pp.448-451; Cox, History of Ireland, 2 vols., 
London, 1869, App. XLIX,M,pp.206-209.
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the Scots seemed amenable to reason, as they did in
September, 1641, there was no longer any urgent need for
Irish support and consequently no need for a military coup.
With the return of the Scots to their allegiance he could
hope to emerge the victor in his struggle with Parliament.
Nonetheless, as a reasonable safeguard, he merely postponed
the "Rebellion"; he did not abandon it.
Whether the King reasoned and acted in this manner or
not, the rebels ignored the request for deferment and took
to arms. Sometime about the beginning of October, the
King sent to Ireland with further instructions Lord Dillon
of Costello, who had gone to court to present the grievances
of the Anglo-Irish Catholics.^ Dunlop believed that these
2
were not conveyed until the rising had begun. Others are 
of the opinion that they were intended specifically to incite 
the rebels to arms. The evidence is, as usual, confusing. 
O'Neill and More, it will be recalled, alleged that they 
were acting with the King's knowledge and sanction, in 
proof of which they now produced a commission under the
1. E.H.R., II, p.529.
2. Ibid.
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the ■ Great Seal that empowered them to kill and slay
all the Scots and English in Ireland who should resist them^*
The general opinion dismisses this document as a bare-faced
forgery. Though it would seem to have been madness on the
King's part to originate such an authority, and though
Antrim later deposed that O'Neill and More had failed
2
to consult Ormond, the Pale Nobility or himself, through 
whom the King was conducting the intrigue, and had acted 
independently, it was singularly unfortunate for the King 
that so many wrong-doers at different times during the last 
decade of his reign should have counterfeited commissions 
apparently bearing the stamp of his approval.
In this instance, whether he had personally instigated 
the rebellion or not, it still remained probable that he 
had intrigued with the Catholic leaders in Ireland to seize 
Dublin Castle and the Protestant strongholds and, to that 
extent, had encouraged the would-be rebels to consider that,
1. Cf. this extract from the examination of four ships' 
masters taken at Plymouth: "... and that they said they 
had received a commission from his Majesty under the 
broad seale of England, to kill and slay all the English 
and Scots in the kingdom, that should reside them: and 
that when they have done there, they have the like 
commission for England." Collection of Pamphlets,
B.M., E.118, p.3.; see also Gilbert, I, XVIII.
2. See above
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as against the Puritans and their violent anti-Catholic
policy, he was on their side. Morally he stood convicted
of collusion. And while in the matter of the controversial
1commission he was almost certainly innocent, his name was
indelibly associated with its virulent tone at home and 
2
in Ireland. Thereafter his friends no less than his 
enemies were predisposed to deny him the benefit of the 
doubt.
Moreover, the whole question of his complicity in the 
events leading up to the Rebellion was to have a vital 
bearing on his future relations with the Irish Confederacy 
which was formally inaugurated in 1642. On the one hand.
1. This was Dunlop's conclusion after sifting all the 
available evidence; cf. also,Gilbert (Bellings), I, p.18: 
"This crime (of implicating the King) was so€greate an 
affliction to Sir Phelim O'Neale, who was the contriver 
of it, that he often during his imprisonment, and at
his execution^ acknowledged^ and with much sorrow 
endeavoured to expiât# the guilt of it."
There is also preserved at Trinity College, Dublin, the 
copy of this statement made by Sir 'William Stewart :
"On seizing Charlemont he (Sir Phelim O'Neale) found 
there a patent of Lord Caulfields, sealed with the great 
seal of Scotland. Sir Phelim cut the seal off the patent 
and attached- it to a document which he had caused to be 
drawn up, and which perpetrated to be a commission from 
the King." TC.D P. 3
Such a revelation is highly interesting in view of the 
controversy over the Earl of Glamorgan's patents which 
was to arise later.
2. Of. Historical View, p.1038.
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he had established the precedent of corresponding with the 
Irish Catholics, and, on the other, he had created the 
impression - or to be more just, perhaps, the impression 
had been created for him - that he was willing to stoop to 
intrigue and double-dealing in pursuit of his objectives 
Consequently the Confederates were only too willing to 
enter into negotiations with him after the outbreak of the 
Civil War, but never ceased to question the sincerity of his 
intentions and never felt that they had sufficient surety 
for giving him the assistance he so desperately solicited.
In their turn, the Royalist Protestants in Ireland were 
constantly alert to hamper his negotiations and prevent his 
coming to terms with the Catholics. As for the English 
Parliament it was given an unexpected instrument of 
propaganda which it never failed to turn to profit. Any 
tit-bit relating to the King's dealings with Ireland would 
be published so as to embellish the account of his wrongdoing 
presented to it at this time. And, ironically, its 
propaganda was to influence most of all the King's own 
close supporters who considered it calamitous for the 
Royal cause to become identified with the Irish Catholics, 
so outraged was feeling in England by the atrocities with 
which the rising was associated. As a result the King 
never dared to conduct his negotiations on a realistic basis. 
So it turned out that the plan to use Ireland to destroy the
15.
rising power of Parliament helped to bring on the very 
Civil War v/hich at all costs the King should have avoided 
as being militarily the weaker side, and ever afterwards 
hindered his efforts to obtain succour from the same source.
When the news of the ghastly events in Ireland began 
to trickle into England the King was about to return from 
Scotland to Whitehall. His feelings must have been mixed.
He had been relying on Ireland to support him in the 
event of an open conflict with Parliament. As it was, he 
had no choice but to express his sorrow for the victims and 
to pledge himself to co-operate with Parliament in punishing 
the bloodthirsty rebels. Still, it must instantly have 
occurred to him that he could turn the rebellion to his own 
advantage, for an army would have to be raised in England 
for the purpose of suppressing the rebellion, and an army 
was just what he needed for putting an end to the arrogant 
pretensions of Parliament. Pym was equally quick to spy 
danger and resolved that whatever happened the King should 
not be given control of arms and men. In fact^ Charles was 
already harvesting the first bitter fruits of his equivocal 
dealings with the Irish, and, it might be added, of the 
Queen's intrigues with Catholics abroad and her involvement 
in the army plot, for Pym and his collaborators v/ere able 
to insinuate concern not merely that the King might turn 
the army against Parliament after completing his mission 
to Ireland, but that he might ignore Ireland altogether
16.
and take up arms against Parliament forthwith. Nor did 
Pym let slip the opportunity to weaken further the King’s 
standing in the country by implicating him in the rebellion.
In this regard his most ingenious stroke was to broadcast 
the suspicion attached to the King by having the Gommons 
prepare a declaration exonerating him from the false charges 
of inciting the rebels alleged to be in circulation 
throughout England 1^ *
At the same time Pym and his friends, aided and 
abetted by Parsons and Borlase in Dublin, embarked on a policy 
which had the twofold objective of eradicating Catholicism from 
Ireland and making an accommodation between the King and the 
Rebels impossible. Since Ireland was the King’s last hope 
of reviving his authority, Ireland must be placed irrevocably 
outside his grasp. This end could best be served by 
compelling the King to associate himself with a policy of brutal 
reprisals against the Rebels, while denying him control of the 
army and the government of Ireland. Thus it was determined 
to treat prisoners not as belligerents but as rebels, thereby 
excluding them from the customary rights of war. Again, 
on February 24th the King was reluctantly forced to assent 
to the Bill that came to be known as the Act of Adventurers.
This Act - based on a suggestion from the Lords Justices - 
is of outstanding importance; it embittered and frightened
1. R.I.A. Tracts, Box 10, Tract 13.
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the moderate Irish perhaps more than any other single
measure. Its object was to raise money for putting down
the rebellion by promising land in Ireland to 'Adventurers'
in exchange. This would entail depriving the Irish of
some 10 million acre's, and introducing a host of new tenants
from England.^  It also gave the supporters of the English
Parliament a vested interest in annihilating the rebels
and so turned them against any attempt to compromise. No
wonder the Irish became so bitter. No wonder they were
so reluctant in the years to come to trust to the King’s
promises alone with this act lying on the statute book.
The greatest success of the Lords Justices was to
drive the Lords of the Pale to associate themselves with
the revolt. Par from supporting the rebellion, many lords
such as Gormanstown who were later to lead the Confederacy,
first placed themselves and their property at the disposal
of the government for the purpose of suppressing it.
Clanrickard went to the length of saying that no gentleman
of quality of English or Irish extraction, except perhaps
Colonel Plunket and Roger More, was in any way connected 
2
with it. It is certainly true that whereas the Pale 
nobility might have been willing to seize control of 
Ireland for the King they recoiled from participating.
1. J. Rushworth , Historical Collections, 8 vols., 
London, 1721, III, p.556.
2. Clanrickard to the Earl of Bristol, Nov. 14,164-1, T.Carte, 
The Life of James Luke of Ormond, 6 vols., London,
1851, V, p.26l.
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in a rebellion against M m ,  especially with the Old Irish
for allies. Moreover, as has been pointed out, they were
as yet content to work in harness with the Protestant members
of the Irish Parliament in order to obtain increased
independence for Ireland. But the very first act of the
Lords Justices was to prorogue the sitting of Parliament
fixed for November 11th until February 26th^‘and to stand
out against subsequent efforts to have the date of
2
reassembly brought forward. This appeared as a deliberate 
measure to prevent joint action by the Protestant and 
Catholic members of Parliament to suppress the revolt.
When they begged for arms, practically none were given 
them on the plea that they might use them to side with
3
their co-religionists. More intimidating were the edicts
against the rebels issued by the Council, for these 
promised punishment :
"for all Papists without distinction of any"^
1. Gilbert (Bellings), 1, p.20.
2. Ibid., pp.25-8. Eventually they were forced to agree 
to a sitting of two days which was quite inadequate.
3. Ibid., p.20; see also Gormanston to Clanrickard, Carte, V,
p.286.
4. Cf. Bellings’ comment :
"It cannot be imagined how much the nation was amazed 
at the expression ... meant to impute particular 
môn’s offences as a crime to religion,.and ... to 
involve therein the natives and all the CatholicfeSj 
either as assistants, abettors, or well wishers
of that Rebellion." Gilbert, 1, p|îl8.-
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and spoke of:
"a most disloyal and detestable conspiracy 
intended by some evil affected Irish 
Papists." 1
Several distinguished Anglo-Irishman gentlemen were tortured 
on the rack and Sir Charles Coote, charged with the military 
suppression of the revolt, encouraged his troops to massacre 
Catholics without regard for guilt, age or sex. Thus when 
the Earl of Essex wrote to the Lords Justices advocating 
the banishment overseas of the Pale gentry ,2 they decided 
reluctantly that they had no choice but to join the Old 
Irish. Nevertheless, the fact that they were driven to take 
part in the rebellion^was fated to weaken its impetus and 
bring about its eventual collapse.
l e  C a r t e ,  JL, p e 2 3 6 *
C .Meehan, The Confederation of Kilkenny, Dublin, 1862,p.?*
3. A Light to the Blind, pp.66“‘6, instances several of the 
methods used by the Lords Justices to faa the frames of 
insurrection. See also Carte,1.1, vciting tkie rluMet"-
Dunne M o . ) .
"Before the Irish of the Pale fell from ooedience 
.to tne government, olr W.Parsons at a publiok 
entertcxinment oefore many witnesses declared 
that within a twelvemonth no catholiok should 
be seen in Ireland.."
2 0 .
Although it was not until January, 1643, that the
King first communicated with the Confederacy, his enforced
association with Parliament’s policy of extermination and
mass expropriation came to an end with the beginning of
the Civil War in August, 1642. Meanwhile,the year 1642
had witnessed the rapid development of ordered government
at Kilkenny where the Confederates had established their
headquarters.^ The way was prepared by the clergy, who,
observing the lack of organisation in the movement, arranged
a meeting at Kells in Armagh to see what could be done to
2
set matters right. This was followed by a convention 
of lay and spiritual leaders. A General Assembly having 
legislative powers was created, while an executive of 
24 members to be called the Supreme Council was entrusted 
v/ith the direction of affairs. Here it is necessary to 
concentrate only on those developments which were to have 
a bearing upon the future negotiations with the King.
Of these the most remarkable was the extraordinary 
care taken by the Confederacy to affirm its loyalty to
1. Another important development was the arrival in 
Ireland on 15th April of General Monroe and 2,500 
Scottish troops.
2. Gilbert, I, p.86.
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the King, alike in its official debates and pronouncements
and in the place accorded him in its constitution. The
burden of its repeated statements refuting the charge of
being rebellious was that the Puritan officials in London
and Dublin, having weakened the Royal prerogative, had
begun to assail the religious privileges and legal rights
of the Catholics in Ireland as the prelude to their total
extinction, in spite of the King’s disapproval and protests.
So vindictive had this policy become that they had been
driven to resist further assaults by force. But they had
taken up arms reluctantly, and not against the King’s own
person but specifically to restore to the King the power
of which Parliament was unlawfully depriving him.^ In
support of this theme it was even said that proclamations
bearing the King’s seal should not be recognized lest they
2
be the mendacious work of the King’s enemies. And when 
the General Assembly first convened it declared its inability 
to designate itself a Parliament, because, to do so, would 
be to encroach upon the sole prerogative of the Crown to
1. Of. the address of the Confederate Peers, Nobility and 
Gentry of Galway, 29 Sept. 1641, Gilbert, I, pp.244-5.
2. Acta Congregationis generalis cleri, 10 - 13 May, 1642, 
Commentarius Rinucclnianus. O'ï'errall B., and O'Coimell, 
B., ed. J. Kavanagh, 6.Vols., Lublin, 1949, I, pp.320-6; 
Gilbert, II, pp.32-43.
2 2 .
summon such a body.^
Such anxiety to legalise their position may be
attributed partly to the desire of the nobility of the 
Pale to appease its hag-ridden conscience, but its main 
source was unquestionably political. The Confederates 
were in dread lest the King and Parliament should resolve 
their differences and launch the whole weight of England 
against Ireland. This was an eventuality to be avoided 
at whatever price. Consequently they sought to widen, 
or at least to maintain, the rift between the two 
contestants in England. And finally, when they were 
firmly established in Ireland, they aspired to join with 
the King in a combined operation against Parliament.
In the meantime, it was imperative not to allow a situation 
to arise in which it would be impossible to effect a 
reconciliation with the King. The simplest way of doing 
this was to pretend that they had never ceased to be 
loyal subjects.
Yet, while the Confederacy was sedulously disclaiming 
any estrangement from the Crown, it was simultaneously 
sapping the very foundations of its a,uthority. It gave 
itself the right to raise revenue, to coin money, to levy 
troops, to appoint judges, to make peace and declare war.
1. Gilbert, II, p.131.
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Abroad, it sent agents, with the status and powers of
ambassadors, in quest of recognition, arms and money.
under
It specified the conditions ' which it would be prepared 
to dissolve itself. All these measures were a practical 
recognition of the need for law and order inside the 
territory under its control, and for the efficient and 
resolute conduct of affairs. But no amount of apology 
for temporarily taking this or that action, could conceal 
the fact that the Confederacy was arrogating to itself 
sovereigh powers, which even the Puritans in the English 
Parliament, the alleged subverters of the royal prerogative, 
had not presumed to claim. What, indeed, the Confederacy 
had created for itself was effective legislative, judicial 
and executive independence, except for the attribution to 
the King of the empty symbols of sovereignty.
The oath of association which every Catholic was 
required to swear to the Confederacy epitomised the 
contradiction between their claim to maintain the royal 
prerogative on the one hand and their manner of taking 
it away on the other. 'By it the "Confederate Catholic" 
swore to bear true allegiance to the King and"to maintain 
to the utmost his prerogatives, the fundamental laws of 
Ireland, the free exercise of the Catholic religion, and 
the lives, liberties, and possessions of all fellow 
confederates." "The fundamental laws of Ireland" and 
"the lives, liberties and possessions of all fellow
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confederates" are here made to appear to harmonise with 
the King’s prerogatives when in fact they could not do 
so and the Confederates and the King knew that they could 
not do so. The oath on to require that the Con­
federate shaflflAobey all orders made by the Supreme Council 
and only accept a peace ratified by the General Assembly. 
In practice this would mean also that he could only accept 
conditions that entailed a limitation of the King’s 
sovereignty. With this oath as the point of departure 
it was perhaps no cause for surprise that discussions 
with the King never seemed to advance very far.
Discussions were to be further cirumscribed by the 
territorial and ecclesiastical arrangements made by the 
General Assembly. All the lands which had belonged to 
the Protestant Church before 1641 were declared to be the 
rightful property of the Catholic Church in Ireland, and 
the Catholic Church was to enjoy all the privileges and 
immunities granted to it by Magna Carta. This settlement 
would confront the King with two difficulties. With 
regard to the allocation of land he would have to ponder 
on the angry feelings of the Protestants in Ireland who 
could not be expected to take kindly to the permanent 
loss of their property. And in the matter of the status 
of the Church he would have to be willing to restore to 
Rome the power which Henry VIII had wrested from it.
It was unlikely that he would give way on these two points
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unless driven by desperation.
All in all the conclusion is inescapable that 
developments during the first nine months or so of the 
Confederacy's life scarcely augured well for fruitful 
negotiations with the King. Nevertheless, both parties 
were soon to display ardent interest in opening negotiations, 
and negotiations once begun were to end only with the 
King's death. Seldom can so much concern for a re­
conciliation between two parties have been combined with 
so adamant a refusal to agree to compromise.
Chapter II 
The Background to the Negotiations.
The negotiations between Charles I and the Confederacy 
cannot be followed intelligently without some preliminary 
knowledge of the difficulties under which both sides 
laboured and of the machinery tëipy employed. In this 
chapter it is intended to examine these difficulties and 
to describe this machinery.
Of the many problems standing in the way of a mutually 
satisfactory agreement, three were especially serious. 
First, the demands of the Confederates were excessive from 
the King’s point of view. Secondly, Royalist Protestants 
felt as bitter against the Irish Catholics as did any 
Puritans. And, thirdly, the Confederates were not united.
. The King’s attitude to the Confederacy’s aims was 
fundamental. Could he ever bring himself to make the 
minimum concessions they were bound to demand? If he 
were to be honest, it seemed very unlikely. On the one 
hand, the security of religion the Confederates required 
would entail weakening the established church; on the 
other hand, the legislation which would have to be 
introduced in order to guarantee them increased economic 
and political freedom must lead to a diminution of his 
sovereignty. In other words, he would be in the position 
of having to yield to the Irish Catholics what he refused
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to yield to the opposition in England and Scotland,
The only way round this apparently insuperable difficulty 
was to make promises to the Confederates which he did not 
intend to keep. With his conviction that whatever he did 
was right, Charles was capable of doing this without a 
qualm of conscience, Even so, it would not be easy to 
deceive the Confederates, for they would expect convincing 
proof of his sincerity; promises alone would scarcely suffice.
Given that Charles in desperation decided to give the 
Confederates what they asked, he had still to reckon with 
the outraged feelings of his Protestant supporters against 
the Irish Catholics. The risk was great that they would 
choose to withdraw their allegiance rather than accept 
virtually complete toleration for the very people whose 
recent atrocities he himself had condemned. Significantly,
even his own advisers, though they realised that he must 
somehow obtain foreign aid in order to have .any hope of 
winning the war, were reluctant to recommend a treaty v/ith 
the Irish, in case their reputations suffered for it
The Irish Protestants were particularly uncompromising.
1. This became abundantly clear at the time of the Oxford 
Conference, Apri1-May, 1644, see below
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In the view of all but a very few,^ no concessions whatsoever 
should be made to the rebels. This was obviously an 
absurd attitude but nothing could make them change it.
It was not simply that they were genuinely incensed by the 
savagery that had accompanied the rising but that they 
could not countenance anything like equality for the Irish 
Catholics. In the past, the attraction of Ireland had 
been precisely that Catholics were treated as second-class 
citizens and they wanted this state of affairs to continue. 
In addition, many of them were justifiably aggrieved 
because the Confederates had seized their property and 
they were afraid that it would not be restored.
To make the situation still more serious for the King, 
a number of supposedly loyal Irish Protestants were secretly 
Puritan sympathisers, partly for doctrinal reasons and 
partly because they approved of Parliament's brutal Irish
1. The received view that all the Irish Protestants were 
hostile to the Irish Catholics may be v/rong. One 
Protestant was to declare in 1644:
"No man looks upon this Rebellion with more horror 
than 1 do, few men have felt sadder effects of it, 
either in the exercise of the sword or fire my Houses 
burned and my two Sonnes killed in cold blood: yet 1 
doe believe very many honest men have been cozened 
into this action, by the power and perswasion of 
their Leaders, or frighted into it by the ill 
managery of affaires here ... believe it, unpardonable 
faults will be found in those who have cryed out most 
upon this Rebellion." R.l.A. Tracts, Box 29>
Tract 14, V. 34.
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p o l i c y T h e  influence of this group, which tried 
constantly to control official policy in Dublin, ^  was 
particularly strong up to the time of the Cessation 
in September, 1643.
Charles had no illusions about the depths of anti- 
Catholic feeling among his supporters. From the outset, 
he realised that a public settlement with the Confederacy 
could only be achieved in spite of a majority of Irish 
Protestants, perhaps even at the risk of their desertion 
to the Parliamentary camp. This knowledge may have 
convinced him that the only possible way to treat was 
in secret.
The third major problem affecting the relations between 
Charles and the Confederacy was the absence of solidarity 
among the Confederates themselves. In the past, the 
differences between the Native Irish and the New Irish
1. A delegation representing this group which attended the 
Oxford Conference in 1644 had only one object - to make 
sure the King did not come to terms with the Confederates. 
See below p.f&7 fT,
2. Dublin was crowded with refugees who had been driven 
off their lands. Their presence was a constant 
source of embarrassment to the negotiators with the 
Confederacy.
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may have been exaggerated by historians^ - indeed, the
entire interpretation of Confederate history as a struggle
for power between two races needs to be revised - but that
there was a division of interest between two sections of
opinion which steadily widened there can be no doubt?
It is important, however, to emphasise that violent
conflict was avoided until the final debates over the
acceptance of the Ormond Peace. Up to that point, the
leadership of the New Irish was accepted, however
2
reluctantly, by the rest of the country.
The differences between the two sections were more 
than political. They were also economic, social and, 
above all, religious. It is important to be clear from 
the beginning what each section stood for.
1. In criticising the Papal Nuncio for conceiving the two 
parties in terms of black and white, a contemporary 
writer suggested that some of the Old Irish were aligned 
with the Ormondists v/hile some of the New Irish desired 
better terms for their religion than the Ormondists 
were prepared to fight for. In any case, neither the 
Old Irish nor the Clergy sought complete separation 
from England; they simply v/anted honourable terms.
He also questioned Rinuccini’s wholesale consignment 
of the regulars to the Ormondist camp. Com.Rin. , //,
After a close inquiry into the background of the personnel 
at Kilkenny Pr. Donal P. Cregan concluded that the 
difference between the Ormondists and the rest was 
geographical rather than social or historical ( The 
Confederation of Kilkenny; its organisation, personnel 
and history -unpublished thesis in the office of the 
National University of Ireland)
2. At the risk of over-simplification it could be argued that 
it was the Papal Nuncio, Rinuccini, who arrived in Ireland 
in October, 1646, who brought the conflict to a head.
See below p. FA
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The Old or Native Irish, especially those affected
by the plantations in Ulster, and the rank and file of
the Clergy, who sprang generally from the same population,
were as much opposed to compromise as the Irish Protestants,
although they at least based their stand on an intelligent
appreciation of their immediate prospects. At first,
they did not command the unqualified support of the
bishops, at least half of whom by birth and inclination
tended to identify themselves with the gentry of the Pale?
Wcien, however,the Pope so far committed himself as to send
an agent to Kilkenny, and when it also became apparent
that most gentlemen of the Pale were primarily concerned
to safeguard their own interests rather than to enhance
the Church's authority, nearly all the bishops joined their
side. Habit proved too strong for the regulars, however,
most of v/hom continued to associate with the great houses
as they had done since their monasteries and abbeys had 
2
been closed.
The towns welcomed the restoration of the autonomy 
they had enjoyed before 1603, and either sided with the
1. According to Rinuccini the bishops disliked having to 
pay for the war and were reluctant to revert to the 
use of their full regalia which complete freedom of 
religion v/ould entail, also because of the expense. 
Com.Rin.,II, p.17. He may have been unfair in attributing 
such-self-interest to them; after all, they had set 
aside two-thirds of their revenues for the war.
2. The Franciscan MSS, , preserved at the Franc is an
House of Studies, Kilfcfnifty, near Dublin, contain many
references to the disputes between the regular and 
secular clergy.
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Old Irish from the outset or later came to do so.
Certainly, when the decisive split occurred in 1646
1
they stood solidly behind the Papal Nuncio.
This group of interests must have numbered at least
80^ of the total population. Nevertheless, they were
not very powerful until 1646, when they emerged as a
clearly-defined party under the name of the "Nuncioists"
or the "Nuncio's" party, a description which was more
accurate than either ‘*01d" or ‘'Native" Irish. In
general, this group wa%very uneasy about dealing with
Charles at all, because of his well-known inconstancy.
They felt that, even if he sincerely wished to grant
their requests, the hostility of the Protestants would
prevent him from fulfilling^any contract when it came
to the point. In this sense, victory for the Royalists
would be only one degree preferable to victory for
2
Parliament. Unlike the papal ambassadors, they shrank 
from pursuing this line of thought to its logical 
conclusion - that they should seize absolute power in 
Ireland while they had the opportunity and arm themselves 
to the teeth so that, no matter who emerged victorious
1. See below pf.
2. Scarampi, arrived in Ireland in 1643, and Rinuccini.
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in England, they would be able to defend their country. 
Nevertheless, in practice, they were so strongly opposed 
to the sort of propositions that the King could be 
reasonably expected to consider, that they might as well 
have done so.
The New Irish, or Anglo-Irish, as they are soBietimes 
described, existed as a close-knit pressure group almost 
from the beginning, a fact which partly accounts for their 
political supremacy during the first four years. They, 
too, were to be given a more accurate label in 1646, that 
of 'Ormondists' or the 'Ormond Party'. At first, they 
demanded of the King the restoration of the Clergy's property 
and jurisdiction and of the political independence their 
ancestors had enjoyed before^ the accession of Henry VIII.
Hut, as the King's position in England deteriorated, so 
they steadily reduced their terms until, eventually, 
they would have settled for the privilege of private 
worship and security of tenure and a promise that the 
Church would be taken care of when his authority had 
been fully restored.
Their reluctance not to press the King for terms he
dare not offer openly, because of the opposition of his
followers, was not inspired by quixotism. Though English
government policy during the previous sixty years had
aroused in them fears for religion as deep as in the
Old Irish, they had also had less worthy cause for disquiet.
34
Above all, they had resented the way in which upstarts
from England were enabled to make fortunes at the expense
of their own formerly privileged economic status? They
wished to undo the effects of this policy. This entailed
helping the King to defeat the English Parliament without,
as a corollary, having to share power with the rest of
the Irish, including the Clergy, for whom, generally,
2
they had nothing but contempt.
Even if they had not been concerned to regain 
exclusive privileges for themselves, they would still 
have required to keep the majority of Irishmen depressed 
and to prevent the Church from becoming too powerful, in 
order to safeguard their property. A great number of 
them, including such prominent figures as Bellings,
1. Cf. a typical comment: "The Earl of Corke reputed 
worth 20,000£ a year in 1641; tho' not worth 100£ 
when he went to Ireland". 'Plunket-Dunne ME.', 
Carte's Abstract, p.675.
2. The social factor played a large part in shaping 
their attitude. Consider this nasty comment;
"These clergy were poor creatures, few of extraction 
of Cent., and coming to the possession of wealth 
forgot their former condition of nullity. They 
presently took upon themselves to be councillors 
in state affairs, none more saucily impudent and 
abusive than those upstarts ..." ibid., pp.777-8.
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Pennell, Bagnall and the Earl of Gastlehaven? had come 
by church lands within the past sixty years and were 
afraid of having to surrender them? Over all hung the 
threat that the native Irish would overwhelm them by 
sheer weight of numbers, destroy them as a social caste, 
and deprive them of all their lands, which some people 
still claimed had been wrongfully annexed as far back as 
the thirteenth century.
V'/hen the width of the gap between the two parties at 
Kilkenny is revealed, it is remarkable that they managed 
to preserve an appearance of unity for so long. Not 
that even the appearance lasted beyond the first lull in 
the fighting in so far as relations with the men of Ulster 
were concerned. Rory 0 'More, the brain behind the revolt, 
was not given office and disappeared from the political 
scene. And, from the moment of his return to Ireland,
1. Castlehaven is a good example of the men in this position, 
As late as 1606 his grandfather had been granted the 
former monastery of Connell, co. Kildare, the former 
monastery of St. Erinus, alias Rosglas, co. Kildare,
the preceptory of Clonmel, co. Tipperary, the former 
Carmelite monastery of leighlinbridge, co. Carlow, the 
former priory of Rosecarbery, co. Cork, etc. Memoirs, 
xii-xiii.
2. This fear may well explain their increased anxiety to 
reach agreement after the appointment of a Papal Nuncio 
had been announced. Rinuccini himself stated that 
they had spread the report that he had come to restore 
Ireland to the Holy See; The Embassy in Ireland of 
Monsignor G-.B. Rinuccini, trans. from the Italian by
A. Hutton. Dublin, 1875-p.l34. It did not occur to 
him that they may have genuinely believed this to be • 
the object of his mission.
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Owen Roe O'Neill, the one general with the qualities of
leadership and the skill which might have made the
Confederates militarily the masters of the country, was
cold-shouldered by the New Irish.
Thus, hampered by the necessity of appearing to consult
the shortsighted opinions of his own supporters, the King
had to negotiate with a body which was seriously split.
Moreover, correspondence had to be channelled, officially
at least, through the Privy Council in Dublin, through the
hands, that is, of Irish Protestants who were among the
q
most obdurate opponents of compromise. The prospect
would have been hopeless if he had not been able to
entrust the actual conduct of negotiations to the Marquis
of Ormond who at least saw the necessity of coming to some
sort of agreement. Prom first to last, Ormond was the
key figure in the official relations between Charles and
the Confederacy. It is essential, therefore, to know
what kind of man he was.
According to one point of view, expressed by Professor
2
T. Coonan in a recently-published work, he was a second-rate
1. This was especially true during the early stages of the 
negotiations. Cf. Charles to Ormond, Peb. S, 1643: . 
"I finde ... that the justices intends to desyre of mee
some stop of(%bcecution of that commission (a truce 
with the Confederacy); and I know that I need not bid 
youKrhe concurrance of my protestant subjects in that 
desyre." Carte, V, p.4.
2. The Irish Catholic Confederacy and the Puritan 
R evolution, Dublin, 1954.
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statesman, conceited, lacking in originality, and a petty 
conspirator. He deliberately ignored or destroyed the 
King's commands whenever he disagreed with them; he never 
had any intention of yielding to Confederate wishes and 
indeed schemed persistently to bring about the disintegration 
of the Confederate government? Professor Coonan draws the 
material for his sketch of Ormond almost entirely from Old 
Irish apologists. Naturally, they could scarcely be 
expected to see eye to eye with Ormond\s policy. It is, 
however, one thing for partisans to condemn him and all 
his works because he was neither a Catholic nor a 
Confederate sympathiser, and another for a modern historian
1. Ibid.,pp.54-6.
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to accept their word that he was both dishonest and 
self-seeking?
Unfavourable estimates of Ormond conflict with the 
concensus of contemporary opinion, with the portrait of 
a superb nobleman painted in the eighteenth century by 
Carte, his biographer and panegyrist, with the frequently- 
expressed opinion of Nicholas, and above all the high 
regard of Clarendon. The bulk of his contemporaries 
may have exaggerated his qualities, but it is hardly 
likely that they were all wrong. Fortunately, it is 
not necessary to depict Ormond either as a knave or as
1. The source of most of the adverse comments on Ormond's 
character and ability usually turns out to be either the 
author of the Aphorismical,Discovery., or the Papal Nuncio, 
Rinuccini. Neither could be described as impartial.
Nor could Bishop French, who attacked Ormond's record 
in a post-Restoration pamphlet with the unconsciously 
8elf-revealing title of The Unkind Deserter (op.cit.).
The bitterness of Bishop French was largely due to his 
sense of having been betrayed by Ormond, for he, like 
many others, had considered him in the last analysis a 
fellew-Irishmen and had been cruelly disillusioned when 
after many years he discovered otherv/ise. He had, 
however, deceived himself; Ormond had frequently made 
his position perfectly clear.
The sort of misjudgement likely to result from blaming 
Ormond for not being what he did not claim to be was well 
illustrated by the author of the Aphorismical Discovery. 
In one passage, pp.21-2, he described Ormond as stealing 
away to Dublin when the rising began - incidentally like 
a coward leaving his wife and children behind at Kilkenny 
even though he had frequently informed the rebels he 
would throw in his lot with them. Nowhere is there any 
evidence to corroborate this statement, unless, that is, 
the author was referring to the earlier plan to seize 
Dublin Castle which was a very different story. As for 
his going to Dublin, it only appears in a bad light if 
his main attachment were reckoned to be to the Irish and 
to the Catholic Church.
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a nonpareil to account for his beliefs and the policy which 
he pursued. Three factors influenced him throughout his 
dealings with the Confederacy: his sincere attachment to
Protestantism; his English outlook; and his desire to 
protect his property.
Orphaned when young, Ormond had been brought up as 
a strict Protestant under the personal guidance of Archbishop 
Abbott. A convinced Protestant he always remained.
According to Rinuccini there were two doctrines of the Catholic 
Church to which he found it impossible to subscribe, namely, 
the presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the authority of 
the Pope? For his own part, Ormond reminded George Digby 
in 1647, when his own and the King’s position could scarcely 
have been more desperate, that there were certain concessions 
to Catholicism which he could never support:
"yet I hould it not amis to remember you, that it is 
in what concearnes any concessions that may seerne to 
perpetuate to the Roman catholiques either Churches 
or church-livings, or that may essentially take from 
ours, or give to their cleargy ec/jJlesiasticaU 
jurisdiction."
Even without referring to specific statements of this kind, 
it is possible to detect a note of almost Puritan antipathy 
in all his comments on the Roman Church and its clergy.
1. Embassy, p.136.
2. Carte, VI, p.485.
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A second and equally important effect of Ormond’s 
early upbringing was his conviction that what was good 
for England must be good for Ireland. This was in turn 
coloured by that condescension which the English aristocracy 
showed in treating with a subject nation. Certainly his 
English outlook prevented him from identifying himself with 
the emotional attitudes and aspirations of the Irish, and 
from conceding that they had any prima facie grounds for 
desiring independence. Thus, the apparent Confederate 
threat in 1646 to sever connexions with England was so 
hateful to him that when confronted with a choice between 
surrendering Dublin either to the English Parliament, or 
to the Confederacy he chose to surrender to Parliament.
It is also significant that he gave more credence to the 
frequently-circulated rumours that Ireland was to be 
offered to the Pope or Spain than their provenance warranted?
The third main factor influencing Ormond was his
anxiety to preserve his Irish estates. While in this
2
respect he displayed some of the self-seeking with which
1. Cf. "That which ... made a deep impression on the Marquis
was the knowledge, that there had been, from the beginning 
of those treaties, a design in the principal contrivers 
of them entirely to alienate the Kingdom of Ireland from 
the Crown of England; ... and to put themselves into the 
protection of some foreigh prince, if they could find it 
impossible to ercect some of the old families."
Clarendon, Historical View, p.1068.
2. In reading the correspondence between Ormond and his agent, 
Edward Comerford, the impression is formed that he was too 
much concerned with his revenues, his fine wines and his
cloths, in view of the wretched condition of the Dublin, 
population; Ormonde MSS., National Library of Ireland.
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his critics charged him, paradoxically he was tied by it 
to the King’s Irish policy, the very policy which they 
accused him of deliberately wrecking. In a private letter 
which he wrote to his financial agent, Edward Comerford, 
on April 6th, 1644, there occurred this remarkable passage:
II I had rather sufer temporary losse than want 
such suplys as may inable mee to proceeds in the Kings 
businesse, upon the good successe whereof depends 
(now more aparantly than ever) my life fortune and 
the subsistence of my house, the pretended Par . at 
London haveing impeached mee of high treason con- 
cludeing (&c as they alreadge adviseing) the cessation 
here... this way of impeachment I have not heard they 
hgge proceeded in against any but the Queene & mee, 
w . showes their intention to my destruction & 
therefore engages mee to put all my strength to 
advaunce his Maj service (wherein consists my owns 
& this Kingdomes preservation if the great councell 
would soe beleeve it) & that if otherwise it may not 
be at my owne charge."1
Thus, if it was plain to his critics, it was also plain to
Ormond, that for his own sake if for no other reason, he
must try to reach a settlement in Ireland on the King’s
behalf.
In retrospect, it is,even so, possible to see that 
Ormond’s convictions were always likely to stand in the way 
of a compromise between the King and the Confederacy, that 
his reluctance to make concessions to the Catholic Church 
would outweigh his sincere desire to help the King, but 
this was not obvious at the time to the King or to the
1. Ibid., Mar.25 - Aug.l, 1644, pp.14-7.
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Confederate leaders. On the contrary, Ormond seemed 
uniquely fitted to be the King’s representative. His 
own brothers and sisters were Catholics, he belonged to 
the Anglo-Irish nobility; he had a splendid physical 
appearance and great charm of manner^; he was conscientious, 
apparently straightforward, and universally respected even 
by the Parliamentarians and the Scots. He was on good 
terms both with the King’s ministers and with the leading 
Confederates, which could be said of no-one else except 
perhaps the Earl of Clanrickard - indeed, his relations with
several of the Confederates remained so intimate as to
2 3
arouse suspicion. On more than one occasion, Pr. Pennell
seems to have arranged mortgages on his behalf, while his
own agent, Comerford, who continued to act for him, was
1. Even Rinuccini admitted that his manner was charming 
and courteous; Embassy, p.135.
2. To some extent the closeness of these relations was
inevitable. Pr. Pennell had been his personal 
physician, Patrick Parcy, his legal adviser; Viscount 
Mountgarret was his great uncle, the Earl of Muskerry, 
his brother-in-law. Moreover, the Butler estates 
were scattered around Kilkenny and for most of the time 
he was allowed to go on drawing rents from them 
(certainly after the first Cessation) through the good 
offices of his old friends.
3. Pennell was given a particularly sly and sycophantic 
character by the Old Irish. On one occasion he was 
supposed to have sent a report of proceedings at 
Kilkenny in cypher to Ormondj AphorPisc., p.40
43.
also acting for a long period as financial agent for the 
q
Confederates. Finally, Ormond himself recognised that 
he alone could preserve the Royalist position.
On the surface, Ormond brought to his task yet
another quality, a remarkable imperturbaj^ity. In fact,
this imperturb^ity concealed some major flaws : he
lacked deep feelings and inspiration. Moreover, for all
his poise and flair for leadership, he was incapable of
shaping policy. Certainly his approach to the negotiations
could only be described as negative. When the King
commanded him to continue negotiations in 1644 after the
Oxford Conference had ended inconclusively^he accepted
the duty without enthusiasm. What was the hope, he asked
that he could succeed in Ireland, where feelings
were so inflamed, when the King had failed in the more
2
favourable climate of England? Even so, when all the 
various facets of Ormond’s character are considered, 
there seems little foundation for the view of detractors
that he not only pursued the negotiations in a dilatory 
fashion but stealthily contrived to wreck them. V/hatever 
his faults, he was a man of principle.
1. Ormonde MSS., N.L.I. Much of this correspondence 
consists of letters between Ormond and Comerford.
2. Carte, VI, pp. 154-5.
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Besides Ormond, another person played a prominent 
part in the relations with the Confederacy, This was 
Ulick Bourk, Earl of Clanricjprd, a Catholic and a Royalist, 
with extensive estates both in England and Ireland, and 
brother to the Parliamentarian general, the Earl of Essex. 
These associations fitted him admirably for the part of 
intermediary between Dublin and Kilkenny v/hich he con­
ceived it his duty to play. Thus, he rejected numerous 
overtures from the Confederates inviting him to take the 
oath of association? At the same time, while sedulously 
placing himself under the orders of the government in Dublin, 
he somehow managed to convey the impression that he occupied 
an independent position. The measure of his skill at 
remaining uncommitted was revealed in 1646 when it was 
hoped to make him commander-in-chief of the Confederate 
armies.
Clanricj^rd desired that the Confederates should 
renew their allegiance to the King, but he saw, as Ormond 
did not, that their demands for religion were legitimate.
He kept up a voluminous correspondence with his many
1. At the outset his defence of the Royalist interest in 
Connaught brought him into verbal conflict with the 
Confederacy, but once a truce had been arranged the 
sincerity of his convictions was recognised and he was 
accepted as a genuine mediator.
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friends in both camps and so was uncommonly well-informed, 
using his knowledge to impress his opinions on both sides. 
Ormond regarded him as indispensable, invited him to 
attend all negotiations, and when in difficulties, 
requested his assistance and advice. There is no 
doubt that the existence of a go-between of this calibre, 
supported by others of less note, helped to keep the royal 
cause alive in Ireland and the channels open between 
Dublin and Kilkenny.
Apart from the divided Confederates, the Royalists, 
and the few men with a foot in both camps, there were 
two other parties in Ireland to make the situation more 
complicated: Parliamentarian sympathisers, who were greatly
strengthened in 1644 when Inchiquin deserted the King and 
took most of Munster with him, and the Boots in the North 
under General Monroe . After the Confederacy and the 
Royalists had arranged a truce, in September, 1643, fighting 
still went on between the Confederacy on one side and 
the Scots and the Parliamentary enclaves scattered throughout 
the country on the other. The map was never neatly divided 
into three parts. Confederate, Protestant and Royalist. 
Besides more or less broad fronts against the Scots and 
the Royalists inside the Pale, the Confederacy had to contend 
with a number of Royalist as well as Parliamentary pockets, 
not to mention the independent commands of such grandees as 
Clanrickard and the Earl of Thomond. It was therefore
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essential that the Confederates should come to terms 
with the Royalists, so that their military strength 
could be concentrated against the Scots and the 
Parliamentarians.
Moreover, although the Scots and the Parliamentarians 
were rarely mentioned in the passages between Ormond and 
the Confederates, their activities tended to regulate the 
pace of the proceedings. For example, if the Scots 
threatened to move south, the Confederates conducted 
their negotiations with a heightened sense of urgency?
It is particularly important to notice that when Rinuccini 
led the opposition at Kilkenny to take up what seemed to 
Ormond an extreme position, the Parliamentarians became 
the key factor in the negotiations. For Ormond used the 
threat of surrendering to them as a means of bringing the 
Confederates to heel. It then became a question of 
whether or not Rinuccini would call his bluff.
And yet it would be misleading to imply that a 
sense of urgency generally informed the negotiations.
Often they seemed to be at a standstill. Progress of a 
sort was being made all the time, even so. As each 
session ended, it would be assumed that certain points 
previously disputed had now been settled once for all.
1. See below pjp-<2.3»^ >-C
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The King in particular steadily made concessions as his 
strength grew weaker, as will be seen. But two factors 
made for slowness apart from the fundamental incompatibility 
between the two sides, namely, faulty communications, 
especially between the King and Dublin Castle, and the 
inefficient policy-making machinery in use at Oxford and 
Kilkenny.
Communications in Ireland were better than in England. 
Messages between Dublin and Kilkenny usually took less than 
three days and occasionally less than one day? Delay was 
not unusual, hovæver, when, for instance, Ormond was out 
campaigning or members of the Supreme Council were dispersed 
far and wide on private or public business. But between 
Oxford and Dublin there were frequent delays and, all too 
often, letters miscarried. Maybe fewer messages went 
astray then Court officials sought to claim - it was a 
convenient excuse for having failed to reply promptly to 
letters received, or to send copies of documents that had been 
requested; George Digby, in particular, probably found 
this pretext useful. Nevertheless, for proof of the 
hazards of the route to Ireland both on land and by sea 
one has only to look at the weight of captured dociments
1. This fact is easily confirmed by examining the dates 
of receipt on the letters from Kilkenny sent to Ormond.
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q
published by Parliament. Furthermore, messengers from
Ireland had to assume that the King was at Oxford, unless
they obtained reliable information to the contrary. Very
often this meant that they reported at Oxford only to find
that he was elsewhere. All the time, too, of course,
territory was changing hands, ports were being lost, and
naval activity in the Irish Sea was increasing. The
messenger bound for Ireland had a particularly dangerous
job. Having evaded Parliamentary patrols on land, he had
to choose a port in Royalist hands, hope to find a ship,
and slip through the cordon of Parliamentary vessels which
hovered near the Irish coast and, from time to time,
2
blockaded Dublin Harbour. It was no wonder that on one 
occasion Ormond did not receive instructions in reply to
3
a request made in November until the follov/ing March.
1. There was trouble even over the choice of messengers. 
See below p A  '6,
2. To slip out of Dublin Harbour it might be necessary 
to get the captain of a Parliament ship drunkI Of. 
Ormond to Digby, Nov.7, 1644, Carte, VI, p.214.
3. On November 4th, 1644, Sir James Ware and two others 
left Dublin for England to obtain instructions from the 
King. They, were captured at sea and, as a consequence, 
Ormond did not hear from the King until March 6th.
See below *
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In an attempt to overcome the problem of communications, 
the King finally empowered Ormond to use his own discretion? 
but this concession proved almost worthless. Ormond was 
not only temperamentally incapable of showing much initiative, 
he also recognised, as indeed had the far more enterprising 
Strafford, that the powers of any subordinate under an 
absolute monarch, however irresolute, were strictly limited? 
Furthermore, no matter how loyal, Ormond could scarcely be 
expected to forget what had happened to Strafford.
After all, the fact was that on the Royalist side, 
policy could only be formally initiated by the King, - 
however susceptible he was to suggestion. This meant 
that his directives frequently travelled in the wake of 
events, particularly when they concerned Ireland.
In any case, the King’s Irish policy was ill-judged 
and ill-managed. For this there were several reasons: 
a fundamental disregard for the importance of Ireland as
1. See below pp . 14 1  3.
2. Of. "And if his majestie will have mee to shape my
course soe hefflhe, as may be most for his advantage 
in England, or least hurtful!to him; it is of 
necessity that I receive cleere instruction, else it 
is ods but that, thorough my ignorance, or by a 
suddaine change, which may be more probably foreseene 
there then heere, I shall Unwillingly fall into some 
pernitious error." Ormond to Digby, Qalr./Ç, 1644,
Carte, VI, pp.208-10. It is noteworthy that the basic 
reason given for disowning the Earl of Glamorgan in 1646 
was that the powers he claimed were too wide to be credible; 
see below p.
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such; the absence of accurate information on which to 
base plans; the manoeu-rrés for power and privilege at 
Court. Overshadowing all, was the King’s own inconsistency 
and lack of drive.
Over the centuries, the outstanding characteristic of 
Anglo-Irish relations was the essential indifference of the 
English government ; so long as Ireland was not actively 
troublesome, she could be ignored. When the Irish became 
restive, as they did from time to time, the main concern 
was to put an end to the nuisance as quickly as possible 
without thought of trying to work out a permanent solution. 
This was undoubtedly the attitude in the middle of the 
seventeenth century. It was not confined, incidentally, 
to England alone. France, Spain, and, indeed the Pope 
himself, subordinated Irish interests to their preoccupation 
with England.
Charles I himself never really cared about Ireland 
for its own sake and never really appreciated its problems. 
His overriding aim being to extricate himself from his war 
with Parliament with as little power lost and as much face 
saved as possible, Ireland was no more than a pawn in the 
game. Thus, he picked up the thread of Irish negotiations 
whenever he was particularly desperate for reinforcements, 
issued ad hoc instructions to Ormond, and hoped for the 
best. The curious thing is that he obviously saw clearly 
from time to time that Irish resources might save him and
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yet was unable to concentrate his efforts upon obtaining 
them.
The Royalist intelligence service v/as very defective. 
Consequently,Court officials were never able to understand 
what was going on in Ireland, This was bad enough but 
they made matters worse by giving rein to an incurable 
optimism. Thus, while overestimating Ormond’s powers of 
persuasion they underestimated the bitterness of the Irish 
Protestants and, without good reason, constantly assumed 
that peace was about to be made or had already been made, 
that troops were already at sea? How could the King’s 
Council possibly formulate practical policies when they 
were ignorant of essential facts?
The struggle for place' and power at Court also
adversely affected the King’s Irish policy. The letters
2
of Ormond’s correspondents were crammed v/ith details of 
the latest intrigue and of the newest arrival at Court who 
was seeking this or that favour in Ireland. All this 
need not have had serious consequences, if the King had 
ignored the intrigues and rebuffed the petitioners.
But this he could not or would not do. As already
1. See below p. for a striking example of this.
2. Particularly Arthur Trevor, Sir George Radcliff and 
the Archbishop of York.
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pointed out, if someone should present a private scheme
for extracting aid from Ireland, he would usually agree
that it should be tried out without apparently noticing that
so many such optimists were at work that there was bound to
be duplication of effort, if not sabotage of one another’s
efforts. As a result, Ormond frequently found his
policies being obstructed - even nullified - and his
position undermined by the activities of others who had
extracted promises or commissions from the King?
It is difficult to define the particular views on
Irish policy of the privy councillors. A few at least
were definitely hostile to the Confederacy, notably Hyde 
Co \Q,y»e,\?'peî;'
and 4^0ttihg%on. What is quite certain is that all the
councillors, with the possible exception of Digby, hesitated
to endorse any major concessions to the Confederates for
the very good reason that they did not wish to see their
2endorsement placed indelibly on record.
1. See below Chapter VI , pp Even more 
vexatious from Ormond’s point of view was the interference, 
as it appeared to him, of Henrietta Maria from Paris.
See below p.
2. See below pj&. Ill -
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On the Confederate side, the formulation of policy
was also cumbrous. Ultimate sovereignty resided in the
General Assembly which consisted of elected representatives^
and which, when in session, functioned as the executive as
well as the legislature. But even though appointed by
the General Assembly, it was the Supreme Council which
tended to be the effective authority. The C o u n c i l
normally had twenty-four members elected on the basis of
3six for each Province. Any 12 councillors were to be 
always resident at Kilkenny or in a b o d y  at some other 
place if they should find it convenient. A quorum was 
to be nine and a minimum of seven votes was required to 
legalise any resolution. The President was to be 
nominated by the Assembly and was to be one of the twelve 
residents. In the event of his death or i n c a p a c i t y  the 
other residents were to elect his successor.
1. About 500 altogether. The peers (27 Anglo-Irish,
7 Old Irish and the Earl of Castlehaven) and commoners 
sat together after the first Assembly.
2. There were nine G e n e r a l  Assemblies, the dates of which 
have been worked out by Pr. D.P. Cregan, op.cit., a s  follows:
i. October 24 - November 21, 1642. 
li. May 20 - June 18-9, 1643. 
iii. November 7 (approx.) - December 1, 1643.
iv. July 20 - August 31, 1644.
V. May 15 - a d j o u r n e d  July 5 - r e - a s s e m b l e d  August 27 - 
dissolved after August 31, 1645. 
vi. February 7 (approx.) - March 4, 1646.
vii. January 10 - April 3 or 4, 1647.
viii. N o v e m b e r  12 - December 24, 1647. 
ix. September 4 - January 17, 1648-49.
3. Castlehaven claimed that he was made an additional 
member. Memoirs; p.33.
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Though not granted plenary powers the Supreme Council 
exercised virtually absolute authority during the long 
recesses between one Assembly and the next. Moreover, 
according to Rinuccini, the Papal Nuncio, the Council 
was early given sole power to conduct peace negotiations^ 
Jiven without the superior knowledge and political experience 
ite-mombors gained from continuity, it would have been
In a«y
powerful^ because of the high quality of its members.
Only the coming of the Papal Nuncio in 1646 changed the 
situation, for he tried with some success to stimulate a 
majority in the Assembly to use its latent powers to 
v/eaken the Council.
However, issues connected with peace and war were 
always dealt with by the Assembly in the first instance.
So much so, that most Assemblies were apparently summoned 
for the express purpose of debating whether to start
2
negotiations or to resume negotiations already begun.
The Assembly also claimed the power to appoint the 
commissioners who were to conduct negotiations, as well
1. Embassy, p.128.
2. In spite of this, each Assembly seems to have determined 
on the opening date of the next one at the end of its final 
session. But the agreed opening dates were rarely observed 
and they seem to have been chosen in any case in the light 
of the estimated duration of the next phase of negotiations.
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as a sub-committee, known as the Committee of Instructions} 
whose function seems to have been to give the commissioners 
their original orders and to act as a kind of reserve 
court to which the commissioners could refer back in case 
of doubt. Even so, it must be emphasised that although 
it was the Assembly which resolved to set negotiations 
in motion, it could only give the broadest indication 
of the lines they were to follow. Moreover, while on 
one occasion at least the commissioners were empowered 
to make peace under a specific restriction, in general 
they were given plenary powers. Thus, like the Supreme 
Council, the commissioners came to have virtually 
independent authority.
The Clergy were represented both in the General 
Assembly and the Supreme Council. In the first Council, 
for instance, there were two archbishops and three bishops. 
But they also exercised influence through the ecclesiastical 
congregations which came to meet regularly at the same 
time as the Assembly. Presumably this practice was at 
first adopted for sound administrative reasons. Many 
members of the General Assembly, elected in the ordinary
1."They (the General Assembly) appointed others for 
preparing instructions for those that were to treat, whom 
they named commissioners of instruction." Bp. French, 
op.cit., p.42.
2. See below p.2^7
3. There were thirty dioceses all told, reflecting a 
fairly even balance between Old and New Irish.
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way, were also members of Congregation and they were 
thereby saved one journey. It was also obviously very 
convenient that the Assembly should be able quickly to 
ascertain clerical opinion in matters pertaining to the 
Church. From the coming of the Papal Nuncio, however, 
Congregation became a powerful pressure group, its 
influence reaching a climax in the weeks and months 
following the publication of the first Ormond Peace on 
July 31st, 1646.
It must be emphasised that until 1646 the leading 
members of all three bodies^ except Congregation, were 
one and the same and that almost all reflected the views 
of the New Irish. The situation lent itself to this 
narrow concentration of power, for only a few men had the wit 
and the necessary political experience to control the govern­
ment . It is no wonder that former members of the Irish 
House of Commons and men educated at the Inns of Court 
preponderated. During Rinuccini’s short-lived sway there 
was still oligarchal rule; only the political standpoint 
had altered.
The identity of view held by the ruling clique at 
Kilkenny ought to have made the formulation of policy both 
easy and rapid. But for several reasons it did not do 
so. In the first place, the Supreme Council was too 
unwieldy for decisive action even allowing for a high
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rate of absenteeism. Moreover, if Rinuccini was right,
by 1646 its membership had swelled to 40 through the addition
of supernumeraries from among the peace commissioners who
had represented the Confederacy at Dublin and Oxford]-
Secondly, in spite of their actual power, the New Irish
were afraid to arouse the latent strength of the Old Irish
and the antagonism of the Clergy. In consequence, they
devoted a great deal of time to justifying their policies
with more or less convincing argument. Time was also
lost in voting; every decision had to be approved by the
requisite majority; all trivial as well as weighty matters
2
were considered. Thirdly, they were essentially amateur 
politicians with a pronounced tendency to confuse the cut 
and thrust of intellectual debate with practical action.
So far as can be judged from reports of public debates, 
from contemporary pamphlets and from the records of their 
interminable discussions with Ormond, they admired oratory 
and savoured a nicely-rounded argument for its own sake. 
Fourthly, as the Supreme Councillors and the Commissioners 
of Peace obviously had private as well as public interests,
1. About February 19th, 1646, the General Assembly ruled 
that the Supreme Council be reduced to eight members; Com. 
Rin., II, p.149.
2. Embassy, p.133.
3. This could be a serious under-estimation of their 
political skill for it is possible that habitually and 
deliberately^^couraged delay as a device to keep the 
negotiations/'going.
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they were often widely dispersed. This might not have 
been serious had the rule stipulating that 12 Councillors 
be resident always in the same place been strictly observed 
As it was, much time was often wasted in re-assembling the 
members. Fifthly, just as the King was preoccupied with 
many urgent problems other than obtaining aid from Ireland, 
so the Confederacy was concerned with other matters besides 
the negotiations with Ormond. For example, many hours of 
debate as well as much spleen were spent on resolving the 
rival claims of the Earls of Antrim and Castlehaven to 
supreme command of the army} And, lastly, v/hile the 
Commissioners of Peace enjoyed plenary powers, these would 
appear to have been assumed defunct whenever negotiations 
were formally adjourned. After each adjournment, a new 
General Assembly had to be summoned with concomitant 
delay.
One other aspect of the negotiations between 
Charles I and the Confederacy, which calls for particular 
attention, is the fact that they were not confined to 
Ireland alone. After taking up residence in France in 
the autumn of 1644 Henrietta Maria made spasmodic efforts 
to force them to a conclusion, exerting both direct and 
indirect pressure. She also tried on two occasions to
l.See below p.i
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arrange a settlement with, the Papacy in which the 
interests of the Irish and English Catholics were 
treated as though they were inseparable - over the 
heads of both Ormond and the Supreme Council. The 
part played in the negotiations by the two popes whose 
pontificates coincided with this period was in any case 
very impoitant.
CHAPTER III 
Events Leading up to the Cessation.
The first overtures came from the Confederacy.
Within two months of the outbreak of the Rebellion, 
some time before the Confederacy as such had been 
established, the gentlemen of the Pale prepared an 
address to the King in which they swore to lay down their
arms as soon as their grievances had been redressed}
2
They chose It.Col. Reade, who was not Irish, and who had 
some kind of reputation as a servant of the King, to 
convey the address to England together with a letter to
4
the Queen pleading for her intercession. Reade went
5
first to Dublin where he was arrested by order of the
1. Carte, V, pp.272-6; Gilbert, II, pp.236-40.
2. In A Light to the Blind he is described as English, p.81; 
Bellings has him a Scot, Gilbert, I, p.78.
3. See A Light to the Blind, p.81: "a sworn servant to his 
Maiesty Charles the first". He had witnessed the events 
leading up to the rising and was thus considered to be a 
suitable person to send to the King. Besides, no one 
would molest the King's servant.
4. Carte, V, p.277.
5. According to Bellings' account, Gilbert, I, pp.78-9, 
Reade was given a message for the Lords Justices which was 
not really serious. His true purpose was to get into 
Dublin as an unsuspected person and then to look out for
a favourable opportunity to slip away to England. Un­
fortunately, the Lords Justices found out what he intended 
to do.
According to his ov/n story, Reade wrote to the Lords
Justices requesting a pass into England. They invited
him to Dublin for a conference and, on his arrival,
promptly had him arrested. He was tortured on the rack 
despite his protestations that he bore a message to the
King: cf. The King to Ormond on Sir John Reade's behalf,
Jan. 22, 1645, Carte, VI, pp.235-6.
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Lords Justices, imprisoned and tortured on the rack.
It is not clear whether the Lords Justices took this
action because they genuinely regarded Reade as a. rebel
engaged in trickery or because they knew he was bound
for England and why, and wished to detain him. Naturally,
it appeared to his sponsors of the Pale as a deliberately
1
provocative act. But if it were intended to deter them 
from further approaches, it failed of its object. They
tried again through Clanrickard who wrote to Ormond asking
2 3if a tft^ ee could be arranged; and also through Castlehaven.
The Lords Justices refused}
The first major approach was made in the name of all
those who had rebelled. The first General Assembly,
1. There seems little doubt that it was, but the suggestion 
that the Lords Justices put to Reade the tendentious 
question, "whether the King and Queen had not a hand in 
the Ulster Insurrection", may perhaps be discounted;
'A Light to the Blind, p.82; Plunket-Dunne MS., p.487; 
the story is also supported by Bellings, Gilbert, I, p.79.
2. Carte, V, p.314.
3. A Light to the Blind, p.94; Gilbert, I, pp.302-2.
Various other petitions were made between November, 1641, 
and July, 1642, both by individuals and groups among the 
Irish Catholics. The Lords Justices found a simple way 
of nullifying them - they referred them to Lord Leicester 
in England and he was of course powerless to act without 
Parliament's approval even if he had a mind to do so. 
Borlase mentioned a number of petitions referred to 
Leicester in this way. E. Borlase, History of the 
Execrable Irish Rebellion, London, 1680.
4. Cf. their letter to Castlehaven, March 24, 1642,
Gilbert, I, p.304.
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convened in July, 1642, drev/ up a petition to the King
in which they complained of the difficulty the Irish had
experienced in appealing to him through the malicious
intervention of the Council in Dublin, recounted their
grievances, requested an opportunity to state their position
and pleaded for a cessation of hostilities. As they did
not trust the Lords Justices to convey the petition to the
King, they sent it to Ormond who received it on August 6th
and placed it before the Lords Justices and Council}
Parsons and Borlase reacted as they had feared.
In fact, this new development alarmed and annoyed the
Lords Justices, since a reconciliation between the King
and the Catholics would put an end to their scheme for
turning Ireland into one vast plantation. Thus, although
the whole Council resolved to send the petition to the King,
they were so long in taking action that Ormond himself
2
transmitted a copy on August 13th. Eventually the Lords 
Justices, afraid that the King might hear from some other 
source, sent a copy of the petition in October, along with
?
the advice that he should refuse to listen to the petitioners. 
With the war against the English Parliament now on his
1. Ibid., II, pp.48-50; Carte, V, pp.352-3.
2. Ttoii., n . % 9 . Ibid., U.
3. Cx,^ >"V'e., \ , Ip Tlotd., I» Yes'.
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hands, the King was not inclined to let slip the occasion
for easing the military situation in Ireland. In any case,
he discounted the opinions of the Lords Justices, being
perfectly aware that they were in collusion with his enemies.
His reply to their letter, therefore, took the form of a
reprimand to the effect that it was improper to send him
a mere copy of the petition, and he demanded the original}
2
This was despatched on October 12th.
Meanwhile, so much delay meant that the recently
5
elected Supreme Council at Kilkenny had heard nothing, 
and it might have been expected that through pride they 
would refrain from a further approach. Instead, at the 
end of October, they met again and drafted a second petition 
along roughly the same lines as the first, with the addition 
of a specific plea for freedom to practice their religion 
in peace and for equality v/ith the rest of the King's 
subjects. They added the significant rider that their 
forces would be available to support the King's cause if
1. -Carto ; I ) . Xb;c\.
2 . Of. the endorsement on the copy of the petition retained 
by the Council, Gilbert, II, p.50. For some reason Bagwell 
declared that the King ignored this document and only 
responded to the second petition of the Confederates 
presented at the end of October; Ireland under the Stuarts, 
3 vols., 19o7-16, II, p.4-6.
3 . Nov.il - May 7, 1643. This Council consisted of 5 
spiritual peers, Armagh, Dublin and Tuamf, the bishop of 
Clonfert and the bishop-elect of Down and Connor, 4 temporal 
peers, Gormanston, Mountgarret, Roche of Fermoy, and Mayo, 
and fifteen commoners, mostly eminent lawjrers; of. Gilbert, 
II, pp.85-6.
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their petition should be favourably heard} At the same
time, they prepared an address to the Queen asking her to
2
intercede with the King on their behalf. This time, 
both petition and address were rapidly conveyed to the 
King's headquarters.
Charles had nothing to lose at this stage in 
consenting to let the Confederates come forward with their 
grievances. He intended to make no concession of any 
substance while he might hope to gain the release of
3
Ormond's forces from the Irish theatre of operations,
4
and, possibly, the support of the Catholic army itself.
To the likely complaint of his Protestant adherents that 
he was pandering to the rebels he could reply that it would 
be less than his bounden duty to listen to their petition 
since they might wish to make amends for the wrongs which 
they had done. As usual, without reasonable grounds, he
1. Carte, V, pp.368-70; Gilbert II, pp.129-32.
2. Carte, V, pp.371-2; Gilbert, II, pp.132-3.
3. The King's anxiety to hasten a settlement in Ireland 
so that troops might be released for service in England 
was shown in several letters sent to Ormond, viz., Feb.2, 
Feb.8, Feb.22, March 23, March 31, Carte, V, pp.3-5.
4. Cf. Gilbert (Bellings), I, pp.119-20. It is plain 
that some of the Confederates could anticipate the King's 
own appreciation of his position.
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assumed that peace could be easily arranged - "my commands
... arÿ very leasable"} Accordingly, he issued a commission
under the Great Seal to Ormond, Clanrickard and several
others, including Sir Thomas Bourke, instructing any three
of them to meet the principal members of the Supreme Council
and receive from them in v/riting whatever they wished to say,
2
the document to be immediately transmitted to himself.
The Commission, together with two explanatory letters, one 
to Ormond, the other to’ the Lords Justices, was given to 
Sir Thomas Bourke to convey to Ireland, but contrary winds 
delayed his ship and he did not appear in Lublin until 
January 30th.
The covering letter to Ormond consisted of a description 
of the requests likely to be made by the rebels together
A
with instructions as to how to deal with them. First, 
Charles predicted, the rebels would ask for the repeal 
of the penal laws. To this, in no circumstances, could 
he consent; the laws were not harsh and he could do no 
more than condone the same laxity in their enforcement 
which had prevailed in the reigns of his predecessors and 
in his own reign prior to the rebellion. Secondly, they
1. Carte, V, p.4.
2. Ibid., V, pp.380-1; Gilbert, II, pp.139-40.
3. Ibid., p.140; Carte, V, pp.l - 3.
4. Oxford, January 12, 1643, C-. Petrie, The Letters of 
King Charles I , London, 1935, pp.132-4.
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would wish to be immune from the legislation of the 
English parliament and not bound to observe statutes 
passed in England until they had been confirmed by the 
Irish parliament. It should be .emphasised that this 
had always been the practice until the present English 
parliament had chosen to ignore it. Nevertheless, in 
the acknowledgement of these legislative rights, there 
was to be no suggestion that a privilege was being granted 
for the first time. Further, they would desire the repeal 
of FoyningÉ Lav/, but to this he could not consent, one 
reason being that more dangerous consequences might follow 
from it than at first sight appeared. Nor could he welcome 
another likely proposal, namely that they should be restored 
to the plantation lands, of which they had been allegedly 
wrongfully dispossessed, though he was prepared to abandon 
the projects relating to Connaught and Clare formulated 
in 1641 and to consider the possibility of referring to 
arbitration the question of ownership in the few plantations 
made in several parts of Ireland during his reign. Finally, 
he thought that they might want to be governed by Ministers 
of State and officers who were Irish, In general, this 
was out of the question, but there would be little harm in 
allowing the Irish to fill some subordinate posts, as these 
could easily be kept under surveillance. In short, though 
he did not explicitly say so, he was disinclined to concede 
any liberty that he had not tacitly allowed at the
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beginning of his reign.
Along with the Commission, Bourke carried a letter
for the Lords Justices requesting that they should do all
in their power to make a success of the impending meeting}
This was the last thing they were willing to do and their
2attitude was supported by the Committee of Parliament.
In fact, from this time forward until the end of April v/hen 
Parsons was dismissed, the struggle in Lublin between the 
friends of the Crown and the friends of Parliament was at
3
its height. In this instance, they sought to confuse 
the issue and postpone the meeting with the bupreme 
Council by casting aspersions upon the record and character 
of Bourke, and, by implication, upon the commission he had 
brought with him. Bourke happened conveniently to be a 
Catholic ; he was also a nephew of Clanrickard and one of 
those commissioned to work out a constitution for the 
confederates, and had, they charged, helped to foment
1. Gilbert, II, p.140.
2. At the end of September, the English Parliament had 
dispatched a committee to Ireland to look after its interests 
and prevent a reconciliation between the King and the 
Confederates. Quite illegally, they were allowed from the 
beginning to attend council meetings. Acting, eventually, 
on orders from the King, the Lords Justices and the board 
informed the two Parliamentary Commissioners, Robert 
Reynolds and Robert Goodwyn, that they might no longer 
attend Council meetings. The King’s order for their
was despatched on February 3, Carte, V, p.393; see 
also the report of the Commissioners themselves to the House 
of Commons, R.I.A. Tracts, Box 26, Tract 35, V.30.
3. Earlier in January, the Lords Justices had given 
instructions to their forces to go to Wicklow and Kildare 
and to "kill all rebels there, to destroy by fire and sword 
their houses and crops and rob them of their cattle".
T.C.P., IV, 137; Gilbert, II, pp.137-8.
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the Rebellion,^ The extent and viciousness of the
rumours put into circulation may be gauged from the fact
that they so affected some of the leading officers in the
army that only the intervention of Ormond himself, who
produced the commission and replied to the more sinister
reports at an assembly of the principals, forestalled the
2
spread of disaffection throughout all ranks. And even 
though the chief pretext for vilifying the commission was 
removed when Bourke ailed of a fever only a few days after 
his arrival, attempts were still made to stir up the 
animosity of the citizens of Dublin. These attempts were 
unsuccessful, not because the parliamentary party in Dublin 
had vanished, but because the King’s fortunes appeared at 
this time to be prospering. So Ormond and his fellow- 
commissioners were able to consult together and to send 
a summons promptly on February grd^ to the Supreme Council 
at Kilkenny to attend a meeting at Drogheda on the 23rd of
1. Ormond to Charles I, n.d., 1643, T.C.P., VII, pp.166-7. 
This document is out of its chronological place in the Papers
2. Ibid.; see also Ormond to Clanrickard, Feb.3, 1643, Carte, 
V, pp.390-1.
3. The Lords Justices tried in vain, in the presence of the 
Parliamentary Commissioners, to get a proposal adopted that 
the King be advised against a treaty; cf. Journal of Agent 
of English Adventurers for Irish Lands, 1642-3, Gilbert, II,
pp.189-90.
4. The summons was sent to Kilkenny within two days of the 
receipt of the King’s commission on February 1st. Ormond 
to the King, T.C.P., IV, p.218.
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the same month. The summons was directed to Mountgarret,
Gormanston, both members of the Supreme Council, and to
eight others. It was signed by Ormond, lord Moore, Sir
T. Lucas and Sir M. Eustace and accompanied by a safe-
conduct over the signatures of the Lords Justices.^
Having examined it the Confederates returned a chilly 
2
answer . For this, they can scarcely be blamed, in view 
of its contents.
Fearing the effect on discussion which the presence 
of clerics might have, Ormond had appended a proviso to the 
safe-conduct that only laymen to the number of thirty 
should be nominated to attend. Later on, he found it 
politic to play off the Ormondists against the bishops, but 
at this time he had no such motive for his action. Opposition 
to any negotiations whatsoever, skilfully stirred up by 
Parsons and others, was so widespread and so vehement that 
to have participated in a conference atteinded by represent­
atives of the Roman Church might have proved disastrous.
Thus, he felt bound to insert this restriction on his own
3initiative and begged the King to endorse it.
1. I.e.p., IV, p.200; Gilbert (Bellings), 1, pp.118-9;
Gilbert, 11, pp.155-6.
2. Gilbert (Bellings), 1, p.120; having at first made 
"Many judgements ... upon the arrival1 of this trumpetter,
and most passionately desired to what messadge he had brought."
3. Ï.C.P., Vll, pp.166-7.
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As he must have expected, the Confederates failed
to regard the difficulty in the same light. They insisted
that they knew best who should represent them and asked
for a sight of the King’s commission. In their opinion
Drogheda was neither neutral nor commodious and so
unsuitable as a meeting-place. Moreover, they could put
no trust in a safe-conduct signed'by two such notorious
enemies of themselves and their religion as Parsons and
Borlase. What particularly incensed them, however, was
an expression used in the safe-conduct, describing them as
’’actors or abettors in so odious a rebellion". They assumed
these offensive words, wrongly as it happened, to have been
maliciously inserted as a snub to them. They denied that
they were rebels and declared their intention of suspending
further correspondence until' this false imputation had been
withdrawn.^ A command was given for their reply to be
published, in order, according to Bellings, to convince
2
the Northern Irish of their firmness.
It so happened that the objectionable words had 
been taken directly from the King’s own letter. Ironically, 
the King had almost certainly included them for the special 
benefit of the Lords Justices in order to disarm any
1. The Supreme Council to the Lords Commissioners, Carte V, 
pp.401-3; Gilbert, II, pp.157-9.
2. Gilbert, I, pp.120-1.
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criticism of his opening relations with the rebels. 
Nevertheless, it was, to put a charitable view on it, 
tactless to insert such words in a safe-conduct, and 
one cannot escape the conclusion that it was a calculated 
attempt to affront the Confederates and set their faces 
against further negotiations. Ormond did not like it and 
described the safe-conduct to the King as that "w?^ the 
hordes Justices thought fit to give.
Yet a stalemate was averted. The Earl of Castlehaven 
was staying by chance at his brother’s house near Kilkenny 
when news of the frigid response to the summons reached 
him. Hastening to Kilkenny, he collected together a 
small group of the leading members of the General Assembly 
who, like himself, were anxious for a reconciliation with 
the King, and led them on a deputation to the Supreme 
Council. They represented that, since the General Assembly 
alone had the right to make resolutions on questions of 
peace and war and since a meeting with the King’s Commissioners 
must be regarded as a necessary preliminary to peace, the
Council were wrong to reject the summons on their own
initiative, despite its offensive tone. Surprisingly, 
the Council accepted this argument with little demur.
By this time, their tempers had cooled down and they were
glad of a pretext for reversing their first decision
1. T.C.P., IV, p.218.
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without loss of face. According to Bellings they had
also been privately informed that the obnoxious words
had occurred in the King’s commission}
Accordingly, though as yet no reply had come to
their letter of February 9th, the Council addressed
another note to the Commissioners, but couched in milder
terms. In this, dated February 18th, they pointed out
that there had been time enough for a messenger to return
with a reply to their first communication. They skilfully
accounted for their persistence in face of a studied insult
by allocating the blame for it to the Lords Justices:
’’who because they would countenance theire own 
bad inclinations, and seconde theire many 
professions to destroy us roote and branch, 
would involve the Kingdome in a warre on both sides 
destructive to his Katies interests. ’’
They insisted on their loyalty and insinuated a willingness
to give material aid to the King, Their purpose was
obviously to exert pressure on the Lords Justices by
manoeuvring them into a position where they would appear
to be frustrating the King’s intentions - as indeed they
were. It no doubt also occurred to them that they were,
in so doing, strengthening the hand of Ormond and those
1. Memoirs, pp.34-6. Castlehaven made his part in this 
transaction appear more decisive and dramatic than did 
Bellings, who described the promptings of the ad hoc 
delegation as very moderate, Gilbert, I, p.123.
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members of the Privy Council who wished to negotiate.
With regard to the arrangements for a meeting, they
repeated their demand that the ’rebel’ imputation be
erased from future communications, asked again for
another meeting place than Drogheda to be appointed,
for some other form of safe-conduct, and for a sight
of the King’s commission. But this time they tacitly
assented to the limitation of their numbers and to the
exclusion of the clergy}
The Supreme Council’s first letter came into the
hands of the royal Commissioners on February 14th and
they, too, were annoyed and undecided whether or not to
proceed further. At first they sought to shirk res-
2
ponsibility by referring the matter to the King, but 
the receipt of the Council's second letter seems to have 
given them second thoughts for they acknowledged it at 
once. There is little doubt that the Commissioners, 
while favourable to the opening of negotiations and aware 
that the Confederates had strong justification for feeling 
affronted, were inhibited by the opposition of the Lords 
Justices and forced to tread warily. The Supreme Council’s 
letter, as was intended, gave them the loophole they required.
1. Confederate Catholics to Lords Justices, T.C.P., IV, 
p^231; Gilbert, II, pp.162-3.
2. Ormond to the King, T.C.P., IV, p.218.
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So they agreed to a change of meeting-place. They 
also agreed to send at least a copy of the King’s commission, 
while pointing out that the obnoxious words had also 
occurred in the King's letter to the Lords Justices of 
January 11th, this being their actual source}
The Council’s reply to this was studiously disarming. 
They now apologised for having taken such offence, re­
affirmed their loyalty to the Crown, nominated six 
commissioners, all laymen, and proposed that the meeting 
should take place at Trim on March 17th? To this 
proposal the King’s Commissioners assented on March 1st
and the appropriate number of safe-conducts was despatched 
4on March 6th.
Shortly before March 17th Ormond led his army out 
of Lublin. At first sight ^ it would appear that he was 
deliberately absenting himself from Trim as a slight to 
the Confederate agents, but this was far from the case. 
Writing later to the King, he explained that he was forced 
to undertake this kind of operation from time to time, 
because the shortage of food in and around Lublin became
1. Gommissioners reply to the Confederate Catholics,
Feb. 18, 1643; T.C.F., IV, p.232; Gilbert, II, pp.163-4.
2. Feb.23., ibid., pp.165-7.
3. Ibid., pp. 221-2.
4. T.C.P., IV, p.262; Gilbert, II, p.222.
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so intolerable that it was necessary for the army to
live off the land} No doubt this was generally true, but
on this occasion the truth was that Ormond was reluctant to
leave the city and only did so at the instigation of the
Lords Justices who wished to keep him out of the way?
This is plain from the vigorous efforts he made to return
to Dublin without delay}
v/hile Ormond was out campaigning, the King’s
Commissioners had been receiving the Confederates’ petition,
as arranged, at Trim}
Its preamble was an ingenious statement of their
position vis-à-vis the King:
"Wee your Majestie’s most dutifull and loyall 
subjects the catholiques of your highnes kingdome 
of Ireland, being necessitated to take arms for 
the preservation of our religion, the maintenance 
of your majestie’s rights and prerogatives, the 
natural and just defence to our lives and estates, 
and the liberties of our country, have often since 
the beginning of these troubles attempted to present 
our humble complaynts unto your royall view
1. Carte, V, p.^31.
2. Order of the Lords Justices and Council, March 1, 1643.
The army must march out and live off the rebels. The tone 
of this letter was remarkable for its viciousness. T.C.P., 
IV, pp.255-6; Gilbert, 11, pp.208-10.
3. See below p. 74, Sellings, who presumably derived 
his information from Ormond himself, interpreted this 
episode as an attempt on the part of the Lords Justices 
to have Ormond replaced by Lord Lisle, who shared their 
views, Gilbert, I, pp.123-7.
4. The Confederates were represented by Viscount Gormanstown, 
the Baron of Upper Ossory, Sir Lucas Dillon, Tirlough O ’Neill, 
Sir Robert Talbot and John Walsh. T.C.P., IV, p.266;
cf. the copy of their authority, Gilbert, II, pp.224-5.
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and later on:
"... and therefore do protest, wee have beene 
therein mallitiouslie traduced to your majestie, 
having never entertained any rebellious thought 
against your majestie, your crown or dignitie; 
but allwaies have beene, and ever will continue 
your majestie’s most faithfull and loyal subjects..."
Thus, they had been ’necessitated- how carefully this
word must have been chosen - not just for the defence of
their own property and religion but in defence also of the
King’s ’rights and prerogatives’. This was the only
possible interpretation of their recent actions that they
could proclaim in public, but there is no doubt that it
was further intended as a hint to the King of a legitimate
pretext for corresponding with them. For if they asserted
that what they had done had been provoked by the Lords
Justices and others, who had deliberately persecuted and
traduced them and goaded them to arms, then the King,
as the fountain-head of justice, was bound to listen to
their grievances.
The tally of these grievances was set down at length
and with great skill, including all the abuses they had
endured since the reign of Henry VII. A sustained attack
was made on the Lords Justices, who aimed, it was said,
at the destruction of their nation and religion and
deliberately prevented them from appealing to the King.
The recent Act of Adventurers and their incapacity to
hold any office under the Crown and to educate their
children in the uhiversities or public schools of the
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kingdom came in for special mention. As usual, their
resentment against the parvenu arrivals from England
spilled over in a flood of bitter complaints. Finally,
they implored the King to have their grievances redressed
in a free parliament during the sessions of which Poyniiqgs ’
Act should be suspended. They also asked that he should
dismiss Parsons. And, their grievances having been
redressed, they offered to furnish ten thousand men for
the King’s service} The Gommissioners instantly conveyed
2
their petition to the King and sent a copy to Ormond.
V/hen news of the Confederates’ list of grievances 
reached Dublin, certain Irish Protestants, in their turn, 
(and at inordinate length) drew up a statement of their 
own interests. In the main, it consisted of their 
customary indictment of the Catholic religion and the 
Rebellion, but in one notable passage the Protestants 
actually identified themselves with the Catholics. This 
occurred when they insisted on the right to freedom from 
the legislative control of the.Parliament in London.
Clearly what they desired was atm lute freedom for 
themselves along with absolute control over all the
3
’papists’ in Ireland.
1. Carte, V. pp.408-24; Gilbert, II, pp.226-42.
2. Ibid., pp.243-4.
3. R.I.A. Tracts, Box 37, 12, V, 41; Rushworth, I, p.240.
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Ormond received the Confederate petition on
March 25th, and though personally disapproving of its
contents and aware that the concessions desired were
unobtainable in view of the King’s letter of January 12th,
forwarded it to England^ At this moment his disapproval
was not confined to the Confederates, The Lords Justices
had taken advantage of his absence to revive their attempts
to sabotage negotiations. Three or four days before the
meeting at Trim, they had talked the Council into ordering
the execution of a group of rebels who had been promised 
2
quarter. And on the preceding day, March 16th,in face 
of opposition from a minority of the council, they had 
drafted a letter to the King advising him against peace 
with the Confederates on any terms short of the complete 
forfeiture of the lands of all those who had taken part in 
the rebellion. As if to emphasize the obtuseness of this 
point of view considering the present plight of the 
Royalists in Ireland, they described in the same letter 
the harrowing straits in which their army and the people
3
of Dublin now found themselves; They still seem to have 
believed that if they repeated their difficulties sufficiently 
often, aid would be forthcoming from England - though from
1. Carte. V, p.451»_____ _ _____________________________________
2. March, 15, Order of Lords Justices to Sir H. Tichborne, 
T.C.P., IV, p.280.
3. Cox, II, app.IV, pp.6-14.
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what source they never specified - and with such aid
they would be able to exterminate the rebels. Ormond,
they considered, was hostile to their policy and they
sought desperately to keep him in the field. Ormond
was equally determined to return to the centre of affairs.
On March 24th he informed them that he could stay in the
field no longer without supplies?" They replied on the
next day that it was impossible for him to bring back the
army for they could not even support themselves. Yet
2
they contrived somehow to send him some stores^to keep 
him quiet I
But Ormond was weary of the Lords Justices, whose 
object, he could see, was to compass the King’s destruction
3
at the hands of Parliament, and he resolved to submit to 
Charles a comprehensive report of the state of Ireland.
On April 1st, he was joined in a letter by several members 
of the Council, of which the gravamen was that, failing 
the immediate receipt of substantial aid, the army must 
disintegrate and the Irish Protestants perisht Indeed,
1. Ormond to the Lords Justices; T.C.P., IV, p.323.
2. Lords Justices to Ormond, Mar. 25, 1643, T.C.P.,V, p.l.
3. In fairness to the Lords Justices it is to be noted that 
they were by no means unrepresentative of Protestant opinion 
generally; cf., for example, Inchiquin to Ormond, Mar.25,
in which Inchiquin frowned on the dealings with the 
Confederates, ibid., p.7.
4. Carte, V, pp.433-5.
80.
conditions in the ranks had become so insupportable
that long before this the officers had drawn up a
remonstrance to the Lords Justices and Council in which
they enumerated their undoubted grievances and stated
explicitly that they had been the victims of misdirection
and peculation. ^
Charles, also, was tired of turning a blind eye to
the disloyalty of the Lords Justices. On March 31st,he
issued an order for Parsons to be replaced by Sir Henry
2
Tichborne as Lord Justice. At the same time he did not 
feel sufficiently strong to punish Parsons beyond this 
demotion and Parsons remained on the Council Board as 
leading spokesman for the Parliamentary sympathisers.
But his time was running out and he was shortly to be
3
imprisoned; This demotion of Parsons has often been 
described as the direct result of the remonstrance 
presented at Trim. The evidence does not support this 
conclusion. However, this was one of those many occasions 
when what came to matter were not the King’s personal 
reasons for taking a particular step but what people chose 
to think they were. Henceforward the Confederates took
1. Ibid., pp.395-7. On February 10th, Charles had written 
to Ormond saying that he had received his officers’ 
grievances and wished them to know how much he appreciated 
their hardships and how beholden he was to their loyalty, 
T.C.P., IV, p.227; see also the King to Ormond, Mar.8,
164-3, Carte, V, p.408.
2. Gilbert, II, XXXV.
3. See below pp.104-5.
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the view that Parsons had been dismissed in obedience to
their complaints against him, and the legend steadily grew
that the rebellion had been largely provoked by the
injustice inflicted on the Irish and that the Irish
instantly returned to their allegiance when the unjust
ministers had been dismissed. This was the argument
consistently advanced by the authors of the Plunket-Diume
MS. and invoked by Bishop Nicholas French:
”... but no sooner were the Presbyterian lords 
Justices deposed and imprisoned by the King’s 
commands, but the Roman Catholics returned to 
their duty, first, by a cessation...”1
The demands made by the Confederates in their
remonstrance were such that the King could not even
consider using them as a basis of negotiations for a
Treaty. The English Parliament was well aware of his
dilemma. Viewing with increasing alarm the progress
towards a cessation, they shrewdly published, at this time,
a declaration against it, on the grounds that it would
aggravate the already dangerous situation of the Irish
Protestants by casting them upon the mercy of the Irish
Catholics. Rather extravagantly, they added the comment
2
that it would foreshadow atrocities in England. The King
1. Op.cit., p.120.
2. Reasons against the Cessation of Arms, Gilbert, II, 
pp.292-5. In a letter to the Lords Justices, Parliament 
referred dramatically to an "impious design” to sell protestant 
blood by a peace with the rebels and to fasten the blame for 
its necessity on them,^£^C.P., V, p.340. pvoae 26^
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judged their polemic for what it was worth and ignored it.
Yet the appalling condition of the army and of his followers
in Ireland cried out for amelioration. Since he could not ’
send them supplies his only recourse was to try to arrange
a temporary truce. This was at the same time the only
way in which he could effect the release of Ormond’s army
for the service in England he now intended for it.
Therefore, on April 23rd, he commissioned Ormond to
negotiate for a cessation of arms for one year, giving
him a free hand as to the terms to be proposed, on account,
as he put it, of his ignorance of the exact conditions
prevailing in Ireland?" He also sent him a personal letter
in cypher requesting that the army be conveyed as soon as
2
possible to Chester. With the commission, he despatched 
an instruction for the Lords Justices, enjoining them to
3
assist Ormond in the prosecution of the affair, but 
significantly advised Ormond not to produce it until he 
had confirmed that the Confederates were prepared to 
discuss a cessation, it being necessary for the sake of 
protocol that the first move should appear to come from 
their .sidet . Already the King was slipping into that
1. Carte, V, p.445; Petrie, pp.135-5; Gilbert, II, p.267.
2. Carte, V, pp.445-6; Gilbert, II, p.267.
3. Carte, V, p.444; Gilbert, II, pp.265-6.
4. Justice Lonnellan informed Clanrickard by letter on 
May 11th that only he and one other knew of the King’s 
commission. Carte, V, pp.447-8.
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complex web of intrigue which was to involve him in so
many difficulties, subject him to so much suspicion, and
cause continuous embarrassment to Ormond,
Having received the King’s commission, Ormond decided
to send two representatives on an exploratory mission to
Kilkenny where on May 20th the General Assembly was scheduled
to meet and whence they might send frequent reports.
Accordingly, on May 16th he issued passes to Lord Taaffe
and Colonel John Barry, both courageous, reliable and
devoted to the King?' Barry was destined to play an
outstanding part in Ormond’s negotiations with the
Confederates. As an old friend - perhaps Ormond’s best
friend - he was entrusted with any confidential business
which Ormond could not manage personally. Taafe regarded
2
himself as Ormond’s man, although occasionally acting
1. Professor Coonan, op.cit., p.163, infers that the King 
himself employed Taaffe and Barry on their mission to 
Kilkenny, because he was beginning to distrust Ormond.
The King would scarcely have selected Ormond’s close friend 
for this role and the evidence for this use of Taaffe is 
slight (Taaffe was sent to Ireland with a persondintroduction 
from the King as one who might be able to induce the rebels 
to accept reasonable terms; the King to Ormond, May 6, 1643, 
Carte, V, p.446). The latter seems to have hinted at 
greater concessions to the Confederates than Ormond had been 
empowered to grant (Ormond to Barry, T.C.P., V, p.208) but 
Professor Coonan adduces no proof that these concessions 
originated with the King.
2. Cf. Taaffe to Ormond, April 13, 1644, T.C.P., X, p.117.
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independently. He also played a big part in the
negotiations. To some, like the author of the
Aphorismical Discovery, he was an opportunist, to others 
a
a cag^ individual. Perhaps, the fairest judgement to be 
passed upon him is that he was genuinely torn between his 
allegiance to the Crown and his obligations to his co­
religionists at Kilkenny.
It would appear that Ormond consulted with members 
of the Council on May 3rd and in pursuance of a decision 
then taken issued Barry and Taaffe with instructions on 
May 15th. According to these, they were to inform the 
Confederates that, while it was thought feasible to have 
a truce, any propositions put forward must be moderate.
Further, the first approach must come from the Confederacy?"
2
At Kilkenny, Barry and Taaffe encountered difficulties 
chiefly in the number of contradictory voices clamouring 
for attention. It was, however, strongly in their favour 
that the Confederates could do no less than agree to 
consider a cessation of hostilities if their desire to 
present their grievances to the King was sincere. They 
were also able to point out that, following upon a cessation.
1. Ibid., V, p.255.
2. Aphor. Disc., p.77, reported the arrival also of 
Clanrickard, Thomond, and Costellagh (Costello). They 
had come to win over the Confederates "to Ormond’s 
Presbyterian partie."
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the bulk of the King’s forces in Ireland would be sent
to England. This troop movement, besides benefiting the
King, would place the Confederate armies in a strong
position. Beyond this, many delegates foresaw other
considerable advantages ensuing from a truce: it would
prevent further devastation of the land by either side,
it would give them time to raise funds, and, above all,
it would afford them an opportunity to expel the Scottish
army from the North?" On the other hand, a number of
delegates thought it not merely inopportune but foolish
to stop the war when their armies were doing so well, and
when it looked as though Ormond's forces were about to
collapse for lack of essential supplies. They were
an
afraid, also, that the King’s pardon might be inadequate 
safeguard, in view of the precedent created by the Act 
of Adventurers, which stripped him of his power to show 
them any grace or favour without parliamentary consent.
At about this time, in an attempt to influence a 
favourable majority, the Marquis of Clanrickard prepared 
and circulated a brief pamphlet setting out reasons for 
supporting a cessation. He pointed out that, no matter 
how often the Confederacy claimed otherwise, they remained 
vis-a-vis the King in a state of rebellion. Obviously
1. The case for a cessation was forcibly argued by Bellings 
in a statement addressed to the papal delegate, Scarampi; 
Gilbert, II, pp.319-21.
2. Gilbert, (Bellings), I, p.155.
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the situation could not be altered unless the opportunity 
were created for a meeting with the King at which they 
might state their grievances. And such a meeting could 
not take place until a truce had been declared. A 
permanent settlement would have to be arranged through 
a Parliament which could not be summoned until the fighting 
had ceased. Now was a good time to sue the King for mercy, 
when their principal enemies were also at war with him.
They would be released from the threat from the Scots.
People would come to Ireland for safety and bring their 
wealth with them - an interesting motive. Both sides 
would be able fairly frankly to discuss matters so as to 
see the other's point of view. The King would be free to 
concentrate upon defeating his enemies across the sea.
On the other hand, failing a^  truce, the bloodshed would 
go on, the king might come to terms with Parliament, 
whereupon all would turn upon Ireland?"
Six days of debate took place, in which the objectors 
clearly caused some wavering among the majority, before the 
Assembly voted to seek a cessation of one year, appointed 
eight agents and proposed articles to be presented at a 
time and place of Ormond's choosing. The chosen 
commissioners were Muskerry and John Walsh, representing 
Munster, Gormanston and Sir Robert Talbot, representing
1. T.C.P., XOIX., p.502.
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Leinster, Sir Lucas Lillon and Geoffrey Brown, representing 
Connaught, and 'Evbt. Magennis and Tirlough O'Neill, 
representing Ulster, any five of them, a quorum presumably, 
being given full powers to conclude a cessation and to 
offer a subsidy to the Crown. Gormanston died during 
the subsequent negotiations and was replaced by both Nicholas 
Plunket and Sir Richard Barnewall. At least five of these 
were to become Ormondists and no fewer than six were 
lawyers, which may help to account for the legal niceties 
which abounded in all dealings with the government in 
Lublin, as well as the attention paid to the setting up of 
Inns of Court in Ireland and the appointment of Irish 
Catholics to judicial office.
One Confederate proposition was that the present 
Parliament should be dissolved and replaced by a free one. 
There was, as Ormond could see, justice in this; the present 
Parliament was unrepresentative and the confederates were 
entitled to a share of the seats. The difficulty was that, 
since they now controlled the greater part of the country 
and most of the towns, they would be bound to dominate any 
new parliament by a large majority. Apparently Taaffe had 
further complicated matters by assuring the Confederates 
that the King had assented to the election of a free 
parliament. In the absence of a directive from the King
1. Order of the Supreme Council, Gilbert, II, Preface xlii-lii
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^Ormond instructed Barry, who had remained at Kilkenny, to 
inform the Confederates that they should entertain no 
expectancy on this point. He also prescribed that they 
should be prepared to subsidize his army, seeing that its 
distress was due mainly to the fact that they had diverted 
the Sing’s normal revenue to themselves. But his main 
motive for insisting on a subsidy was that, once a truce 
had been arranged, his army would no longer be able to 
maintain itself by periodic foraging expeditions into 
Confederate territory. In the circumstances,Ormond’s 
approach to negotiations might seem a little curious, as 
though he and not the Confederacy were arguing from a 
position of strength, and it was doubtless his stiff attitude 
on this and other occasions which gave rise to the belief 
that he was, in fact, opposed to an agreement. On the 
other hand, this stiffness might be taken as a refusal to 
sacrifice principle for the sake of expediency, though it 
is permissible to draw the inference that Ormond was 
presuming that the anxiety of the majority at Kilkenny^ 
thej future "Ormondists", to secure a cessation exceeded 
their capacity for taking offence.
©)n 8th June Barry informed Ormond that he could 
extract no satisfaction from the Confederates on the 
question of a subsidy. Nevertheless, Ormond caused safe- 
conducts to be issued for the eight commissioners on
1. Ormond to Barry, June 1, Ï.C.P., V., p.208; Gilbert, II,. 
p.284-5.
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13th June requesting them to meet him at Castle Martin
on 22nd June?" But hé also asked Barry on the 14th if
the commissioners were to have power to treat on this
point and made the actual delivery of the safe-conducts
conditional upon an affirmative answer. Moreover,
although he had himself already decided on the time and
place of meeting, he thought it better that the official
2
request should come from the other side. No wonderi 
Sir John Temple, a leading parliamentarian , protested 
against the impropriety of asking the "rebels" for a
3
truce before they had petitioned for it.
It was soon shown that his reliance on the anxiety
of the majority at Kilkenny to secure a truce was justified
On June 17th the Supreme Council informed him that they
had appointed agents with plenary powers to conclude a
cessation and asked him to fix a convenient time and place.
They had decided to postpone their demand for a free
Parliament and they were willing to find a sum of money
for his army, the exact amount to be arranged by their 
4
agents.
1. T.C.P., V, p.247; Gilbert, II, p.286.
2. Ormond to Barry, June 14, T.C.P., V, p.252; Gilbert, II, 
p.287.
3. Algernon Sidney to the Countess of Leicester, June 18, 
1643, Gilbert, II, xlviii.
4. Gormanston and others to Ormond, June 17, T.C.P., V., 
p.269.
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Meanwhile, Ormond, whose difficulties with his
own camp were almost as serious as those with the
Confederates, had been carefully educating opinion in
Lublin to accept the necessity for a truce. In some way,
news of the King’s commission had leaked out. Wild,
sinister rumours were being circulated about what it
portended. At first Ormond only took into his confidence
those members of the Council whom he knew to be loyal?" but
2
soon he had to enlighten the whole Council. To several 
of the councillors the nev/s came as a complete surprise.
Some of them were bitterly opposed to a cessation.
"Ilike it so ill as I shall never assent to it", wrote 
Sir John Temple to Lord Leicester. But, he went on, the 
Viceroy claims that he has complete authority from the King
3
to conclude it and need not consult anyone here. This
1. A number of letters addressed by parliamentary sympathisers 
to friends in England were intercepted by the Confederates. 
Besides throwing light on the attitude of the extremists
in Lublin towards the Confederacy, they contain useful 
information about the events leading up to the opening of 
negotiations. We learn, for instance, that from June 9th 
onwards frequent meetings took place at Ormond’s house at 
which Ormond discussed the Confederate proposals and 
considered what action he should take with Lord Taaffe, who 
had reported back from Kilkenny, Tichbourne, the Earl of 
Roscommon, Lord Brabazon, Sir James Ware, Justice Lonnellan, 
Sir Maurice Eustace, and Sergeant Major Warren. Extracts 
from this captured correspondence were quoted by Gilbert,
II, xlv-lxviii.
2. Ormond to the King, July 11, Carte, V , pp.456»6,
3. June 20, 1643, T.C.P., V, pp.284-6.
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may not have been true. Temple was no friend of Ormond
and an atrabilious enemy of the Irish Catholics. And it
is a fact that Ormond took the precaution of obtaining the
unqualified support of the majority of the Council before
taking the next step. On June 21st, at the council-board,
he proposed a motion that if a cessation were considered
dishonourable to the King, prejudicial to the safety of
Protestants in Ireland and dangerous to the army, letters
to that effect should be sent to the King and with them
should go a proposal for some easier, surer way of protecting
the interests of the King, his protestant subjects and the
army. If such letters and such a proposal were to be
produced, he undertook by the power vested in him to pursue
no further negotiations for a truce?" To make doubly sure
he declared on the next day that if he were to be provided
with £10,000, half in money and half in food, he would once
again march out against the enemy and have no further parley 
2
with them. No supplies were forthcoming; even the Mayor 
and other prominent citizens were brought in to confess to 
the poverty of the city; no proposition was put forward.
These facts were solemnly inscribed in the council books
3
and signed by the full board. Temple and others having 
apparently decided to exercise discretion rather than risk
1. Gilbert (Bellings), I, p.156.
2. Gilbert, II, pp.290-1.
3. Act of the Board concerning the Cessation, June 22, 1643, 
T.C.P., V, p.291.
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showing
the consequences, of/valour. As for Ormond, his
conscience nov/ clear, he set out for Castle Martin, in 
the county of Kildare, accompanied by several members of 
the council and a number of senior army officers.
Punctilio was the keynote of the negotiations between 
the Confederate commissioners and the King's government 
in Ireland from their very opening until their fruitless 
end. Time might not have mattered. The discussions, if 
they may be so described, which terminated in the declaration 
of a truce, were typical of the negotiations as a whole.
It is intended to describe them in some detail, in order to . 
illustrate the cumbrous procedure adopted, but with regard 
to subsequent negotiations to refer only to outstanding 
points at issue or to points raised for the first time.
Aside from Ormond's refusal to recognize the legality 
of the Confederacy's existence, which scarcely made for 
harmony, the extraordinary feature of the negotiations 
lay in the fact that they were conducted almost entirely 
in writing. There was no verbal argument. The Confederates 
presented their grievances and thereafter their amendments, 
and explanations in writing, and Ormond returned
1. There is a detailed account of the series of conferences 
leading up to the cessation in one of the tracts contained 
in the collection of the Royal Irish Academy, Box i .  Tract 34. 
Most, if not all, the relevant documents are among the Carte 
Papers, Volume V; of. also Gilbert, II, pp.284-308; pp.344-381.
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ills acquiescence, his refusals and his explanatory 
observations in the same form. George Lane, secretary 
to the council-board, acted as bearer of the correspondence. 
Very rarely one side, usually the Confederate Commissioners, 
proposed that a particular matter might be orally discussed 
in order to save time, which shows that negotiations by 
epistolary correspondence, although the method adopted, 
was recognized to be tedious.
The conference took place in the house of Sir Maurice 
Eustace and began on June 23rd, 1643. At the first 
encounter the Lord Lieutenant sat in a chair with his 
head covered while the Commissioners stood.uncovered.
Ormond requested that whatever grievances they wished to 
propose should be framed in writing. He would reply in 
the same manner. Gormanston, spokesman for the Commissioners 
until his death, asked to inspect Ormond's commission.
Ormond simply replied that he would hear what they had to 
say in writing and appointed 8 a.m. on the next day as the 
time when he would receive their first communication.
Accordingly on June 24th, the Commissioners formally 
requested a sight of the King's commission. This was 
produced. Next they submitted their propositions, but 
these were returned unread because, it was pointed out, 
they were neither signed nor dated. Duly signed and 
dated, the propositions were conveyed by Lane to Ormond 
for the second time.
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There followed more by-play and then the commissioners 
demanded to see the King's letter of May 3rd. Having 
examined it, they pointed out that they had "not observed 
any to be joyned in Gomraission with your lordship in the 
Treaty, nor doth our Commission warrant us to Treat with 
any other", and insisted upon private talks with Ormond.
They then asked to see the King's letter of April 23rd for 
the reason that that of May 3rd was only a copy.
The suspicions of the Commissioners were probably not 
levelled primarily against Ormond himself no more than 
Ormond's extreme regard for etiquette was concerned with 
putting the commissioners in their place?" Both sides 
had to consider the reactions of their own supporters.
Thus, while the Commissioners were personally keen to 
make quick progress they dare not appear to be giving 
anything away. At the same time they realized that Ormond
1. This is far from suggesting that Ormond and the Commissioners 
felt no distrust of each other. Throughout this period of 
discussions Ormond was particularly sensitive to the movements 
of the Confederate forces, for fear that they might unleash 
a surprise attack or attempt to enlarge their territory 
pending the conclusion of a truce: cf. Ormond to the Lords 
Justices, June 24, T.C.P., V, p.317: "Captain Chaytor can 
inform y &  in what places and numbers the rebells lie, his 
intelligence agrees with what I have receave here, & I 
suppose yoY lidps will hould it very needfull eather for 
the enlargement of o quarters if the cessation be agreed 
on, or for ye interuption of their désignés in case it should 
not to send forth a strong partie with all expedition".
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was far from being a free agent and they still feared, with 
good grounds, that dark influences were at work in Lublin 
to make a reconciliation with the King impossible. Hence 
their toughness was intended simultaneously to impress the 
General Assembly and to secure themselves against the 
machinations of their enemies in Lublin. Likewise Ormond, 
although undoubtedly very conscious of the great dignity 
attaching to his office, and determined to extract every 
ounce of respect for it, was resolved not to give the 
Puritan elements on the Council and in the army any excuse 
for claiming that there was softness in his dealings with 
the Confederates. It is, in fact, by no means uncertain 
that Ormond was obliged to appear harsh and unbending lest 
he find himself isolated. In other words, in order to 
obtain a truce at all, he had to create the impression 
that the Confederates were making all the concessions, 
that a truce was a victory won and not a battle lost.
Moreover, as the business of governing the kingdom 
had to go on and as he dareclnot risk more than a little 
delegation of his authority, he had not the time to devote 
himself single-mindedly to the negotiations. This need 
not have been a serious limitation had the agenda of negot­
iation been simple and easily stated in general terms.
In fact the points in dispute were tiresomely complex and 
skilfully supported on the other side by highly-trained
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lawyers. Thus, it paid Ormond to adopt the procedure 
of negotiation by correspondence, for when it was his 
turn to reply, he could take his time if other urgent 
matters pressed upon him, and he could refer the multi­
farious details and the legal quiddities to his own experts.
Of course, there is another explanation of these respective 
attitudes. It is that neither side could see the wood for 
the trees. The Confederate Commissioners, of whom two- 
thirds were members of the legal profession, seem to have 
lost their way among their own subtleties. And if Ormond 
were no lav/yer, it is arguable that he never saw, or, seeing, 
refused to admit the necessity of accepting the minimum 
foundations upon which a lasting settlement could be builtw
At any rate the tedious overture which signalled the 
beginning of negotiations established a theme for everything 
that was to follow. Boring counterpoint followed boring 
counterpoint until it was a miracle that anyone recalled 
how and why the work had been set under way. Ormond and 
the Confederate Commissioners may have known what goal 
they sought but they erected every conceivable obstacle 
along the path towards it.
When Ormond had received the Confederates' propositions, 
he refused to consider them in detail until the Commissioners 
had agreed to a truce of one year's duration. He then 
stipulated further that they must consent beforehand to 
furnish supplies for his army. To this pre-condition
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the Commissioners would not agree on the grounds that it
lay outside their commission and could only be considered
after a truce had been arranged. But they concurred that
the truce should last for twelve months in the first
instance. A day later they yielded so far as to consent
to a discussion of the question of supply without prejudice.
Ormond apparently remained adamant, for on the following day
they abruptly told him:
"Wee are resolved to make noe further declaration 
in the matter of supplie, other than what wee have 
done all readie."
With this Ormond had to be satisfied.
The Confederate agents had presented their articles,
of which there were ten, on June 24th. In the first
instance, they called for a cessation of hostilities for
a period of six months, later to be extended to one year.
Secondly, they desired to retain their existing form of
government. The third article concerned the freedom of
commerce by land and sea. The fourth requested freedom
to enter into hostilities with any of the King's enemies.
The next two articles sought to designate anyone who attacked
the Confederacy equally the enemÿa» of the King, and to
obtain the protection of the King's forces for anyone who
t r a d e d  w i t h  t h e  C o n f e d e r a t e s ,  w h e r e v e r  t h e y  m i g h t  b e .
These articles were evidently inserted in the expectation
that the Scots in the North would reject the Cessation.
If Ormond could be made to accept them, he would be
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obligatorily ranged with them against the Scots, an 
alignment of forces they strove constantly to create.
The seventh article begged leave to send agents to the 
King under safe-conduct. The eighth dealt with the 
release of prisoners and hostages on both sides. The 
ninth requested the summoning of a free parliament for 
the redress of grievances before the end of September, 
this Parliament to meet in the presence of the King or 
someone whom they could trust,, and no person to be debarred 
from a seat in it because of incidents that had happened 
since the beginning of the troubles. The final article 
proposed that some means be found of distinguishing between 
those who gave allegiance to the Crown and those who 
supported Parliament.
Ormond's reply began with a carefully phrased preamble 
to the effect that he neither recognized the leyality of the 
Confederacy nor accepted their argument that they had risen 
in arms to protect the Crown. The second and ninth of 
their articles he refused even to consider and the fourth 
and last he declined to answer. With regard to infringe­
ments of the cessation he thought that the guilty should be 
prosecuted but could not agree to assist the Confederates 
with the King's forces; he also specified that a breach of 
the cessation in one part of the country should not lead to
Ix T.C.P., V. p.315.
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a general rupture, and that, in any case, hostilities
should not begin until commissioners had investigated the
cause of the breach and fourteen days had expired. Safe-
conducts to England would be given to their agents provided
that these did not exceed four, excluded clergymen and
travelled with a retinue of sixteen or fewer. Prisoners
and hostages should be set free with the exception of those
who had borne arms or committed capital offences. He
assented to freedom of trade on condition that the King's
right to collect customs dues should be revived. And,
lastly, he would approve a cessation of hostilities provided
all his conditions were taken into account and an adequate
subsidy furnished for the King's service?"
Disappointed with this limited offer the Confederates
agents requested an adjournment until July 12th so as to
2
have more time for reflection. This was granted. On 
July 3rd Ormond said he would appoint a time for the re­
opening of talks in due course, and they returned to Kilkenny
As they intended that each side should be left in possession
loVwck
of the territoryji^it held on the date a cessation were 
declared, and as their troops at this time were making ground
1. T.C.P., V, pp.364-5.
2. Ibid., p.374. At some point on or before June 27th, 
the meeting-place had been removed to Sigginstown; of. 
the safe-conducts issued to the Confederate Commissioners, 
ibid., V. p.348.
1 0 0 .
in the field, it may have paid them to interrupt proceedings.
Even so, they and not he became impatient about delay.
On July 12th they made no reference to Ormond's commentary:
upon their propositions, but restricted themselves to the
question of supply. While the King had not asked for a
subsidy in his letters and while therefore they were under
no necessity to reply on this point, nevertheless as an
earnest of their affection and loyalty they were prepared
to make a voluntary gift of money to the -Kd-rtg. In the
circumstances there was no obligation to divulge the amount
which they had in mind.
Their letter was received by Ormond on July 14th.
He judged it totally unsatisfactory and resolved once more
to try conclusions ih the field. It is evident that this
decision was hastily taken. Taaffe and Clanrickard, both
hoping to persuade the Confederate Commissioners to be
reasonable, were actually on their way to Castle Martin
at Ormond's invitation when a message from Dublin informed
them that the meeting had been deferred indefinitely. As
far as they could gather, Ormond had moved out of Dublin
because of menacing reports that Preston was marching towards 
2
the city. Ormond informed Gormanston that he was disappointed
1. According to Bellings Ormond took this step for two reasons: 
to counter Preston's activities, and, by displaying his 
strength, to impress upon the Confederates how much relief 
they would gain from a truce. Gilbert, I, p.161.
2. Gilbert, II, Ixxxiv-v; Ormond confirmed this in a letter 
to Clanrickard dated July 23rd, ibid., Ixxxvi-vii.
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by the excessiveness of their demands and that he would not 
be able to confer with them on the appointed day because he 
would be otherwise occupied with his Majesty's affairs; 
his business being concluded, he would recommend another 
date?" Resentful and suspicious the commissioners demanded 
to know what this important service might be, and in two 
letters they urged an immediate resumption of the convention
2
and talked of slackness in looking after the King's interests. 
In fact Ormond was still reluctant to press all out for a 
cessation and determined to give nothing away. He continued 
to be suspicious of the Confederate troop movements, and no 
doubt wished to make a show of strength in order to deter 
them from any sudden incursion into his territory. Moreover, 
it would appear that his ov/n troops were again so short of
5
food that it was necessary to forage far afield.
On their side the commissioners could scarcely be 
blamed for feeling aggrieved. They had more than an 
inkling of what Ormond's pressing business might be; 
standing at Kilkenny for moderation, they had with difficulty 
overcome the arguments of those who opposed a cessation;
1. Ormond to Gormanston and others, July 15, 1643, T.C.P., 
VI, p.41.
2. July 15 and 19, 1643, ibid., p.48.
3. It is evident from the correspondence of Sir Phillip 
Percivall about this time that Ormond had been driven to 
complain about his troubles, N.L.I., Ormond MSS., June 12 
1643 - March 24, 1643-4, p.92. He had also asked the 
Council for supplies only to be given the bad news that 
there were none to spare, ibid., pp.99-100.
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they were conscious that their bargaining position was
strong; yet here they were, being fobbed off with a dusty
answer to their propositions. It seemed that they could
reach agreement only by sacrificing every gain for which
they had reluctantly taken up arms. Moreover, they were
irritated by the conviction that the King had not inspired
either Ormond's provisos or the demand for a subsidy.
They felt that, as always in the past, there was a conspiracy
to deny them access to the King. The truth was that the
King had given Ormond a free hand. Ormond was only doing
what he conceived to be his duty. They would have been
more correct to assume that the King would have wished
him to be more flexible.
Ormond's campaign had soon to be abandoned. Preston
refused to be drawn into a pitched battle and there were not
the means with which to pursue him?" Elsewhere Confederate
2
troops were making inroads into their territory. For Ormond, 
this was conclusive proof that the only recourse was to 
secure a cessation. A few members of the council were 
still against it, but could not supportiheir position with 
any argument fit to be voiced in public. To clinch the 
matter Ormond received early in August a fresh commission
1. Ormond to the Lords Justices, July 24, 1643, T.C.P.,
VI, p.63.
2. Cf. Lords Justices to Ormond, Sept.8, where they describe 
how the rebels have gained much ground since the suspension 
of the treaty in July, ibid., pp.230-1.
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to treat with the confederates for a cessation of one year.
In England the King * s affairs had not prospered during 
the summer of 1643. Consequently, whereas at the beginning 
of the year he had been interested in securing a truce primarily 
in order to relieve an intolerable burden from his army and 
adherents in Ireland, it was nov/ bound up with his own 
survival. At Edgehill a favourable opportunity to settle 
the issue of the Civil V/ar had misfired, forcing him on to 
the defensive and confronting him with the threat of defeat 
unless he could supplement his military resources with 
foreign or Irish aid. Thus, even at this stage, he may 
have come to believe that a peace treaty with the Confederacy 
would simultaneously safeguard his loyal Irish subjects and 
provide him with a reservoir of troops for service in England.
On July 2nd, he sent Ormond a second commission to 
treat. The date is important. "it disposes of the 
excuse that he took this step only through fear of an 
imminent attack from Scotland. It was not until July 21st 
that the parliamentary commissioners set out to undertake 
negotiations there.
Charles instructed Ormond to negotiate for a truce to 
last one year provided means could be devised of assuring 
the subsistence of the royalist army during that period.
He was willing to dissolve the present parliament, to 
summon a new one before November 10th, and to guarantee 
the safety of those members who should be elected to it.
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To make things easier, he authorized Ormond to licence
representatives of the Confederacy to travel to England
with a view to presenting a petition listing their grievances
and preparing the way for ”a just, honourable, and perfect
peace in that our Kingdome". His anxiety to have an early
meeting with the Confederates is clear from the fact that
he asked Ormond to nominate suitable representatives of the
protestant side^ It is also worth noting that he described
the Confederates for the first time as the "Irish in arms"
whereas previously they had always been "the rebels". As
usual, his light disregard for the difficulties of the
situation was only too apparent for already he was making
plans in anticipation of a cessation. Thus, when on July 31st
he instructed the Lords Justices to issue a commission to
Ormond under the great seal of Ireland, empowering him to
treat for a cessation of one year's duration and to use
his own judgement in respect of conditions, he was ready
to believe that the matter was already in hand:
"And in case the said cessation shal bee agreed 
and concluded vtpon before or after these our 
letters shall come vnto your hands."2
To strengthen Ormond's position and to put an end
to the obstructionist tactics of the Puritans in Lublin,
he also gave orders for the dismissal from the Council of
3Parsons, Loftus, Meredith and Temple. Since being demoted
1. The King to Ormond, July 2, 1643, Carte, V, pp.435-6
2. Carte, V, pp.459-60; Gilbert, II, pp.317-9.
3. Gilbert, II, Ixvii.
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Parsons had continued to oppose negotiations with the 
Confederates. Henceforward, Ormond held undisputed sway 
over the government in Ireland.
The Lords Justices notified the Confederate Commissioners 
that negotiations would be reo^eWed at Sigginstown on August 
17th^ Within the past month, opposition to a truce had 
been hardening among the Irish. The Pope had given concrete 
expression to his blessing on the Confederate cause by sending 
a personal envoy, a member of the Oratory brotherhood namedL
Peter Scarampi, whose ability and good sense he esteemed
2
highly. Scarampi arrived in Ireland about the middle of 
June bringing with him a supply of arms and money.
The Pope had delayed in shov/ing his hand, for he could 
not afford either to support a lost cause or to give the 
appearance of supporting rebellions. Hence, before acting 
officially he allowed time for the Confederacy to become 
established, as also to see what constitutional position 
the Confederacy would adoptf Even now, he refrained from
1. August 5, T.C.P., VI, p.94.
2. Com. Rin., I, p.392; Gilbert, II, pp.264-5.
3. At the same time he scarcely wanted to give the impression 
of cold-shouldering the Confederates. Thus, he and his 
nephew. Cardinal Barbebini sent gifts of money and also 
encouraged Generals Preston and O'Neill to proceed from 
Flanders to Ireland; of. Gilbert (Bellings), I p.152.
4. His policy of inaction was assisted by the fact that the 
Confederacy took time to be formed. Consequently, the 
first official request for support was not made until 
November 28, 1642; of. the Council's address to the Pope 
Urban VIII, Gilbert, II, pp.99-101.
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sending a Nuncio and strictly enjoined Scarampi to keep the 
Confederates loyal to the Crown, and to avoid becoming 
involved in domestic politics^ It is to be noted further 
that both this Pope and his successor were reluctant to 
gain Ireland at the risk of forfeiting the chance of 
reconverting England.
Nevertheless, Scarampi's arrival stimulated the 
native Irish party and the clergy. jSe also supported their 
arguments against agreeing to a cessation. Principally
it
these were: that wheiçjas their own armies were doing well
in the field, that of Ormond was faring badly; that the
Pope's subsidies could be regarded as the first of many
to come from foreign princes, who would refrain, however,
from tendering aid if the Confederacy suspended operations;
finally, that it was ridiculous to provide supplies for
the Protestant army when they were badly needed for the
maintenance of their own troops,,especially since the bulk
of them would probably be used against themselves. In
conclusion, Scarampi pointed out that he had not been sent
to Ireland to assist in arranging an uneasy truce for one
year, but to bring about the full restoration of the
2
Catholic religion in Ireland.
1. Gilbert (Bellings), I, p.153.
2. Gilbert, II, pp.321-7.
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The case of those who favoured a truce was put by
Bellings in a statement to Scarampi which sounded feeble
by comparison. He began by repeating how important it was
to refute the charge that they were rebellious, then forecast
that the money given to maintain Ormond's army would be
offset by the ending of the depredations at present being
made by the starving soldiers. He hoped that, following
a truce with the Hoyalists, it would be easier to deal with
the Scots in Ulster, and gave the assurance that the King
would be free to concentrate all his efforts on the task,
which was equally vital to them, of defeating the English 
1
Parliament.
Whatever their respective merits, the views of such 
as Bellings finally prevailed over those of Scarampi, in 
part through the support given by three prominent neutralists, 
Clanrickard, Castlehaven and Taaffe. But passions remained 
inflamed and from this time forward, no common policy emerged 
from Kilkenny. Rather was it to be the policy of the New 
Irish, the self-styled moderates, which held sway, based 
on the majority of seats they enjoyed in the Supreme Council.
Accordingly the Confederate Commissioners agreed to 
reopen negotiations with Ormond. The date of resumption 
as proposed by the Lords Justices in their summons, was 
inconvenient, however, because, as they pointed out in 
their letter of acceptance, some of their number were so
1. Gilbert, II, pp.319-21; see also Com. Rin., I, pp.413-21;
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widely scattered that they could not possibly be assembled
before August 31st^ To a new proposal that they should
2
meet on August 24th, they replied nonetheless that they
3
would do their best. And on August 24th when Ormond 
informed them that he was proceeding post haste to
4
Sigginstown, they also appear to have set out from Kilkenny.
By now, the desperate plight of the King's forces 
had been sharply revealed, for the Lords Justices had 
been compelled to authorize Clanrickard in Connaught and 
Inchiquin in Munster to arrange a temporary cease-fire in 
their respective provinces, so as to forestall the imminent
5
collapse of their armies. Again, on August 23rd Ormond 
expressed his and the Lords Justices' concern to hasten the 
reopening of negotiations in a letter to Clanrickard^
It was, therefore, with a feeling of relief that the 
government began discussions with the Confederate Commissioners 
on August 26th.
The conference was held this time in the house of a
n
I/ir. George Aylmer Hartwell and besides the official
1, I.e.P., VI, p.112.
2. Ibid., p.125.
5. Ibid., p.140.
4. Ibid., p.144.
5. Tichbourne, writing in his military capacity to Ormond 
on August 29th, spoke of the necessity of a truce in 
Connaught if not already arranged. T.C.P., VI, p.256.
6. Carte, V, p. 1^ 64.
7. I.e.P., VI, p.148.
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representatives Clanrickard attended on the special order 
of the Lords Justices^" As the essential debate had already 
taken place on the Confederate side progress was much more 
rapid than before. Even so, there were some acute 
differences, and both sides continued to be suspicious of 
the honesty of the other’s intentions.
The Commissioners tried in vain to get Ormond to 
commit himself to declare against the Scots:
t GS"w|e desire the assistance of his Ma. fforces 
ag. all such, as shall oppose the Articles of 
the Cessation, and will not yield obedience 
thereunto."2
But Ormond would only agree to examining each breach of 
the cessation on its merits as an isolated case and 
skilfully evaded any general commitment. They also 
disagreed over the conditions which should govern the 
dispatch of a g e n t s  to the King. The Commissioners 
maintained that the dispatch of agents should be regarded 
as an implicit right of the Confederates, while O r m o n d  
insisted that they must first obtain a licence from the Lords 
Justices. Eventually, it was a g r e e d  that they should apply
3
to the Lords Justices purely as a question of form.
1 .  Order of the Lords Justices, Aug. 2 5 ,  ibid., p.1 4 6 ;
cf also the particular invitation to attend sent by Ormond 
on Aug. 5 ,  Gilbert, I I ,  xcviii.
2 .  T.C.P., p.1 5 0 .
3 .  Ibid., p.1 5 7 ,  p.1 5 9 .
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A graver matter was Ormond’s suspicion that 
Castlehaven’s Leinster army was taking advantage of the 
lull occasioned by the Conference to annex new territoryî"
V/hen he complained of this army’s movements, the Commissioners 
protested that they could scarcely be blamed in view of the 
way negotiations always dragged. They also believed that
2the Royalists, too, were trying to "enlarge their quarters."
Ormond’s method of putting an end to the problem was to
request the Commissioners to agree to a standstill of troops
in Leinster throughout the term of the conference and to
instruct the Lords justices to send out a force to the area
3
in which Castlehaven was operating. Castlehaven could not 
have been acting with any particularly sinister intent, 
because he ordered his troops to cease operations almost 
at oncet On the other hand, the Lords Justices refused
5
at first to sponsor a cease-fire'^and only relented when 
Ormond, who may have exaggerated in order to terrify them, 
stated categorically:
1. Cox, II, p.132.
2. Gilbert (Bellings), I, p.161; Castlehaven, IVImoirs, p.4 3
5. Sep. 7, I.e.P., VI, p.243.
4. Ibid., p.244.
5. Sep. 8., ibid., pp.250-1.
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"if the forces now sent to repell the rehells 
about Trym and those partes have not speedy and 
good successe and that this treatie shall end in a I oXot
now bvV" in a very short tyme the rebells will be intyrely 
masters of this County."1
Later, on September 13, just two days before the truce was
officially announced, he reported that the situation had
2
already deteriorated. Whatever the author of the 
Aphorismical Discovery recorded must be treated with 
suspicion, but he claimed that Ormond’s chief muster-master 
had sworn to him that "there lived only at the time of the 
said cessation 500 men in all Ireland." This report was 
demonstrably inaccurate. Nevertheless, so many signs seem 
to indicate that Scarampi and his supporters had been correct 
in their appreciation of the relative strength of the 
Royalist and Confederate armies.
There remained the problems of quarters and supply; 
how to draw a line between the territories of the two sides 
and how big a grant of money the Confederates should be 
prepared to make. It was in order to hasten agreement 
over the first problem^ which was complicated by the presence 
of royalist pockets in the territory held by the Confederacy, 
that the Commissioners proposed a switch from written
1. Sep.8, ibid., p.257.
2. Ibid., pp.289-90.
3. P.73.
4. The author of the Aphorismical Discovery (p.73) was able 
to suggest another explanation for "the Hommissioners’ haste - 
they had just heard of Lord Moore’s defeat in Meath by O ’Neill
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exchanges to verbal debate. Whereas supply concerned Ormond 
most of all, the Irish maintained that they were under no 
obligation to make an offer. As a token of good will they 
were in fact prepared to do so, but only after all other
matters had been settled. In the end, however, they
2
waived this point and offered to provide £30,000 payable 
in instalments, half in cash, half in cattle. Ormond 
stipulated a larger sum, but allowed himself to be persuaded 
that this was the maximum they could afford.
When all the articles had been approved, Ormond, 
punctilious and cautious to the last, laid them before 
the councillors and the senior army officers in attendance 
for their endorsement. This was readily given, for it 
was generally realised that there was no alternativef 
iind so, on September 15th, Ormond, on the one side, as 
the sole person to whom the King’s commission had been 
addressed, and the nine commissioners, on the other, 
formally signed a Cessation of hostilities to be in force 
for one year from that date.^ They also signed a joint 
proclamation to be published throughout Ireland calling 
upon all and sundry to respect the truce. On the next
1. T.C.P., VI, p.163.
2. Sometimes the sum of £30,000 is mentioned.
3. Carte, V, pp.468-9.
4. Gilbert, II, pp.364-84.
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day, the Confederates granted the King £30,800, to be 
paid in six monthly instalments^ Evidently this grant was 
made separately from the official agreement, in order to 
satisfy the Confederates' insistence that it was an 
unsolicited gift.
The terms of this Cessation made no reference to 
any of the demands put forward in the various petitions 
of the Confederacy to the Crown. Neither did the Con­
federates commit themselves to despatching any military 
assistance to the King. Each side was to retain the 
lands held in its possession on September 15th, trade was 
to be free, and prisoners were to be surrendered. Above 
all, it was agreed that the Confederates should be permitted 
to send a delegation to Oxford, under safe-conducts which 
were to be issued on demand at any time.
The Scots, as expected, disdained to keep the peace
2
and sporadic conflict continued in the North. For the 
rest, the difficulty is to sift fact from fancy. In the 
main, Protestants recorded that Catholics broke the truce, 
while Catholics protested to the contrary. Probably
3
there were some infractions on both sides.. Many stories
1. R.I.A., Box 30, Tract 25; Gilbert, II, pp.378-9.
2. Although according to Sir James Turner, the Scots needed 
a respite as badly as anyone. Memoirs , pp.29-30.
3. Cf. E^mont MS., V.l, pt.l, for infringements of the 
Cessation.
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of Protestant provenance narrate that the Catholics
purposely seized as much land as they could on the very
eve of the Cessation^ There is, however, surely some
significance in the fact that the Ulstermen, who might have
been expected to be more recalcitrant than anyone else,
2
behaved with restraint.
Even so, observance of the truce did not connote
approval. Most Protestants detested it. In the opinion
of Lord Blayney,
‘^None that hath an English heart in his body, 
a Protestant face, and a Christian conscience, 
will give any obedience to such an unnatural 
composition of so great a quarrel, so just 
a warZ3
For Cox it was a plot to achieve by treaty what could 
not be achieved by war and he tod outlined various ways 
in which the Confederates exploited it to their advantage!
1. Cox, op.cit., p.134. On the other hand the author of 
Aphorismical Discovery, p.75, records that the Confederates 
surrendered land in their possession.
2. Among the MSS. at Trinity College, Dublin, there is a 
letter from Owen Roe O ’Neill to Chichester, dated October 7, 
1643, answering a complaint about a breach of the cessation 
by some of his men in which he says he is willing to discuss 
the matter and, if necessary, refer it to Ormond’s arbitration^ 
T.C.D., 3, 11, f.120.
3. /Lor^Blayney to ^ r d  Conway and Killaltagh/ - C.S.P. 
Ireland, p.395.
4. One was to disburse the money for the maintenance of 
Ormond’s army in driblets so as to keep that army enfeebled 
by short commons. It is interesting to note that Bishop 
French reported that the money was paid at once, op.cit.,p.37.
In fact both were wrong. But there is no point in drawing 
attention to any further contradictions. Both Catholics 
and Protestants, outside the governing parties, were 
convinced that all the advantages redounded to their opponents.
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The Cessation was also a plot in the eyes of many 
Catholics but one hatched by the enemy. Its object was 
to ensnare the Pale nobility and make them tools of Ormond. 
From this time forward, Old Irish apologists always made 
great play çf their subservient relationship to Ormond.
Three hundred years later Professor Coonan follows this 
partisan line^but when his sources are checked they prove, 
as usual, to come from the Aphorismical Discovery. But to 
those who had flinched at taking up arms against the Crown, 
even to save it, the truce brought welcome relief of con­
science. Some of this group were never to fight against
2
the Crown again: a few, no doubt, were pleased to be able 
to renew their old intimacy with Ormond. This did not 
prevent them, however, from conducting the negotiations 
that were to follow with vigour and tenacity.
1. Op.cit., pp.169-70.
2. The author(s) of the Plunket-Dunne MS. were most concerned 
to distinguish between these men and those who did fight 
again. The former were purged of any taint of disloyalty, 
the latter deserving of any punishment meted out to them. 
According to the same source, "Lord Muskerry, Col. R. Butler, 
the Duke of Ormond’s brother, his uncle Bourk in Connaught, 
the Lord Mountgarrett, Col. Walter Bagnel, his cousin German, 
adhered to the peaces and Cessation, and ho one of his 
relations joined the Nuncio." Carte’s Abstract, p.556.
3. Ormond was certainly pleased to be able to resume normal 
friendly relations with some of them. A letter of his to 
Fennell dated September 30 began, "It is long since I durst 
write to you in this open way" and ended "Your very assured 
friend". Carte, V,* p.468; Gilbert, II, p.386.
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Yet, to believe that Old Irish apologists are 
unfair in attributing nothing but self-interest and 
gullibility to those who arranged the truce, is not to 
deny that the Confederacy struck a bad bargain. For 
while the short-term gains of Charles I and Ormond are 
apparent, it is hard to see what advantages accrued to 
the Confederates. In view of the wretched condition of 
the Royalists, they might well have angled for better 
terms. As things were, they had given Ormond a life- 
saving respite., and had still to reckon with the Scots.
In ending the fighting they had deprived themselves of 
the only bond which united them, and,for vindication, 
they must trust in a conference with the King which might 
easily be shelved if the King’s fortunes in England should 
take a turn for the better.
The clue to this bad bargain was the strong desire 
of the dominant faction at Kilkenny to put themselves right 
with the Crown. Effectively their interests had already 
diverged from those of the Old Irish, although there was 
not to be a formal division into rival parties at Kilkenny 
until the arrival of a papal nuncio in the Autumn of 1645.
The Cessation paved the way for negotiations with 
the King - the main notive for arranging it so far as the 
Supreme Council was concerned - but at a heavy price, 
for the Confederate movement was thereby robbed of its 
momentum. From now on, it wore itself out in a series
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of interminable, sterile debates on policy. forthe King 
the Cessation held out a wonderful opportunity. Despite 
his relatively weak bargaining position, the Confederacy 
had chosen to come to him. In the future he would have 
ample space for manoeuvre# if he cared to use it skilfully, 
for the Confederate leaders had not the stomach to resort 
to arms a second time. As things turned out,^ * it was to 
be neither the King, nor the Confederacy who profited from 
the truce, but their common enemy, the Puritans.
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Chapter IV 
The Oxford Conference.
The English Parliament greeted news of the Cessation
with mixed feelings. It would release some of the King's
forces from Ireland, it might quickly lead to the descent
of a Catholic army on England, and it v/ould make it more
difficult to treat the Irish 'rebels' as undeserving of
any mercy. On the other hand, it was a further weapon to
be directed against the King's reputation. So, promptly,
Parliament published a bitter Declaration against the
Cessation. It would, they said,
"... highly affront the Protestant religion by
setting up Popery, in the full height of all its 
abominations."
The rebels were weak and could not, in any case, abide by
its conditions. It would only end in
"an inglorious, dishonourable peace, or a more 
doubtful war."
It would threaten the lives and property of the adventurers
in Ireland and enable the Papists in Ireland
"to help the faction against religion here, and to 
act the second part of their bloody tragedy in this 
kingdom.1"
Parliament's indignation was largely feigned; it was 
perfectly aware that the sorry state of the Protestant army
1. Gilbert, II, p.292.
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in Ireland, to which it had contributed by cutting off 
supplies^ alone called for a lull in the fighting, not 
counting other considerations. Nevertheless, its 
strictures alarmed the King, for they were carefully 
designed to arouse the anti-Gatholic sentiments of the 
majority of his followers, ignorant of the true state of 
affairs in Ireland. In the circumstances, he felt that 
he had no choice but publicly to defend his action. 
Accordingly, he prepared a pamphlet,The Grounds and Motives 
of the Cessation, relying on reassuring a sufficient number 
of his adherents to compensate for those who might regard 
his apology as an admission of the strength of Parliament's 
case, and thereupon desert him. The gist of his defence 
was precisely that the army could not subsist in Ireland 
through shortage of the very supplies which Parliament had 
refused to send, but he also made the point that removal 
of the Scots from Ireland was projected, an action calculated 
to imperil still further the safety of his protestant
1. Cf. The Lords Justices and Council of Ireland to the 
speakers of the two Houses of Parliament in England,
Carte, V, pp.481-97; cf, also, Plunket-Dunne MS., Carte's 
Abstract p.415: "The Parliament of England kept back
all relief from the Duke of Ormond, else after the battle 
of Rosse he might have passed the Barrow fordable in several 
places and taken Kilkenny, but want of provisions forced 
him to retire to Dublin; and enter on the Cessation;" 
cf. also H. Hazlett, "The Financing of the British Armies 
in Ireland, 1641-9" I.H.St., I, pp.21-41.
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subjects in that country. He concluded:
"... in fine there was an absolute necessity of 
their Cessation, as preparatory to a peace; which 
nevertheless he will never admit, unless it be such 
a peace, as may be agreeable to conscience, honour, 
and justice."1.
In spite of this defence, some Royalists withdrew
their support, just as the King had feared. According to
Cox, many of Newcastle's army laid down their arms. The
Earl of Holland withdrew from Oxford saying
"that after he had heard of the Cessation, his 
conscience would not give him leave to stay on 
longer there.2."
Other courtiers may have gone with him. It also seems
probable that news of the Cessation was a further inducement
3
to the Scots to give military aid to Parliament. ' What 
is certain is that the Scots' decision to join forces with 
Parliament seriously weakened Ormond's position in Ireland, 
for Monro, who up to this time had collaborated with him,
1. Carte, V, pp.469-472.
2. Cox, II, p.134; Clarendon attributed Lord Holland's 
departure from Oxford to spite; cf. History of the R ebellion, 
III, pp.258-9.
3. Clarendon was to write later: "The Cessation ---  though
prudently, charitably, and necessarily entered into, had 
been the most unpopular act the King had ever done, and 
had wonderfully contributed to the reputation of the two 
Houses of Parliament"I Historical View, p.1070.
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henceforward acted in the interests of Parliament, with 
the bulk of the Scottish and English forces in Northern 
Ireland in support, despite the sustained efforts of the 
Council and Ormond to persuade him to observe the truce.
These results of the Cessation could not have failed 
to warn Charles of the much more serious consequences of 
any settlement leading to the use of Irish Catholic troops 
in England. If he had not known it already, he must have 
decided now that any such troops must be brought over with 
the minimum of publicity.
It must be added that if Parliament's criticism of the 
Cessation was dishonest, the King's defence of it was 
disingenuous, for while all the reasons he adduced were 
valid, he was careful to omit the most important of all - 
the need to free Ormond's troops for service in England.
As early as September 7, eight days before formal agreement 
on the Cessation had been reached and long before its 
announcement in England, he had written to the Lords 
Justices and to Ormond, ordering them to consider the best 
means of transporting the army in Leinster to England.^
By this time, the English Parliament and the Scots had 
struck their hard bargain and at any moment he could 
expect his forces to be heavily outnumbered unless he 
could detach some reserves from Ireland. For his efforts
1. Carte, V, pp.4-65-7.
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to redress the balance he cannot be blamed, yet it is 
vital to insist that had his primary concern in securing 
the Cessation been truly the safety of his Protestant 
Irish subjects, as he said in his pamphlet, he would have 
taken advantage of the truce and the £30,000 to be paid 
by the Confederates in order to refresh and re-equip Ormond's 
army so that it would be in good fighting condition if there 
should be a breach of the Cessation or if the Cessation 
should not be extended beyond one year!
Ormond took pains to warn him of the temporary value 
of the Cessation. Along with the official documents, he 
included a note to Nicholas in which he pointed out that 
the King had gained no more than a little time
"to provide for the security and settlement of 
his interests in the Kingdom, which, without 
such a respite, would in all probability run 
very great hazards."
Unless the respite was turned to profit, the King would
have to accept far worse terms in a year's time. It was
imperative that there should be a strong body of troops
in Ireland. More urgent still was the maintenance of
communications between England and Dublin, so that the
troops could be serviced from England and not left to
2
rely on the exiguous supplies available in Ireland.
1. This was certainly the opinion of Ormond, cf. Ormond 
to Nicholas .(H_.6.P.. . II, pp.155-6.
2. Ibid., p.156.
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But, as usual, Charles was neither interested in Ireland
for its own sake nor in anticipating future problems.
He v/anted the troops there and then and the troops he
would have. George Bigby v/as given the task of' arranging
for their passage in collaboration with Ormond.
Bigby had just become His Majesty's second Secretary
of State. His appointment was important, not only because
_ 1
he was to have the oversight of Irish affairs ,.but because
he immediately struck up a warm friendship with Ormond,
which was to influence relations between the Court and
Ireland. There was about Ormond some /^qwality which
seems to have appealed to his impulsive nature and, on his
side, Ormond responded to Bigby's originality of mind and
vital charm, , while apparently fully aware of his many
defects of character. On October 5th, Bigby penned a
letter of introduction saying that even if he had not
been given an official post bringing him in contact with
Ormond he had been resolved
"to have intruded moselle the way of your
Jordshipjf s service, ftnd even of being a voluA&eW-^ 
in the kind's businesses to have sought a parte, 
in that parte of it which principaljL^^ concern©! 
your tordshipj;^ that is^  the affair©? of Ireland'.'
1. In theory, he was merely to convey the orders of the 
King and the Council to Ireland. In practice, he was 
constantly active on his own account. His interpretation 
of his office may have been unconstitutional but it was of
immense value to the future historian. On paper Bigby
was both free and discursive, almost as though he were 
thinking aloud. Thus, while he deposited some rubbish
he left behind a great deal of important evidence that a 
more careful Secretary of State would have kept to himself.
2. Carte, V, p.475.
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That these were not mere fulsome words Bigby was soon to
prove. He was to be always at pains to understand and
sympathise with Ormond’s problems and to ensure that Ormond’s
views did not go by default at Court.
Eigby v/as to make an impression on Irish affairs during
the next few years for two further rasons. The first
was that he quickly came to stand at Court for those few
who saw the need for an accommodation with the Conférâtes.
He was not antipathetic towards Catholicism as were most
of the King’s other councillors and indeed eventually
became a convert. The second, that his quick, inventive
mind and somewhat slippery principles made him an apt
confidant for the Irish intrigues which the King found so
irresistible a snare and which ,indeed, he frequently initiated.
Gardiner went so far as to say:
"In Bigby, Charles had a man to whom he could
confide secrets of which it was well to keep the
honourable secretary, Nicholas, in ignorance."1
Bigby and Ormond indulged in a lively correspondence
over the organization and transport of the expedition to
England. One of the questions to be decided was whether
2
or not Ormond should command the force in person.
1. Cicyil War, I, p. 246.
2. The pros and cons were set out by Bighy in a letter to 
Ormond, Nov.17, 1643, Carte, V, pp.511-14.
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Reluctantly it was decided that in Ormond’s absence the 
Royalist position in Ireland might deteriorate beyond
1
redemption, and that he must of necessity remain there.
As it happened, the King was out of luck with the
army from Ireland. As well as the problem of finding a
suitable commander, there was also difficulty in assembling
2and servicing the troops, in weeding out malcontents and 
suspected parliamentarians, and above all in hiring ships. 
It was a wonder that the morale of the three detachments 
which sailed for North Wales between November and February
1. Bigby to Ormond, Jan.20.,1644, Carte, VI, pp.21-22.
Prince Rupert was given the command instead. To judge from his 
careful way of communicating the news Bigby feared that 
Ormond might be offended.
2. So much so that Ormond had to pledge himself personally 
to pay for equipment lor the horses as v/ell as powfder:
cf. Ormond to Nicholas, Feb. 5, 1644, N.L.I., Ormonde MSS., 
June 12 - March 24, 1644, p. 525.
5. T.G.P., VIII, p.154; Ormond to the Archbishop of York,
Oct. 26, 1645, Carte, V., pp. 479-81.
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1643-4, was as high as it was! Having been encouraged at
first by several minor victories over the Parliamentarians
in Cheshire the army was crushingly defeated outside the
walls of Nantwich on January, 25, 1644, and ceased to
2exist as an effective operational force. For the King, 
the whole expedition was a disaster. His plan to 
counterbalance the addition of the Scots to the other side
1. Several reports described the army’s morak as high.
Bigby, for example, wrote to Ormond saying how ’’they were 
soe steadye and soe well settled in their affections to 
his majestie’s service"; Carte, V, pp.534-5. But it is 
significant that when disaster came both the Court and 
Byron sought to pin the blame on the poor quality and 
treachery of the troops. Lord Byron had no doubts as to 
their worthlessness. On February 6th, 1644, he wrote to 
Ormond requesting him to send over "a considerable number 
of Irish natives with as much speech as may bee" (sic) as 
"The English (excepting such as are gentlemen) not beeinge 
to be trusted in this warr, wherof I have dayly some sadd 
experience or other." (Lord Byron to Ormond, T.C.P.,IX,p.70.) 
According to Bigby the fact that most of them were Welsh
and Cestrians made them "very subiect to bee corrupted in 
their owne count ryes . ’’ (Bigby to Ormond, Feb. 8, 1644,
Carte, VI, p.33). In fact the evidence for treachery is 
unconvincing. At most, of 5,000 men who lived by fighting,
700 joined the Parliamentarians (Sir John Mennes to Prince 
Rupert, E. Warburton, Prince. Ruuert and the Cavaliers,
3 vols., London, 1849, II, p.371)y And Clarendon writing 
in retrospect praised the carriage of the Royalist army> 
(Rebellion, III, pp.322-5). The truth is that Byron was 
defeated through over-confidence and bad tactics.
2. Contemporary records of the army’s brief campaign abound. 
See, for example. Malbon, Memorials of the Civil War in 
Cheshire, Cheshire Record Society, 1889, pp.87-119.
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had failed and, what was worse, he had stripped his
followers in Ireland of their main line of defence.
He must have been painfully conscious of the absolute
necessity of restraining the Confederates from taking
up arms again and of the fact, indeed, that the arrival
of these troops in England represented, henceforth, his
only hope of escaping defeat. Other lessons which ought
to have been learned seem to have been overlooked; the
futility of bringing over troops in separate contingents!
the need to co-ordinate their movements v/ith those of the
2
royalist forces in England, and the need to give Irish 
troops time to acclimatise themselves before being committed 
to any major action. It is noteworthy how, from this time 
forvmrd, the King fixes ]j.is gaze on obtaining 10,000 troops, 
a figure the symmetry of which seemed to reassure him, as 
though getting them was all that mattered and questions of 
equipment, morale and co-ordination of operations less 
important. Perhaps the Confederates might have been 
more readily persuaded to fit out an expeditionary force
1. It is true that this practice was unavoidable in view of 
the shortage of shipping. But it was unwise to commit 
the army until all the troops had been brought over. As 
it was. Inchiquin’s spare troops were sent to Bristol and 
operated in the south-west while the third contingent of the 
Northern Group landed too late to take part in the decisive 
battle at Nantwich.
2. Prince Rupert was ultimately given Command of Wales and 
Cheshire and consequently of the Irish forces but rather 
too late in the day: cf. Carte, VI, pp. 13 and 14.
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if he had thought to present them with a clear plan of
campaign, in which the details appeared to have been
given close consideration, and every tactical objective
clearly stated.^
There were still several private gentlemen in
Ireland encouraged by the Cessation to make the attempt
to enlist armies on their own account for the King*s 
2
service. Prominent among these were Colonel John Barry,
•5
Lord Taaffe, Sir John Dong an, and Sir Kobert Y/elch, each 
of whom expected to produce between two and three thousand 
men. However, the Supreme Council refused to allow 
private contingents of this sort to be taicen out of the
1. This is not to reject the theory of Professor A.H. Dodd 
(see belowp^ .2ié-7) that Charles nurtured a grand strategic 
plan for the union of Irish and Welsh forces. If the plan 
existed, the fault lay in not making it clearly known and 
in appointing an incompetent commander like the Earl of 
Glamorgan to manage the Irish side of it. In any case
it v\^ ould seem fair to allow Charles credit for concocting 
imaginative strategic schemes ; it was as a tactician and 
commander of men that he was inadeq_uate. (Studies in 
Stuart Wales, University of Wales Press, 1953; see also 
above Chapter IV 1
2. The King recommended them and others to Ormond; cf.for 
example, the King to Ormond, Feb.4, 1644, T.C.P., IX. p.58 
recommending Col. Anthony Willoughby, who wished to raise 
troops from anywhere in Ireland. Ormond is to advance
him £500. See also Ormond to Digby, Jan.19, 1644, Carte VI, 
pp.18-19.
3. Taaffe was usually optimistic and never more so than 
on this occasion; of. "... send me commission and I will 
furnish your Highness with as many Irish well-armed, as 
you please ", Taaffe to Prince Rupert, Oct.16, 1643, 
V/arburton, op.cit., p.320.
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Kingdom on the grounds that they would be better employed as
1
part of the large force it proposed itself to raise. In fact,
the Supreme Council was determined to make the King deal
exclusively with itself. The provision of troops was the
basis of its bargaining power; if the King could obtain the
troops he required by making a series of agreements with
individual commanders, this power would largely disappear.
Whether the King ever had such piecemeal action in mind is
open to doubt, but certainly, by the Spring of 1644, it was
brought home to him that if approaches were not made through
the Supreme Council, they had to be abandoned altogether.
Much has been made of the Council's willingness to allow levies
to be recruited by France and Spain at the very time when they
were refusing the King a similar privilege. The circumstances
were, however, quite different; the Council was on friendly
terms with Spain and France, anxious, indeed, to obtain money
and munitions from those countries - it was still'in arms’
2
against the King. Moreover, during the period when they
1. There were other reasons - maintaining Castlehaven's army 
which was going to be in action against the Scots, for instance ; 
cf. Supreme Council to O'Hartegan, Gilbert, II, pp.109-110.
2. Ormond was apprehensive of the consequences of Spain and 
France coming to recruit in Ireland. He believed the Irish 
would be encouraged thereby to raise their demands and to 
refuse to allow private recruiting for service in England; 
Ormond to Digby, Carte, VI, p.19.
13o
were hoping for a successful outcome their meeting
with the King at Oxford, they carefully refrained from
sending any troops abroad^
Thus, the King’s main hopes still rested-on a general
accommodation with the Confederates, and, consequently, on
his go-between, the Marquis of Ormond. That this was his
own opinion is shown by the fact that when news reached
him that a Cessation had definitely been arranged, he
decided at once to make Ormond his Lord Lieutenant. The
exact nature of his hopes of Ormond and of Ireland may be
deduced from the commission v/hich he issued when formally
conferring upon him the Lord Lieutenancy.,
It instructed him to prevent a rupture of the
Cessation and to try to put back the departure of
2
Confederate agents to Oxford. If their departure could 
not be deferred, he v/as to induce them to moderate their 
demands. He was to extract from the Irish all the money 
and supplies that he could obtain and to see to it, as
1. Cf. Supreme Council to Father O ’Hartegan, Feb.22,1644, 
Gilbert, III, p.110; De la Moneyie to Cardinal Magarin,
April 8, 1644, ibid., pp.135-6.
2. Yet, as early as October 19th, Charles issued instructions 
concerning the despatch of Irish officials to England to
act as advisers during the cohference v/ith the Confederates 
which was arranged for in the Cessation; cf. Charles I to 
the Lords Justices, Oct. 17, 1643; T.O.P.,VII, p.101,
This may have been a rare example of administrative 
efficiency. The letter was countersigned, Nicholas.
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quickly as possible, that the 10,000 troops were ready 
for service in Scotland or England, as the situation 
should require. He was also to keep Monro’s troops in 
Ulster. Charles suggested three astute but nasty ways 
in v/hich this might be done. First, he might bribe Monro 
to remain. Secondly, he might stir up the Scots against 
the Cessation. And, thirdly, if these two strategems 
failed and Monro, after all, left Ireland, the native Irish 
should b e told that
’’they could in no ways so much recommend themselves 
to the King, nor obtain for themselves such 
conditions as by following of them and falling 
upon them’.’l.,.
Ormond replied in a letter to Digby dated 13 January, 
1644. He could see the point of keeping Monro in Ulster 
but scarcely had the resources to induce him to stay.
In any case, there was as much to be said for letting 
Monro go as for keeping him; for if he were to be well 
supplied in Ireland, while the Royalist forces være not 
so, it might turn out to be:
1. T.C.P., VII, p.188; Gardiner, op.cit.. I, pp.248-9
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’’very dangerous to His Majesty’s interests here . 
and immediately destructive to his best subjects"
At the same time, it was rather unreasonable to expect
the Confederates to send troops to England and Scotland
so long as the Scots remained behind to make havoc in
Ireland. His task of conciliating the Irish ^ould be
made much easier if he could be given power to pardon those
Confederate, leaders who were willing to return to their
allegiance, to confer places of profit and honour upon
Irishmen, and to give higher appointments to Protestants
vfho had no reputation for anti-Catholicism. Ormond was
already convinced that the best policy for the Crown was
1. Carte, VI, pp.4-10. Tactfully - or perhaps pointedly - 
Ormond made no reference to the other means of detaining 
Monro in Ireland recommended by the King.
2. Whether influenced by Ormond or by expediency, Charles 
soon came to share this view. As fiigby observed in a 
letter to Ormond dated March 8:
"While they (the Scots) remains.in Ireland it is not 
probable that the Irish would spare any of their 
men or armes o^er hither; which, being ridd of 
that feare, it is probable they may in good numbers, 
in case wee come to any good agreement with the agents." 
Ibid., p.55.
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to exploit the differences between the Old and New Irish,
so as to wean the new Irish back to their allegiance.
This could not be done; however, unless he were made sole
distributor of appointments and honours in Ireland. He
insisted the more strongly upon this point:
"for that there hath already something been done 
in this kinde: particularlye they have been tould 
by some they belAeve in)from that side or heere, 
that a litÿle mon^^y given at court would more 
advantage them than any they could give heere".
Then he turned to a matter upon which he felt still
more strongly - the King's habit of employing adventurers
of the Antrim type, a habit that never ceased to lead to
misunderstandings and needless complications throughout the
negotiations with the Confederacy. ¥/hat Ormond, its
principal victim, had to say of the practice deserves to
be quoted in full:
"It will make theuinrish)think they have a nearer 
and more easy way to their ends, then by those in 
whome His ÎKjajest h a t h  placed his authority, and by 
whome he expects they should be conta6.yned in obedience, 
and made vsefull to him. And if there be difficulty 
made to graunt these things, which such an» midertaken 
may make them believe His Majest|eis inclinable vnto, 
though their vnreasonablenes^ in themselves, or the 
danger that yealding to them would bring on the King, 
necessitates a denyall or suspensipn^ yet that 
inter^ÿuption will be held by them/^fke worke of the 
governov^ against whomethey will then have such
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prejudice that whatever he propounds will he 
suspected and fruitless;!’. 1
Ormond was to return on a number of occasions to 
this kind of protest, only to be met invariably with a
p
soft answer, as indeed on this occasion. Digby always
sympathised and yet, now and then, he had to announce that
the case in question was exceptional and that the King was
obliged to grant the office or honour for which he was
being petitioned. The most serious instance of this
occurred within a few months of this time, when the King
conferred the Lord Presidency of Munster on the Catholic
■5
Lord Portland rather than on Lord Inchiquin; The sole 
consequence of this benighted appointment was that Inchiquin
1. Ibid., VI, pp.4-10. What could be more apt here than 
Trevor’s comment in a letter to Ormond?:
"My lord of Antrym’s interest, and how it moves, and 
in what it points at your lordshipp, and how this 
knight (the bearer. Sir Edmond Butler) will acquaint 
your excellence; for I dare not venture the state 
of such a question in a paper-boate. And indeed 
there was nothing that hath been acted here, but hee 
is an index to the history of Ireland, (that is,) 
soe much of it as hath been transacted since his 
taking on in the King’s business on this syde the 
water." ibid., VI, p.15.
2. Digby to Ormond, Nov.29, 1644, ibid., V, pp.529-32.
3. Presumably this appointment was made to please the 
Confederates. It is an interesting example of the King’s 
willingness to employ Catholics, despite the disapproval of 
his Protestant supporters, and it makes the claim 
subsequently made by the Earl of Glamorgan to be the King’s 
chosen successor to Ormond even less far-fetched.
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took Munster with him into the Parliamentary camp.
Ormond could never have made the same mistake, and in
fact tried to get any appointment to the presidency 
1
deferred.
Another matter over which Ormond had frequent reason 
for complaint was the King’s choice of messengers. These 
were not mere couriers, but men of some standing who were 
often given verbal, as well as written, messages. Some 
of them, indeed, were given special commissions which they 
themselves were to perform. Quite plainly, it often happened 
that a gentleman had some reason, personal or public, for 
passing from one kingdom to the other, and the King or
Ormond judged it convenient to use him as a messenger.
2
Daniel O ’Neil played this part on several occasions, as
3also did Will Somers. But one messenger frequently used 
by the King was neither liked nor trusted by Ormond. This 
was Sir Bryan O ’Neil, cousin to Daniel. V/hen Ormond 
recorded that he was the kind of man he would deal with 
only "at stave’s e n d " D i g b y  pointed out that O ’Neil was
1. Ormond to Digby, March 8, 1644, ibid, VI, p.54. The 
King became aware of his error too late and through Digby 
informed Ormond that they were anxious to find some way 
of placating Inchiquin, T.C.P., IX, p.290.
2. Of. the article by D. Cregan published in Irish 
Historical Studies, II, No.8, pp.398-414.
3. Ormond’s personal servant and used a great deal.
4. Ormond to Digby, July 22, 1644, Carte VI, p.177.
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the King’s choice; he personally would have preferred to
use Dick Power, a good Protestant. Ormond’s adverse
judgment o& O'Neil was vindicated in February 1645, when
an intercepted letter from O ’Neil described him as a knave?"
Digby’s only commenfe was that he had credited O ’Neil with
2
more wits if not honesty.
Ormond met with little success in carrying out the 
King’s various direction. It is true that Monro remained 
in Ulster, but this was none of his doing. As for the 
Confederates, they were now awaiting the results of the 
peace conference, which the King wished to defer, before 
making any further advances. Ormond had the greatest 
difficulty in extracting the £30,000 subsidy promised by 
them for the maintenance of his forces, although this was
3
through no fault of the Supreme Council. And he would 
appear to have reminded them of their undertaking to find
10,000 troops for the King’s service in vainl All they
1. Ibid, VI, p.260.
2. Ibid, VI, p.286.
3. Cf. Muskerry to Ormond, Nov.30, Ï.C.P., VII, p.410, in 
reply to one of Ormond’s many complaints. He has Warned 
the Assembly of the deleterious consequences upon the 
King's supporters and themselves of their failure to supply 
Ormond. The Assembly has resolved to send out strict 
warrants to delinquent counties.
4. This may be inferred from the fact that Ormond told 
Digby he intended to do this; Carte, VI, p.19*
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would do v/as to permit the Earl of Antrim to recruit three
________
thousand men for service under Montrose in Scotland and
(to provide Ormond with some shipping)d
According to the Scots, the Earl of Antrim had come
to Ireland as the Queen’s agent with the object of effecting
a union between the Royalist and Catholic armies and then
expelling all parliamentary sympathisers from the country.
This was doubtless what Antrim himself had in mind to
accomplish, but probably exaggerates the royal interest.
What is clear is that Antrim was acting in some capacity
on the King's behalf, although he was probably limited to
using his influence with the Confederates to further a 
2
Cessation. Antrim arrived in Northern Ireland at about 
the beginning of May, 1643, and fell into the hands of the 
Boots, who imprisoned him in Carrickfergus Castle. Several 
futile attempts, sponsored by the King, were made to secure 
his release. Then, at the end of six months, he contrived 
to escape and made his way to Kilkenny.
1. Cf. Castlehaven to Ormond, from Wexford, Nov.7, 1643;
he had been instructed to send ships to Ormond, d . , i C.P 
p.232; see also, Ormond to Nicholas Plunkett, Nov.27, 1643; 
it is plain from this letter that Ormond had been hiring 
ships and seamen from the Confederacy, ibid., p.375.
2. Antrim left England at about the same time the King ordered 
Ormond to negotiate a truce, namely,April 23rd (see aboVe p.82).
3. Cf. Montgomery MSS., p.324.n; see also J.S. Reid,
History of the Presbyterian Church, I, pp.409-10; see 
also" hlTlT' op.cit. , p. 2'62.
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Antrim’s great ambition was to raise an Irish army 
for Charles I. He v/as actuated, to a large extent, by a 
deep sense of loyalty but he also liked to cut a figure and 
hoped for some dazzling reward, such, for instance, as the 
Lord Lieutenancy. At Kilkenny, he won over an influential 
party in the government. His supporters maintained that 
a powerful mediator at Court would be valuable at a time 
when they were on the point of sending agents there to 
treat for peace. Antrim was particularly fitted for this 
role, on account of his wife’s influence in the royal circle.^ 
The Duchess had shown them remarkable friendliness and 
willingness to be of service. it would be foolish to 
reject her good offices; rather they ought to find some 
way of expressing their appreciation of her regard, and 
how better than to bestow some signal honour on her husband, 
say the title of Lieutenant General of the Confederate 
Catholics, This, by the v/ay, would strengthen his 
supporters in Scotland and force some of the Scots in 
Northern Ireland to return home, thereby lessening the 
pressure on O ’Neil. Their argument did not greatly impress 
the Council. As Bellings drily observes, it had already
1. The former Duchess of Buckingham was a Catholic. She 
is said to have married Antrim because he resembled the 
late Duke. vVhatever her motive, she was a loyal wife and 
took up permanent residence in Ireland. At this time, 
she was staying at Waterford.
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had too much experience of controlling generals. When,
however, Antrim’s clique argued that the title only was
required, not the accompanying powers, the Council
recommended the appointment to the Assembly which, without
debate, approved it?"
Still afraid that Antrim would read too much into his
appointment, Bellings proposed that,as Secretary, he should
send the commission to Wexford where Antrim was then staying,
together with a letter carefully limiting his pov/ers.
Copies could then be placed on record and invoked should
2
the need arise.
Antrim quitted Kilkenny for England in November.
As Bellings had predicted, he intended to appear at Court
5
as the veritable commander of the Confederate Army. In 
advance, he despatched three propositions to the King.
They were - to have himself appointed .commander-in-chief 
of all the Catholic armies; to raise 10,000 troops for
1. Gilbert, III, pp.4-15. The account of this episode 
given in the Aphorismical Discovery is hopelessly garbled, 
pp.79-80. Nevertheless, it is of some interest in that 
it reveals a scheme to have Antrim made Lord Lieutenant.
2. Bellings’ precaution was to be justified by the event, 
isaste bclf)w-#w, 4"to.
3. Cf. Radcliff to Ormond, Feb.19, 1644, ibid., p.39:
"Lord Digby will not believe but that Antrym is 
general, and the earl of Castlehaven fiieutenant- 
general; for so hath the garl of Antrym resolutely 
tould &ord Digby and the King."
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service in England; to raise a further 3,000 troops for
service in Scotland} Charles, being dubious of his 
2
ability, informed Ormond of his designs on the supreme
3
command and recommended Ormond to thwart them. Nor did 
he entertain much hope of the 10,000 troops. The third
proposition, however, struck him as attractive and feasible.
He therefore directed Ormond to afford Antrim all possible 
assistance, especially credit for raising supplies}
There was a risk that such an enterprise against Scotland 
might impel Monro to transport his army there also, but 
the risk seemed worth taking and at least it would release
some pressure from the Royalists in Ireland.
Trust in iuitrim to mount this Scottish enterprise was 
based on two considerations: first, his ancestry and family 
background; secondly, the fighting temperament of the men 
of Ulster, where he planned to recruit his army. Antrim 
stemmed from the most pov/erful clan in the Highlands, the 
Clan Macdormell, his grandfather having emigrated, with
1. C&y ("(1 , Id, '
2. Clarendon conveyAolAhe impression in his account of this 
episode that the King barely tolerated the importunities 
of Antrim and Daniel O'Neill but was persuaded to support 
them by Digby. He also had Digby and O'Neill engage in 
some very devious play-acting in order to gain this end; 
cf. Rebellion, III, p.532.
3. Carte, V, p.531.
4. Ibid., VI, pp.20-21.
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many followers to Ireland. Relations between the two
branches of the family had been maintained and there was
reason to believe that Antrim would be able to count on a
«
warm welcome in Scotland. As for the Ulstermen, they 
were chafing at the suspension of the war and would be ready 
instantly to take up arms again. They shared in common 
the language and many of the customs of the Highlanders and 
could be expected to detect in a Scottish expedition a 
means of withdrav/ing Monro's army from Ulster. Moreover, 
Montrose, then at Oxford, had indicated to the King that 
the Highlanders were prepared to answer the call to arms.
It was obviously sensible to give him all possible additional 
support.
In his correspondence with the King, Antrim invariably 
exaggerated not only the number of troops he could recruit 
but also his own standing at Kilkenny. In truth, he was 
closely related to a few members of the Council, on friendly 
terms with several more, and the erstwhile patron of its 
two principal bureaucrats, Dr. Gerald Fennel and Richard 
Bellings. Yet his instability of mind and temperament 
were well-known and the clergy, in particular, were loath 
to place too much confidence in him. Even Antrim, with 
his puffed-up pride, seems to have realized this, for he
1. "The design of %Witing the Earls of Montrose and 
Antrim, which was yet wholly managed with the king by 
the Lord Digby". Clarendon, Rebellion, III, p.538.
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admitted his inability to accomplish anything without the 
backing of Ormond, which he duly requested}
When he left Oxford late in January, 1644, he was
2
accompanied by Daniel O ’Neill, an old and respected friend.
Throughout the negotiations between the Court and Kilkenny,
3O'Neill is ubiquitous. Persona grata at Court and with 
both the Old and the New Irish, nephew of Owen Roe and 
intimate friend of Digby} he was better fitted, perhaps, 
than anyone to travel hither and thither on conciliatory 
errands. Moreover, though not averse from deceit in 
his dealings with others, he was passionately devoted to 
the House of Stuart. In 1646 he would be prepared to risk 
his reputation and his Irish estates to warn the temporary 
commander of Dublin that his own^uncle, Owen Roe, was about
5
to march on the city. It was Digby who drew the King's
1. Digby to Ormond, March 14, 1644, Carte, VI. p.62; 
with regard to .rintrim’s reliance on Ormond cf. his two 
letters, Feb.29, March 2, 1644, T.C.P., IX, p.214, p.224.
2. Clarendon says of their relationship:
"Whether by allegiance or friendship or long 
acquaintance, O'Neill had more power with the 
Earl of Antrim than any man, and by the ascendant 
he had in his understanding and the dexterity of 
his nature he could persuade him very much -"
Great Rebellion, II, p.117.
3. There is a full account of Daniel O'Neill's career as a 
Royalist agent in an article by Donfi(l F. Cregan in Irish 
Historical Studies, Vol.ii, no.8, September, 1941, pp.398-414.
4. "My speciall deare and intimate frêènd", Carte,VI, p.21.
5. Daniell O'Neill to the Earl of Roscommon, Sep.l, 1646, 
Anhorj^Disc., 1, pt.ii, pp.701-2.
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attention to the advantages of sending him along with Antrim, 
for he could keep a watchful eye and a restraining hand on 
that optimist, act as a buffer between him and Ormond^ and 
use his influence at Kilkenny and with his uncle to ease 
the path of the mission. The fact that on this occasion 
and in the future he was prepared to spend his own money 
no doubt also appealed to the King.
Summoned by the King, before their departure, O'Neill
predicted that Antrim would readily muster the troops but
would then run into difficulties. These would be occasioned
by his own unsteadiness, Ormond's dislike of him and the
likely refusal of the Irish leaders to permit troops to
quit the country. He, O'Neill, would do his best to see
2
these difficulties surmounted.
At Digby's instigation, the King conferred the title 
of Marquis upon Antrim and the office of Gentleman of the 
Bedchamber upon Daniel, who had long coveted it. He 
consented to let them try their luck, and commissioned 
Antrim to
1. In fact, O'Neill seems to have acted as a mediator 
between Antrim and Ormond.
2. Clarendon, Rebellion, III, pp.539-40.
3. Confened by privy seal, Oxford, January 26, 1644, 
Lodge's Peerage, I, p.210.
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"... persuade the Catholics in Ireland to send
10,000 men to England, ammunition, artillery and 
ships. If the conditions offered are too high, 
to do the best he can to get 2,000 men for Scotland 
to join Lord Seaforth and Sir James Mcdonald in 
falling on the Marquis of Argyll's country. To 
correspond with the Earl of Montrose, and to attempt 
to draw General Monro and his forces into the King's 
service, by promise to him of an Earldom of Scotland, 
with £2,000 per annum."1
He was to try, also, to divide the Supreme Councillors
2
against one another. Yet Ligby professed little optimism 
as to the outcome of the venture when apprising Ormond of it. 
Perhaps, of course, he wished diplomatically to disarm 
Ormond's certain annoyance at this fresh employment of
3
Antrim. Antrim might be useful somewhere, he wrote,
but clearly not, as he hoped, in the post of Commander-
in-Chief of the expeditionary force to England when it
materialised. That appointment was, naturally, being
4
reserved for the Viceroy himself.
1. Gilbert, III, pp.88-90; Clarendon State Papers, II,
pp.165-6; Antrim also entered into à formal agreement with 
Montrose which was witnessed by Ligby, O'Neill and Sir 
Robert Spotswoode.. By this, he was committed to invade 
the territory of the Marquis of Argyll before April 1,
1644. The agreement is printed in Hill, pp.206-7.
2. This v/ould appear from a letter which Daniel O'Neill 
wrote to Ormond, March 2, 1644, Aphor.Disc., p.571;
see below p.’/ffZ.
3. It was typical of both Charles and Digby that they 
should be prepared to employ Antrim and to ask Ormond to 
help him, when he had not only affronted and inconvenienced 
Ormond but had been unequivocally described by Ormond as 
feather-brained and dishonest.
4. Carte, V> ST3I; Ste /i, fa. 7^,
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Antrim and O ’Neill arrived at Kilkenny on February 23rd
and put their requests^ to the Supreme Council. O ’Neill
sought to influence them with the assurance that a favourable
response would be the best way of supporting their delegation 
2
at Oxford. Antrim was even more explicit; he stated that 
the provision of 10,000 troops was a necessary pre-condition
3
of the conference taking place. After five days of debate,
the Council announced that the provision of the troops
depended on the outcome of the Oxford negotiations^but
that supplies for an expedition to Scotland would be
found on condition that Antrim himself raised the men, and
that a port in Ulster should be named for receiving them,
5
the Governor of which should be Walter Bagnail. Ormond
1. These included a request for arms and ammunition for the 
use of Prince Rupert. Nothing came of it; cf. Prince 
Rupert to Lords and Gentlemen assembled at Kilkenny, Jan.18, 
1644, Carte, VI, pp.14-15; the King to Ormond, Jan.18, 1644, 
T.C.P., v m ,  p.345; the Supreme Council to Ormondj Feb. 28, 
ibid., IX, p.206; same to same, April 15, ibid; X, p.128.
2. O ’Neill to Ormond, Aphor.Lise., I, pt.ii, pp.569-70.
3. Gilbert (Bellings), III, pp.6-7.
4. Answer of the Supreme Council to the King’s demands for
10,000 men; n.d. Feb.7, 1644, T.C.P., XIV, p.l08r This 
is out of its chronological order in the Transcripts.
5. An order issued by the Supreme Council, Feb.29, 1644, 
T.C.P., IX, p.207. Antrim may have tried to get the 
governorship for Baijnall; cf. Radcliffe to Ormond, March 8, 
1644, Carte, VI, p.56.
1 4 6
regarded the second condition as a pretext for capturing
either Carlingford or Greencastle, ports which the Con-
1
federacy had long coveted, and refused to agree. Ormond
was evidently so convinced that the Confederates had designs
on these two ports that he ordered Lord Moore to strengthen
2
their defences.
In the meantime, Antrim had consolidated his position 
at Kilkenny. By dint of taking the oath of association, 
he had become a member of the Council as well as Lieutenant 
General of all the Confederate troops in the Kingdom on
3
the strength of the King’s commission; He was no less 
successful in speedily raising the greater part of the 
troops for Scotland, drawing them chiefly from among his 
own tenants and neighbours. The officers were mostly
4
those discontented with the Cessation. Unfortunately, 
the Supreme Council was extremely slow in producing the
1. Ormond to Ligby, March 13, 1644, ibid., pp.60-61.
2. Jan.29, 1644, T.C.P., IX, p.36.
3. Gilbert (Bellings), III, p.10.
4. Taaffe to Ormond, April 13, T.C.P., X, p.117? Gilbert,III 
p.139; Carte,ÎIÎ,p.fBl. It may be deduced from a con­
gratulatory letter from Ligby to Antrim, dated March 14th, 
that the latter had informed the King of his success and 
complained about the restrictions put upon his commission. 
Apparently, he was to receive orders from Montrose and did 
not like the idea. Q .S.P.X,t-roland, pp.392-3.
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promised ammunition and supplies, apart from 2,000 weight
of powder} despite his complaints about the cost of
maintaining the troops and the injunctions and entreaties
of Ormond who was perturbed lest the successes of Montrose
being reported from Scotland should come to an early end
2for lack of the expected reinforcements from Ireland.
Barry, handling the negotiations for Ormond at Kilkenny, 
summed up the difficulty of the situation with characteristic 
wit:
"... more I could not doe thoughe I wanted neither 
importunitie or impudence, and towards beings soe,
(it maye be) drinlce was sometymes necessarie, as 
it was to molifie and incline to kindness the hard ? 
hart es of some of the members of the greate Councill."
Ships had been hired by Ormond and were ready to sail on
May 12. Disappointed by the delay and alarmed at the
rising cost, Antrim announced'that he was abandoning the
whole enterprise. It would seem that he suspected Ormond
of being lukev/arm in his support, if not actively hostile.^
1. Supreme Council to Ormond, April 17, T.C.P., X, p.159.
2. He offered to offset the cost against payment of the 
residue of the money promised under the Cessation^ Ormond 
to Pennell, Mar.6, Carte, VI, pp.48-9; same to Pennell and 
Bellings, April.22, T.G.P., X, p.190.
3. Barry to Ormond, April 18, ibid., p.181.
4. Cf. Ormond to Antrim, July 10, Carte, VI, p.159, wheyt 
he says he has heard from several sources reports of 
Antrim’s allegations about his lack of sincerity towards 
him; see also Digby to Ormond, March 14, ibid., pp.62-3.
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He may even have voiced his suspicions to the King, since
the King wrote to Ormond on March 12 at first saying that
much was to be expected from Ireland as he gathered from
the reports of Antrim and O ’Neill and continuing,
’only one thing I thought necessary earnestly 
to give you in charge myself; which is, that you 
will UYi'ite yourself in a strict and entire
correspondence with Antrim, and contribute all
your power to further him in those services which 
he hath undertaken; for I find that almost the 
whole kingdom is so much divided betwixt your two 
interests, that if you join in the ways, as well as 
in the end,for my service, you will meet with small 
difficulties there .,.’1
If, in fact, Ormond had wished to sink Antrim, he could
have accepted his threat to abandon the expedition,
especially as his own original estimate of Antrim’s
2
influence had now been justified. As it was, he took
3
great pains to persuade j-mtrim. to persevere v/ith the venture, 
d At last, on June 19th, the troops and munitions were aboard 
ship and ready to sail, though Ormond himself had to supply 
most of the powder^ and the troops numbered not 3,000, but
1. Ibid., V, p.6.
2, On March 25th, a correspondent at Court informed Ormond 
that the stock of Antrim, and O ’Neill had slumped ’two shillings 
in the pound’ since the arrival of the Confederate Commissioner^? 
Ibid., VI, p.69.
5. June 1, Ormond to Antrim, ibid., p.139.
4. This must have been a great sacrifice on Ormond’s part.
Apart from Prince Rupert’s request, the King had recently 
sent over a special envoy to solicit arms and ammunition 
in the expectation of a big build-up of forces around 
Chester; cf. Digby to Ormond, Feb.20, 1644, ibid., VI, 
pp.40-41.
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l,60o} However, they were commanded by three excellent 
officers, notably Alexander Macdonne11, usually known by 
his picturesque nom de guerre, Colkittoe. In Scotland, 
they were to fight splendidly and to make a big contribution
p
to Montrose’s brilliant campaign. They constituted, 
moreover, the only concrete assistance ever afforded the 
King by the Confederacy. Allowing that this small band 
consisted of volunteers eager to fight, their gallantry 
in action makes one wonder what might have been had the 
mythical 10,000 troops ever sailed for England, especially ■ 
if they had been commanded by a general of the calibre of
1. Antrim to Ormond, Jun.27, ibid., p.150. At first a 
mere 500 in the Aphorismical Discovery account, p.280.
-^t is also claimed by the same questionable authority 
that "Owen Oneyll did send men, ammunition and all 
necessaries with his frigats for transportation with 
them." Ibid.
2. Cf. Clarendon, Life Written by Himself, II, p.246.
"It cannot be denied thaïT the levies the Marquis of 
ilntrim made, and sent over to Scotland under the command 
of Colkitto, were the foundation of all those wonderful 
acts which were performed afterwards by the Marquis of 
Montrose ... and the Marquiss of Montrose did always 
acknov/ledge, that the rise and beginning of his good 
success was due and to be imputed to that body of the 
Irish which had in the beginning been sent by the Marquiss 
of Antrim, to whom the King had acknowledged the service 
in several letters of his own handwriting".
3. Apart from small batches of reinforcements sent later 
by Antrim to replace their own losses.
15#
1
Owen Roe O ’Neill,
It is, perhaps, too easy to assume that Antrim was
both dishonest and feckless. Arrayed against him were
2
Ormond, Digby, Bellings and many others. And yet, it was
1. There is an inventory of troops among the Ormond MSB.
in the National Library of Ireland which indicates that 
Antrim and O'Neill had been optimistic about raising 
not 10,000 but 12,000 soldiers. Apparently, Daniel had 
sent a list of Ormond, The cypher copy is accompanied 
by a decoded copy that as follows:
"A List of those yt prefer their service to fintrim
Earle. Owen 0 ’Neale (sic) with three regiments 
consisting of 3,000 men all armed. Collonel Preston 
with a Regiment of 1,000 men halfe arm’d. Sr. Pierce 
Crosby with one Regiment of 1,000 all arm’d. Sir 
James Dillon a thousand - all arm’d, James Macdormell 
A thousand but 200 arm’d. Hugh Mac, phe 
1500 half arm’d, Torlogh O ’Corian a thousand half 
arm’d, besides many more etc." (the cypher copy continues 
"wch because unarmed I lorbeare to tell of", and ends - 
"I have seene the Engagement of some of the Principell 
in this list sent mee by 310 under their own hands).
N.L.l.j Ormond MSB.^Jan.3, 1644-45 - May 14, 1645. The
Cypher copy is numbered 223 and the decoded one 227.
Presumably these two documents are wrongly placed. They
should occur in the volume numbered 2308.
2, And, of course, the King and the Queen. Charles felt 
grateful for Antrim’s efforts. Thus;
"Antrim, I have ever been send able of your very 
harty affictions in my service, and now I find the 
fruités of them likely prove soe much to the advantages
of my affaires, by the forces wch you caused to be
landed in the highlands of Scotland. That it chalengeth 
from me very particular thanks. And as yew have done 
these soe I make no doubt But if you shall find it
requisite for my service, you will not neglect going
thither in person. As on my part I shall take care
to give you assurances that I am
Your affectionate friend,
Charles R.
Clarendon, Sep.27, 1644. Hill, p.471.
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he who alone ever raised troops in Ireland for the King's
service elsewhere, he alone who helped to maintain those
troops for three years in Scotland} Moreover, it is
significant that, at the Restoration, Antrim successfully
sustained his claim for the restitution of his property
and estates on the strength of his past services, in face
of Ormond's opposition and the determination of the Irish
Council and most of the King's advisers to have his claim 
2
rejected.
The importance in general of aid to Scotland has also 
been unwarrantably minimised. For instance, the King 
himself informed Ormond on January 4th, 1645, that Montrose's 
victories had already produced "very powerful effects in the 
temper of the Scottish nation at London," and urged him to 
send aid to Scotland, this being, "one of the most essential!
3
points of all affa^i^". Ligby also, though one of 
Antrim's most scathing critics, was moved to write that 
the best policy would have beentc;
1. The author of the Aphorismical Discovery, who had no 
axe to grind in this instance, described'Antrim as "viribus 
et p^sse for the King" p.76; he also claimW that Antrim 
went in person to Scotland in 1644 with 2 frigates and re­
inforcements, ibid.)p.89.
2. See below pp.^ frl-J'where Antrim's post-Restoration experience 
is compared and contrasted with that of the Marquis of 
Worcester (formerly Earl of Glamorgan).
5. Carte, Vl, 12^-6 .
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"te l!jfse all possible means to encourage and assist 
the ilarl of Antrinm and his forces in the service of 
Scotland; whereoïji^Çhe King’s party) finde such 
admirable effects (in England) T 1
In addition, presuming Daniel O ’Neill to be a
trustworthy reporter, Antrim had some measure of success
in carrying out that part of the King’s instructions
which concerned sowing seeds of dissension among the
Confederates. For O ’Neill notified Digby as early as
March 2nd,
* that matter (upon my credit) is so well ordered, 
that it is not in the power of either catholic 
clergy or Pope's nuncio, Spanish or French to 
make any party against the King".2
At the same time, Daniel described the Supreme Council
as being divided in its allegiance between Ormond and
Antrim - a division which it is hard to accept.
In this same letter Daniel assured the King that
he need not give way to any of the Confederate Agents'
demands which he deemed 'exorbitant'. About the same time
hejj^ gave Henrietta Maria the astonishing news that the Irish
Council had agreed to give her £4,000 per annum and invite
3
her to Ireland. Hearing of all this, Digby informed Ormond
with more than a hint of incredulity that 'promised
wonders'} In fact it is doubtful whether O'Neill's assurances
1. ^^4. Carte, VI, p.221.
2. Aphor. Disc. , I, pi^ii, p,571.
3. Trevor to Ormond, Mar. 9, 1644, Carte, VI, p.57.
4. Ibid., p.56.
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were taken very seriously at Oxford and not improbable:
’’that he was appropriating to himself in advance a 
little of the credit for the settlement.”
v/hich he was convinced would be arranged.^
Meanwhile, preparations had been going forward
slowly at Oxford, Waterford, Kilkenny and Dublin for a
conference between the King and Confederate representatives,
as stipulated for in the articles of Cessation. At first
2the King had put off a meeting with the Confederates.
Then, about the end of December, he changed his mind, 
presumably because it had become only too evident that the 
Confederacy would otherwise give him no support, and
3
instructed Ormond to hurry over a delegation.
At Waterford, the Third General Assembly had convened 
on 7th November for the primary purpose of nominating 
commissioners to wait upon the King with their grievances^ 
The election went smoothly, but afterwards there was a long
5
period of contention. The chosen commissioners were mostly
1. Ibid.
2. See above p. (So.
3. Dlgby sent safe-conducts for the Confederate delegation 
on Dec.23, Digby to Ormond, Carte, V,pp.543-4.
4. The Assembly was also to discuss ways and means of 
increasing pressure against the Scots. It probably 
dispersed at the end of the month.
5. Gilbert (Sellings), III, p.2.
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Ormondists - Lord Muskerry, Geoffrey Brown, Richard Martin,
Lermot O ’Bryen, Alexander Macdonnell (not ’Colkittoe’, of
course, but the Aarl of Antrim’s brother), Nicholas
Plunket and Sir Robert Talbot} On December 19th, a formal
2
request for safe conducts was addressed to Ormond.
Presumably acting on the King’s instructions to try 
to put back the sending oi a delegation to Oxford Ormond 
carefully refrained from giving a reply. Again, therefore, 
on December 19th, Sellings, on behalf of the Council, 
protested against the delay and renewed the request for
3
safe-conducts. On this occasion Ormond considered it 
expedient to make some acknowledgement at once and so he 
wrote to Muskerry.
Muskerry, who was to lead the delegation and whose 
influence had become paramount among the peace-making 
elements at Kilkenny, had asked Ormond, apparently on his 
own initiative, for advice relative to the propositions 
which it would be fitting to put forward to the King. 
Ormond’s reply dwelt on the respect they should show to 
His Majesty and contained a warning that they must not 
expect an ideal reception, in view of the bitterness
1. Gilbert, III, p.65. Apparently, when they finally went 
to Oxford, they were accompanied also by Robert Barry, 
vicar apostalic of Ross, who represented the interests of 
the clergy, {Com. Rin.,f II, p.478.
2. Gilbert, III, p.65.
3. T.C.P., #  VII, p.102: Gilbert, III, p.65.
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engendered by recent events. For the rest, he suggested
somewhat vaguely that they should ask for nothing that the
King could not be expected to give, this admirable restraint
being what he himself would have practised if charged with
a similar weighty employment} In brief, his advice was
not of much use, although it is difficult to see what
other form it could have taken. It is to be presumed
that Muskerry took the questionable course of approaching
Ormond, not only because he was concerned, in his moderation,
to make the conference with the King a success, but because
there was wide disagrement at Kilkenny as to the demands
which should be presented, and he believed that Ormond’s
. 2
opinion might carry some weight.
This may be evidenced by the fact that, whereas the 
safe-conducts v/ere despatched’by the Lords Justices on
3
January 1, 1644, the agents did not leave Kilkenny until 
early in March. In a further letter to Muskerry, dated 
January 23, Ormond mildly observed that, in view of the 
ardour with which the Confederate agents had pressed for 
an audience with the King at the time of the Cessation,
1. Dublin, Dec. 19, 1643, Carte, V, p.540.
2. Of. also Sellings’ account, Gilbert, III, p.2.
3. T.C.P., VII], p. 273. - They did not waste time; Digby 
had only despatched the safe-conducts on December 23rd. 
See above p. ,
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he would have thought that they would, by now, have long
been in England. As it,was, he had to inform them that
(VKe«vv) 1
he had been commanded by the King ’to hastenjthither’ .
The difficulty, as on so many occasions, lay in evolving
a programme satisfactory alike to the gentlemen of the
Pale, the clergy and the Old Irish. Compromise over the
objects of their movement became progressively more difficult
to achieve with each month that passed, and, in this
instance, while the New Irish were willing to accept less
than heretofore, the Old Irish would not abate any of
their former demands. As it happened, even the requests
of the New Irish were to be far in excess of what the King
felt himself able to offer and the long debate was thus
typical of the interminable, intolerant wrangling that
characterised discussions at Kilkenny. The delegation
2
arrived at Oxford on March 23rd.
At the request of the King, a delegation had also
3
to be sent to represent the Protestants in Ireland.
For this the King had presumably at least three motives: 
a genuine desire to hear what the Protestants had to say;
1. T.G.P., IX, p.16.
2. Hadcliffe to Ormond, April 2, 1644, Carte, VI, p.84.
3. AS has been pointed out, above p.lSO, the King gave
orders as early as October 17th that several Irish 
officials should be sent to hngland to attend any 
conference which should take place with the Irish 
Catholics . VII, p.101.
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the need to appear impartial, as the Sovereign giving 
ear to a petition from his subjects and passing judgement; 
and,lastly, the possibility of being able to induce the 
Confederate Commissioners to modify their terms by holding 
constantly before them the intransigence of the Protestant 
agents and his own consequent inability to give way to them. 
If the King's thoughts did not run roughly along these 
lines, his decision can only be considered ill-advised, 
for to invite the Protestants v/as to run the risk of getting 
no agreement at all, though the risk was to some extent 
lessened by the fact that the Lords Justices and Council 
could be expected to propose the names of fairly moderate 
people. In the event, they put forward a number of names, 
asking the King to make his own choice from among them. 
However, the Lublin Protestants, alarmed that their 
interests might be neglected, petitioned that they be 
allowed to send a delegation on their own account. The 
King, reluctantly perhaps, agreed. On hearing the names 
of the official delegates nominated, they decided that 
their interests would, after all, be safeguarded and that 
there was no need for the special delegation}
1. Carte, VI, pp.22-3. Professor Coonan infers that Ormond 
wished the extremists well and sought to curry favour with 
them, op.cit. p |77 . And yet the delegation never even
went so far as to embark for England.
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A minority of extremists were still dissatisfied, 
however. On October 1st following on the Cessation, 
hearing of the Confederate plans to send a delegation 
to Oxford, they had gathered together at the house of 
the Earl of Kildare to decide upon their course of action} 
Shortly afterwards, they had presented a petition to the 
Lords Justices claiming the privilege of attending upon 
the King at the same time as the Confederate agents and 
requesting licence to travel. The Council replied on 
October 12th that the question of Protestant representation 
had been taken in hand; they had sent a list of suitable
1, In a contemporary tract, which has not been previously 
used, this dissident group described in detail the events 
leading up to the Oxford Conference as well as the Conference 
itself as it appeared to their representatives. Although 
their views on the Irish Catholics were extreme and 
intemperately expressed, they ;were remarkably objective 
in assembling the report. It is a pity that they could 
not gain access to more information since theirs is the 
only complete account of the experience of a party at 
the Conference that we have. Unless another reference 
is specifically given, it may be assumed that all 
references to the actions, opinions and statements of 
this party were extracted from the tract:, which is 
contained in the Royal Irish Academy collection. Box 37. 
Tract 12, V, 41. The Tract will be referred to simply 
as Tract.
159
persons to the King at his request so that he might make 
his choice from among them. Although there was no precedent 
for granting the sort of licence they had asked, a copy of 
their petition was being sent to the King.
At this juncture, a second confabulation took place 
at Kildare House. The dissidents decided that the 
representatives likely to be sent to Oxford^ would fail to 
present their particular case strongly enough. They believed 
that there was precedent for issuing a licence to travel.
It also seemed to them that there was a conspiracy afoot to 
allow the Confederate Agents to get to Oxford first. To 
safeguard their interests, they therefore elected agents 
of their own - four apparently - and drew up a petition to 
the Crown.
Then, on October 19th, they again petitioned the Lords 
Justices for permission to travel, and delivered a copy of 
their petition to the King. Again the Lords Justices politely 
refused. And, apparently on the day following, a 'protestation* 
was published against the disgruntled petitioners}
■The explanation of this treatment may not be far to seek. 
Kildare and his supporters were obviously crypto-Parliamentarians 
and they must have aroused the wrath of the sincere Dublin 
Royalists. There is, besides, some evidence that a few 
Protestants at least were sufficiently enlightened to wish
1. Tract.
l6o
for peace in Ireland on terms of compromise. This is 
apparent from the following contemporary report}
It appears that the English Parliament attempted to 
sponsor, among the Irish Protestants, a petition against 
making peace. An Irish Protestant, questioned about it by 
a member of the English House of Commons, replied - as though 
he were speaking for many more - that peace was necessary. 
Then, to a large extent, he defended the rebels, while 
attacking Puritan policy. Nonetheless, he detested Roman 
Catholicism;
"but you must pardon me if I doe not believe the way 
to remove the Errors, is to destroy the mess, that 
the way to People Ireland with Protestants, is to 
cut the throats of all the Papists."
lYith inexorable logic he exposed the crudeness of the
extremist argument :
"Why then must we have no Peace? because they are 
Rebells: Is that your Proposition? No Rebellion
must be extinguished but with the blood and
extirpation of the Rebells."
There were many Catholics, he concluded, who had taken to .
arms with the deepest repugnance but who had been driven to
do so by the:
"skill and industry used by some of your friends 
in England, and some of my friends in Ireland, to 
improve and continue this Rebellion".2
1. R.I.A., Box 29, Tract 14, Vol.34.
2. Ibid.
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If there had been more men in Ireland who could reason
with such fairness and humanity, the impending tragedy for
the King and the Irish Catholics might have been avoided.
Meanwhile, on November 6th, the King had granted
permission for the dissident petitioners to send their own
delegation to confer with him. On January 21st, 1644, Sir
Charles Coote and Captain Y/illiam Parsons were also elected
1
to go to England, and permission asked for their attendance.
Coote seems to have acted as leader of the party. Ormond and
the Council insisted upon examining their instructions.
They perused them on March 4th and refused to permit certain
items. At about the same time, they ordered Coote and Parsons
2
^to take their regiments with them to England. This would 
seem fairly conclusive proof that they supported Parliament 
and indicates that their troops v/ere also disaffected.
Intensive patrolling by Parliamentary frigates of the 
sea lanes between Dublin and Chester delayed the departure
3
of both Protestant delegations and neither had arrived when 
the Confederate commissioners submitted their proposals on 
March 28th.
This signalled the beginning of the Oxford Conference 
which was to last for about two months. The word 'Conference’
fhe
is perhaps a misnomer when applied to^desultory meetings that
1.Charles to Ormondf Council, Feb.27, agreed that Parsons and 
CooiE may attend, T.C.P., XIV, p.105.
2. T^act.
3. Ormond to Nicholas, April 2, T.C.P., X, p.64.
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took place. There were very few verbal discussions as
such and, apparently, on no occasion were all the interested
parties assembled together to thrash out matters in dispute.
(Indeed, both Protestant delegations towards the end of the
Conference were uncertain whether the Confederate agents had
departed or not I ) ^  The only group which had a clear idea
of v/hat was going on was the committee of the privy council
charged to deal with Irish affairs. This was obviously
considered policy. The committed consisted of Lord Digby,
the Earls of Bristol and Portland, Mr. Secretary Nicholas,
Sir John Colepepper, Sir Edward Hyde and Cottingéon| who 
2
presided. All handled the negotiations gingerly while
Colepepper and Hyde seem to have been unsympathetic to the
Catholic case. Hyde,especially, always enjoyed a very low
3reputation among the Irish. Sometimes, evidently, the business 
was considered by the whole council under the presidency 
of Charles himself.
Essentially^the Catholic propositions were designed to 
secure religious freedom and political independence, to regain 
at least some of the lands forfeited by Catholic prop$W$#^
1. Percivall to Ormond, Carte, VI, p.130.
2. Tract.
3. "Sir Edward Hyde and ëir John Colepepper are suspected to 
bee something rigide in the business of the Irish. This from 
Bord primate, who is yett well." Trevor to Ormond, March 25 
Carte, VI, p.70.
163
during the past eighty years, to guard against reprisals 
for the uprising, and to insure that the entire settlement 
should be so enshrined in law as to obviate the possibility 
of trickery. As regards religion, they demanded the repeal 
of the penal laws and the right of Catholics to share state 
appointments. They were perfectly aware that the necessary 
corollary of religious freedom was political independence 
and this they intended to acquire through a variety of 
reforms. First of all, the Irish Parliament should not be 
subordinated to the superior jurisdiction of the English 
Parliament. The practice of packing the House with lords
not estated in Ireland should cease. The pov/ers of the
Executive should be drastically reduced: thus, conciliar 
jurisdiction should be strictly limited to matters of state, 
the tour of duty of viceroys should not exceed three years, 
and the standing army, the coercive instrument of a-uthority, 
should be disbanded. The Court of Wards, which was
exploited skilfully to extend the power of the State and to
convert Catholics in its charge to Protestantism, should be 
abolished in return for a fixed revenue to be determined by 
mutual agreement. Concerning land, all titles and grants 
conferred since the first year of Elizabeth should be 
reviewed in a free parliament. The Act of Adventurers must 
clearly be repealed, as well as other acts, attainders, 
outlawries, etc., promulgated since October 1641. To 
forestall any reprisals whatsoever there should be a
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comprehensive Act of Oblivion. The whole settlement
should be embodied in Acts passed by a free Parliament
summoned for the purpose, during the sessions of which
Poyning^ Law must of necessity be suspended. Naturally,
they could not agree to dismantle the system of government
they had created until the process of enactment had been
completed. If the King could see his way to accepting
their terms, they would put 10,000 troops at his disposal}
Muskerry described these proposals to Ormond as so moderate
and reasonable that the King could surely accept them without
prejudice to his situation in England; in any case, they were
2
the very least they could stand by. His view was not shared 
by the King and his advisers who stated indignantly that the 
propositions were scandalous to contemplate and that it was 
pointless to continue on such a basis. If v/hat they stated 
was true from their point of vievf, it is nevertheless very 
doubtful that they wanted the Conference to end thus quickly 
and pretty certain that they counted upon the Commissioners 
making a fresh approach. This may be inferred from Ligby’s 
appreciation of the way the Conference might turn out for the
1. Gilbert, III, pp.128-133. The proposals were described
as being 'in pursuance' of the Remonstrance presented at Tri$.
2. March 29, Carte, VI, p.74
3. Digby to Ormond, April 2, ibid., pp.85-6; Radcliffe to 
Ormond, April 2, ibid, p.84; Clarendon retrospectively accused 
the Commissioners of demanding the total alteration of 
government both in Church and State^ Historigal View, p.1044.
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Royalists. As ne saw it, they could not fail to gain, for 
if it were to end in jpeace their troubles in Ireland would 
be greatly diminished and they would receive reinforcements 
in England, while if it were to end with no settlement they 
would have the 'advantage of a very popular rupture’. But 
if there were to be no settlement, then it was up to him and 
his colleagues ’to protract and drawe out the treaty to length', 
so as to be able to use the respite to supply Ormond and the 
Royalist forces in Ireland}
In spite of the letter to Ormond^ Muskerry and his 
colleagues decided to v/ithdraw the offending proposals and 
to submit a modified list - the repeal of the penal laws, 
i:he summoning of a free Parliament, the annulment of all 
acts passed by the Protestant rump in the Irish Parliament 
since the outbreak of the Rebellion, a general act of 
ëblivion for all offences committed since that time, the 
rescindment of all forfeitures of land in Connaught, Tipperary, 
Limerick, Kilkenny and Wicklow since 1634, and the abolition
2
of the Court of Wards; in return, the promise of 10,000 troops.
1. Digby to Ormond, March 29th, Carte, VI, p.81. At times 
it is difficult to tell whether Digby was given to mendacity 
or entangled in so many, tortuous schemes that memory betrayed 
him. For he was to deny roundly only four months later the 
allegation that theie had been any attempt to detain the 
Confederate agents at Oxford. Digby to Ormond, Aug.13,
1644, ibid. p.195.
2. C.fh* , III, (/(». 49X00
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It is hard to see that this marked a major retreat,
hut the Committee chose to interpret it as such. Radcliffe
informed Ormond that the proposals were now neither scandalous
nor dishonourable for the King to consider} Digby concurred,
adding 'we worke upon these, with some confidence of good 
2
successe’. There is no means of confirmation but it may be
that the Commissioners' manner was so conciliatory as to take
the sting out of their demands. At any rate, optimism was
for a short time the keynote and the Committee briskly
declared that it would meet every day at 3 o'clock until the
business was completed. On April 7th, the first verbal
encounter took place. Discussion covered nine particular 
3points.
Shortly afterwards, however, the Conference began to 
falter in the absence of the Dublin delegations. This v/as 
unavoidable. A further impediment should have been foreseen 
but was not. Many of the Confederate propositions were 
concerned with the articles agreed on between the King and a 
deputation from the Irish Parliament in 1641. Unfortunately 
no copies of these or of the printed statutes of Ireland 
were available, and Nicholas had to ask Ormond to send some
1. April 2, 1644, Carte, VI, pp.84-85.
2. April 2, 1644, ibid., pp.85-6.
3. Catholic Commissioners to Sellings and the Supreme 
Council, April 7 ,/^ pK 10, 1644, T.G.P., X.p.lOO, p. 101
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over. Nicholas took the opportunity of informing Ormond 
that the basic differences between the two sides were three: 
the freedom of religion desired was unreasonable, though the 
Commissioners had agreed to moderate their demands; the 
calling of a new Parliament raised many difficulties ; and, 
the suspension of Poyningjfe Act, for which there was admittedly 
a single precedent, "it is conceaved, may now be of^gr^at
p
inconvenience to the king’s affaires on that side".
At last the 17th April saw the arrival of the Protestant
delegations, which had sailed from Dublin on April 2nd.
Coote and his party handed their credentials to Nicholas and
were told to attend next day in Christ Church garden at 9 a.m.-
At that time, they put forward their propositions. These
amounted to a broadside assault on the Confederate suggestions
and made counter-recommendations which, if adopted, would
have increased rather than relaxed the severity of the
penalties to which Roman Catholics were liable. Clause 2
was savage:
"That the Popish titular Archbishops, Bishops, Jesuits, 
Friars anf Priests, and all members of the Roman Clergy 
be banished out of Ireland, because they have been the 
stirrers up of all rebellions, and while, they continue 
there, there can be no hope of safety for your Majestie's 
Protestant Subjects. And that all the Laws and Statutes
1. By the very next day, he had somehow got hold of copies of 
the printed statutes^ Nicholas to Ormond April 16, 1644, 
Carte, VI, pp.88-9.
2. Same to Same, April 15, ibid., pp.87-88.
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established in that Kingdome against popery and 
popish Recusants may continue of force, and be put 
in execution."1
The very crudeness of this sort of proposal indicates
that the main object was to terminate the Reaeft Conference;
it was designed to influence the King and his advisers and
Protestant opinion generally rather than to answer the 
2
Confederates. Coote, Parsons, and the rest were of the 
same kidney as Loftus, Cork and the ex-Lord Justice Parsons, 
that is to say, they stood for spoliation of all Catholic 
lands and the maximum personal profit. ' Their aspirations 
coincided with those of the English Parliament rather than 
with those of the Royalists and evidence even points to 
their being in league with Parliamentary agents. In so 
far as they had any representative rights at Oxford, they 
depended on the letter of instructions furnished by the 
small group that had foregathered at Kildare House.
1. Gilbert, III, pp.143-48; Tract.
2. Digby told Ormond that their propositions stemmed from 
madness or malicej May 6, Carte, VI, p.109.
3. Some time after the conference was over D:g)y reported 
to Ormond: "... and found cle#ely those fewer persons 
imployed hither to be persons, either corrupt in their 
loyalty, or fanatickin their vnderstandings; and their 
upholders and correspondents Ireland were in an union 
with the Scots covenanters; and accordinge to this doctrine, 
I heaie their discourses and demeanour are at London".
July 22, 1644, ibid., p.175.
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Their propositions v^ ere sufficiently uncompromising as 
they stood, but Coote and Parsons chose to flavour them 
with their ovm violent spices.
On April 20th, these propositions^together with those 
of the Catholics, were given to the official Irish 
delegation, which appears to have travelled over with 
Coote’s party, for their critical comment. The whole 
matter was then discussed by the committee for Irish affairs. 
The Committee was dismayed by Coote’s propositions, which 
if published at large, might cause such serious offence to 
the Confederates as to spark off a resumption of hostilities; 
this, apart from the fact that they were utterly incompatible 
with the Confederate proposals and consequently an irremovable 
barrier to peace. Nor did it believe that they faithfully 
reflected Protestant Irish opinion.
The King himself granted them an audience on April 25th 
and tried the effects of sweet reason, giving, incidentally, 
some indications of the way in which he justified his own 
dealings with the erstwhile rebels. He pointed out that 
the conspiracy to revolt had not been general in the first 
instance, that the gentlemen of the Pale had been forced
1. Consisting, in the event, of Sir William Stewart, Sir 
Gerard Lowther, Sir Philip Percevall, and Mr, Justice 
Donnellan with the addition of Sir George Radcliff and 
V/i hiAM. Sambach who were already in England. Apparently, 
Radcliff begged to be excused}^ Ibid., p.84.
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into it by his Irish governors, and that the rising
might easily have been suppressed had Parliament allov/ed
him to go into Ireland. But no argument could soften
their intransigeance, which was aggravated by a suspicion
that they were being kept in ignorance of the conversations
taking place between the Irish Committee and the Confederate
Agents and that peace might suddenly be declared as a fait
accompli. Hence they took the precaution of asking
Nicholas that no final decision should be taken before
they had had a full opportunity to state their case and
had seen the Confederate proposals. In reply, Nicholas
merely said that their various papers were being reviewed
by the Irish Committee}
It is in fact quite clear that Coote and his party
were being deliberately col-shouldered as tools of 
2
Parliament. Indeed, one of the Committee informed them 
that those who were examing their propositions believed 
them to have been written by the close Committee of London 
and wondered that "His Majesty would receive so monstrous 
a Petition". And When they asked Cotting&on if they 
might peruse the ’rebels’’ propositions, he blandly claimed 
that he knew nothing of them, though, as chairman of the
1. Tract.
2. Of. Percivall to Ormond, Carte, VI, p.130.
3. Cox, II, p.140.
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Coimittee, he must have studied them, in detail. Even 
the official Dublin delegation, according to their own 
report, was forbidden to communicate the Confederate 
propositions to them. Their own explanation of this 
secrecy was that an attempt was being made to broadcast 
the impression that the propositions were moderate.
At last, they were allowed to state their case to 
the Committee. It was badly received. In a message 
later conveyed by Ceorge'Radcliffe, the Committee ’let 
them know how ill they tooke the height, and unreasonable- 
nesse of their said Propositions’, which he said, neither 
represented Protestant opinion generally nor faithfully 
reflected their instructions. If, he continued, they 
went on being so inflexible, the war must necessarily go 
on, and as the King could send no relief, the Irish would 
inevitably destroy them. They replied that they preferred 
the war to go on, that, as the Cessation still had five 
months to run, there was plenty of time to arrange for 
relief. In the last resort, they argued, the Irish 
Protestants could be evacuated. Ys/hen Radcliffe asked 
them how this might be done in safety, they revealed the 
v/ilfulness of their position by proposing that the Irish 
agents should be detained as hostages. Radcliffe was 
able to point out that the King could not in honour 
countenance such a thing. Nor was there any certainty 
that the Confederates would abide by the Cessation if
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their propositions were rejected. But Coote and. his
friends were impervious to persuasion.
dl
As, manifestly, the King dar^not condemn their
uncompromising' attitude out of hand, he made two attempts
to win them over. On May 9th, in audience, he asked them
frankly what, without peace, could be done for his adherents
in Ireland in the absence of any possible relief from
England and in view of his inability to allow them to join
with the Scots or any group that had taken the covenant.
He then gave instructions that they should be provided with
a copy of the Confederate proposals. On May 13th, at the
Council Board with the Prince of V/ales, the Duke of York and
the Irish committee also present, he received their answers
to the Confederate proposals. Obviously, the King was
only concerned to hammer home one crucial point - the
possible fate of the Protestants in Ireland, as he put it
"if the Rebel Agents should break off their Treaty, which
was to be feared they would do; if they had not their
Propositions for the most part yielded unto." In answer
to this they retorted that firmness would bring the ’rebels’
to accept better terms. They had been confidently assured
before leaving Dublin that Muskerry had refused to come to
1
Oxford with limited instructions. There could evidently 
be no meeting of minds here since one side was prohibited
1. Tract ; Cox, II, pp.141-2.
173
from reasoning logically by the need to conceal its main 
purpose, namely, the destruction of the Irish Catholics with 
the aid of the English Parliament and the Scots. Con­
sequently, although verbally outgunned, Coote and Parsons 
refused to withdraw their propositions, saying disingenuously 
that they were happy to leave the fulfilment of their 
desires to the King and Council. On this farcical note 
the audience ended. They were not summoned again.
An attempt was made to outflank their position by
sending both sets of propositions to Ormond with a request
2
that he should test Protestant opinion in Ireland. It 
could not have been made very seriously since the delegations 
were allowed to return home before Ormond had had time to 
reply. Nonetheless, Ormond’s experience was informative.
He found it difficult to assess Protestant opinion.
Parliament would waste too much time in debate and there 
was no precedent for summoning any other representative 
body. There remained the group of men who had prepared 
the instructions for Éoote and his friends and who appeared 
to be in communication with Oxford. Brought before the 
Council on June 8th and asked the same key question put 
by the King to Coote, they replied evasively that the
1. Tract.
2. Digby to Ormond, May 6th, 1644, Carte, VI, pp.109-110; 
see also same to the same, May 9th, ibid., p.144.
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propositions tendered at Oxford accurately reflected 
their instructions. As to what should be done to 
alleviate the growing distress of the country^ they could 
only say that it concerned higher policy which they were 
unqualified to formulate. When, however, Ormond asked 
one of their number privately whether he honestly believed 
that the Protestants in Ireland would prefer to see the war 
resumed rather than withdraw any of their propositions, 
he replied that he would not. Exhaustive inquiries of 
council members and others confirmed the accuracy of 
this answer}
The difficulties of the Irish Committee were aggravated
by the conditions for peace insisted upon by the official
delegation. evidence about the individual views of this
delegation is confusing. Radcliffe implied that three
of them. Sir v/illiam Stewart, Lord Justice Lowther and
Sir Phillip Percivall, leaned towards Parliament, opposing
2"the papists more th^n there was any hope to prevails".
And Clarendon observed that "they knew not how to behave 
themselves, but so distrusted the Confederates as to want 
them to be kept under restraint. Whether their comments 
were entirely justified or not it is a fact that Percivall 
resented what he considered to be the Catholic bias of the
1. Ormond to Digby, Jun.8, 1644, Carte, VI, pp.143-6.
2. Ibid., p.147.
3. Historical View, p.1044.
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1
Council. So also, did Inchi quin who v/as in Oxford during
2
the Conference. It is hard to account for the strength 
of their resentment in view of the Council's reluctance 
to give the King any encouragement whatsoever to make 
concessions to the Catholics. A possible explanation is 
that they genuinely believed themselves to be objective but 
could not prevent their deeply-rooted religious prejudice 
from distorting their judgement. The King at any rate
1. Cf. his observations to Ormond, Carte, VI. pp.129-31
2. Cf. his account of the negotiations in a report to the 
House of Commons given in 1646:
"At my being at Oxford, perceiving what I did not 
till then imagine, that the Irish were so well 
befriended there as that they were likely to obtain 
a peace destructive to the well-affected Protestants 
in Ireland, and very prejudicial to the kingdom of 
England, as well in relation to the interest the (x) 
held in that kingdom as to the disturbance the 
Parliament might receive from thence, I instantly 
resolved to give all the opposition I could to so 
mischievous a design..."
C.S.P.I., p.434.
3. Borne Protestants experienced such revulsion for 
Catholicism as a creed and particularly for the Irish Catholics 
that they would make judgements based on sheer fantasy.
A man named Dod, for instance, who visited Oxford in June 
1643,Xinformed a committee of the House of Commons that 
the city was crowded v/ith Irish rebels - 3,000 in all 
including priests. There could have been precious little 
evidence to substantiate this estimate. Indeed, one of 
the 'rebels' mentioned by name was Sir John Dongan, who 
distinguished himself fighting for the Royalists and 
in 1646, having returned to Ireland, refused to stay 
among the Confederates where he had been helping to apprehend 
truce-breakers, when the Ormond Peace had been rejected 
(see belov/ p.f63n) . And yet Pod's report was probably 
honestly made^ Gilbert, II, Ixxvi).
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attached no blame to them^and Nicholas subsequently-
described them as having been helpful, able and well- 
2
informed.
Their proposals for peace included the disarming 
of the Irish, the payment by the Irish of all damages 
incurred during the war, the enforcement of the penal 
laws and the exemption from pardon of those who had taken 
part in massacres at the outbreak of the rebellion/^
Total disarmament was obviously out of the question 
since it would leave the Roman Catholics at the mercy of 
Protestant vengeance, in spite of any official safeguards 
v/hich might be offered them. In any case, simultaneous 
disarmament of the Protestant side, as well as acceptance 
of their minimum terms, was a prerequesite of agreement. 
Turning to the matter of reparations the Commissioners 
simply said that they could not pay them even if they wanted 
to, for they could not dispose of anything like the necessary 
resources. They were willing to agree to the punishment 
of those implicated in the massacres provided that 
Protestants who had slaughtered Catholics after promising 
quarter should also be brought to book. As for religion, 
they were willing to modify still further some of their
1. Cf. Charles I to the lord Lieutenant and Council 
testifying to the excellence of their services, June 1, 
1644, T.C.P., 3L[, p.50.
2. Nicholas to Ormond, May 20, 1644, Carte, VI, p . 12#".
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demands but they could never tolerate rigorous enforcement
of the penal laws.
Although the members of the Privy Council recognised
the moderation of the amended proposals submitted by the
Confederate commissioners and that it was incumbent upon
the King to accede to them in the present state of his
affairs, no one was anxious to declare his opinion for
fear of scandalising Protestants everywhere. So acute
was the fear of being compromised "that some of the Lords
deméd to avoid sitting in councell when the business of
Ireland was d e b a t e d . D i g b y  wittily described the
situation to Ormond,
"averyénây'that is faithfull to the Jting/s 
interests apprehendss the necessitye of a peace, 
both for the preservation of the protestants in 
Ireland^ and the support of our affayres heefe^ ; but 
everyyfcady alsoe is seeking^, as the ape did, to" pull 
the ches^nuttout of the fire with the s foote,
and to cast ofÿ the councÈll of graimting,Vnyy^hing^ at 
all to his neighbour."2
And Radcliff underlined the situation:
"I am very confident that most of the lords of the 
couneell thought not fit to advise the kinge* to 
doe that, which in their private opinions they 
thought he must doe for the necessity of his affaires."3
All the King could do, it was thought, was to promise
privately to relax the 'penal laws’.
1. Tract.
2. Carte, VI, p.119.
3. Ibid., p.146.
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The King was thus placed in an unenviable position. 
dL
He desired but dare, not conclude peace entirely on his
1
own initiative. If only a few of the Council members 
had recommended it, he might have been able to preten&( 
that he was acting on their advice. As it was, he was 
left with no alternative but to reject the Confederate’s 
main proposals as mildly as he could, while exaggerating 
the generosity of the paltry concessions he was able to offer. 
On the whole, these coincided with those he had been 
prepared to make on the eve of the rebellion; they had 
this much to be said for them - that they satisfied 
incidentally some of the demands for greater legislative 
freedom made by the Irish Protestants themselves in 164-1.
Thus, they would be left on peace to practise their 
religion provided they did not ’stir up sedition’.
They could have a new Parliament and though he would not 
hear of the annulment of Poyning’s Act, he would concede 
increased legislative independence. He would not, and 
indeed, could not declare any Acts intrinsically unlawful, 
but v/ould see to it that they did not suffer from any acts 
passed since 1641. He would consent to grant a general 
pardon but must stop short of a general Act of Oblivion 
since that might appear a condonation of rebellion and 
there were certain crimes that could not be overlooked.
1. The kind of pressure with which he had to contend is 
illustrated by a letter to Archbishop Usher in which he 
promised not to grant toleration to Papists' Cox, op.cit., 
p.143.
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«k
/ A. -
To all the lo3?\dô mentioned, save those in Kilkenny and
f
Wicklovf; he would waive his rights. He would agree to the 
lifting of incapacities from taking up state office, and 
to the cffaùtion of Inns of a University and free schools.
Finally^he would award public offices to Catholics, put an 
end to the oppressions of the Court of Wards and set right 
any injustice coEnnitted in the pa$t^ But all these 
concessions he felt constrained to qualify with contingent 
restrictions, so that, in essence, he was merely asking 
the Commissioners to put their trust in his good intentions.
The Confederate commissioners sympathised with the 
King in his dilemma, realising that the meagre concessions 
he offered represented the absolute limit to which he 
felt publicly capable of committing himself. Most of 
them would privately have accepted them for the time 
being provided they had his word for more generous con­
cessions at a later and happier date. But they also 
knew the concessions would appear almost worthless to their 
compatriots in Ireland. Tactfully and courteously,
1. T.C.P., X, pp.171-3.
2. About this time, the King must have received a letter
from Henrietta Maria, dated Paris, April 21, reporting a
suggestion of Lord Dillon that she should write to the
Irish Commissioners adjuring them to moderate their demands
for the time being and "to assure them that when you shall
be in another condition than you are now, that you will
give them contentment." Letters of Henrietta Maria,
Ed^ M.A.B. Green, p.STi
Cf.
3.^Historical View, p.1044; Bee also Digby’s subsequent 
letter to Ormond, Dec.16, 1644, Carte, VI, p.219.
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therefore, they stated:
"that as his majesty's affairs then stood, they 
believed he could not grant them more, and they 
hoped that their general assembly, when informed 
of the truth of his majesty's condition, (v/hich 
v/as unknovm when the instructions were given) 
might be persuaded to depart from some of their 
demands; but as for themselves, they had no 
authority at present to recede from any of them."
The King was equally concerned not to end the abortive
conference on a dissonant note and not to close the door
on the resumption of negotiations in Ireland? His final
words were these:-
"that if upon those conditions which were all he 
could grant without prejudice to himself, and 
which were sufficient for the security of their 
lives, estates and exercise of their religion, 
they lost no time in returning to their duty, 
and assisting him to receive the rights and 
power of his crown, he should never forget the 
merit of such a service, and might think himself 
bound to gratify them in some particulars, not 
seasonable to be now granted; but if theyshould 
insist on others, which he could not in honour or 
conscience comply with, they would in the end have 
reason to repent this their senseless petwerseness, 
when it would be too late, and when they found
themselves under a power that would destroy them,
and make them ta? cease to be a nation. "3
The Confederate agents left Oxford on May 22nd^
and arrived at Waterford on June 23rd. Apparently they
1. //3.
2. It may be that the Conference had to be brought to a
premature end because of the approach of Parliamentary
forces; cf. Supreme Council to O ’Hartegan, Gilbert, III,p.235.
3. I (if 3- Y.
4. Hot all, perhaps. According, to the Coote report Sir 
Robert Talbot and Permot O'Bryen left for Ireland on 
May 10th; Tract.
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faithfully reported the King’s parting message to the 
Supreme Council? a  month later on July 20th they made
p
their official report to the General Assembly. It 
received a chilly hearing. Nevertheless, most of the 
magnates and a majority of the Supreme Council followed
3
Muskerry’s lead in desiring an early settlement with the 
King.
The official Irish Protestant delegation appear 
to have started their return journey before June Ist.^
On May 30th Coote and his party, who had been 
cooling their heels since their abortive audience with 
the King on May 13th and wrathfully speculating what 
arrangements had been made with the Confederates, kissed 
the King's hand. Charles told them that he had written 
to Ormond and that he had a care for his Protestant 
subjects by whom:
1. Plunket-Dunne MS., Carte's abstract, p.775.
2. This was the opening day of the fourth General Assembly 
summoned for the very purpose of discussing the outcome
of the Oxford Conference and the opening of negotiations 
with Ormond.
3. The King had been much impressed by Muskerry's 
friendliness and from now on placed a great deal of 
reliance on his efforts at Kilkenny. According to 
one report:
"The King would have made Lord Muskerry an Karl 
but he refused it, lest his countrymen should ’ 
think that he had any self view in the management 
of this affair." Ibid., p.774.
4. T.C.P. , p.50.
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"he meant his good Protestants, and not 
such as did either take or adhere to 
such as had taken the Covenant."1
Doubtless Coote and company were far from being mortrified
by the rebuke implicit in this leavetaking, for they could
congratulate themselves on having helped to insure the
failure of the Oxford Conference.
1. Tract.
CHAPTER V
The Earl of Glamorgan and the Plan to raise an army 
in Ireland in 1644.
Although the Earl of Glamorgan^did not appear in 
Ireland until the midsummer of 1645, his name has usually 
been associated with Irish affairs as early as April 1st, 
1644, the date of a commission to raise troops among the
1. It is convenient to make use of this title consistently, 
though Glamorgan was to become the Marquis of V/orcester on 
the death of his father in 1646, and there is some doubt as 
to the date on which he became entitled to an j3arldom.
Lord Herbert, to give him his certain title, was probably 
created Earl of Glamorgan and Baron Beaufort of Caldecot 
Castle by Charles I some time in 1644 or early in 1645.
It is doubtful, however, whether the patent ever passed the 
Great Seal. Dugdale took no notice of such a creation 
(cf. E.îh^^ October, 1887, pp.687-8) and Beatson reported 
that if'was cancelled in 1660. (Joseph Haydn: Beatson*s 
Political Index Modernised. The Book of Dignities.)
Authority for the title is based on numerous references 
to * Glamorgan* both in the letters of Charles I himself to 
and about Glamorgan and in other correspondence. In 
particular there is the address employed at the beginning 
of a patent dated April 1st, 1644, "Edward Somerset, alias 
Plantaginet, Lord Herbert, Baron Beaufort of Caldecote,
Grismond, Chepstow and Gower, Earl of Glamorgan" (see below pp.i^ ^^ -*)
The one undisputed fact about the patent is that it was 
received in the signet office in 1645. Collins stated 
"that there is remaining in the signet office a bill under 
the sign manual at Oxford (if a patent did not pass the Great 
Seal therein), in order to his being created Earl of Glamorgan 
and Baron Beaufort of Caldecot Castle in the County of Monmough" 
(Collins^Peerage of England.1, p.222). It is possible that 
Charles wished to keep the grant secret until Glamorgan's 
mission had proved successful when it would have been confirmed.
For a brilliant discussion of the title, see J.H. Round,
'The Earldom of Glamorgan' (Genealogist, N.S. XIV. pp.213-5,
April,1898), in which Round denied the authenticity of the 
commission of April 1. See also below p.V?0.
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Irish. Catholics apparently given him by Charles I. Since 
this commission could only have been issued as a by-product 
of the Oxford Conference, it must be discussed at this stage 
in the narrative. It will also be necessary to anticipate 
the famous treaty arranged by Glamorgan with the Confederacy 
on August 25th, 1645, for the commission and the treaty have 
become so entangled that it is impossible to examine one 
without the other; some historians, indeed have wrongly 
placed the commission in 1645 and assumed it to be Glamorgan's 
authority to negotiate with the Irish.
The Glamorgan Treaty will be described at length in a 
subsequent chapter. For the moment, it will be sufficient 
to take note of a few assential facts. Claiming to act on 
the King's authority Glamorgan agreed to give way to the 
fundamental demands of the Confederates in return for 10,000 
troops to be put at the King's disposal in England. These 
d)emands were still regarded as impossibly high by Ormond? 
Moreover, the King was still maintaining, at least in public, 
that they were incompatible with his religious beliefs and 
his conception of sovereignty. The agreement was to have 
been kept secret pending the despatch of the 10,000 troops 
to England, but through an untimely accident it was made 
public much sooner than was intended and its conditions
1. Who had been negotiating with the Confederacy in the 
King's name for over a year by the time Glamorgan arrived 
in Ireland.
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were never fulfilled. Even so,* both Charles' contemporaries
and historians ever since have been passionately curious to
know what really happened.
Referring to the Treaty some years afterwards in the
course of a letter to Nicholas, Clarendon, then still Sir
Edward Hyde, had this to say:
"Yet I must tell you, I care not how little I say 
in that business of Ireland, since those strange 
powers and instructions given to your favourite 
Glamorgan, which appear to me so inexcusable to 
justice, piety and prudence. And I fear there 
is very much in that transaction of Ireland, 
both before and since, that you and I were never 
thought wise enough to be advised in."1
Yet one may examine his monumental work on the ' Great
2
Rebellion' and find no mention of the episode. This is 
but one of several anomalies relating to Glamorgan's mission 
to Ireland that have never been satisfactorily explained.
The compelling problem which puzzled contemporaries 
and which has never ceased to challenge the ingenuity of 
historians may be put simply: did Charles I empower
Glamorgan to arrange a treaty with the Confederacy by 
offering terms which he publicly avowed to be unthinkable - 
or did he not? Parliamentary sympathisers refused to
1. Clar. S.P., II, p.337.
2. Cf. Thoyras Rapin, History of England, II, p.866, who 
noted this omission over two hundred years ago: "This is 
not one of the least curious points of Charles I's reign, 
tho' the lord Clarendon has thought fit to pass it over in 
$ilence". In fact. Clarendon did make a fleeting reference 
to the subject elsewhere; cf. An Historical View of the 
Affairs of Ireland, pp.1066-7.
186.
credit his innocence? And in their hearts many prominent 
Royalists, besides Clarendon, found it difficult to give 
him the benefit of the doubt.
After his death the part he had played became the 
subject of excited controversy? Antl-Eoyalists, and 
subsequently anti-Jacobites in particular, considered that 
if Charles could be convicted of treachery in this one 
instance, then all the other imputations on his character 
were probably justified. It became incumbent upon 
Monarchists and, later, upon Jacobites^to prove that 
Glamorgan had deceived the King, because to keep silent 
on the subject would appear as a tacit admission that the 
King's critics were in the right. Thus, Dr. Birch, for 
example, in 1747 demonstrated the King's undoubted guilt to
3
his own satisfaction, and within a few years, the Rev. J.
4
Boswell attempted to free him from all blame.
Even historians with an open mind on the Royalist 
question were anxious to implicate Charles in deceit in
1. C.S.P.Ven., 1643-7, p.248.
2. Cf. Annesley'8 Letter to the Duke of Ormonde, 1681, in 
which he requested information about Ormond's'knowledge of key 
events connected with the years 1642-7. One of the episodes
he wished to know more about was: "The Mystery of Glamorgan's 
Peace and his punishment".
3o Inquiry into the share whtth King Charles had in the 
transactions of the Earl of Glamorgan (London,"1756, second ed.).
The Case of the Royal Martyr.
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order to justify their belief that he was both a faithless 
friend and a bad King. J. Lingard had this intention, 
though he was careful to treat his material objectively?
Indeed, it was only towards the end of the last century that 
an approach was made to the problem in a spirit of dis­
interested enquiry when S.R. Gardiner and J.H. Round entered 
into a vigorous dispute in the pages of several learned 
journals? Since then'only five historians have dealt with 
the subject at any length and four of them have made no 
reference to the account of J.H. Round, by far the most 
convincing of those put forward and presented with such an 
array of scholarship and such skill in close argument that
1. History of England, 8 vols., London, 1849, VIII, app.,p.623.
2. The first salvo was discharged by J.H. Round in*The True 
Story of the Somerset Patent 1644' (Academy 8^ Dec.^1883).
In this article Round alleged that Glamorgan's key patents 
were forgeries. Four years later S.R. Gardiner presented 
a novel explanation of Glamorgan's mission based on the 
assumption that his various commissions were genuine I 
(E.H.R.  ^1887, pp.687-704, 'Charles I and the Lord Glamorgan'). 
Then in 1898 Round returned to the attack with a scathing 
criticism of many of Gardiner's points and apparently damaging 
proof that the document upon which Gardiner relied principally 
for establishing his thesis was a palpable counterfeit. 
(Athenaeum Jan.15, 1898, 'Charles I and Lord Glamorgan').
A month later Gardiner handsomely admitted that his case 
had been built on unstable foundations (Athenaeum  ^Feb.26.,
1898). In the Genealogist, April, 1898, Round next discussed 
the whole question of the Earldom of Glamorgan. However, 
his most complete account of the entire mission, an account 
which he clearly intended to be definitive, did not appear 
until 1901. (Peerage and Family History pp.367-434). The 
final reference to the contention was made in a rather 
pathetic footnote to the 1901 edition of Gardiner's History 
of the Civil War, in which he wrote: "Last time I was at the
museum I began an examination of the Round criticism of my 
arguments contained in his "Studies in Peerage and Family 
History", but I had then hot time to complete my investigation, 
and am now too ill to enter into any discussion on the question 
raised by him" - Il^f.n. 1, p.158.
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it seems churlish as well as careless to ignore it?
Yet even Round may not have spoken the last word. There 
are several important factors whichhe overlooked and it is 
possible to challenge the validity of some of his conclusions.
The fact that no entirely satisfactory answer to the
problem has yet been produced, despite the close and frequent
attention paid to it, is chiefly a question of sources and
of method. No contemporary chronicler appears to have been
acquainted with more than a few facts while Glamorgan himself
left no clear account of his negotiations. The Marquis of
Ormond could probably have revealed the truth but kept
silent. If the King's own statements are taken at their
1. (a) TF- Coonan, The Irish Confederacy and the Puritan 
Revolution, Dublin, 1954; e.g. "To his [G-lamorgan'F]" 
credit we have the warrant of March 12, 1645, the 
authenticity of which all reputable historians admit 
..." Round did not I
(b) D. Townshend, George Digby 2nd Earl of Bristol,
London, 1924; besides making no reference to Round this 
account is open to factual correction at several points.
(c) Lady Burghlere, Life of Ormonde, 2 vols., London, 1912.
(d) Miss C.V. Wedg#wood in the second volume of her
Civil War trilogy surprisingly overlooked Round's brilliant 
studies. The King's V/ar, 1641-7, London, 1958.
(e) Professor A.H. Dodd,'""’Studies in Stuart Wales,
University of Wales Press, 1952, referred to Round in a 
footnote p.92. Though not concerned to examine Glamorgan's 
dealings with the Irish in any detail, (a fact which he
has confirmed verbally to me) Professor Dodd has made a 
number of penetrating observations in passing.
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face value, he had done nothing reprehensible, and there 
is an end to the business. If not, and he could not be 
expected to damn himself out of his own mouth, it is 
necessary to go elsewhere in search of evidence. The 
success of historians has varied in proportion with the 
number of sources available at the time they wrote and 
with the prejudices and prepossessions they brought to 
the subject. As already stated, only S.R. Gardiner and 
J.H. Round were not prepared to sacrifice material which 
did not fit in with their own sympathies, and even they 
had not the advantage of certain documents now available?
The interpretations of the evidence relating to 
Glamorgan's mission may be divided into four groups; 
those writers who maintain that Glamorgan forged the 
authorities he produced; secondly, those who believe 
that Glamorgan carried genuine authorities and zealously 
obeyed his instructions only to be callously disowned by 
the King; thirdly, there is the theory of S.R. Gardiner 
that Glamorgan indeed received genuine authorities at the 
hands of the King but misconstrued the powers they bestowed 
upon him, especially by neglecting to submit himself to
1. Mention must be made of H. Dirck's The Life and Times 
of the Marquis of Worce^t^, London, 1866, "who listed his 
references in no particular chronological sequence and 
seemed to assume that no interpretation of them was 
necessary. This was unfortunate, because he had access 
to several documents at Badminton that would appear 
subsequently to have gone astray.
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the control of the Marquis of Ormond, as he had been 
instructed; and, finally, we come to J.H. Round who thinks 
that Glamorgan obtained some credentials from the Crown, 
but forged others, notably the authority to arrange a 
treaty. Of these solutions only those of Round and 
Gard-iner have force, since their predecessors either 
ignored evidence hostile to their theses or had no access 
to material subsequently available. In the following 
pages it is hoped to disprove all these theories, to show 
that Glamorgan was never expected to obey Ormond, and to 
suggest that the height of his offence, if it can be counted 
so, was to imagine that concessions which to him as a 
Catholic seemed reasonable would appear in the same light 
to his master, the Supreme Governor of the Church of 
England. In order to achieve this object it is necessary 
to start at the very beginning with the occasion that first 
involved Glamorgan in Irish affairs.
That he appeared in Ireland in the summer of 1645 no 
one disputes, nor is there any question that the purpose 
of his journey was to perform some service for the King, 
were it only to persuade the leading Confederates, with 
many of whom he had acquaintance, of the wisdom of coming 
speedily to terms with Ormond. Wliat is in dispute is 
the date on which the King first decided to employ him 
in Ireland. Was it the 1st April, 1644? - the submission 
of S.R. Gardiner and most writers who believe in the
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genuineness of a comniission of that date later produced 
by Glamorgan and purporting to have been issued by the 
King. Or was it not until December of the same year? - 
the view of J.H. Round who contemptuously dismisses the 
commission of April 1st as a forgery. To determine 
which of these views is correct we had best examine in 
the first place the motives which led Charles to employ 
Glamorgan in any capacity at whatever time in Ireland.
We can then turn to a perusal of the disputed commission.
One motive can be eliminated at once. It was not 
because the King regarded Glamorgan as a brilliant soldier, 
as the man best fitted to command an expeditionary force, 
for up to that time Glamorgan had not been a successful 
General? He had "Command in chiefe in the absence of the 
Lord Marquis Hertford" (in South Wales and Gloucestershire) 
during the campaign of 1642-3, and had fairly wide 
experience of action in the South-eastern Counties, but 
there is no evidence that he had any remarkable command 
of the art of war. In a famous engagement with the forces 
of Sir Edmund Waller before Gloucester in March, 1643, he 
failed to benefit from a superior tactical position and 
greater numbers. Though he himself was to claim later on
1. Cf. Dircks, his panegyrist, p.67 - "In short in his 
military capacity he bears a most mythical character."
2. Ibid., p.40.
3. A Famous Victory Attained by Sir Edmund Waller against 
the "%orcTRupert""" anH' thenVelsH^availei^, lon&on," EarcE,T643,
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had
that he/played a prominent part in several campaigns and
produced a substantial number of troops at Edgehill^
the absence of references to his generalship in most
reports of military intelligence seems to indicate that
his virtue lay in recruiting and victualling troops rather
than in deploying them on active operations. This is of
course a point in his favour as the would-be organiser of
an expeditionary force. Even so, the King might have
been expected to exclude Glamorgan from his short list of
candidates if he had simply been seeking a military commander.
What did single out Glamorgan for a mission to Ireland
was his dual character of devout Catholic and loyal subject
of the Crown:
"The Lord Herbert was a man of more than ordinary 
affection and reverence to the person of the King, 
and one who he was sure would neither deceive or 
betray him. For his religion, it might work upon 
himself but could not disquiet other men. For 
though he was a papist he was not like to make 
others so."2
His services to the King had been on so lavish a scale that 
he had once angered his omi father, reputedly the richest
3"’man in England, by raising a troop without permission; 
the campaign of 1643 alone had cost him £60,000 according
4
to his own estimate. In addition he had married ^€a&=the 
ti-w A Lady Margaret O'Bryan, daughter of the Irish
1. Lircks, p.328.
2. Clarendon, History of the Great Rebellion, II, p.524
3. Cf. Vif ar bur ton. III, p. 525.
4. Somers Tracts, V, p.312.
5. GeccnA
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Earl of Thomond, owned property in Ireland and was
acquainted with some of the Irish nobles. Other
considerations further recommended him. His great
wealth would enable him to defray expenses from his own
pocket, a circumstance of some weight to the impecunious
King. Among the King's courtiers there were those who
detested the Worcesters for their Catholicism? and from
time to time protestant animosity reached such a pitch
2
as to embarrass the family. For instance, it would 
appear that Glamorgan wished to become President of Wales 
as a reward for his services. The King was willing to 
grant his wish but had to decline because of the outcry
*5
raised against the appointment. There is a possibility, 
therefore, that the King may have wished to compensate 
Glamorgan for the malice borne against him in England 
by giving him the appointment of Command er-in-Chief of 
Irish troops, secure in the knowledge that those very 
qualities tending to give offence in England would appear
1. In a political tract of 1642 there occurred the following 
explanation of the Marquis of Hertford's refusal to serve 
the King: "For that the King hath not only given way to
the raising of a Popish army in the North, but hath granted 
commission to the Marquis of 'Worcester, a Icnown papist, 
to be general of the forces in those parts where he is", 
ibid., VI, p.459; cf. also Warburton. III, p.525.
2. In a letter to Glamorgan, dated December 7th, 1641, 
the King used these words: "and the rather that you may 
find out the authors of these lying and scandulous 
pamphlets concerning your father and you, touching (which)
I not only promise you protection to your innocency but 
justice against those offenders..." Birch, p.351.
3. A. Trevor to Prince Rupert, Y/arburton, 11, pp.399-400.
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to the Irish to betoken sympathy and good faith? It 
was no accident that the Papal Nuncio and his supporters 
liked and respected Glamorgan, but never ceased to impugn 
the sincerity of Ormond, whose conduct seems to have been 
singularly free from duplicity for a man of that century. 
Whatever critics may say about Glamorgan they cannot deny 
that he possessed several qualifications requisite in a
o
secret emissary to the Confederacy:
Moreover, there is reason to believe that by 1644 
the King had been on confidential terms with Glamorgan
1. It is a strange fact that a rumour was already 
circulating concerning Glamorgan and Ireland; of:
"Our Queene is departed from Holland, but 
wee doe not yet heare of her landing in 
England. Some doe report she will goe to 
Ireland, and that the L.' Worster goes thither 
as Viceroy with commission to give the 
catholique full libertie, and remitte all 
Plantations." O'Hartegan to Pr. Wadding, Paris, 
Feb.14, 1643-4, Franciscan MSS., D.I, F.425.
2. Miss Townshend, op.cit., p.106 would include among 
these intellectual capacity and scientific skill.
He was, she wrote, "undoubtedly the first discoverer 
of the use of steam". It would be interesting to know 
her exact reasons for making this bold claim.
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for some years? that while he may have questioned his 
competence and the soundness of his judgment he was 
convinced of his quixotic and steadfast fidelity.
Certainly the King had entered into verbal and written 
correspondence with Glamorgan, to which he gave a con­
spiratorial gloss, either to beguile Glamorgan or because 
the topics they discussed were indeed strictly private.
No less certainly, he had sought to convey the impression 
that Glamorgan was the one person to whom he could always 
turn when troubles came with assurance of obtaining instant 
sympathy and practical help. Otherwise, what is to be 
made of this passage from a letter to Glamorgan composed 
on December 7th, 1641, at Whitehall?
"But certainiie I have juster cause to requyre 
your attendance; for it is well known, how that 
you are to give me account of matters, not onlie 
for my own use, but lykewais for the good of 
the kingdoms".2
1. Cf. "Then young Edward Somerset, heir to the Earl of 
Worcester, a fine Catholic and loyalist, came one day 
all excited and asked Cox if he had discussed the oath 
with the King, as his majesty had veered right round 
from his former views. Charles, who was very fond of 
Somerset, had admitted to him in private that the oath 
as it stood contained a scandalous proposition, and 
that he had to sympathise with those who refused it. 
Somerset said that his Majesty previously had looked 
upon anyone rejecting the Oath as a bad subject and 
traitor. That the Almighty had driven that idea out 
of the King's head was the greatest boon the Catholics 
could have hoped for." Albion, p.270.
2. Dircks, p.33.
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ür this extract from a letter despatched on March 6th,
1642, from Royston,
"Herbert,
Your services are expressed to me in so noble 
a way, that I Ccnnot but acknowledge it to you 
under my owmhand, and that I shall thinke myself e 
very unhappie, if I did not live, by reall 
testimonies, to express my gratitud to you.
For the Blankes^i have sent them according 
to your desyre..."2
Again, there was at Badminton a document^entitled,
"The effect of the message your Majesty 
desireth I should deliver my father for your 
Majesty at Nottingham, the 9th September,
1642."4
In his characteristically wordy report Glamorgan stresses
5
the indebtedness to the Earl that the King feels himself 
to be in, requests a loan of £10,000, which sum would help 
to further 'your Majesty's designs to a most hopeful 
condition' , holds out the promise of a Marquisate and 
the garter to the old man, and begs the Earl's advice 
with regard to some undefined but apparently weighty 
business. The total impression to emerge is of the King 
treating Glamorgan as a sympathetic, discreet and helpful 
confidant.
1. A significant reference in view of what was to happen later.
2. Ibid., pp.33-4.
3. It may be that Glamorgan fabricated this document for 
some improper purpose, though in this instance even his 
most vehement detractors would find it difficult to show 
what he hoped to gain by it.
4. Dircks, p.44.
5. The Earl became Marquis of Worcester on November 2nd,1642.
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It may be - to look upon the matter cynically - 
that the impoverished King regarded Glamorgan simply as 
a reliable source of funds so long as his vanity was 
flattered and his romantic notions of service and loyalty 
kept alive, and provided also that the King displayed 
solicitude for all Catholics and especial sympathy for 
the family of Worcester on account of the unpopularity 
and social discomfiture that their religion brought upon 
them. In fact, though Glamorgan had means of his own? 
it was his father who commanded really great wealth and 
extracting money from the old man called for tact, for 
he was proud and plain-speaking, suspicious of favours 
and frankly sceptical about the King’s honesty. Thei^ore, 
in order to tap the wells of the family fortune, it was 
necessary to ask his son to intercede. V/hether the 
King's intimacy with Glamorgan before 1644 was solely 
inspired by financial need or not, it had repaid him 
handsomely, because by that time he had benefited in
1. He had inherited from his grandfather money and 
property to the value of £200,000.
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money and security to the tune of £300,000? Still,
whatever the King's motives, it can be affirmed that
1. A copy of a detailed and imposing account of Glamorgan's 
services to the King, of which the original in his own 
handv/riting was among the MSS. at Badminton, is to be 
found in the British Museum (10825.F.9). It is couched
in Glamorgan's characteristically diffuse style and was 
submitted to Charles II in 1660 when Glamorgan was trying 
to establish his claim to the dukedom of Somerset; 
cf. Dircks, p.57; Warburton. III, p.55. As a specific 
example of his father's generosity^ confer:
"After the disappointing answers of the Spaniards 
and the French, Barberini was at last able to 
record a subsidy he had won from the Queen. It 
was from the Catholic Earl of V/orcester, who 
offered the Cardinal 30,000 crowns for the cause 
of the Queen and the Catholics. He insisted, 
however, on the strictest secrecy, asking Barberini 
to give the money in his own name".
Albion, p.376.
The Worcester contribution to the King's cause is important 
for another reason which concerns the mission to Ireland. 
J.H. Round implies that after the Restoration Glamorgan 
grossly exaggerated this contribution, such exaggeration 
being of a piece with his habitual tendency to adorn plain 
facts, in order to justify his actions or gain reward. 
(Peerage and Family History, p.380) In view of this 
allegation it iswell to ascertain the precise details 
of Glamorgan's expenditure. He himself put the total 
outlay at £318,000. Could this figure be accurate?
A minute examination of the references that can be traced 
suggests that it is indeed accurate, for Glamorgan included 
in it his father's expenditure, which he rightly regarded 
himself as being largely instrumental in obtaining. Also, 
by 'expenditure', he meant the cost of raising and 
maintaining troops throughout the Civil War, and not merely 
gifts in money to the Crown. There was also preserved at 
Badminton a letter from Henrietta Maria to Glamorgan 
(after he had become Marquis of Worcester) dated May 20th, 
1648, in which she stated that he had spent "trois cens 
soicante et dix mil livres" in the royal cause. (li.M. 
C.R.. MSS. Badminton, p.31). At any rate, the Worcesters 
were vastly poorer in 1660 than they had been in August, 
1642. Thus, in at least one particular. Round overstated 
his case.
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he was long in the habit of corresponding with Glamorgan 
on confidential terms when the name of Glamorgan makes 
its first appearance in connection with Irish affairs?
The First of April, 1644? an appropriate day as 
J.H.Round sarcastically pointed out, was the date of 
Glamorgan’s disputed commission, the first of a number
1. Professor Dodd, op.cit., p.91? draws the same conclusion 
from the few letters printed by Dircks: "During the months 
preceding the Civil War he (Glamorgan) was in frequent 
communication with the King and the letters refer in 
cryptic terms to more secret verbal communication.
It is likely that these came to no more than a promise 
on Herbert's part of "the loans" out of his father's 
immense fortune which first enabled Charles to put an 
army into the field at all, with vague but rosy promises 
of advancement for the house of Raglan in return; at 
any rate the position of Lord Herbert as secret agent for 
the sort oi intrigue the King loved so well and handled 
so ill was already established in Charles' mind."
2. Birch and Dircks ascribed the commission wrongly to 
1645. The chronology of Birch and others is frequently 
at fault. Birch, for instance, has Charles enjoining 
Ormond to make peace in 1644 instead of a year later. 
Dircks, who assembled most of the important documents 
relating to Glamorgan's career, and published his work 
as recently as 1866, made no attempt to check the dates 
he employed, thereby lessening the value of what should 
have been an important work of reference. 
t<j-"havg=arigeii b-gcaugj? the tbat.ir Gl-amnrgarH-s-
begaii-on ■ March: £5.th was ignexed-.
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of coniinissions which he later produced? It coincided
in time with the conference between the King and the
Confederate Commissioners at Oxford and ran as follows:
"Charles, by the Grace of God King of England,
Scotland and Prance, and Ireland, Defender of the 
Faith, etc., to our right trusty and right well- 
beloved cousin, Edward Somerset, alias Plantagenet, 
Lord Herbert, Baron Beaufort of Caldicote, Grismond, 
Chepstow, Ragland and Gower, Earl of Glamorgan, son 
and heir of our entirely beloved cousin, Henry Earl 
and Marquis of Worcester, greetings. Having had 
good and long experience of your prowess, prudence, 
and fidelity, do make choice and by there nominate 
and appoint you, our trusty and right well-beloved 
cousin, Edward Somerset, etc., to be our Generalissimo 
of three armies, English, Irish and foreign, and 
Admiral of a fleet at sea, with power to recommend 
your lieutenant general for our approbation, leaving 
all other officers to your own election and discrimin­
ation, and accordingly to receive their commission 
from you; willing and commanding them, and everyone 
of them, you to obey as their general and you to 
receive immediate orders from ourself only. And 
lest through distance of place we may be misinformed, 
we will command you to reply unto us, if any of our 
orders should thwart or hinder any of your designs
1. The Commissions issued to Glamorgan were as follows:
a) April 1, 1644 - Authority to raise an army - Dircks,pp.20-2.
b) January 2, 1645, Dircks, pp.72-4.
(c) January 6, 1645# Of this we have only a Latin 
translation. It was concerned with the levying of troops. 
On the same day that Glamorgan received his third 
commission of January 6th, Charles issued a patent
giving the Dukedom of Somerset to Glamorgan's father 
and his heirs. It appears really to have been 
Glamorgan's reward for the services he was about to 
render. .
(d) January 12, 1645. Dircks, pp.79-80.
(e) March 12, 1645. The commission claimed by Glamorgan 
as his authority for concluding a treaty with the 
Confederacy, ibid., pp.80-1.
(f) April 30, 1645. Letter to the Nuncio in which the 
King purported to "perfectioner ce que a quoy il 
(Glamorgan) s'obligere en nostre nom." ^
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for our service. And there being necessary great 
sums of money to the carrying on so chargeable an 
employment, which we have not to furnish you withal; 
we do by these impower you to contract with any of 
our loving subjects of England, Ireland, and dominion 
of Wales, for wardships, customs, woods, or any our 
rights and prerogatives; we by these obliging ourselves, 
our heirs and successors, to confirm and make good the 
same accordingly. And for persons of Generosity, for 
whom titles of honour are most desirable, we have 
intrusted you with several patents under our great 
seal of England, from a Marquis to a Baronet ; which 
we give you full power and authority to date and 
dispose of, without knowing our further pleasure, so 
great is our trust and confidence in you, as that, 
whatsoever you do contract for or promise, we will 
make good the same accordingly, from the date of this 
our commission forwards; which for the better satis­
faction, we give you leave to give them, or any of 
them, copies thereof, attested under your hand and 
seal of arms. And for your own encouragement, and 
in token of our gratitude we give and allow you 
hence-forward such fees, titles, preheminences, and 
priveleges, as do and may belong unto your place and 
command above-mentioned, with promise of our dear 
daughter Elizabeth to your son Plantaginet, in 
marriage, with three hundred thousand pounds in 
dower or portion, most part whereof we acknowledge 
spent and disburs'd by your father and you in our 
service; and the title of Duke of Somerset to you 
and hour heirs male for ever; and from henceforward 
to give the garter to your arms, and at your pleasure 
to put on the George and blue ribbon. And for your 
greater honour, and in testimony of our reality, we 
have with our own hand affixed our great seal of 
England unto these our commission and letters, making 
them patents. Witness ourself at Oxford, the first 
day of April, in the 20th year of our reign, and the 
year of our Lord, one thousand six hundred and forty four.
The Commission raises four questions. Was it genuine?
If so, why was it given at this time? What was the extent
of the powers which it bestowed? Why was it kept secret?
1. Collins, Peerage of England, I, pp.72-73, 2nd edit., 
London^l741.
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Most writers have Ireen no reason to doubt its 
authenticity, although many such as Bagwell, the historian 
of 17th century Ireland^ found it an ' extraordinary * patent? 
Rinuccini, the Papal Legate, constantly expressed his fears 
about the King's sincerity, but accepted, albeit cautiously, 
Glamorgan's credentials. J.H. Round, however, rejects the
p
commission as an impudent forgery. Should his judgment be
sound, there is no point in further discussion. It is 
essential, therefore, to try to reach some conclusion as 
to the value of the document despite the complexity of the 
evidence relating to it and the closeness of Round's reasoning.
For all their clarity and verve Round's two principal 
articles are marred by acerbity and an overriding determination 
to reduce to tatters the arguments of S.R. Gardiner, to which 
they are in the nature of a challenging refutation. The 
result is that he sometimes appears to concentrate more 
upon rebutting speculative points raised by Gardiner than 
upon the words of the documents themselves. This is 
specially true of his attitude towards Gardiner's main 
thesis, namely that the King's situation in the spring 
of 1644 substantiates the theory of what he calls a 'Grand 
Design' to bring troops from Ireland and the mainland of 
Europe. Gardiner goes on to argue in this fashion.
Charles is optimistic about the outcome of the Oxford
1. Ireland Under the Stuarts, II, pp.84-5.
2. Peerage and Family History,^pp.567-595.
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negotiations and will shortly need, or so he believes, 
a commander for the Irish troops. Such a commander has 
to be simultaneously acceptable to himself, to his Protestant 
Counsellors and to the Irish Confederates. Glamorgan is 
the obvious choice^ Round dismisses this line of reasoning, 
arguing that the commission was forged? albeit based upon 
genuine commissions issued in the next year at a time when 
a ’Grand Design’ was on the stocks. how Round is un­
questionably right to dismiss Gardiner’s arguments as 
Gardiner himself tentatively admitted later on, but this 
has no bearing on the document itself, which makes no 
allusion to any ’Grand Design* - unless, that is, we are 
to equate the one word ’foreign’ with a ’Grand Design’.
This is but one of several objections that Round makes to 
the genuineness of the document.. We shall consider the 
remainder in the order in which they occur.
2
First, he refers to the ’absurd phraseology’. But 
other commissions whose authenticity he accepts were likev/ise 
absurdly phrased. In any case, to write of eccentricities 
of language in a document which was supposed to be absolutely 
secret is to beg the question. For had the King desired to 
keep his dealings with Glamorgan a secret even from his
1. E.H.R., pp.690-1; Athenaeum, Feb.26, 1898-1, pp.278-9.
2. Early writers, among them Carte and Bosv/ell, also 
questioned the authenticity of all Glamorgan’s patents on 
the grounds that they were improperly drawn up, couched in 
uncourtly language, and unknown to anyone except Glamorgan 
himself.
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Principal Secretaries and they were at a later date
indignantly to deny any knowledge of them^- he would have
been obliged to draw up the commissions himself or to allow
2
Glamorgan to do so. The latter*s style was habitually 
turgid and given to fantasy, so that it was to be expected 
that any document drafted by him would be ’absurdly phrased’. 
Nor, for that matter, was the King’s own use of language 
notable for its simplicity and directness, assuming that 
he himself was the author. Indeed, in a sense, the 
maladroitness of this and other commissions argues in 
their favour.
Next, Round states,
”I pass over the pertinent inquiry how, when the 
great seal was in the due keeping of Lyttleton, 
it came to be in Glamorgan’s hands for this 
irregular purpose."3
This presupposes beyond any reasonable conjecture that
the Great Seal never strayed out of Lyttleton’s hands.
Yet there is some doubt on this point. Three pieces of
evidence would seem to suggest that there were occasions
when persons other than the Lord Keeper had the Great Seal
1. See below p . ^ 35" ; cdso
2. That is to say, either Charles or Glamorgan would have 
decided the wording of the commissions. The actual writing 
could be left to Glamorgan’s secretary. It is perhaps 
significant that Glamorgan should have informed the papal 
nuncio, Rinuccini, that all these honours and powers, to 
which Round takes exception, had been bestowed upon him 
under the King’s hand and Seal - Birch, f .n.,pp. 22-3;
Com. Rih.. ,(i^ p.7^  .
3.Peerage and Family History, p.385.
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in their custody. With reference to another commission
Glamorgan was to say in 1660 that he and Endymion Porter
had contrived to affix a seal to it in an irregular manner^
In 1660 Porter was dead. The choice of his name as an
associate was therefore either very c l e v e r a n d  cleverness
is not usually attributed to Glamorgan, particularly by
Round - or an extraordinary stroke of good fortune, or
else an expression of the simple truth, for it was commonly
believed that the Great Seal had been in Porter’s possession
2
when the King was in Edinburgh and again at least for some
3
time in the autumn of 1642. Again, in the message which 
Glamorgan conveyed to his father from the King, mentioned 
abovef there occurs this passage.
'1. Dircks, pp.227-30. Miss D. Townshend, George Digby, 
p. 107, wrote that Porter ’’had already more than once done 
the same job for the King”, but unfortunately neglected to 
cite any authority.
2. B.M., 176/25? p.38, 1643.
3. Cf. The Censure of the Earl of Berkshire by the Lords 
in Parlt,(coll. of Pamphlets, B.M., E.118^)with reference 
to the commissions which some of the Irish rebels claimed 
to have received from the King. The Lords expressed the 
pious hope:
’’that if any such commissions are, they have been 
obtained by some sinister meanes without the 
knowledge or privity of his majesty; Sir Endymion 
Porter (not being a sworn officer and one that is 
disaffected to the King and Kingdoms) having for 
divers months together had the custody and possession 
of the great seal of England.
Great cause therefore had the Lord Keeper to make 
some excuse For himselfe, by signifying unto the 
Parliament...”
4. ^p. k
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”... and also having the Great Seal in your 
Majesty’s own custody, you would pass a patent 
of Marquis of what ever title my should desire.”
This also was written during the Autumn of 1642, in
September. -^ t is of course possible that Glamorgan and
Porter collaborated in manufacturing some of the former’s
commissions, but even in this event they may have done so
with the King’s knowledge. Otherwise, apart from this
coincidence of dates and Glamorgan’s reference to the
affixing of the seal, there is no record of any further
connection between the two men. Thus here we have
Glamorgan associating himself with the one man who appears
to have had the seal in his possession in 1641 and 1642.
If he had had it in those years, why not in 1644? It is
to be remembered also that Porter had Catholic connections
and died a Catholic, and that from the time of the King’s
visit to Madrid when the King was still Prince of Wales,
he had lived on exceedingly intimate terms with the King
frequently carrying out delicate and private missions on 
1
his behalf. In short, it is open to doubt that the 
Great Seal was always in the due and proper keeping of 
Lyttleton.
As to the matter of the dukedom granted at the end of 
the commission. Round asks why, if the commission were 
genuine,the King should have found it necessary to issue
1. Dorothea Townshend, The Life and Letters of Endymion 
Porter, p.19; G. Huxley, Endymion Porter; the life of a
courtier, Londi^l959, passim.
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another patent on May 4th of the same year conferring the 
same dukedom on Glamorgan^ In answer to this query it 
can only be said that there was surely nothing strange in 
issuing a formal patent to regularise and supersede a 
grant made, as Round himself puts it, at the tail of a 
complex commission.
The garter given henceforward also at the tail leads 
Round to imply - presumably he considered his point too 
obvious to require an explicit statement - that here is 
yet another odd contradiction, since the garter is shortly 
to be offered to Glamorgan's father on August 2nd, 1644.
How could it be offered to the father when it had been 
already given to the son? S.R. Gardiner, noticing this 
difficulty, was of the opinion that the Marquis resented
3
the granting to his son of honours not possessed by himself. 
This would seem a natural reaction, the justice of which 
would appeal to Glamorgan. Why then should he not have 
requested the King to withdrav/ the grants made to himself
1. Op.cit., p.389; at the Restoration, Glamorgan, by now 
Marquis of Worcester, produced a patent under the Great 
Seal which apparently conferred upon him the title of 
Duke of Somerset and Beaufort. Historians, beginning 
with Birch, assumed this to be the commission of 1644 
under discussion. Round proved conclusively that this 
was not the case, op.cit., p.370; see below p.
2. Ibid., pp.389-90.
3. E.H.R., pp.693-4.
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and bestow them instead upon his father?^ Afteh all, 
the Marquis was paying the piper and may well have insisted 
on calling the tune. In any case, was there any reason 
why the garter could not have been granted to both father 
and son?
Round comes next to his strongest point. In both this
commission and the dukedom patent of May 4th, the Lord Herbert
is styled ’Earl of Glamorgan’, although as he. Round , has
2
shown in an earlier article Glamorgan is nowhere else so 
described before 1645. The question arises, how could the 
title of Glamorgan appear in documents one year before the 
title was granted unless those documents had been forged at 
a later date? By way of answer it can first be iterated 
that just as all Glamorgan’s commissions were issued secretly 
so was this title. Consequently■only the King would be 
likely to use it in 1644 and then only in the most secret 
correspondence. And the safets plan would be not to use 
it at all. It is significant that throughout 1645 the 
King uses the addresses of ’Herbert’ and ’Glamorgan’ as
1. The King’s choice of words in the course of the letter 
to the Marquis dated August 2nd would seem to bear this out:
”...In the meantime, finding your son so much more 
desirous that there should be placed upon you some 
mark of my favour rather than upon himself, I have 
thought fit to let you know that as soon as I shall 
confer the Order of the Garter upon any, you shall 
receive it .as a testimony. You, etc.” Lircks, pp.102-5.
2. Genealogist, April, 1898.
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though they were interchangeable, and that in I646 he
denied ever having granted the title in the face of his own 
frequent use of it. Moreover, there is among the Stuart
Papers at Windsor Castle a patent dated April 10th, 1644, and
signed ’Glamorgan’ It is true that this may have been
forged and ingeniously given a retrospective date, but, if
so, it is difficult to see what Glamorgan hoped to gain by
such malpractice. At least it seems fair to conclude that
Round's deduction does not necessarily follow from the facts.
The proposal of a match between Glamorgan’s son and the 
2
Princess Elizabeth is surprising to say the least, but it
would seem nonetheless to be corroborated by this passage
which occurs in a letter from the King to the Marquis of
Worcester dated January 6th, 1645:
"As by a match propounded for your grandchild you 
will easily judge. The particulars I leave to 
your son Glamorgan his relation."5
January 10th was a likely time. Round states, being,
"More than hine months after the date of the alleged 
patent assuming (not propounding) that "matche" under 
the Great Seal."4
1. Calendar of Stuart Papers, p.l.
2. The Princess was in the hands of Parliament at this time 
and could scarcely have known of any proposal to bestow her 
hand in marriage. I have carefully examined the exiguous 
records of her short life without finding a single reference 
to such a match.
3. Dircks, pp.103-4; S.R. Gardiner takes this passage to be 
a further point in favour of the Commission being authentic. 
E.H.R., 11, p.697.
4. Op.cit., p.391.
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This would seem a weak point. Is nine months really
such a long time, especially since Charles appears to
have corresponded only once with the Marquis, namely on
August 2nd, 1644,^ during the whole of that period? As
2
for ’assuming’ the commission no more than 'promises', 
which is not so very different from propounding.
3
Round's final point is that Glamorgan's inglorious 
military record scarcely accords with his being appointed 
"Generalissimo of Three Armies", etc., and with the lack of 
faith the King was about to express in his judgmentt To 
these criticisms one can only reply that the King did intend 
Glamorgan to command an expedition against England, and that 
we knmv this from other evidence which Round himself does 
not reject.
The object of the foregoing commentary upon the case 
against the commission so vigorously argued by Round is 
limited to showing that what emerges at first sight as 
irresistible does not stand up so well when the essential 
stages in its development are isolated and exposed singly 
to criticism. In short, there is no compulsion to refrain 
from discussion of the commission just because Round appears
1. See p. X\x.
2. It is perhaps a trifling point but Charles frequently 
uses the word 'promise' in a conditional rather than an 
obligatory sense. Thus one questions whether he personally 
would have made any distinction between ' promise ' and
'propound'.
3. Op.cit., p.392.
4. Charles I to Ormond, Dec.27, 1644, Carte, V, pp.7-8; 
Gilbert, V, p.8; see below p. I.
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to have proved it fraudulent.
To begin with, there is one relevant fact that Round's
all-seeing eye overlooked. On the very first two pages
of the first volume of the Calendar of Stuart Papers
preserved at Windsor Castle, published in 1902, there appears
what is described as a true copy of this commission^
Round might have been hard pressed to account for its
2
appearance in the Royal collection. It is suggested
in the Introduction to the Calendar that the commission
III
came into the hands of James II or/when a descendant of a 
certain Sir Richard Iviinshull, who had apparently been 
created a viscount by Glamorgan on April 3rd, 1644, by
3
virtue of this commission, sought to claim his title.
If this were so, far from being weakened, Glamorgan’s 
commission would be strengthened!
1. Professor Dodd also notes this point (op.cit., p.92, n.3):
"Round’s denunciation of this document as a "preposterous" 
fabrication of Glamorgan does not take into account the 
copy in the King’s private papers (subsequently 
calendared in H.M.C., Stuart 1 - 2) to which Glamorgan 
can hardly have had access, nor of the accompanying 
patent which shows how soon he began using his new 
powers. If this crucial document is authentic.
Round’s wholesale rejection of other documents in 
the case may need reconsideration."
2. Of course. Round must have seen it but presumably chose
not to re-open the subject.
3. XXIX-XXX.
4. See below p.%13.
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Moreover, suppose it were possible to adduce evidence 
to indicate that after the miscarriage of the Oxford 
negotiations the King did not, as is generally believed, 
abandon the plan to raise an Irish army with Glamorgan 
at its head. Would not the repute of the commission be 
strengthened? Such evidence does exist.
For instance, this letter, dated August 2nd, 1644, 
from the King to the Marquis of Worcester, requires 
explanation, although attention has not previously been 
drawn to it:
"Worcester,
I am sensible of the great affection which you 
and your son have expressed unto me, by eminent 
services, and of the means he may have of doing 
me more in that way wherein he is engaging himself, 
that I cannot choose before his going..."1
To what was Charles referring in expressions such as
'means' and 'his going*, if not to the project of raising
an army. The suggestion bas not been made before, but
is it not possible that Charles still hoped that Glamorgan
would be successful in raising the desired army, and that
ever since April 1st, Glamorgan undeterred by the breakdown
of the Oxford talks, had been making the essential
preparations^ Three facts support this contention.
1. Dircks, pp.102-3. The rest of the letter was concerned 
with the conferment of the garter on the Marquis.
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First, contrary to the accepted view that he did not
avail himself of the powers contained in the commission
of April 1st until he disembarked in Ireland, there is the
patent issued by Glamorgan on April 3rd to Sir Richard
Minshull, creating him Viscount Minshull, presumably in
expectation of services to be rendered in return! Secondly,
in a letter to the King written in the following March,
just before he set sail for Ireland, he said:
"That to advance these his undertakings, he hath 
Thirty thousand pounds ready, ten thousand muskets, 
two thousand case of pistols, eight hundred barrels 
of powder, besides his own artillery; and is 
ascertained of Thirty thousand more which will be 
ready on his return."2
The criticism may be voiced that Glamorgan was as usual 
lying or at best indulging his passion for hyperbole.
On this occasion, at least, he was culpable of neither 
fault, for not only was he quoting figures which the King 
would be able to verify in the event of his mission being 
successful, since the Irish army would be fatally under­
equipped if no stores awaited when it disembarked in Wales, 
but in a letter to Ormond, dated April 3rd, 1646, he would 
offer,
"to immediately give and bringe back with him 
10,000 muskets, 2,000 cases of pistols, 8000 barrels 
of powder."3
1. Calendar of Stuart Papers, p.l. This patent is to be 
found with the copy of the commission. See above p.ZC
2. 'The King’s Cabinet Opened & o', Harl.Misc., V, pp.330-1.
3. Gilbert, V, p.309.
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and again on July 19th, 1646, he would contract to the
Nuncio to supply a similar amount! The repetition of the
same quantities of the same stores three times rings true.
It is also in his favour that his father's castle at Raglan
was a notorious cache of arms, functioning as a sort of
depot for the bulk of the royalist forces in South Wales
and the adjacent border counties.
In seeking evidence to support the commission of
April 1st, Gardiner either overlooked this letter or missed
its significance, for to amass such large supplies must
have been an expensive and, so far as the present argument
is concerned, a protracted business. This could explain
that delay in Glamorgan's departure for Ireland which
Gardiner and others adduce as proof that Glamorgan could
not have been engaged on the King's behalf else he would
2have sailed for Ireland sooner than he did.
This theory that Glamorgan delayed his departure for 
Ireland in order to prepare Wales for the reception of an 
Irish expeditionary force is supported by circumstantial 
evidence brought to light by Professor Dodd. He points 
out that serious Royalist reversals in the North and South 
in the Autumn of 1644 made Wales "no place for the landing
3
of substantial forces from overseas". In order to press 
on with his plans Glamorgan had first to clear Monmouth
1. Dircks, p.174.
2. E.H.R., pp.700-1.
3. Op.cit., p.93.
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of hostile troops, and it is suggested that this’operation 
occupied his attention during the winter months!
p
In the Calendar of Domestic State Papers and in a
3
work by N. Pond©3&, there are two references to Glamorgan’s 
presence in Monmouthshire in the second half of 1644 and 
a specific reference to a skirmish before Gloucester on 
October 13th, in which he took part. These appear to be 
the only extant indication of his whereabouts between April 
1st and the last months of the year! Considered apart 
from the letter of August 2nd, above mentioned, they suggest 
that Gardiner is right. Glamorgan had been forced, to 
abandon his plan for Ireland and had automatically returned 
to his former place with the King’s forces in South V/ales. 
But taken in conjunction with the same letter, they signify 
nothing more than that Glamorgan was in the Monmouth area, 
which is exactly where we would expect him to be if he 
were raising supplies; that is, in his ov/n special territory, 
His being involved in a skirmish is not surprising, if the
1. Ibid, p.91.
2. p.31.
3. Memorials of English Affairs, 1682, pp.102-110.
4. It appears from a letter, dated August 23rd, 1644, from 
Glamorgan to Prince Rupert, that Glamorgan was indisposed 
for a period during these m o n t h s ^ t h o u g h  I have the 
ambition to kiss your most valorous and princely hands, 
yet because I am newly entered into a cause of physic, I 
do humbly desire to be excused for the present..."
Warburton. III, p.22.
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fluid state of the war in South V/ales and the likelihood 
of colliding with enemy patrols be remembered!
Thirdly, there are convincing signs that the King had 
for some time envisaged a military operation based on a 
strategic union between Irish and Welsh forces. As early 
as 1639, at the time when he had hoped to bring over 
Strafford’s army to put paid to the Scots, he had issued 
a secret commission to the Earl of Worcester empowering him 
to command an army and had ordered several deputy lieutenants 
of the neighbouring counties to submit to his commands.
Wales was the obvious landing place for troops from Ireland, 
but it was necessary to insure a friendly welcome for them.
It was probably intended, therefore, that Worcester should 
occupy and dominate South Wales, so that Strafford’s forces 
could disembark in safety and then link up with his own 
command.^
If this had been the plan in 1639, it would have been 
remarkable if the same plan had not occurred to the King 
early in 1644 - that is to say, at some point between the 
failure in the North-West of the army sent over by Ormond
1. Of course, if Professor Dodd is correct to suggest that 
he was engaged in clearing Monmouth of hostile troops, this 
is precisely the kind of encounter that would be reported.
2. O.S.P.P., 1640, pp.631-2; Transactions of the Honourable 
Society of Qymmrodorion, 1948, p.50; Dodd, p.81, p.86, and 
pp.90-1; see also "...Committees were formed to investigate 
the ’V/elsh Popish armie and the popish Hiérarchie’ - the 
former a force raised ih Ireland for the King’s service by 
the Earl of Worcester and his son. Lord Herbert, Catholics 
both." D.’Ewes, p.324.
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and the arrival in Oxford of the Confederate Commissioners.
This would seem to be the belief of Professor Dodd. Put
briefly, the plan would have been for Glamorgan to raise 
his troops in Ireland, return to South Wales, disembarking, 
say, at Milford Haven, and to join forces with a contingent, 
mainly Catholic, from the Monmouth area, which he was to 
have recruited and for which he was to have built up supplies 
before his departure. Charles was to moVe his main army 
into Wales.
Three items of evidence may be put forward in support
of this theory of a grand strategic plan for the union of
Irish and Welsh. First, there is Glamorgan’s own statement^
contained in a message sent to the King on the eve of his
departure for Ireland in 1645:
"...God willing, by the end of May or beginning of 
June, he will land with 6,000 Irish.
That the gentlemen of the several counties of
Monmouth, Glamorgan, Brecknock, and Carmarthen,
will very speedily, for your Majesty’s service in 
securing these parts, raise and arm four thousand men.
That with the ships, which shall bring over the 
Irish, his Lordship designs to block up Milford 
haven, at which time he doubts not to draw these 
Welsh into Pembrokeshire.
That to advance these his undertakings he hath 
thirty thousand pounds ready, ten thousand muskets, 
two thousand case of pistols, eight hundred barrels 
of powder, besides his own artillery; and is 
ascertained of thirty thousand pounds more, which 
will be ready upon his return.’’2
1. Admittedly this is ex parte evidence.
2. Harl. Misc., V, pp.550-1.
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Secondly, the old Marquis of Worcester seems to have
1
anticipated such an operation. Thirdly, when in the
next year Glamorgan had sailed for Ireland the King moved
with an army into South V/ales as though-expecting: his ------
2
return with an Irish force.
There is also one tangible connection between
Glamorgan and Ireland in the autumn of 1644. His uncle-
in-law, Barnabas O'Brien, Earl of Thomond, excusing
himself to Ormond on September 30th for being unable to
attend 'a conference in Dublin to discuss peace terms
with the Confederates, stated:
"Yet I humbly desire that you wil be pleased to 
take into consideration that on Saturday last, 
receaving some letters (by my Lord Herbert’s man) 
from my Lord Muskerry ... I have therefore 
embouldened myselfe see farr to presume on your 
Lordship's favour as to crave leave for my absence 
(whereby to give the best contentment I may to my 
Lord Herbert in his desires signified by his 
servant, which without some time I cannot possibly 
accomplish) till towards Allhallowtide".3
Now it is obvious from a letter sent by Ormond to Viscount
Muskerry in the next year that the Earl of Thomond * s
estate was one of the sources from which Glamorgan
expected to obtain money to finance the expedition that
no one doubts was being planned at that time. It is
1. There was an acidulous exchange between the old Marquis 
and the local parliamentary commander in May, 1646, in the 
course of which he darkly hinted that his antagonist would 
shortly rue his insolence when his son arrived. Cf.the 
Marquis of Worcester to the Governor of Chepstow and the 
rest of the Committee for the Parliament for the County of 
Monmouth,Ragland,May 29,1646, Coll.of Pamphlets,1646,B.M.B.340
2. See below pp.296-7 ; see also pp.361-4.
3. Bunratty,T.C.P .,Xll,p.249._______________________________
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perhaps not straining coincidence too far to deduce that
his business with Thomond in the autumn of 1644 was connected
with the same matter^ especially as Muskerry, the leader
of the delegation to Oxford had something to do with it.
It is,moreover, imperative to emphasize the date of
this commission. April 1st was one of the very few days
in the whole of 1644 when the King might have counted with
justifiable expectation on receiving troops from Ireland,
that is to say, one of the fev/ days between the auspicious
opening of the Oxford conference and the emergence of
2
impossible obstacles. It is a fact to be noted again and
again that Glamorgan, whose opponents are obliged to depict
3
him as a maladroit conspirator in order to bolster their 
argument, displayed an uncanny knack for giving his forged 
documents convincing dates.
There is one more fascinating piece of evidence which 
deserves mention and which seems so far to have gone unnoticed.
1. See below p.3S(&.
2. Of. Radcliffe to Ormond, April 2, 1644, Carte, VI, p.84:
"There is nothings that is scandalous now, nor dishonourable 
for the King to treats on. I hears by another hands, not 
so good, I confesse, yet reasonable good, that wee shall 
have peace, and that they will submit much to the King'j'l 
Gardiner dwelt at some length on this point.
3. It is, in fact, difficult to endow Glamorgan with an 
orderly mind. But, then, if he is believed to be innocent
of guile, there is no call to do so.
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It happened that a gentleman named Mark Newbie, a Londoner,
who in 1681 emigrated to America by way of Ireland,
suddenly offered in 1682 to sell a quantity of copper coins
to the governors of New Jersey. His offer was accepted
and the coins were put into circulation. Outside America
there has been no trace of these particular coins except
in Lublin and Kilkenny. Subsequently numismati-ifci-SGSB
laboured to account for the provenance of the coins, which
came to be known as the Ploreat Rex coinage, and propounded
a number of unlikely solutions. Then, towards the end of
the last century, at about the time when Round and Gardiner
were hotly engaged in their joust, the Secretary of the
Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland advanced a novel
and strangely convincing theory under the title,
'On the Irish "St. Patrick" or "Ploreat Rex"
Coinage, subsequently circulated in New Jersey: 
with reasons for connecting it with Lord Glamorgan's 
attempts to levy troops in Ireland.'1
Frazer pointed out that means for minting these coins
did not exist at Lublin, or at Kilkenny, or, indeed, anywhere
else in Ireland. Nor, for several convincing reasons, is
it probable that they came from the mainland of Europe.
1. W. Frazer, R.S.A.I., ^/.V., Fifth Series, part IV, 1885. 
There are, of course, several theories about the provenance 
of these coins. For example, they have often been described 
as Confederate coinage. However, it is the opinion of 
Mr. W. O'Sullivan of the National Museum of Ireland, with 
whom I discussed the problem, that Frazer's speculations 
are as valid as those of anyone else.
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On the other hand, under minute inspection, the coins
reveal the craft and style of the Royal engraver in the
reign of Charles I, Briot! How, then, do we account for
the existence of this large store of coins which was not
subsequently used, except for some very small part?
The coins could scarcely have been for direct use
in England, because silver was the only recognized coinage.
On the other hand, copper coins had value in Ireland.
Even as late as the Jacobite Wars Irish soldiers were paid
no more than Id. per diem. It may be assumed, therefore,
that they were intended for Ireland. In that case, by
whom and for what purpose?
To these questions Mr. Frazer answered: by the Earl
of Glamorgan for the payment of Irish troops. Aside from
the difficulty of alighting on any other explanation,
Glamorgan fits in neatly. From his father's V/elsh mines,
"Glamorgan could procure the necessary metallic copper 
for striking the coinage, large though it was, which 
it is probable no other person could obtain at that 
time. Again the two emblems on the coins, on the 
one side "Floreat Rex", and, on the obverse, "the 
mistical prelate with his double cross blessing the 
assembled people, and putting to flight the toads 
and snakes of heresy, leading, as its happy result, 
to the termination of trouble expressed in "Quiescat 
Plebs", these call to mind the twin aspirations of the
1. Of: "So soon as Cromwell died, the widow of Briot made 
a claim of £2,800 stated to be due to her. We do not 
know the particulars of her claim. Evidently she demanded 
compensation for something she did not dare to ask for so 
long as Cromwell ruled." Ibid.
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House of Raglan, a strong monarchy and the revival 
of Papal supremacy."
Lastly, Kilkenny and Dublin were the two places with which
Glamorgan had special associations.
It remained to explain why the coins were never used.
Frazer suggested;
"The complete failure of his (Glamorgan's) negotiations 
prevented the circulation of the coinage, and it 
remained in England, unlmown and concealed, until 
Mark Newbie obtained possession of these pieces."
If this ingenious theory be accepted, the various
mysteries surrounding the coinage are at once solved.
For example it would explain:
i. Why its occurrence was limited to Dublin and
Kilkenny.
ii. Why such a large amount was originally minted.
H i .  V/hy it disappeared so completely from sight during 
the period of the Commonwealth.
iv. Why it remained useless under Charles II until 
Newbie purchased it.1
What light does the theory throw on Glamorgan's
Commission? In the first place its terms appear less
flamboyant. Marriage to a Princess, the grant of a
dukedom and the rest seem less outlandish alongside the
considerable power to distribute secret funds, if not to
1. Clearly Charles II could not use the coins for fear of 
certain scandal.
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erect a mint!
And, secondly, it would seem improbable that 
Glamorgan would have begun minting the coinage at any 
time after 1644, since he must have wished it to be ready 
against the arrival of his Irish contingent in the month 
of May, 1645.
To conclude this defence of Glamorgan, let it be 
supposed that the commission was a forgery. When did 
Glamorgan forge it? Presumably not on the date subscribed 
or at any time in 1644 since, as his critics must have it, 
there could have been no reason for employing him until 
the next year. In 1645, then, when he definitely planned 
to go to Ireland? Hardly. That he received ample authority 
from the King to raise an army no one disputes. Much 
later on, perhaps when he wished'to lay claim to the 
Üukedom of Somerset - in about October 1649, for instance
1. This distinction would appear to be necessary. Frazer 
was unaware that Glamorgan had written to Clarendon on 
June 11th, 1660, stating categorically that while
he had been given authority to erect a mint, he had chosen 
not to exercise itj Clar.S.P., 11, p.201-3J Gilbert V, p.15 
At first sight this statement seems to nullify Frazer's 
elaborate thesis. But, on reflection, it may be inferred 
that though Glamorgan did not erect a mint on his own 
authority, he did so under Charles' directions and with 
his explicit permission. Hence, the employment of the 
King's own engraver, Briot. This would be the sort of 
nice distinction Glamorgan, like so many others, would be 
anxious to make when trying desperately to justify his 
behaviour at the Restoration. After all, why even raise 
the question if there were not something to be explained 
av/ayt
2 2 4 .
according to Hound^, when he wrote to Charles requesting 
the Dukedom and the garter, or at the Restoration, when he 
made strenuous efforts to prove his title? But why should 
he have invoked this commission with its casual reference 
to the dukedom at the close when he could produce a patent - 
whether it was forged or not is here irrelevant - which 
appeared unequivocally to confer the ïjukedom upon him?
Then, on what occasion and for what purpose would it have 
paid him to perpetrate this particular forgery? Upon 
those who doubt the authenticity of this commission lies 
the burden of answering this big question.
If the genuineness of the commission may now be assumed, 
the question of why it was issued on April 1st, 1644, is 
easily answered. It was because the Irish Commissioners 
had just arrived at Oxford and there seemed to be a strong 
possibility of a favourable outcome to the impending 
conference. It may even be surmised that Glamorgan
3
had presented himself at Court, or, indeed, had been 
summoned thither by the king, for the express purpose of
1. Op.cit., p.575.
2. Round examined the whole question of the dukedom in 
the work above cited pp.367-95. See belowupp.i.
3. It is useful to be able to locate Glamorgan at Court 
at about the time the Confederate Commissioners arrived;
cf. Arthur Trevor to Prince Rupert, Oxford circa March 26th, 
Warhurton, op.cit., 11, p.400.
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discussing the raising of troops in Ireland with the
Commissioners. Should this have been the case, it would
help to explain why the Supreme Council looked forward to
2
his coming in 1645 and wny it so readily accepted his claim
3
to be the King's ambassador.
The next question to be answered is what did the 
commission empower Glamorgan to do? Birch, the eighteenth 
century historian^ and several of Gardiner's predecessors 
thought that it was the basis of all Glamorgan's subsequent 
negotiations with the Irish, but this is an untenable view. 
Nor, as Round has proved, is there much foundation for 
Gardiner’s opinion that the King envisaged an international 
army v/ith Glamorgan in command. It is quite reasonable 
and much simpler to take the document at its face value ; 
it is an authority to raise an army and wisely gives the 
utmost latitude for finding money, supplies and ships from 
every conceivable source. This view is reinforced by a 
letter written to Hyde in 1660 in which Glamorgan explained
1. i it His independejÿ command had
given such offenceH:o Ms~enemies that he/nai^ decided 
there was no further scope for his ambition in England.
2. See below pp.33o-lf’
3. One of the principal difficulties of Glamorgan's 
critics is to account for the extraordinary ease with 
which he convinced the Supreme Council of the validity 
of his credentials.
4. pp.13-14.
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why his authority should have been so wide - since his 
mission was delicate and supremely important - it would 
have been folly to hamper his negotiations v/ith provisos!
Why the King should have kept the document secret even 
from his intimate advisers presents a different problem. 
Denigrators of Charles overcome this difficulty by asserting 
that he did not want any one to know of his intention to 
bring over a Catholic army for fear of estranging his own 
Protestant supporters. Gardiner does not raise the problem. 
This may be part of the answer. The rest could be explained 
as follows. To appoint Glamorgan was certainly a risk.
But if the expedition were to succeed, it would then be 
time enough to worry about Protestant susceptibilities.
If it were to fail, little would be lost. It was good 
sense to keep the matter quiet.:
This disputed commission of April 1st,1644, has only 
an indirect bearing on the larger issue of Glamorgan’s 
Treaty, since it could have nothing to do with making 
peace with the Confederacy. If authentic, it helps to 
reinforce the standing of the documents of subsequent date 
produced by Glamorgan; if spurious, it weakens them. But, 
either way, if in 1644 Charles thought at all of Glamorgan in 
connection with Ireland, it could have been only as the 
commander-elect of an expeditionary force. Any thought
1. Clar. S.P., II, p.201.
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of him as a would-be treaty-maker could scarcely have 
entered his head until the end of the year, for up to that 
time he still entertained the hope that Ormond would 
persuade the Confederacy to accept suitable terms.
CHAPTER VI
The Trials of Ormond, May, 1644 - August, 1645
After the breakdown of the Oxford negotiations it 
must have been obvious to men of cool judgment that the 
grounds for disagreement between the Confederates and the 
Protestant Royalists were so wide that the prospect of a 
settlement was remote. The King’s position was peculiarly 
delicate, for no matter how tactful he might be, he was 
bound to give offence to someone. Confronted with this 
problem what should he do?
He decided that the Marquis of Ormond should carry on 
negotiations with the Confederates in Ireland. It has 
sometimes been asserted that he intended to use Ormond as 
a stalking-horse for the Earl of Glamorgan, who was to 
offer secret concessions to the Irish, but this has to be 
proved and it has been shown that, at least in so far as 
the year 1644 was concerned, Glamorgan was employed only 
in a military capacity.
Why Ormond should be appointed to persevere with the 
negotiations, if they were to be proceeded with at all, 
it is easy to see. Ormond himself admitted as much, 
although this did not prevent him from being pessimistic
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about the outcome. Apart from other considerations it
would be difficult to find commissioners on the royalist
side who would be prepared to treat, in view of the
failure of the King and Council to achieve a result.
It was also hardly to be expected that a settlement could
be effected in Ireland, where feeling between Catholic and
Protestant was so bitter, when it could not be reached in
England under much more favourable conditions. In short,
Ormond shrank from the task and wondered what the King
hoped to gain from, his carrying on with the negotiations 
2
in Ireland.
What, indeed, was Charles* purpose? , Obviously it 
was essential to keep in touch with Kilkenny so as to 
prevent the resumption of hostilities. But Charles 
never behaved as though this were his only motive. On 
the contrary throughout the next eighteen months he 
frequently presumed that peace was imminent and Irish aid 
about to be set on its way. It may be that he looked, 
with characteristi(^%founded optimism, for something to 
turn up if the negotiations could only be kept nominally 
in being. He may even have refused to face the implications
1. Nor was he alone in feeling dubious. Towards the end of 
the conference when it became clear that it was the King’s 
intention to transfer negotiations to Ireland, Sir Philip 
Percivall could not restrain a protest on Ormond’s behalf; 
cf. Percivall to Ormond, Carte, VI, pp.150-51.
2. Carte, VI, pp. 1 5 3 - 4 ,
250.
of the Oxford failure, and have genuinely, if naively,
believed that the prospects for peace were still undiirimed.
After all, as higby said at about this time in a would-be
encouraging letter to Ormond, the Confederate Commissioners
had expressed their regret at leaving Court with no
agreement and their intention of persuading their colleagues
on the Sjipreme Council to moderate their demands^ But
could it be believed seriously that this was anything more
than a courteous way of bidding farewell? A further
explanation may be that he relied upon Ormond to retrieve
the situation by sheer force of personality and ability.
If this were really so, he had chosen the wrong man.
Ormond’s ability and commanding personality were not in
question. Nor was his high sense of duty - although
perfectly aware that he was being asked to relieve the
King of the odium as well as the burden of treating with
2
rebel Catholics, he registered only an oblique protest.
Yet, these qualities were insufficient, or at least.
1. Bigby to Ormond, Jul.22, ibid., pp.172-7.
2. Of. Radcliffe to Ormond, June 11, 1644: ”I hope it is 
not intended that your excellence shall take the thorne 
out of his Majesty^^s foote, and put it in his owne” :
Carte, VI. pp. 14$^'7. Arthur Trevor expressed the same 
sentiment even more forcibly: ”... if the earl of Bristoll,
tord Bigby, lord Cottington, and the councall will putt the 
stocke into your hand, and stand themseltfes beheind the 
hangings I presume the marquess^ of Ormonde will thinke it 
proportionable to reason, that they goe their shares, if 
they expect a profite in the returnft^’ ibid., p.198.
231.
misplaced in the present case.
Amid the viciously contending interests to be found
in Ireland only someone devoid of integrity could have
pretended to discern a common purpose. Ormond could not
do so. Unlike Charles he was not accustomed to making
half-promises and throwing out ambiguous hints. If his
strategy was sound - to play on the uneasy conscience of
the Anglo-Irish and to exploit the factional strife at
Kilkenny - his tactics were not subtle enough to deceive.
He was hampered, too, by the strength of his convictions.
As a Royalist with a taste for authoritarianism he loathed
having to make concessions under the whip of expediency;
and, as a Protestant, he was troubled about conceding too
much to the Roman Church^
It is difficult to bâLievé that Charles was unaware
of Ormond’s shortcomings as his intermediary with the Irish
He was certainly conscious of the arduous part for which
he had cast him:
”I am not ignorant how hard a part I put upon you 
in transferrings to you the treatye, and the power 
to conclude a peace with the Irish”.
But although it may have been true that Ormond was:
1. In a letter to Bigby (aee above Chapter 2, ) he
stated that his orders must not controvert ”the grounds 
I have laid to my/'self in pc^nt of religion”. This he 
mentioned ”le€(A the >[ing’s service should suf/er in my 
scrupE3Jousnes/e in things another would find^ lessz dif/iculty
in”.
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"soe intirely addicted to my service, as that you. ' 
will not be deterrd by difficultyes from what may 
soe much conduce to it, as the easinge me at present 
of that treatye”,1
more than loyalty and patience were called for. Thus,
when the immediately obvious explanations of Charles’
confidence in a future peace with the Confederacy are
examined, they are found wanting. One is, therefore,
driven to conclude that Charles was keeping a trick up
his sleeve.
In theory, Ormond now disposed of great power. The 
King had replied favourably to all his suggestions both 
for strengthening his authority and for giving him more 
latitude in dealing with the Confederacy. Moreover, if 
his own report maybe believed, Daniel O ’Neill, now returned 
to Court, had also offered several suggestions which the 
King had graciously welcomed? Some of t h e ^  tallied with
those made by Ormond himself, but there were three 
interesting new ones: the King’s instructions should be 
issued through one secretary of state only, namely,
Digby; Ormond should be given authority to terminate 
appointments made ’’during the King’s pleasure since 1641”;
1. July 17, 1644, ibid., V, p.7.
2. O ’Neill to Ormond, Jul.17, Aphor. Disc., I, pp.598-9. 
Daniel O ’Neill does not give the impression of being a 
deliberate liar but rather of exaggerating his influence 
and the attention paid to his advice. On this occasion 
he may well be believed, for very shortly after he had 
written to Ormond the King issued a proclamation requiring 
all persons who had any office or command in Ireland to 
return there at once. Cal. CIS.P., I, p.260.
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all persons resident in England who had estates in Ireland
and who were not actively engaged in the King’s service
should be commanded to return home? In response to Ormond’s
own proposals, the King granted him authority to give full
2
pardons to such Confederates as should surrender and 
promised to consult him before conferring honours or 
making crown appointments. Those who presented themselves 
at Court behind his back with rosy accounts of their 
expectations of assistance from Ireland would receive no 
encouragement. Nor would he be held up to Confederates
3
as the impediment to the granting of concessions.
Digby, who replied in the King’s name, had long since 
detected the tacit protest underlying Ormond’s matter-of- 
fact requests and sought to reassure him that henceforward 
he had nothing to fear. As early as February 8th he had 
reported that in future either he or Nicholas must sign 
all royal grants and naturally they could be relied upon 
never to flout the Lord Lieutenant’s wishes. As to the 
question of adventurers, his sympathies were all with 
Ormond. Personally, he would have no truck with them. 
Knowing that Ormond had been particularly annoyed by the
1. Daniel O ’Neill’s propositions to the King with the King’s 
answers, Aug. 24, T.C.P., XII, p.107; Aphor. Disc., p.591.
2. Ormond was given specific authority to receive to mercy 
in a letter from the King; of. Ormond to Digby, Mar.8,
Carte, VI, p.51.
3. Digby to Ormond, Jul.22, Carte, VI, pp.172-7.
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employment of Antrim, he emphasised the fact that ilntrim 
had been given no powers likely to detract from the 
viceroy’s own authority, and that Daniel O ’Neill had been 
sent along with Antrim to make sure that he did not 
overstep the mark?
And yet, here as elsewhere, Digby was protesting too 
much. Ormond realised as well as he did that however 
many splendid promises were made there v/ould continue to be 
a great deal of backsliding.
The root of the trouble was the inconsistency of 
crown policy. Though obstinate in some respects, Charles 
was too easily deflected from a straight course. At any 
given moment his views were as likely as not those of the 
person with whom he had last conversed. Again and again 
Ormond’s English correspondents drew attention'to his 
fickleness, but there could have been no more devastating 
commentary on the situation than that of the Archbishop 
of York:
’’Thinges are soe vni'ixed in this court, and his 
majestye (out of his to much goodness and pietye) 
soe obnoxious to be shaken and removed by varietye 
of counsallés out of any settled resolution, that 
I praesume your excellencye is stored (and soe you;# 
hadd neede be) with somme fundamentall instructions 
for the government of that kingedome, as are not to 
be whispered awaye, or discomposed with private 
informations or letters of command vpon such groundes 
as those ... ^ou are to playe your game v/holy in 
your owu tables, without expectinge any helpe or 
much advice from this kingdom^vntill God vouchsafe 
to send V-S better times. ”2
1. Ibid., pp.30-35.
2. Mar.7, 1644, Carte, VI, pp.50-1.
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In his modest and discreet way Nicholas was
probably more genuinely understanding about Ormond’s
difficulties and more practically helpful than Digby.
On one occasion he pointedly expressed utter disinterest
in a particular recipient of the King’s favours and then
continued with a pithy statement of his attitude towards
the legions of Irish petitioners. He had to sign many
letters which he could "wishe might have been forborne”.
In the future he advised Ormond to ignore such letters
unless he were to add a personal endorsement. He also
hinted that it might be wise for Ormond to avoid requesting
instructions and to ignore any instructions which he found
inconvenient?
The King was presented with an opportunity of
collaborating with the Confederates almost immediately
after the dissolution of the Oxford Conference, when
Monro, who was by now in command of all the anti-Royalist
2
forces, English as well as Scots, seized Belfast.
Throughout the Rebellion, any forward movement by these
3
northern forces always alarmed the Confederates. On
1. Nicholas to Ormond, Feb.2, 1644, T.C.P., IX, p.49; 
see also Radcliffe to Ormond, Feb.19., 1643, Carte, VI, 
pp.38-40.
2. Ormond himself reported the loss of Belfast to the 
Supreme Council on May 17; Gilbert, III, pp.168-9.
3. They had already written to Ormond; ”Wee conceive them 
(the Scots) to be our Common enemyes and doe desire they 
should be repelled with our ioynt endeavours”. April 17, 
1644, T.C.P., X, p.161.
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this occasion they offered to place their armies under 
Ormond’s command provided he would lead an attack against 
Monro. As a special inducement they claimed that their 
commissioners to Oxford had been informed by the King 
that he had several times recommended such a campaign 
to Ormond?
It chanced also that at this time a dispute between 
the earls of Antrim and Gastlehaven over the chief command 
of the Confederate armies was causing deep concern at 
Kilkenny. Daniel O ’Neill seized the opportunity to suggest 
to Sellings and Fennell that Ormond should be offered the 
command since Antrim and Castlehaven would be prepared 
to serve under him. Sellings and Fennell asked Ormond
2
if he knew of the suggestion and what he thought about it. 
Ormond denied that he had received any orders on
3
the subject from the King. Nevertheless, the proposal 
embarrassed him, for he had no wish to give offence by 
refusing and yet dared not accept. Recently his stock 
at Kilkenny had slumped, not least because news of his 
plan to break up the Confederacy by conferring pardons 
and honours upon selected leaders had leaked out.
1. Sellings to Ormond, May 30, ibid., XI, p.40.
2. Sellings and Fennell to Ormond, May 25, 1644,
Gilbert, III, pp.470-1.
3. Ormond to Mountgarrett, June 28, 1644, T.C.P., XI, p.183; 
see also Ormond to Digby, Carte, VI, p.164.
4. On April 7 the Catholic Commissioners at Oxford had
notified the Supreme Council that Ormond had asked for a
commission to enable him to warrant "the submission of 
such as will desire it, And to pass them pardons."
This was a dangerous way to break their association.
T.C.P., X, p.100.
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He was reliably informed, moreover, that refusal might
cost him the support of his sympathisers within the
Supreme Council. To make matters worse, Dublin was
desperately short of supplies and dependent on Confederate
sources for what little there wa(â. At the same time he
felt he could not,
"mix his rightful\ power, and unblemished, though 
small forces, with the wild ysurped authority 
and yeit unlawfull^tlT the
Besides which,
"I believe no man will think mee so miaoül as to 
ventureVppon this high strains but by the King’s 
com]/îand*, or soe disloyall as to doe without his 
approbation; and what scandall it may be to him 
to have that belateved,ao4 what hearts it may 
loose him in England elsewhere, his laiajestye
is best able to judge. REere I doe not think 
ten protestants would follow me^, b u t r i s e  
like one man against mee,and adheartSe. to the Scotfeüh
Then, having carefully pre-judged the issue in case the
King should prove less principled than himself, he asked
what he was to do?
In the circumstances Charles had no choice but to
reject the plan for a joint campaign, although he had
1 3
intended to support it. Digby admitted as much to Ormond.
1. Ormond outlined his exchanges with the Confederacy and 
the pros and cons of a combined operation against Monro 
in a lengthy report to Digby dated June 9th; Carte, VI,
pp.153-9.
2. He had informed Lord Taafe to this effect as early as 
Feby 6, 1644, ibid., p.154.
3. Digby to Ormond, August 13, ibid., p.193.
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It is to be wondered whether he and Ormond remarked the 
irony of their refusal? As Gardiner, forcibly expressed 
it:
"What is, however, to be thought of a policy 
which based itself on the co-operation of an 
Irish army in England, when it was impossible 
to grant to the Irish the co-operation of an 
English army in England."2
This was an opinion shared by the Supreme Council 
In reply to a request from Ormond to increase a consignment 
of corn and cattle already promised, they stated that 
they would be glad to oblige but could not raise the 
necessary taxes without first giving the people a good 
reason. As they affected to see it, such a good reason 
would be a declaration against the Scots by Ormond or, 
better still, an announcement that he would combine 
immediately with them against the advance from the North.
Such faithful royalists as Clanrickard, Thomond, Dillon, 
Fitz-William and Taaffe who were desperately concerned to 
see peace restored to the Kingdom, who had ostentatiously 
withheld support from the Confederacy, and who, therefore, 
had no axe to grind, also strongly advocated that the 
Scots should be declared enemies of the crown and attacked
1. Which coincided with the sending of one, Brent, to 
Ireland in a desperate search for powder; ibid., V, pp.6-7.
2. Civil War) II, p.162.
3. June, 21, T.C.P., XI, p.156.
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by Ormond?
The Confederates were evidently mystified by 
Ormond’s claim to have received no orders from the King, 
since their claim that they had been so informed at 
Oxford both by the King and Digby was nothing less than 
the truth. Thus, on July 1st they informed Ormond that 
they were sending Muskerry, Plunkett and Brown to see 
him, because, having attended the Conference at Oxford, 
these three could confirm the statement that had been 
made to them. Fennel was accompanying them so that he 
might explain how prejudicial
’’yo^ Ldps backwardness in this occasion dr awes
upon his Ma. service".2
Nothing came of the visit. Ormond, supported by 
the Council, repeated his denials, although long before 
he received the King’s own admission, he must have known 
that the Supreme Council was in the right. For its part, 
the Supreme Council must have realized eventually that 
the King had not in fact issued any instructions to 
Ormond and that, even if he had done so, Ormond would 
have found it necessary to beg to be excused from carrying 
them out. In the light of the fact that the King at 
Oxford had also informed the Commissioners that he would
1. July 15, 1644, Carte, VI, pp.159-62.
2. Supreme Council to Ormond, T.C.P., XI, p.193.
3. Ormond to Digby, July 17, 1644, Carte, VI, p.164.
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be willing to repeal the penal laws but had not so 
informed Ormond, several conclusions may be drawn from 
this episode? First, the King was prepared to make 
offers of which Ormond disapproved and which he kept 
secret from Ormond. Secondly, while knowing what the 
King wished should be done, Ormond chose not to take 
action in the absence of explicit commands; moreover, 
he took advantage of his assumed ignorance to raise 
objections to the King’s proposed action with a view to 
influencing the King to change his mind. And, thirdly, 
the Confederates realized that the King was willing to 
make substantial promises in quasi-secrecy. It is 
essential to emphasise the importance of these conclusions.
because, without them, it is (geithe^~?)ossible to account  ^
for the recurrent suspicion of the Confederates that 
Ormond was holding back from them the full concessions 
made by the King norfor their ready acceptance of the 
credentials of the Earl of Glamorgan in the following 
year.
The King issued Ormond with his first commission
to treat for peace on June 24th, but for some reason it
2
did not reach Dublin until July 26th, and in the meantime 
Ormond was f t o  rely on gossip. Indeed, his best 
information came from the Confederates. The failure of
1. See bâ-ow, p^o.l^H-tT.
2. Carte, VI, pp.184-5.
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intelligence between Oxford and Dublin at this time was
reprehensible; Digby’s attempt to explain it away was far
from convincing? On July 9th Ormond complained bitterly
that though the Confederate commissioners had landed over
a fortnight ago at Waterford he had no notion of the conference
2
and was ’in the darke as to his majestie’s pleasure'. In 
this and another letter dated July 17th he besought the 
King to give him guidance. Then, at last, the commission, 
whose very existence he had to take on trust from hearsay, 
arrived.
Now that he had it in his possession, he was extremely
doubtful if it would be of any use. Already he had pointed
out how difficult it would be to find suitable commissioners
on the royalist side to take upon themselves what the King
in Council, assisted by selected delegates from Dublin, had
failed to achieve? No wonder he should now say:
"I have little ground b3 hope that thkr commission 
will effect that fpr which it was sent.; to witt, 
the concludfiing of/^"^eace as may be for his 
Hajest^’s horwur, or for the just and reasonable 
satisfaction of his Protestant subjects."
He was still uncertain as to the extent of his powers and
required both a copy of the demands which the councillors
and clergy of Ireland had proposed that the King must
insist upon and which Digby was supposed to have included
1. Digby to Ormond, Aug.13, 1644, Carte, VI, p.192.
2. Ibid., p.153.
3 . Ibid., p.164.
4. Carte, VI, p.154.
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already with an earlier letter? and a copy of the King's 
counter proposals. Evidence of the latter was essential 
if he were to convince the doubting Thomases in the Council.
In fact, on July 22nd, higby had anticipated his request
2
for explicit instructions and had sent the required copy. 
Nevertheless, in response to this particular letter of July 
30th, he replied on August 13th that Ormond must expect no 
advice from England but must act in all matters as he saw
On the surfach this was only reasonable. The King
had the greatest difficulty in communicating with him, 
and it often happened that events outstripped his instructions. 
Even so, this was small comfort for a subordinate who
1. Ormond to higby, July 30, ibid., pp.184-5.
2. Digby to Ormond, ibid., pp.172-7.
3. Same to same, ibid., p.194. This was the second time 
Ormond had complained about the vagueness of his instructions 
and Digby had given this reply; cf. Carte, VI, p.30.
Daniel O'Neill added a revealing gloss: "... you are
to stand or fall by what is good in your own eyes. This 
i^ not what I knowe you expect or desire; butt lett mee
assure you,His all the direction that can bee hoped from
the present condition of affaires, or from our cautious 
counsellors; among which I reckon not fcord Digby. Him 
I find free and faithfull to the end wee all intend, without 
reservation, and to walke in thes affaires of Ireland single." 
O'Neill to Ormond, Aug.13, ibid., p.188. The Earl of 
Glamorgan was to claim later on that his patents were drawn 
up in wide terms precisely because of the difficulty of 
keeping in touch with the Court. 'Was it with conscious 
irony that Digby was subsequently t-o- accused Glamorgan of 
forgery on the grounds that he claimed powers so extensive 
that the King could never have seen fit to grant them?
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preferred to have explicit instructions, and in the event 
Ormond was unable to offer any more generous concessions 
to the Confederates than the King had tendered at Oxford.
On July 30th Ormond notified the Supreme Council that 
he had received the King's commission to treat for peace? 
However, before his meeting with the Confederates could 
begin, there was to be some delay due, as he told Digby,
2
to the inclusion of a cleric among the nominated commissioners.
3
In fact the General Assembly, the fourth to date, which had
opened on July 20th, had added six new agents to the seven
despatched to Oxford including two controversial ones.
Aside from Antrim (sic) there appeared the name of Thomas
Fleming, titular Archbishop of Dublin. The remaining
commissioners were to be: Mountgarrett, Muskerry, Alex.
McDonnell, Uir Richard Everard, Sir Robert Talbot, Mr.
Dermot O'Bryan, Patrick Darcy, Geffrey Brown, Richard
Martin, John Dillon and Plunket. Plunket wrote to Ormond
on August 11th asking for safe-conducts for these thirteen
4
and a copy of the King's commission.
Ormond's eyes and ears at Kilkenny had already fore­
warned him of the inclusion of the Archbishop. Two days
1. Ormond to Muskerry and others, July 30, T.C.P., XI, 
p.392; Gilbert, III, p.220.
2. N.d., 1644, T.C.P., XV, pp.468-74. This letter is 
wrongly placed in the year 1645 in the Transcripts.
3. Dissolved on Aug. 31, 1644.
4. Ibid., XII, p.39; Gilbert, III, p.252.
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before Plunket had sent him the official list he had
already written to Muskerry pointing out that he could
not agree to it and suggesting that the meeting should
take place in Dublin? On the 13th he explained officially
to Plunket that he had heard nothing but good of Fleming
and only objected to him because of his cloth. At the
same time he enclosab a copy of his commission. In an
attempt to steer round the exclusion problem he omitted
2
Fleming's name from the collective safe-conduct.
Ormond's determination to stick to the principle of 
disbarring the clergy from negotiations was one aspect of 
his attempt to exploit the differences at Kilkenny.
Apart from his honest conviction that the presence of a 
cleric would hamper fruitful discussion, and scandalize 
Protestant opinion, he was bent ;on driving a wedge between 
the Catholic nobility and the clergy. By this time he 
had realised that while agreement on the political and 
territorial demands of the Conl'ederates was not beyond 
reach, agreement on ecclesiastical differences was 
virtually unattainable. If, therefore, in some way, these 
demands could be kept in two separate compartments, it might
be possible to induce the to conclude a peace by
conceding most of their political and territorial demands 
while promising only to consider the ecclesiastical demands
1. T.C.P., XII, p.61; Gilbert, III, pp.231-2.
2. T.G.P., XII, p.60; Gilbert, III, pp.252-3.
245.
at a later date. In some way clerical influence had to
he weakened, and terring the clergy from negotiations was
one way of doing so.
Against his opposition the Confederacy made only a
token stand. When Plunket wrote to Ormond on August I6th
agreeing to Dublin as the meeting-place and proposing August
26th as the opening day, he observed that there was no
d&barring clause in the King's commission? But when he
wrote again on August 23rd requesting a postponement of the
opening until August 31st it was plain that the Supreme
Council had wriggled out of the difficulty with ingenuity#
but pusillanimously. He repeated that the General Assembly
could not alter its list of nominees in view of there being
no restriction in the King's letter. Hov/ever, when the
time had come for formal election of officers, it had
been decided to appoint only eight commissioners who should
be the first named, to wit, Muskerry, McDonnell, Talbot,
2
O'Brien, Brown, Darcy, Dillon and Plunket.
Yet the Confederates were not accommodating in every
respect. On August 19th Antrim was ordered to write to
Ormond requesting the withdrawal of the Irish ships which
were supporting the expedition to Montrose and being
3
maintained out of Confederate funds. Plunket informed
1. T.C.P., XII, p.68; Gilbert, III, pp.253-4.
2. Ibid., pp.255-6.
3. T.CLP., XII, p. 81; Gilbert, III, p. 256; Antrim to Ormond, 
Aug.20, ibid., pp.254-5.
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Ormond that maintenance would cease? Ormond requested that
they be maintained for one more month, on the advice oddly
2
enough of the Duchess of Buckingham, and proposed that the 
expense incurred should be offset against what he claimed 
was the balance still outstanding from the subsidy promised
3
at the Cessation. The General Assembly considered its 
debt paid in full and on August 29th asked Antrim personally
4
to recall the ships. Apparently there was a genuine need 
for the ships but it would have been difficult to find a 
better way of emphasizing royalist dependence on their 
resources on the very eve of the negotiations.
Whether the General Assembly debated the terms for 
peace it would be willing to accept is not known for 
certain, but it would appear to have done so if we may 
trust the word of the Countess of Antrim. According to 
her report, Scarampi urged that they should negotiate 
ohly for a cessation pending the receipt from the Pope of 
£260,000 which he claimed they would have within four 
months. If the money should fail to arrive, then they 
might arrange a peace. But on no account should they 
agree to a settlement which did not remove all the penal
5
laws and restore their churches. Scarampi's advice
1. Ibid., p.257.
2. Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, Aug.20, ibid., pp.257-8.
3. Ibid., pp.258-9.
4. John Walsh to Ormond, Aug.30, 1644, ibid., pp.267-8.
5. Duchess of Buckingham to Ormond, Aug.23, 1644, ibid..
Ill, p.260.
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was not followed, for the Commissioners had plenary 
authority to arrange ±o.' a peace; if their efforts were 
unsuccessful for the time being^they were to renew the 
Cessation?
Talks began on September 6th, having been put back 
2
from September 1st. The Commissioners were all lodged
3
in the same house in Dublin and presumably held their own 
discussions on developments there. The same procedure 
was adopted as for the conference leading up to the Cessation; 
each side communicated its point or points in writing and 
George Lane acted as messenger; infrequently there were 
verbal meetings. Ormond consulted with the Council^ 
before making any decision. He did this mainly because 
it was the correct procedure. But there is no doubt that
5
he was determined also not to become a single scapegoat.
He was also rightly convinced that if the Council declined 
to support his actions it was absolutely certain that the 
great majority of Protestants would do the same. Presumably 
in order both to simplify matters and to obtain expert
1. T.C.P., XII, p.136; Gilbert, III, pp.269-71.
2. Cf. Plunket to Ormond, Aug.30, ibid., p.269.
3. Aphor. Disc., p.92.
4. fwhich I intend to take along with mee to the end of
this great worke"; Ormond to Digby, July 30, Carte, VI, p.184.
5. He had requested Digby "to attest the answeares given by 
his majestie to the propositions of those deputed from the 
Irish, whereby all scruple will be taken from tha^e, that
I must necessaryly advise with in this treaty, soe farre 
as there is any concession in those answers to the desires 
of the other party"^ibid.j
2 4 8 .
advice, he appointed a special committee consisting of 
the Lord Chancellor, several members of the Council, the 
Judges of the King's Bench and the sergeant-at-law to 
report on disputed issues arising?
2
At the opening of the conference the Cessation was
3
renewed until December 1st. The first exchanges followed, 
using the Confederate proposals at Oxford as the point of 
departure. The author of the Aphorismical Discovery was 
inimitably scathing about subsequent events. As he saw it, 
for ten whole weeks the two sides interchanged 'little 
billets' over frivolous points, all to no purpose whatsoever; 
at the end, they published a book of these sterile 
proceedings? It is tempting to share his intolerance and 
yet he is not quite fair. That there was pedantry is 
indisputable, but the principals, while free agents in 
theory, were constrained in practice to say nothing and 
to agree to nothing which could later be turned against 
them by their own partisans or, what was worse, used as a 
pretext by the majority of one side or the other for 
repudiating any settlement which might be reached.
1. Ormond to Digby, T.C.P., XV, pp.468-74; Gilbert, III, 
pp.329-33.
2. Gilbert extracted from the Carte Papers all the documents 
relevant to the negotiations. These occur in Volume III
of Confederation and War, pp.277-329.
3. Gilbert, III, pp.273-5.
4. 4).92.
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Apart from this, whereas the fundamental differences 
between the two parties might easily be stated in general 
terms, they could not be resolved without minute attention 
to detail. This must also be said. Neither side really 
believed that the time was ripe for agreement, but no-one 
wanted a rupture. Thus, Ormond was happy just to keep 
the negotiations going, no matter how little headway was 
made. As for the Confederate Commissioners, perhaps 
they found it convenient to become immersed in the minutiae 
of debate, as a means of steering clear of t.nt:; discussion 
of the fundamental differences separating them from Ormond.
The main points in dispute can be reduced to three: 
the repeal of 2^ Elizabeth and all Acts subsequently 
relating to it; the repeal of Poynings* Act; a general
‘ I
Act of OblivionV including the annulment of attainders 
and outlawries? Other important demands of the Confederates 
were: the abrogation of all acts passed since August 7th,
1641; the removal of their incapacity to purchase lands, 
leases, etc.; the establishment of Inns of Court, a 
University and their own schools; their appointment to 
offices of trust ; that non-residents should not sit in the 
Irish Parliament or vote by proxy; that the jurisdiction 
of the Council should be limited to State matters ; that 
Viceroys should be appointed for a maximum period of three
1. Singled out by Ormond himself in a letter to the Earl 
of Thomond; Dec. 5, 1644; T.C.P., XIII, p.12.
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years; that all murders and crimes committed by persons 
on either side since the outbreak of the rebellion should 
be tried in the ordinary courts of law; that lands claimed 
since 1634 should be restored to their original owners; 
that the Court of V^ards should be abolished in exchange 
for a guaranteed revenue. For his part Ormond made 
certain demands: these amounted to the restoration of
all the towns, castles, churches, land and property 
acquired by the Confederates since 1641 to their rightful 
owners, the King, lay Protestants, and the Protestant 
clergy respectively; the making good of the King's lost 
revenue and any damage done to requisitioned property.
It is noticeable how, in this session and in ensuing 
sessions of negotiation, the list of Confederate grievances 
was steadily whittled down. On this occasion, Ormond 
gave his assent to several important concessions; they 
need not take the Oath of Supremacy, the Court of High 
Commission should be suspended, they should be eligible 
for offices of state, and they should enjoy religious 
freedom as during the most lenient periods of the reigns 
of Elizabeth and James I.
But little advance was made upon the King's own offer 
at Oxford with regard to the major demands of the Confederacy. 
Thus, the King was still prepared to grant virtual toleration 
for his Roman Catholic subjects, but he would not, indeed, 
dared not concede to Ireland the legislative independence
251.
which the Confederacy deemed essential, partly for material
reasons but primarily because it was not prepared to
dismantle itself without first making sure that the King
would be constitutionally powerless to interfere with the
Catholic religion. The Confederacy desired to exercise
that religion as a right whereas the King could only see
his way to tolerating it as a privilege. Ormond, in his
name, could not even agree to annul outlawries and attainders?
Yet neither side had the least wish to end the
negotiations. On the contrary both Ormond and the
Oommissioners looked upon a definitive break as a potential
disaster. So also did the Earl of Clanrickard: whose
judgment in such matters had the virtue of being impartial.
On hearing that Muskerry and the Commissioners were about
to leave Dublin he urged Ormond at all costs to detaih them
pending fresh instructions from the King. For,
"If the comjj^ is si oners shall now departs in this 
Vnset#led condition, I am most confident it will 
not be in the povær of any the best affected to 
prevent a sodaine and irrecoverable breach, and 
whether that may not (all things consider'd) 
reflect Vpon your excellence with as much or more 
danger than to hazard somewhat the other way, I 
humbly submitt to your better judgement."2
1. Confederate Propositions, T.C.P., XII, p.148; Ormond's 
answers, ibid., 150-7 ; Ormond's further explanations pp.150-7. 
Substance of the debatejp.173-8; Answers of Confederate 
Commissioners, ibid., pp.194-5; Ormond's answers, ibid.,p.205; 
further propositions of Confederate Commissioners; ibid.,pp.208-9; 
Further reasons, ibid., pp.232-9; Reasons why dissatisfied
with Ormond's answers, ibid., pp.240-4.
2. Clanrickard to Ormond, Sept.29, 1644, Carte, VI, pp.200-1.
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To which Ormond agreed, "but how to perswade their stay
I know not". He was prepared to co-operate if Clanrickard
could recommend a way of doing so.^
In the event, the Commissioners did not stay long,
but they left on friendly terms. The negotiations were
formally adjourned on October 3Ist until January 31st, 1645,
a short adjournment until November 4th having been
2
previously agreed - and it was decided to prolong the 
span of the current truce to cover the intervening period. 
Meanwhile, in order that relations might not entirely 
cease, it was arranged that the Commissioners should be 
allowed to journey freely to and from Dublin.^ Lord 
Brabazon, Sir Henry Tichbourne and Sir James Ware were to 
report what had happened to the King and to obtain his
5
instructions. At Kilkenny, the expected uproar did not 
take place, for Ormond's decision to refer back to the 
King for further instructions was made to appear an 
achievement, it not being doubted the King would make big 
concessions.
1. Ormond to Clanrickard, Sep.30, 1644; ibid., pp.201-2.
2. Ormond to Digby, Oct.18, Carte, VI, p.321. It is extra­
ordinary but it would appear that in the first place Ormond 
hoped to receive the King's instructions on or before this 
date. The actual date of receipt was to be March 6th, and 
indeed, the messangers sent to ask for the King's instructions 
only left Dublin, by an ironic coincidence, on November 4*
3. Gilbert, IV, pp.36-8.
4. T.C.P., XII, p. 324; Gilbert, IV, pp. 37-8.
5o T.C.P., XII, p.305.
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Ormond’s opinion of the Conference may be gathered
from his public and private reports to higby^ In the
first, he again noted the repeal of the Penal Laws, the
scope of the cuct of Oblivion, and the suspension of
Poynings’ Act as the outstanding points in dispute. He
was at pains to emphasize the advantages that lay with the
Confederates in negotiating: they had a considerable army
in the field which had been reinforced during the negotiations
by officers experienced in the fighting in Germany; the p#rt
of Luncannon had defected to Parliament; so had Inchiquin -
2
a terrible blow; but, above all, the harrowing condition of 
Dublin and the pressing wants of the Army were causing the 
private soldiers to desert.' Obviously the King was to be 
left with no illusions as to the onerous task entrusted 
to his Lord Deputy.
In his private report explaining why he was compelled 
to refer back for instructions he pointed out that it would 
be dangerous, if not impossible, to make peace in Ireland 
without the Council * s approval, for the Irish Protestants 
would certainly refuse to observe a peace which the Council 
should disavow. Again, any concessions made to the Irish 
would have to be confirmed by acts of Parliament, and these
1. Conveyed by Brabazon, Tichbourne and Ware.
2. The defection of Inchiquin in July had been,indeed, a 
deadly blow to the Royalist forces in Ireland. At the same
time it had the effect of strengthening Ormond in his 
dealings with the Confederates, for the more Parliament 
appeared to be waxing in power the more keenly they desired an 
accommodation.
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the Council could veto unless Poynings' Act were first
suspended. It was also his experience that the Council
would not underwrite any concession which the King had not
specifically offered. Besides, he still kept by him the
King's memorial conveyed by Bourke in January, 1 6 4 5 This
had carefully limited the concessions which he might offer
and he had to know whether the King intended to give him
mote latitude.
As regards the Confederates, he believed that they
would not argue over their other propositions if they were
guaranteed the repeal of the penal laws. He had gone as
far as he could short of agreeing to repeal. He warned that
in the event of a rupture the Confederates would seek
foreign aid knowing that they would be too weak to
withstand the forces of England when that country was
restored to peace.
His letter contained a startling reference to one
further advantage held by the Confederates which had gone
unmentioned in his public report:
”I shall add ... this one, that they have been 
assured by divers, and by some of those as from 
the king, that his majestie would not stick at 
the repeale of the penal laws".
They had been given this assurance in the first instance
by (Thomas?) Bourke and later by Taaffe and William Brent,
the latter two claiming that they had been expressly
commanded by the King to give the assurance.
1. See above pp. 65-7.
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Vüiat was more, the general view of those coming from
Gmrt to Ireland was that this was the intention of the
King and most of his advisers. The reports had assumed such
proportions that he had been compelled to deny firmly that
he had ever had such instructions, in order to prevent the
negotiations from coming to an inconvenient end.^
Yet the reports may well have been true. Both T'aaffe
and Brent ahad only recently come over from England. The
Supreme Council were sure that the penal laws were to be 
2
abrogated. Ormond made no comment but simply assumed that
it could not be possible, leaving it to the King either to
say - you are quite right, or else admit that he had agreed
to repeal the penal laws. V/hat the King did, of course, was
3to utter a denial. But the evidence indicates that we need 
not take his denial for the literal truth. Thus, within a 
very short period Charles had twice, through several channels, 
expressed his willingness to make large concessions without 
informing Ormond.
1. This long report occurs exactly one year out of date in 
the published collection of letters arranged by Carte 
(VI, pp.321-5).
2. See below pp. - &-0
3. Digby to Ormad. , Dec. 16, 1644, Carte, VI, p. 219.
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Ormond's appreciation of the changed attitude of the
Confederate Commissioners was correct. They were now
willing to reduce their terms on the understanding that
the restrictions on the Catholic Church were to be lifted.
Prom the outset their quarrel had been with the English
Puritans and their minatory anti-Irish Catholic policy
rather than with the Crown. Moreover, they were beginning
to realise that the longer the state of rebellion continued
the more restless, uncompromising add powerful the native
Irish would become. Soon, the initiative at Kilkenny would 
be wrested from their hands, relations with the King would 
be severed irrevocably, and the system of government which
afforded them a privileged position would be swept away.
They much preferred to keep Ireland under the Crown of
England - v/hose power had been conveniently reduced! And so,
sub rosa, Muskerry and his friends let it be known to
Ormond that they would accept the King's terms provided
they could be assured of ample security for their lives and
property. As to ecclesiastical matters, they appreciated
the King's inability formally to concede to their demands
in the prevailing conditions, and would put their trust in
his word alone.^
1. Carte, V, pp.10-12.
257.
This approach was not as trusting as it appeared.
They already had, or thought they had, the King's promise
of repeal of the Penal Laws and they had no intention of
surrendering the Churches 02? Church landed
In spite of this promising development, Ormond seems
to have considered as confirmed his earlier views upon
the futility of carrying on negotiations, at least with
himself at the helm. He determined to submit his resignation
to the King and on November 14th sent this message by the
hand of Barry:
"I humbly desire his Majestie to be pleased speedily 
to appoint some other fitting person for the 
Government of this Kingdom..."
He explained the special handicaps under which he worked
and suggested that someone who had neither stake nor
relations in Ireland might be better placed to make
concessions, for such a man might appear as a disinterested
instrument of the Crown. He wished the King to know that
supplies for the conduct of government and the maintenance
of the greater part of the army in Leinster were about to
2
fun out and that his own poverty was acute.
1. Cf. Supreme Council to Luke Wadding, Oct.26, 1644, 
Gilbert, IV, pp.55-6. The message was apparently conveyed 
by Browne.
2. Gilbert, V, p.197. The fact that this letter was 
unknown to, or ignored by, historians before Gardiner 
vitiates their conclusions. See below p.XCdl.
258.
On the face of it, Ormond's motive for resigning 
was quite clear. Knowing himself to be incapable of the 
shifts and suppression of truth which alone could give rise 
to a settlement satisfactory to all men, he wished to give 
the King the option of choosing a less scrupulous assistant. 
But it is questionable whether he was sincere. More likely 
than not his request to resign was a shrewd piece of bluff, 
since there is not the slightest hint elsewhere that he 
contemplated giving up the vice-royalty ; this was his 
method, that is, of forcing the King to enlarge his own 
authority and to abandon the practice of employing agents 
to Ireland and making promiseiâ without his concurrence. 
Certainly it had the effect of producing from the King a 
series of orders designed to augment his power^
Whatever Ormond's motive, his request to resign 
obliged the King to look squarely at the Irish problem.
He could no longer delude himself that somehow through 
Ormond's efforts the Irish army would suddenly materialise. 
Three courses lay open to him: to go on employing Ormond
despite his evident distaste for the negotiations; to send 
an assistant to substitute for Ormond in matters affecting
1. Ormond received a series of orders, all dated January 22, 
1645, greatly extending his powers; e.g. to dismiss and 
replace the privy councillors. An order of Jan.17, 1645, 
empov\rered him to receive to pardon, T.C.P., XII, p.508.
It is also significant that he was given leave to go into 
England by an order dated January 15, 1645, ibid., p.265.
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the public character of the Lord Deputy, as Round and 
Gardiner suggest; to employ a new agent. The more closely 
the obstacles in the path of a settlement with the 
Confederacy are examined, the more apparent becomes the 
futility of acting through Ormond. It is informative to 
conjecture how the King might have reasoned.
In the first place there could be no question of 
appointing a new Lord Lieutenant. Plainly no one but 
Ormond was capable of holding the Government together and 
without him the royalist enclave would quickly crumble.
Making peace with the Confederacy was another matter, for 
it was only too clear that Ormond's political and, in 
particular, religious scruples would never permit him to 
offer even the minimum of satisfaction. Besides, he was 
hamstrung by the Council in Dublin which he insisted 
punctilliously on consulting at every stage in negotiations, 
not to speak of the intense hatred felt by most Protestants 
in Ireland for those whom they regarded as guilty of atrocities 
during the uprising. In view of this, agreement could 
never be reached unless he were to substitute for ^rmond 
a more pliable go-between. Unfortunately, the very scruples 
which inhibited Ormond might impel him to hamper the efforts 
of anyone else. And even if Ormond were to refrain from 
interference as itbe wording of his letter of resignation 
implied, the Council and public opinion would certainly 
be hostile. In short, an appointee likely to appeal to
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the Confederacy would be exactly the sort of person whom
the majority of Protestants would never tolerate. He
could never operate except in absolute secrecy. V/hat is
more, in order to cover up his operations, in order to
deceive everybody including Ormond, it would be necessary
The Earl of
to carry on with public negotiations. / Glamorgan, v/ho had 
already been commissioned to raise an Irish army, was the 
obvious choice for secret envoyé
Prom this reconstruction of the way the King might 
have reasoned it is possible to draw a valuable inference - 
if he ever decided to offer the concessions stipulated by 
the Confederates, he had no alternative but to choose 
someone who was a distinguished Catholic, unswervingly 
loyal, and willing to risk his life and reputation, someone, 
that is, devoted and quixotic like Glamorgan. Moreover, 
he had to instruct his chosen envoy to conduct himself 
much as Glamorgan did. In other words, and this conclusion 
cannot be too strongly emphasized, Glamorgan's mission to 
Ireland ceases to pose so many problems once the theory has 
been accepted that the King was determined to lay hands on 
Confederate troops in spite of Ormond and Protestant opinion.
1. Cf. the King's letter to the Marquis of Worcester, set 
above p.-^^X; in addition, when he wrote a second letter to 
the Marquis early in January, 1645, he again made glowing 
references to Glamorgan^ s labours on his behalf which 
seemed to suggest that Glamorgan was engaged in very 
important businessJ Dircks, op.cit., pp.103-4j. The
original was among the papers preserved in the muniment 
room at Badminton.
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Whatever the King’s thoughts may have been, the only 
indisputable facts known about his reaction to his dilemma 
are that he retained Ormond as Lord Deputy and that Ormond 
proceeded with the public negotiations. Other facts which 
may or may not have a bearing on the King's reaction are a 
letter sent to Ormond on 2?th December, and a series of 
strange commissions issued to the Earl of Glamorgan from 
1st January, 1645, onwards, culminating in the document 
produced by Glamorgan as his authority to treat for peace. 
The King's letter to Ormond ran as follows:
"Ormonde,
My tord Herbert having businesstsof his owa»\ 
in Ireland;, (wherein I desyre you to doe him all 
lawful! favour and furtherance^)^ I have thought 
good to vse the power I have^i)oth in his affection 
and duty,to ingage him in all possible waye# to 
further the peace there; which he hath promised 
to do&. vvherfÿforef as yoU; f^nd occasi*on)you may 
confidently and trust him in this, or any 
other thing he shall propound to you for my 
service; there being none in whose honiggsty and 
zeaj^^to my person and crowndl have more confidence.
So I rest^
Your most assWed/ fr^end,
Charles R.
Oxford;27th December 1644.
His honesty or affection to my service will 
not deceÛLve you; but I will not answer for his 
judgement."1
1. Carte, V,pp.7-?.This letter was delivered by Glamorgan, 
himself, the postscript being not surprisingly in cipher. 
To its composition the King gave unusual care, as we 
learn from his exact recollection of it over thirteen 
months later. See below, pp. -4
262.
Taken in conjunction with Glamorgan’s commissions, this 
letter has provided historians, at least in their own 
estimation, with the clues needed to deduce the course of 
action actually taken by Charles. Those historians who 
were unaware that Ormond had asked for permission to resign 
and who therefore, were not concerned with the problem of 
how, if at all, Charles had replied to his request, have 
taken Charles’ postscript as evidence that Charles was 
already engaged in secret planning with Glamorgan. The 
postscript, they maintain, is merely a lie designed to 
safeguard the secrecy of their relations^ Gardiner and 
Round reason differently, and it is only with their theories 
that we need deal.
Gardiner reasons that Barry's letter induced Charles 
to employ Glamorgan in the performance of those tasks 
which Ormond found it impossible to"be seen in", while 
refusing to accept Ormond's resignation. The postscipt 
proves that the King could never have entrusted someone 
of whom he had such a moderate opinion with the intxi.câte 
and delicate task of concluding a treaty. Charles was 
now set on "procuring an understanding with the Confederate 
Catholics upon the terms offered by Muskerry". Borne 
energetic, sincere person was required to influence those 
who were not of Muskerry's party and to let it be understood
1. Birch and others either intentionally omitted or over­
looked the possible significance of those passages in which
Charles impjiedc that Glamorgan should be subordinate to 
Ormond.
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that the laws would not be enforced against the Irish 
Catholics, even though they remained unrepealed. The fact 
that Glamorgan's judgment might be defective was not serious, 
since he would be obliged to submit himself to the control 
of Ormond} This is a fair interpretation of the facts, 
but it is not the only one. An equally reasonable 
deduction, as has been suggested, is that Charles decided 
that Ormond was the wrong man to conduct the peace negot­
iations, and determined to grant Glamorgan wide and secret 
powers to conclude the peace.
The point about relying on Muskerry's terms is too pat. 
Though aware of them, Ormond still wished to resign, which 
seems to indicate that he for one was pessimistic about 
their being adopted by the Confederates as a whole. hor 
does the argument about influencing those outside the 
Muskerry party carry much conviction. How? By what 
sort of concessions? The kernel of the problem was 
precisely that someone had to promise to give them 
practically all they asked for and convince them that he 
had the King's authority for it. And this was also 
precisely, as we have seen, what Ormond would neither 
promise himself, on Gardiner's own admission, nor agree 
to connive at. A fuller examination of the facts can 
be given when all the evidence has been exposed. It is 
sufficient here to stress the point that having taken
1. Civil War, II, pp.l64-r5.
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events so far in their chronological order, there is
nothing to indicate that Charles might not have employed
Glamorgan on a secret mission. Moreover, the theory
just adumbrated has the special advantage of explaining
why Ormond would have struggled on conscientiously with
the public peace negotiations throughout the following
year, while a secret agent was carrying on a separate
negotiation. Por, it is to be noted, that whatever was
happening under the surface, Charles continued to admonish
Ormond to conclude an early peace.
To Ormond's plea for permission to resign there is
no evidence that the King ever gave a specific reply.
Apparently his one and only acknowledgment of its receipt
occurred at the opening of a letter dated January 18th:
"I am sorfy to findt by ^LoMdlBarry the sadd condition 
of your particular fortune, for which I cannot find€ 
soe good and speedy remedyi as the peace of Ireland."1
Presumably interpreting the absence of a definite order
as a refusal Ormond continued in office, no doubt feeling
that his position had now been greatly strengthened.
The King's reply to Ormond's request for further
instructions with regard to the peace negotiations was
prepared on December 15th and given to Brabazon, Tichbourne
and Ware to convey to Ireland. Unfortunately these three
1. Carte, V, pp.9-10.
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were intercepted at sea on the passage back by a
Parliamentary ship and forced to jettison the King's
instructions} Thus it was necessary to draft duplicate
2orders. These were dated January 18th, conveyed to 
Ireland by Barry and received by Ormond on March 6th.
It would seem that the King penned two letters; the 
one intended to be public, the other secret. The public 
letter is missing, but we have the private letter which 
was obviously the more important. Its main import was 
that peace should be despatched out of hand. To secure 
it the King guaranteed not to enforce the penal laws once 
peace was made and to have them repealed by Àct of 
parliament when he had been restored to power with the 
help of the forces they had promised. Por fear that too 
much might be read into this concession he specified that 
he was excluding "all those /statute^ against appeales to 
Roame and premuniry". Referring to the assurances given 
by Muskerry, Plunket and Browne he wished them to know that 
he was delighted with their conciliatory offer and made 
his present concession as an earnest of his gratitude.
This vital concession was not to be divulged except to
1. Lord Brabazon and others to Ormond, Jan.5, 1645,
T.C.P., XIII, p.181. This unlucky trio were for a term 
in peril of their lives, being regarded as combatants by 
Parliament and imprisoned in London. It took ten months 
to secure their release.
2. Gart^ V, pp.9-10. Gardiner refers to the letter of 
December 15th as though it were the one received by Ormond 
and not the one lost at seaj Civil War, II, p.164.
3. But see below, p. , f.n.i.
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the three Confederates mentioned. Obviously the Council
were to be kept in ignorance of it, despite Ormond's pointed
comments on the absolute necessity of consulting that body.
Obviously, too, the King placed great reliance on Muskerry's
influence with the rank and file of the Confederacy.
In a letter to Ormond, evidently intended to accompany
the King's instructions, Digby underlined the optimism
engendered by Muskerry's demarche;
"Our princip^ÿaH hopes of the settlinge/W (peace) 
are grounded Vpon the last paper delivered in by 
Browne, which seemes to wave their stiffnes in 
mater of religion ..."
It was urgent that men and arms be speedily transported to
England. A further measure of the Court's expectations
of a quick settlement may be gathered from the fact that
Digby actually asked how many men would be coming over,
what ships would be available for their conveyance and to
which Irish ports shipping should be directed from the
English side'. Plainly the promise to repeal the penal
laws was considered quite sufficient to cut the Gordian
knot and Charles and Digby were at their usual game of
counting unhatched chickens.
Digby's letter concluded with three particular
injunctions to Ormond: to retain Clanrickard's support;
to try to win back Inchiquin; and to obtain reinforcements
for Antrim's forces in Scotland} Shortly after this date
1. Carte, VI, pp.219-21.
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the King expressed his personal view of the importance
of Montrose's campaign and sent over Colonel Steward to
1
obtain men and supplies for immediate use in Scotland.
Even these were-not to be provided.
The feature of the early part of 1645 was indeed
Charles' desperate search for reinforcements. At this
time Henrietta Maria was negotiating with the Dutch and
2
the opportunist Duke of Lorraine, and the Earl of Glamorgan 
was provided with several commissions to raise troops.
As for Charles, he wrote a series of importunate letters to 
Ormond, in which he extended his concessions to the Con­
federates and gave every sign of feverishly staking all 
on the prompt impact of an Irish expeditionary force on 
the war in England.
On January 9th he was urging Ormond to make peace as 
soon as possible, so that "the Irish would send as great a 
body as they can land about Cumberland", when it was hoped 
that they might join forces with contingents from Scotland 
and Wales. He warned that with the passing of Spring it 
would be most difficult to move troops to England because
3
the Parliamentary frigates would command the sea. In part 
to counter misleading rumours, in part as a means of inducing
1. Ibid., pp.225-6.
2. See below. Chapter B.
3. A point already made by Clanrickard; cf. Clanrickard to 
Ormond, Jany.4th, 1645, Carte, VI, p.227.
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the Irish to settle quickly, he announced that the English
Parliament having agreed to treat would almost certainly
insist upon maintaining the war in Ireland. This news
could be used to influence the Irish in two ways:
"First, to hasten(with all possible diligence) 
the peace there, the timely conclusion of which 
will take off that inconvenience,v/hich otherv/yse 
I may bee subject to, by the refusal! of that 
article*, vpon any other reason. Secondiv, by 
dexterously convoying to the Irish the dam^$& 
there may bee of their total! and perpetual! 
exclusion from those favours I intend them, 
in case the rebells here^ clap vp peace with mee^.Z*
He did not doubt that there v/ould be peace but he took
the precaution of adding in a postscript, that failing
peace Ormond was to renew the Cessation for one year,
"For which you shall promis^ the Irish (if you 
can have it no cheaper) to jo^ntwith them against 
the Scots and Inchiquin."1
It is to be noted that while he,refers to the Parliament
in England as 'the rebels' the Confederates have become
respectable - they are now 'the Irish'.
Only thirteen days had elapsed when he was writing
2
again. This was clearly a public letter since, apart 
from approving of Ormond's conduct of negotiations to date, 
he went out of his way to state that he could never 
countenance the repeal of the penal laws I On the other
1. Carte, V, pp.8-9.
2. It is very likely from internal evidence that this was 
the public letter accompanying the private letter of 
January 18th to be conveyed by Barry.
269.
hand he was prepared to consent, if absolutely necessary,
to the suspension of Poynings' Act}
On February 16th when recommending a petition he
cannot forbear reiterating the necessity of hastening the 
2
Ifish peace. On February 23rd in his name Digby enjoins
Ormond to avoid a rupture at all costs should the concessions
prove inadequate until
"you can informe the king punctually what will 
content them, and receive the king's pleasure 
therein."3
And on February 27th Charles sounds desperate; he will
have peace "whatever the cost", although Ormond is still
to make the best bargain he can and not to disclose the
full extent of his concessionary powers unless he has to
.do so. Yet his qualification rings false. Consider,
for example, his insistence that aid should not be
spurned "for such scruples* asjin/lesse pressing condition)
might terreasonably^stucke at by me". Moreover, he now
makes his concessions explicit:
"5?et I cannot but tell you, that if the suspension 
of Poinings act for such bills as shall be agreed 
on betweene you there, and the presen^ taking away 
of the penall laws against papists by( law will doe 
it, I shall not thinke it a hard bargains"
Indeed, he will not:
1. Ibid., VI, pp.233-4.
2. Carte, V, p.12; see also Digby to Ormond, Feb^.l7, 
ibid., VI; pp.248-9.
3. Carte, VI, pp.25®-2.
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"soe that freely and vigorously they engage 
themselves in my assistance against my rebells 
(sic) of England and Scotland, for which no 
conditions can bee too hard, not being against 
conscience or honor".1
Principle was evidently fighting a rearguard action against
expediency and losing it. In less than a year the King
had come to make a substantial advance on his Oxford terms.
But he was yielding too late. The Confederates were about
to raise their terms and Ormond was going to be over
scrupulous in heeding the injunctions to refrain
from showing his hand until he was compelled to do so.
How was Ormond to know that the King really expected him
to lay hands on the Irish troops at any price and forget
about the niceties of honour, protecting his Protestant
subjects and all the other sops the King was feeding to
his conscience?
The complete failure of the negotiations with
Parliament at Oxbridge encouraged Digby to state the
King's reliance on Irish aid in the frankest terms.
As there was a stalemate in England - presumably Digby
could not bdjig himself to confess that the odds were in
Parliament's favour - the King was not merely justified
in seeking any helping hand whatsoever but was obliged to
do so. Given this obligation, it were far better that he
should rely on his Irish subjects rather than foreigners.
1. Digby to Ormond, ^ r o h  -4, 1645, ibid. V, p.13.
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Hence the vital importance of the ’speedy settlement of 
a peace.'1
While the King's several messengers were making their 
tardy way to Ireland, Ormond, deeply worried as to what 
had happened to them and still embarrassed by the im­
poverished state of his army and his supporters, was 
trying v- . iously to persuade the Confederacy to send help 
to Scotland, from where reports were coming in of the 
splendid bearing of the Irish detachment and the desperate
need for reinforcements, and to send powder and other
2
supplies to Chester and Horth Wales. There were persistent 
requests from Royalist H.Q. in the Horth West of England 
for more men and munitions to which Ormond always paid
3
serious attention, for it was important that the coast 
opposite Dublin should remain friendly not only to insure 
that the lines of communication should remain open but also 
to provide a safe assembly area for the projected expeditionary 
force from Ireland. Signs are not wenting that the Supreme 
Council also recognized the strategic importance of Horth 
Wales, just as they appreciated the value of Montrose’s 
diversionary campaign in Scotland and could see that the 
despatch of further Irish reinforcements to his side might
1. Ibid., VI, pp.251-2.
2. This particular request came from Prince Maurice,
Feb. 20, 1645, T.C.P., XIJT, p.65; Gilbert, IV, p.146;
Ormond's reply was dated March 18, T.C.P., XIV., p.158;
Gilbert, IV, pp.175-6.
3. Cf. Carte, VI, p.244.
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lure some of Monro’s forces away from Ulster. Yet 
they were not very helpful in spite of conveying an 
impression of good will.
%
The fact is they would have liked to help, as
witnessed by the warmth of their letters to Ormond at
this time, by the restoration of his income from his
estates, and by a promise to provide Prince Rupert with
the powder they had refused at the beginning of the year}
but felt that they could not afford to do so. For one
thing, they were still not prepared to weaken their chief
bargaining counter; namely military aid, without a
definitive settlement or some outstanding strategic
advantage in return. Another more important reason may
have been that they lacked the necessary resources.
It was always assumed by Charles and his advisers,
though not perhaps by Ormond, and by Parliament - and,
indeed, it has always been assumed by historians - that the
Confederates had the means to assist the King but lacked
a compelling motive. This may have been a false assumption.
A part, if not most, of the time they had no surplus resources.
On this occasion Dr. Fennell at first ascribed their
inability to give help to two causes; that Antrim was
handling the whole business of the Scottish expedition
in such a way as to make its success redound to his
and
singular cred#/that there was a grave shortage of shipping
1. Sellings to Ormond, Oct.14, 1644, T.C.P., XII, p.456; 
Gilbert, IV, p.32.
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the seamen who had taken part in the initial expedition
having had such an unpleasant experience that they were
reluctant to hire out their services for a second time.^
As Ormond observed, these were minor difficulties when
placed alongside the gains to be derived from Montrose’s
2
continued success.
But may Fennell’s half truths have not concealed the whole 
truth - that Confederate resources, though stretched to the 
limit, were not even adequate for their own needs? During 
the Winter of 1644-5 the Confederacy was notifying its agents 
abroad that in the absence of external aid, it would not
3
be able to reach its declared objectives. In January, 1645, 
Clanrickard reported to Ormond, with undertones of grat- 
■ ification, that the Confederacy could not maintain itself 
for much longer.^ De la Monerie, excusing his failure to 
hire mercenaries for France, pointed out that the Confederate 
forces were outnumbered by those of their several opponents.^ 
Thus,on those occasions when the Confederacy expressed regret 
for being unable to aid the Royalists on grounds which were 
demonstrably specious or when they demanded a quid pro quo, 
they may have had nothing to give. Of course, to confess 
at any time that they were unable to help the King was 
to make nonsense of their negotiations with him. The
1. Fennell to Ormond, ïmov.2, 1644, Carte, VI., p. 212;
Gilbert, IV, pp. 39-40.
2. Ormond to Fennell, Nov.7, Carte, VI, pp.213-4; Gilbert,
IV, pp. 43-44.
3. Gilbert, IV, pp.33-37.
Carte,^ VI, pp. ^ 22J-8.
De la Monerie to Mazarin, Feb. 20,1645;Gilbert, IV, pp.147-9* 
This French agent had arrived at Kilkenny about July 1,1644.
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surprising thing is that once or twice they did so, thereby
giving a demonstration of uncommon naivete - or was it
cunning? After all, no one would believe in their poverty,
Ormond’s negotiations for aid to Montrose began with
Antrim. Between them they could not raise a single 
1
frigate. The problem of obtaining shipping was so acute
that eventually Ormond informed Digby that the bulk of it
2
must come from England.
Next Ormond turned to the Supreme Council. For a 
while he sensed such a stiffening in their attitude towards 
him that he asked Clanrickard to inquire into the reason for 
it. Clanrickard, who was supporting Ormond’s efforts to 
obtain aid for Montrose especially by exerting his influence 
over the Connaught CoiJincil, failed to account for Ormond’s 
unpopularity but painted a black picture of the general 
malaise at Kilkenny from which he drew the comforting 
conclusion that Ormond’s bargaining power vis-a-vis their
3
own was strong. Vyhether encouraged by this news or not 
Ormond displayed unwonted optimism. He informed Montrose 
that he was confident of an early peace and discussed plans 
for giving him aid} At the same time he wrote to Digby
1. Gilbert, IV, pp.57-58.
2. Feb.4, 1645, Carte, VI, p.244.
3. Jan.10., 1645, Carte, VI, pp.228-9.
4. FebfLQ ibid, p.247.
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concerning the provision of ships for the Irish expedition 
to England}
But he soon found that the Confederates were not
prepared to give anything away. To his first specific
request for reinforcements for Scotland the Supreme Council
replied cautiously. Their experience of the previous
year had made them realise how formidable an operation
would be involved. In any case, as their numbers were
thin, they would be unable to give a decision until they
2
were nearer full strength.
A fortnight later, having received a letter of reminder
from Ormond, they reported that they had no troops or
supplies to spare because of their many commitments.
However, they were shortly expecting supplies from overseas,
which would put an end to their difficulties and enable 
them to assist the King in the way proposed. They were
careful not to make a precise offer or to mention any
dates. Furthermore, by a studiously oblique approach,
they made it clear that Ormond would be expected to
declare against the Scots, in accordance with the King’s
wishes, and put the port of Carlingford into their hands.
As a final hint that they were aware of bargaining from
strength rather than weakness, contrary to Clanrickard’s
1. Feb.4, ibid., p.244.
2. Mountgarrett and others to Ormond, Feb.13, T.C.P.,XIY, 
p.50; Gilbert, IV, pp.138-9.
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opinion, they asked Ormond to refer their requests to the
King if he lacked the authority to grant them.^
In fact, Ormond was unwilling to defer to their requests.
To announce that the Scots were rebels would be to state the
obvious, but, because his troops were in no condition to fight,
he had not the least desire to precipitate open conflict.
Nevertheless, he referred to the King for instructions and
informed the Supreme Council accordingly, taking the opportunity
of asking them to descend from generalities and explain what
2
aid for the King they had in mind.
1“,Q00 men and no shipping was their brisk reply.
Indicating that they were both suspicious and determined to 
drive a hard bargain, they repeated their two requests and 
again called for speedy reference to the King. Having 
remarked on the striking advantages to be derived from joint 
action against the Scots they reminded him once more of the 
promise v/hich the King had made at Oxford.
In the end, however, no reinforcements were sent to 
Scotland. As a result, for the second time the Confederates 
approved of levies leaving the country for service in the 
French army while refusing them to the King.
1. Same to the same, Feb. 27, T.C.P., XIV, p.97; Gilbert, IV, 
pp.154-6.
2. Ormond to the Supreme Council, Mar. 3, T.C.P., XIV, p.114; 
Gilbert, IV, pp.172-3.
3. Castlehaven and others to Ormond, Mar.14, T.C.P., XIV, p.149; 
Gilbert, IV, pp.173-4.
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Owing to the various mis^iaps which had befallen the 
messengers between Oxford and Dublin it was not until 
March 6th that Colonel Barray brought the King’s latest 
concessions to Ormond. On the very day before^the 
Confederates had requested a further month’s grace before 
resuming talks. He had arrived dangerously late.
Format Kilkenny, the waning of the King's fortunes 
during the six months that had elapsed since the last 
adjournment was having its inevitable effect. Even the 
Ormondists were less anxious for an immediate settlement 
in expectation of extracting better terms from the King 
as his situation became more desperate. Thus, on the 
eve of the re-opening of negotiations the Supreme Council 
could inform the Nuncio to France that they did not
anticipate agreement because they would refuse to betray
2 3
the Church’s interests. And when the Commissioners
arrived in Dublin on April 10th, having grudgingly accepted
Ormond’s rejection of a further postponement until May 10th,
1. Initially the negotiations had been put back to January 
10th. They were then postponed further until February 10th; 
T.C.P., XII, p.210; Gilbert, IV, p.117. Upon Barry’s 
arrival Ormond proposed re-assembly on March 18th, but the 
Commissioners indicated that they could not, or v/ould not, 
report until April 10th; Ormond to Digby, Mar.28, Carte, VI,
p.272.
2. April 10, Gilbert, IV, pp.207-9.
3. Their commission was issued on April 5th, T.C.P., XIV,p.205.
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they were one short of their statutory number and a
whole week passed before they reached full strength.
The four to arrive punctually were Muskerry, Robert Talbot,
flunket and Dermot 0*Brien: the missing one was,
surprisingly, Geoffrey Brown, whose presence was also
essential so that Ormond might communicate to him,
flunket and Muskerry the King’s message of 15th December^
At Ormond's request both Glanrickard and Thomond
attended the conference (the latter towards the end) with
a view to exercising a moderating influence. This, so
2
Ormond later reported, they did successfully.
When discussions began, it soon emerged that the 
Commissioners could make no binding commitments without 
the approbation of the next general assembly which was 
summoned for May 15th. Nevertheless, they wanted Ormond 
to consider their propositions and to make the most generous 
counter-propositions possible in the hope, as they claimed, 
of being able to coax a majority in the Assembly into 
accepting them.
There was a pronounced hardening in these propositions. 
Notably, they proposed for the first time that the King's 
agreement to allow them access to places of honour and 
profit should be so interpreted as to mean that all offices
1. Of. Ormond's report. May 8, Carte, VI, pp.278-83*
2. Ormond to I)igby, May.8, ibid., p. 284.
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should be divided equally between Protestants and
Catholics. This particular suggestion was utterly
rejected by the Council which otherwise was conciliatory.
The King's word for not enforcing the penal laws was
guaranteed and a number of concessions relating to
agrarian and legal rights and the reduction of rents were
made. The Court of Wards would be abolished in return
for a fixed annual subsidy to the Crown of £12,000. To
suspend Poynings' Act in the manner prescribed would not
be necessary since the King swore that 'the bills which
shal bee agreed upon in the Treaty are to receave no
change ... being done by vertue of his Majestie's
comision under the greate seale'. The Roman Catholics
themselves should act as judges in cases concerning persons
1
indicted for crimes exam pted from an ^ t  of Oblivion.
Acting on the King's instructions Ormond had a 
private meeting with Muskerry, Browne and Plunket before 
the conference began, at which he relayed to them the 
King's message of December 15th. To his astonishment he 
was informed that they had already been given a paper 
promising repeal of the penal laws as far back as the 
Oxford Treaty. However, there had been a proviso attached 
that they should only show it to the members of the Supreme 
Council. This restricted circulation robbed the concession
Of. T.G.P., XIV, pp.265;264; 280; Gilbert, IV, pp.242-8
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of any value since they could do nothing without the 
sanction of the Cominittee of Instructions and the 
General Assembly.
So suspicious was Ormond of their claim to have 
received the paper at the King's own hands that he asked 
to see it in order to make a comparison with his own 
instructions on the subject. Poor Ormond1 Once again
an important step had been taken behind his back. • And 
yet, as usual, he uttered no direct protest and discreetly 
neglected to record the findings of his comparative studies 
for the King's benefit. Instead, with his own Ikand of 
subtlety he refrained from mentioning that he was authorised 
to repeal the penal statutes, in spite of the fact that 
the King's intention of giving way to the Confederates was 
now only too obvious. In handling situ^ions of this kind 
his sangfroid was exceptional. The only sign of un­
certainty occurred in the apologetic preamble to his 
official report.
For this omission he gave the reason that it would 
have been unwise to play such a strong card when the 
Commissioners had no mandate to conclude a treaty on the 
spot, since at the next round of negotiations they would 
have regarded it as a prize already won and raised their 
stakes. This odd episode provides ammunition for the 
charge that Ormond was really bent on obstructing the 
treaty all the time, his main object being to shatter the
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solidarity of the Confederates and thence make himself
the head of a broadly based Irish party consisting of
the Royalist Protestants and the Anglo-Irish and their
dependegats. Now it was fair game for Ormond to try to
split the Confederacy; indeed, it is surely arguable that
it was no less than his duty to do so. The charge of
deliberately impeding the peace is, however, another
matter. But can it be sustantiated in this instance.
According to the King's own instructions he was prohibited
from disclosing this concession unless it were the only
way of reaching agreement. It was only common sense to
conceal it when it could have no decisive effect. It is
true, of course, that the latest disclosure of the King's
lighthearted capacity for dissimulation indicated that he
did not intend his protestations of protecting his honour 
too
to be taken aver literally. But as Glamorgan was to 
discover, carrying out what you knew to be the King's 
real intentions was no guarantee that you could count on 
his support if your schemes went wrong. Moreover, Ormond 
had to deal with the Council and the Protestants on the 
spot; the King did not. And, as Ormond pointed out, the 
Council would never approve of the repeal of the penal 
âtatutes; particularly as they had no knowledge of the 
King's private instruction to himself - indeed, they only 
knew of the exception to it, because he had been obliged 
to show them the King's letter of December 15th. At the
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very least the King must issue an explicit directive. 
Besides, unlike the King, who believed that to sign a 
treaty was all, Ormond was looking beyond, for what 
earthly use would such a treaty be if the Protestants in 
Ireland were promptly to reject it? The King's condition
would be worse than before.
In any case Ormond, for once, was optimistic that the 
concessions he had just offered were sufficient in them­
selves. For example, it was unlikely that they would 
continue to press for the repeal of Poynings' Act now that 
they had accepted his argument that it was unnecessary.
And though it were true that they had raised this new 
question of parity in the distribution of state offices, 
he did not think they would insist upon it. He had taken 
note of the King's desire for a cessation of one year and 
sounded the Commissioners. Doubtless such a prolongation 
could be arranged but he advised against it. Then followed 
a curious statement: "I conceive I am able to ruine their 
supreamacy by deviding their party". But to do this would 
in no way profit the King's cause I^
On May 6th, the conference over, the Commissioners 
prepared to leave for Kilkenny with expressions of good will 
and the promise that they would o.us.e - their influence
at the impending session of the General Assembly to gain
2
acceptance of the concessions they were conveying to it.
1. Ormond to the King, May 8, Carte, VI, pp.278-83; 
of. also Ormond to Digby, ibid., pp.283-5.
2. Ibid.
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Talks were to be resumed at the end of the month or 
when fresh instructions were received from the King. 
Glanrickard accompanied the Commissioners in order to 
throw his v/eight on the side of the peace party. Ormond 
also relied on the pre-arranged support of several members 
of the Assembly^
So crucial and so provocative of lengthy argument was 
the debate expected to be that the Commissioners, on their
return to Kilkenny, recommended an extension of the cessation
2
to Ormond. They were right to do so, for although they
3
began their report on May 15th the general debate was 
not opened until May 27th and it was protractedi" Oddly 
enough, Glanrickard did not blame the Assembly for the 
initial delay but rather the Commissioners for their 
clumsy handling of the report. hven so, he agreed with • 
them that it would be necessary to prolong the cessation
5
until June 20th. In the event, the cessation was first
r rj
extended until June 18th and thereafter until July 9th.
1. Ibid.
2. May 11, T.C.P., XIV, p.391; Gilbert, IV, p.248.
3. The Assembly adjourned on July 5th, reconvened on 
August 7th, and was dissolved shortly after September 9th.
4. Glanrickard to Ormond, May 26, Carte, VI, pp.291-5.
5. Ibid.
6. Gilbert, IV, p.271.
7. Ibid., p.281; eventually the cessation was extended 
until August 15th, ibid., pp.358-63.
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As expected the Assembly were quite satisfied with 
Ormond's political proposals but displeased with those 
concerning religion. Indeed, in Glanrickard's opinion, 
there could be little hope of peace unless the penal laws 
v/ere repealed. He chose to add that he could see no 
valid reason for opposing repeal if aid were really 
expected from the Irish. And to make his point quite 
unambiguous he stated that whereas peace would immediately 
follow the repeal, failure to agree to it merely furnished 
effective propaganda to the anti-peace party.
Glanrickard had to report that an even more serious 
difficulty than the repeal of the penal laws had suddenly 
emerged. This was the question of the restitution of the 
churches in Confederate hands. It would be wise to 
postpone restitution until all the agreed concessions had 
been formally ratified by act of parliament; or, better 
still, to omit the subject altogether from the negotiations. 
One reason for this omission in the view of the Confederates 
was that aid from abroad would be withheld should they 
agree to restore the churches^
This vital issue was thrust into the forefront of 
debate by Congregation which, in accordance with established 
custom, was sitting at the same time as the Assembly.
On May 25th Congregation considered a query put to it by 
several conveniently anon^rmous members of the Assembly -
1. Carte, VI, p.292.
/
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What was the minimum satisfaction for the Church
required by their oath of association? üfter deliberating
for several days, Congregation, which included the four
titular Archbishops, seven bishops, and twenty one others,
ruled that it necessitated writing into the final treaty
a special article :
"for keeping in their hands such churches, abbeys, . 
monasteries, and chapels as were in their possession".
In reply to further questions addressed to it on June 2nd
Congregation declared that no one could support any peace
with a clear conscience so long as Protestant bishops
were to sit in Parliament and exercise spiritual jurisdiction
2
while the Catholic bishops were denied such privileges.
In order to safeguard the clergy's interests. Congregation 
nominated the bishops of Waterford and Clogher together 
with Dr. Walter Lynch and Father Nicholas French, soon to 
be bishop of Ferns, to sit as a committee throughout that 
particular session of the üssembly.
It is obvious that the questions had been put 
deliberately to elicit prearranged answers, so that the 
clergy would be enabled to influence the course of the 
debate in the Assembly without leaving itself open to 
the charge of being authoritarian. The manoeuvre was 
successful, for a majority in the Assembly supported the
1. Resolution of Convocation, June 1, Gilbert, IV, pp.270-1.
2. Com. Rin., I, pp.524-9.
3. Ibid., p.531.
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declarations of Congregation, in spite of the argument of
Muskerry and his followers that their formal adoption would
prohibit a settlement.
Finally, on June 9th, the Assembly resolved:
"... as to the Marquis of Oimiond ' s demand for the 
restoring of the churches to the protestant clergy, 
the Com3^® should give an absolute denyeall to it, 
and the Comitee of Instructons are to prepare an 
Instrucion to this effect."1
This did not please either those who had compiled the
original instructions or the Commissioners who had been
to Dublin, since it implied that they had broken their
oath, and they insisted indignantly that the ruling should
be revoked. The Clergy had no choice but to refuse, yet
they did relent so far as to declare that no one was being
accused of perjury. Tempers still flamed in the Committee
whose members vowed to break off relations with the Clergy •
and bother themselves no further either with peace of war
unless they were given more appropriate satisfaction.
Keen as ever to mediate, Clanrickard proposed a way
out of the difficulty. Ormond, on his side, should be
asked to waive his insistence upon the restitution of the
Protestant churches pending the declaration of Peace, and
the summoning of a free Parliament. At that time, the
Protestant Church would automatically receive back its
3
property according to the laws of the land. This solution
1. Com. Rin., I, p.529; Gilbert, IV, pp.278-9.
2. Com. Rin., I, pp.531-5.
3. Clanrickard to Ormond, June 4, Gilbert, IV, pp.278-9> 
Carte, VI, pp.297-8.
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lacked appeal since it left out of account the principal 
point on which the Catholic Clergy now stood firm - that 
they should never surrender the property which they 
believed to be rightfully theirs.
In the end, the Clergy, while refusing to retract, 
stated that it would not be an offence against conscience 
if the special article were excluded from the peace treaty, 
provided that the effect of keeping possession of the 
churches remained the same. Honour was appeased, but the 
peace party were hamstrung, for everyone realised that 
this proviso amounted virtually to a vetoV
This issue - for Clanrickard 'thés greate rock#, that 
threatens shipltra®kfe both to His Itejestie's and all men's 
interests in this Kingdoms'^  - was the most intractable 
obstacle to peace, in a situation already bristling with 
difficulties, that had yet emerged, though it had been 
obvious from the beginning that eventually the clergy 
would adopt such an unequivocal stand. And, of course, 
the longer they enjoyed possession of the former Protestant 
property, the less inclined were they to surrender it. 
Besides, the news from Bngland was so full of the King's 
declining prospects that supporters of a moderate peace
2
were struggling against a rising tide of extreme demands.
1. Carte, VI, pp.297-8.
2. In the Plunket-Dunne MS. - always hostile to the clergy - 
the issue is clearly stated from the Ormondist point of view: 
"The Irish had imprudently from the first took the church 
livings from the Protestants which in justice and duty to 
the King they should not, and not keeping 'em in their own 
hands for support of the war had given them to their Bishops 
and clergy who had lived before on the laity's charity, and
had they still done would have been dependant on their Vvlll 
and management." op.cit., p.776.
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In his reports to Ormond of the trend of the great
debate at Kilkenny, Clanrickard showed himself unwontedly
sympathetic to the Church's point of view. Indeed, his
long stay at Kilkenny and his close attention to the
arguments passing to and fro would seem to have strengthened
his concern for Catholic interests. He put it to Ormond
that the Confederates could not be expected to surrender
their churches, though many of them would not resist if
the King were to order their seizure. For the time being
the whole matter ought to be waived. With the intention
perhaps of influencing Ormond to make a favourable reply,
he reported that Plunket andthe Committee of Instructions
had declared their intention of providing the King with
the promised 10,000 troops should peace be arranged;
moreover, they were now in a position to furnish some of
1
the necessary shipping.
Ormond was evidently put' out by the time being consumed 
in debate at Kilkenny, since he considered that the 
political concessions were very generous and framed in 
such a way as to lend themselves to rapid acceptance.
Honesty compelled him to admit the limited scope of the 
religious concessions. Hut there was nothing further 
he could do to extend them. The new issue concerning 
restitution of the Churches struck him with unpleasant 
surprise and for once nettled him. Tartly he observed
1. Carte, VI, pp.297-8.
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that there were other people besides the Confederate 
Catholics with tender consciences. The tone of his 
remarks indicated that he underestimated the strength of 
religious feeling informing the debate. For him it was 
a quibble about whether the churches should be restored 
in a matter of weeks or a matter of months^ when the 
fundamental question was whether they should be restored 
at all. In his replies to Clanrickard he set his face 
against any further religious concesssions^
The raising at last of the question of ownership of 
the churches marked the end of any prospects for a peace to 
which Ormond should be one of the signatories. Either 
he must cease to be the principal negotiator or some 
other agent must yield this point on the King's, behalf.
As has been indicated, it was not practical politics to
ÛU
dismiss Ormond. It must be^resort to the second 
alternative or nothing.
For the moment, the King revealed his anxiety to 
placate both Ormond and the Confederates at the same time. 
On the one hand he warmly approved of the conduct of 
negotiations by Ormond and the Council - for whom Ormond 
himself had specifically requested some such praise, 
presumably because he had been uneasy about the warmth
1. Ormond to Clanrickard, May 29, p.294; same to the same, 
June 9, ibid., pp.298-9.
2. The King to Ormond, May 22, ibid, p.289.
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of their support. On the other, he instantly waived
the restriction on conceding repeal of the penal laws
2
expressed in his public letter of January 22nd. There 
were several other straws in the wind to indicate that 
his anxiety to please the Confederates remained acute 
On May 13th he ordered that Clanrickard be admitted to 
the Privy Council and that to make this possible the 
oath of Supremacy be waived and a novel formula devised.
This appointment, and the preparation of a special form 
of oath for Catholics could not fail to encourage the 
Catholics at a time when they had just uttered a demand 
for Crown offices to be distributed equally between 
Protestants and Catholics. It was followed on ggnd May^^«^d 
by the issue of letters patent to Ormond for passing on 
to selected Confederates as governors of the forts and
5
towns they were Jo hold under the terms of the treaty.
On the day before, Charles had written to Ormond;
"... to desyre you to make the best bargains you 
may; yet soe that you doe not endanger the Irish 
peace, the effecting of which is of soe absolute 
necessity for my affaires."6
1. Ormond to Digby, May 8, ibid., p.283.
2. King to Ormond, May 13, 1645, Gilbert IV, p.lviii; 
Digby to Ormond, May 21, ibid., pp.287-9.
3. T.C.P., XIV, p.310.
4. Ibid., p.311.
5. Carte, VI, pp.290-1.
6. Ibid., V, p.14.
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The calamity of haseby had still to come I
Having made its fateful resolution to insist upon 
retaining the churches, the General Assembly issued a 
fresh commission to its delegates on June 13th^
Negotiations re-commenced at Dublin about June 19th and 
dragged on with little positive progress to record until 
they were again adjourned at the beginning of August.
As expected. Confederate demands exceeded any that 
they had previously made. The amnesty must be complete.
All the laws against Roman Catholics should be repealed 
including not merely those passed since the reign of 
Henry VIII, but also the Acts of Provisos and Praemunire 
passed in the reign of Richard II. Special emphasis was 
laid on exemption from the jurisdiction of the Protestant 
clergy and freedom from the threat of impeachment or 
interrogation for Catholic priests. The lands in Wicklow 
and 'jlbdough should be restored to their former owners while 
any person who considered that he had been ill-treated by 
the plantations of James I should petition Parliament and 
obtain relief. The churches now in their possession should 
be neither asked for nor expected from them. Ports and 
towns should remain in their hands. Their present system 
of government should be preserved until all their demands 
had been satisfied by Acts of Parliament. They should
1. Gilbert, IV, pp.279-80.
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have an equal share in terms of member and influence 
in affairs of state and their own universities and schools. 
All privy councillors, judges and magistrates must swear 
to observe the articles of peace. Poynings' Act should 
be suspended and an Act of Parliament should be passed
stating that the articles of peace should never be repealed^
2
During the session Ormond was firm but conciliatory.
He yielded on a number of points. Thus, on July 7th,
the Irish Board of Judges being consulted ruled that the
statute of 2 Elizabeth, Cap.l, did not mean that priests
3
saying mass were liable to imprisonment or fines. He 
consented to what was virtually a comprehensive act of 
oblivion, to the limitation of the viceroy's tenure of 
office, to waive the King's right to customs dues collected 
since October 23rd, 1641; he agreed that there should be 
no discrimination against Catholics in making appointments 
to public office, but made no reference to the plea for 
numerical equality between Catholics and Protestants^ 
he agreed that acts prejudicial to Catholics passed since 
August 7th, 1641, should be abrogated, that the council 
should confine itself to matters of State, that the Courts
1. Por the details of the proposals and counter-proposals 
exchanged, cf. T.G.P., Vols XIV and XV.
2. That is, from his point of view: "the Roman Catholique 
party have gained more liberty and security to themselves 
in the freedoms and exercise of their religion than they 
had at any time since the making of the Statute of 2° 
Elizabeth."
3. T.C.P., XV,p.132.
4. Digby had written to say that the King was shocked by 
this suggestion. Carte, VI, p.288.
293.
of High Commission should be removed by Act of Parliament,
that the Confederates should be allowed to enrol 4,000
troops and 600 horse in the Royal Army and keep certain
strongholds, and that
"the Acts to be agreed on, in this Treatie may 
receive no alteration or diminucion here, and 
if they must of necessity be transmitted into 
England that they may receive no alteration or 
diminueon there".
But over the principal religious points in dispute-
retention of the churches and repeal of the statutes
against papal jurisdiction - he would give no ground.
Nor, for that matter, would he give way to all the
political demands; he refused,for instance, to agree to
the rescindment of the plantations of Wicklow and Idough.
In his view - expressed in one of his replies to the
Commissioners - if all the Confederate demands were conceded,
"not only his Maj-^^ would bee disinherited, of a 
greate parte of his Royal iurisdiction prerogatives, 
and power: But his Protestant B^E® and Clergie and 
all other his Maj"^^-® Protestant Suiects would bee 
deprived of their lawful iurisdictions, priviledges 
and rights. And a forrMgne iurisdiction would be 
sett up w^- would bee independent of his Maj - 
Royall authoritie ..."
Besides which, there would be continuous dispute as to the
nature of the King's sovereignty^
Limitation of the King's sovereignty was, of course,
the necessary precondi/jf'tion of any settlement and it was
futile to pretend that it could be avoided. Even so,
1. T.C.P., XV, pp.188-9; Gilbert, IV, pp.346-7.
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Ormond may have been goaded into writing in such strong
terms, for the Commissioners would seem to have put their
arguments stiffly. Once again it is hard to condemn them.
Not only were they inliibited by the General Assembly's
ruling of June 9th with regard to retention of the churches,
but their conduct of negotiations was being sniped at.
More and more critics were taking the not unnatural view
that the Confederacy was gaining nothing by the protracted
negotiations with Ormond. The criticism became so clamorous
that on July 4th the Supreme Council published an ordinance
forbidding 'declarationsand protestations ... touching the
condition upon which the new peace is to be concluded or
was continued'. They had other reasons for being tough.
Bellings was now abroad on his begging mission and it was
hoped that they would shortly receive substantial aid?
They had also heard of the disastrous defeat at Naseby on 
Tb AC.
January 14th and would have been more than human had they 
not sought to exploit the King's fatal weakness. There 
is also a possibility that they suspected Ormond of with­
holding some of the concessions that he was empowered to 
grant. Once they announced on July 30th:
"Wee intend /if yoT Excellence be not fully 
authorized thereig/ further to supplicat his 
for the graunting of our desires... "3
1. G.3.P. Ireland, p.404; Proclamation of Supreme Council.
2. Cf. Gilbert (Bellings), IV, pp.2-4.
3. T.C.P., XV, p.192.
295.
They also complained on July 18th that the King's position 
was getting worse through the delay} For all that, they 
had now been guaranteed, as Muskerry admitted, all they 
could expect by way of military, juridical and political 
concessions.
Shortly after Naseby, the King had sent Ormond an 
anguished letter:
"The late misfortune makes the Irish assistance 
more necessary than before. For if within these 
two months you could send me a considerable 
assistance, I am confident that both my last lo.ss 
would soon be forgotten, and likewise it may, by 
the grace of God, put such a turn to my affairs, 
as to make me in a far better condition before 
winter than I have been at any time since the 
rebellion began."2
At the same time, in similar vein, Digby stated that the
3
Court took for granted the conclusion of a treaty; No 
evidence supported this report which is yet another 
example of the Court's utter failure to understand the 
Irish situation - not to mention the v/orthless intelligence 
received at Oxford.
As usual after a major reverse, the King looked to 
Ireland for rescue without reckoning with the difficulties.
On June 26th he dispatched Daniel O'Neill to Ireland in an 
urgent search for supplies and informed Ormond that he was 
presuming peace had been arranged. Provided only that hehad
1. Ibid., p.166.
2. Cal. Cl.S.P., I, p.267; Carte, V, p.14.
3. Ibid., VI, pp.301.2.
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sufficient supplies, Ormond was to come over to England^ 
Digby further explained that O'Neill was to go by way of 
Cornwall in order to hire ships for the troops7 Two
3
other gentlemen, Colonel Fitzwilliams and Sir Marmaduke
Langdale, were also bound for Ireland. The latter was
governor of North Wales and the commander of the northern
cavalry. Apparently, his errand, at the instigation of
Prince Rupert, was to discuss a plan for landing Ormond's
foot in North Wales where they should join forces with
Langdale's own cavalry} On July 13th Digby reported
fancifully to Prince Rupert:
"... and that the news be true... that my Lord
of Glamorgan is landed in Anglesea with a very
great body Irish"5
A week later he was telling Ormond how exceedingly anxious
the King was for foot artillery and ammunition from Ireland
"ere this", he hoped, "transports have set out from thence
with them".
Following his heavy defeat at Naseby the King's 
situation was indeed desperate. That he relied absolutely 
on receiving relief from Ireland is finally confirmed by 
the fact that he moved the remnants of his army into South
1. Ibid., V, p.15.
2. Ibid., VI, pp.302-3; see also Ibid., pp.303-5.
3. Ibid., VI, PP.302-ST see below pp.30H-'l>L-
4. Ibid.
5. Warburton, op.cit.. Ill, p.143.
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Wales and temporarily set up his H.Q. at Raglan, seat of
the Earl of Glamorgan's father, the Marquis of Worcester.
Apparently his plan was to recruit there while relying
on Goring to hold his own in the south west and awaiting
the arrival of the expected Irish contingent. Once the
Irish had joined forces with his ov/n he might return to
the offensive} Nevertheless, when he received Ormond's
account of the Confederates' latest set of demands he went
out of nis way to assert his steadfastness to his avowed
principles; thus he would:
"suffer all extremity, rather than ever abandon 
his religion, either to English or Irish rebels, 
and commanding him (in case the Irish so unworthily 
take advantage of his v/eak condition, as to press 
him to what he could not grant with a safe conscience, 
and, without it, to request a peace) to procure, if 
he could, a further cessation; and if not, to make 
divisions he could amongst them, and rather leave 
it to the chance of war, than to give any such 
allowance of popery, as must evidently bring 
destruction to that profession, which by the grace 
of God he should ever maintain through all extremities^
He could see fit to relax only in so far as to permit
Catholics to have their own chapels in such places where
2they were in the great majority. Not content with assuring 
Ormond of the purity of his conscience, at the same time 
he instructed Digby to write to Muskerry and the .other 
Commissioners who had attended the Oxford Conference to 
the same effect :
1. Digby to Ormond, June 19, Carte, VI, ]pp.50T..*â.
2. July 31, ibid., pp.303-6.
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"u... if nothing would content them but what 
must wound his (the King’s) honour and conscience 
they must expect, that howe low soever his condition 
was, and how detestable soever the English rebels 
were to him, he would in that point join with them, 
the Hoots, or with any of the protestant profession, 
rather than do the least act which might hazard 
that religion, in which and for which he should 
live and die."1
These ostentatious declarations of principle, above all the
threat to have recourse to the Scots, whose opposition was
the initial cause of all his troubles, were all the more
remarkable in that he found himself now in a state of
despair. As Digby reported to Ormond, the situation
was rapidly going from bad to worse. The future course of
the struggle now turned entirely on the immediate receipt
of aid from Ireland? In the light of this, Charles
absolutely commanded Ormond personally to bring over
whatever forces he could scrape together and to let Ireland
3
take its chance during his absence. Again, while chiding 
Muskerry and his colleagues for neglecting the fair promises 
made at Oxford, and forcibly reminding them that the King’s 
ruin would spell their ruin also, Digby frankly admitted 
that the King had suffered for lack of their aid and now
4
stood in desperate need of it.
1. August 1st, ibid., pp.309-10.
2. Ibid., August 2nd, pp.306-9.
3. Ibid., July 31, pp.303-6.
4. Ibid., Aug.l, pp.309-10.
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On the face of it the King's insistence upon 
standing by his principles at a time when defeat at 
last seemed certain proves that he could never have 
been guilty of the double dealing of which he is usually 
accused. But there are one or two facts to be considered 
which must give one pause. To begin with he protested 
too much. There was, for example, no need to drag in the 
threat of resorting to the Scots. Besides, his tender 
regard for integrity was hardly likely to impress the 
Confederate Commissioners who already had two examples of 
his willingness to make secret concessions to his Catholic 
subjects in Ireland - the promises to join with them against 
the Scots in Ulster and to repeal the penal laws. Moreover, 
there is irrefutable proof that they had reason to reject 
his defence of principle inasmuch as they agreed to become 
partners to the Glamorgan Treaty with its total surrender 
to their religious demands after having received Digby's 
letter.
However, the ÿost significant fact is that his letters 
to Ormond and j-v-^ uskerry coincided with a letter to Prince 
Rupert in which he made a similar declaration, apparently 
in order to give the lie to a rumour or, indeed, charge 
that he was contemplating coming to an agreement with the 
Irish on their terms.^ With the evident intention of
1. The kind of disturbing propaganda which obliged him to 
defend himself is illustrated by this report from the 
Committee of the House of Lords and Commons at Westminster: 
"Lord Breghill was enjoined to make an offer for bringing
over from Ireland distressed Protestants who preferred
dying elsewhere to making peace with the Irish."D.H.P.I..n.403.
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dispelling any suspi<LB^ «K which Rupert or any 'honest man'
might entertain he was sending Rupert a copy of the letter
addressed to Ormond. It may legitimately be asked if this
letter, though addressed to Ormond, was not written for the
benefit of 'honest men'. The exact worth of Charles'*
notion of what was honourable was further revealed in the
letter to Rupert, whose attention it could scarcely have
escaped. For, having defended himself from the charge of
lacking integrity, he added:
"As for the Irish,/^l/^assure you, they shall not cheate 
me; butt it is possible they may cousin themselves; for 
bee assured, what I have refused to the English I will 
not graunt to the Irish rebells, never trusting to 
that kind of people (of what nation so-ever) more 
then I see by theire actions."1
These were the people on whom he counted to save him from
'defeat at the hand of Parliament'!
Before these several letters from the King and Digby
had reached Dublin, the Commissioners had already returned
to Kilkenny where they were to report on the treaty proceedings
to a General Assembly convening on August 8th. They had
agreed that the negotiations should continue pending receipt
of further instructions from the King in the light of Ormond's
2
latest report. Meanwhile, the Cessation was to be further
3
prolonged from July 31st to August 15th. To the last they
1. August 3, Carte, VI, pp 311-12; Warburton, 111, pp.150-1.
2. T.C.P., XV, p.197; Gilbert, IV, p.351.
3. Ibid. pp.358-63.
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had bargained hard. On August 3rd, for instance, they
reminded Ormond that he had neglected to comment on this
demand for equality in the distribution of state offices}
To facilitate procedure at Kilkenny, Ormond prepared
a simplified brief of the concessions he had made ;whithethe
Commissioners agreed to present to the Assembly. The
concessioiB were listed under four heads:
(i) Exemptions from penalties and incapacities incurred 
through the practice of their religion.
(ii) Appointments to various offices.
(iii) Conferment of places of honour and profit. ’
(iv) Agreement to redress various alleged grievances.
Ormond thought them generous.
By contrast Muskerry provided a first-hand report of
the state of opinion at Kilkenny when replying to Digby’s
letter of July 31st. Whereas he purported to be a faithful
mouthpiece of the views of others, he wrote with a cutting
edge that could only be personal. His letter, remarkable
alike for its frankness and its skilfully restrained
exposure of the King's irrational defence of principle, is
all the more important since its author was the acknowledged
leader of the peace party.
According to Muskerry there was general astonishment
at the King's declaration that he was fighting principally
in defence of the Protestant religion; a defence based on
1. Ibid., V, p.41.
2, Ibid., V, pp.45-52.
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utility or thorough would have gained a readier
acceptance. This really meant that he preferred to retain
the support of those Protestants who were still loyal rather
than to win over the Catholics whose capacity to give
assistance exceeded that of all the Protestant Royalists
put together. Moreover, if honour compelled him to abide
by his promises to the Protestants rather than to the ^ueen,
they had been misled;
"for either the King has profest more to the Queen, 
or the Queen, (which has some influence upon his 
Honor) has profest more to us than was just for 
her to do in the King's name."
On the k#y issue of conscience Muskerry next contributed
a withering analysis. The King's plea of conscience was
either genuine or feigned. If genuine, then how could he
be trusted to keep his current promises when 'a Protestant
casuist will easily unloose his: Conscience'? On the other
hand, if feigned, how could any one trust himI
The Confederates had always believed that the King
was a Catholic at heart forced to dissemble for reasons of
state. They had considered, that is, that the current
flowed steadily in their favour. The sudden declaration
of faith in Protestantism upset this belief and left them
uncertain. VJiy, they asked, should the King surrender to
the essential request for freedom of worship, and yet decline
to agree to their possession of churches in which to worship?
Why object that their priests should not enjoy more freedom
and better accommodation? The King's estimate of their
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religion must be indeed low.
The threat of joining with the ücots struck an
unpleasant note. But it did not di-smay them. They
could always seek aid and protection elsewhere.
As to the charge that they, and particularly the
Commissioners to Oxford, had enlarged their original demands,
Muskerry could only retort:
"For had we received lesse satisfaction in due season, 
before we had expended so much blood, time and treasure 
in this warre, it had been equivalent to a greater 
proportion now given us."1
This letter assumes unusual significance when it is 
realized that the Confederacy were very shortly to sign the 
Glamorgan Treaty. Evidently Muskerry and his colleagues 
saw fit to be persuaded by Glamorgan that the king * s 
declaration of faith was feigned and his sympathy for the 
Catholic Church unchanged.
On leaving Dublin, the Commissioners travelled with 
Clanrickard, as before, and with the Earl of Glamorgan who 
had taken part in the final stages of the negotiations.
1. Muskerry to Digby^ Co'\\ecV'toi\ oP , I
CHAPTER VII 
The Glamorgan Treaty.
In the summer of 1645 two men came to Ireland 
with instructions from Charles I to carry Irish 
Confederate troops back to England. Both were Catholics, 
the one Anglo-Irish, the other Anglo-Welsh. They were 
Colonel Oliver Eitzwilliam and the Earl of Glamorgan.
Yet neither seemed aware of the other^ s intentions and 
initially at least, they did not cross each other’s 
paths^ The evidence relating to Glamorgan’s mission
is incomplete, that to Fitzwilliam’s is exiguous. As 
FitzwillianP s career as a negotiator was brief as well 
as utterly abortive and his part in Irish affairs otherwise
2
insignificant, it will be convenient to deal with him first.
The son of Thomas Fitzwilliam, Viscount Merrion, and
the brother-in-law of Preston, he was a professional
soldier and had seen much service under the French flag
in Flanders, where,' apparently, he had long experience of
3
recruiting and commanding Irish troops. He had been in
1. Before the end of the year they had obviously met and 
found that they shared common interests; cf. Glamorgan 
to Ormond, T.C.P., XVI, p.140.
2. I have pieced together the ensuing account of his 
embassy almost entirely from the correspondence contained 
in Bigby’s baggage captured at Sherborn.
5. Jermyn to Digby, May 18, Husband, pp.853-5.
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touch with O'Hartegan, the Confederate agent in Paris, 
at least as early as November, 1644^ and, some time later, 
probably in March of the next year, he put forward certain 
propositions to Henrietta Maria who had by this time
p
established her court at St. Germain:-
i. If she would prevail upon the King to give way 
to the Confederate terms,"at least in private", he 
would proceed to Ireland and there raise ten or 
twelve thousand troops for the King's service in 
England.
ii. For the sum of £10,000 he would undertake to 
provide the necessary arms and ships.
iii. Upon landing in England money should be advanced 
for one month's pay for the troops.
iv. He should be Commander-in-Chief.
V. Under no circumstances should the Confederate 
force be split up.
vi. The force should be supported by cavalry of whom
2,000 should be mustered ,at the landing place.3
It is evident from a later reference that Fitzwilliam
construed the Confederate terms, which he described as
'just', as including complete toleration, a free parliament,
and the removal of incapacities^ Whether he made this
clear to Henrietta Maria is not certain. At any rate
she accepted his proposals, put her signature to them,
and sent him to the King with a very warm blessing.
This marked the beginning of a characteristically
1. Cf. Clar. S.P., II. p. M l  .
2. Her dealings with the Confederacy while in Paris are 
described in the next chapter.
3. Fitzwilliam*s Propositions, Husband, p.861.
4. Fitzwilliam to Digby, ibid., pp.856-7.
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futile adventure.
As a personal safeguard Fitzwilliam had insisted 
that the King should keep the document signed by the Queen 
and issue in its place a copy «^signed with the royal Kcxnd 
which he would take with him to Ireland. The 
plan was obviously thought out in some detail in Paris 
and by a number of people; the Marquis of Newcastle, for 
one, knew of it and suggested that he might be the most 
suitable person to command the cavalry which was to meet 
Fitzwilliam when he put ashore in Lancashire^
Jermyn’s careful phraseology in writing to Digby 
about the scheme on the Queen’s behalf suggests that it 
was supported by no great optimism. Twice he referred 
to its being contingent upon the King’s approval. "The 
Queen", he interpolated/ at one point, "doth approve of, 
but not as a thing to be much relied on, for it is a 
great thing that will remaine to be done on the Gollonels 
part". The King was not to interpret the Colonel’s 
stipulations too literally, for, Jermyn implied, he made 
them to strengthen his hand in dealing with the Confederates 
rather than because he expected them to be fulfilled.
Jermyn’s style is here, as so often elsewhere, obscure, 
but he would seem also to suggest that the Queen sponsored 
Fitzwilliam so as to avoid giving him offence and thereby
1. ^Vhereas Glamorgan proposed to make a landing in Wales, 
Newcastle thought that Lancashire was the only possible 
place.
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deter other would-he helpers from coming forward^
Even allowing for Jermyn’s disparaging remarks, 
the Queen’s decision to sponsor Fitzwilliam remains 
curious. By this time, she had had experience of 
negotiating with the Irish and she should have known that
Si I o w .
he was departing on a . Neither she nor
Fitzwilliam made any reference to the one thing that really
mattered - how could the King yield to the Confederates
’just demands’? The only tenable explanation is that
she believed Ormond had already arranged a peace or was
2
on the point of doing so - although,even in this case, 
she must have been aware that the Confederates were 
pledged to seal their side of the bargain by providing
10,000 troops and that, in consequence, Fitzwilliam 
would find himself superfluous.
Fitzwilliam’s satisfaction with his allotted part 
is easily explained. He hoped to earn distinction for 
himself and a reward for his family - his father wished 
to be a privy councillor as soon as Catholics became 
eligible for the office. Apart from this, he was taken
1. Jermyn to Digby, Husband, pp.853-5.
2. It is hard to ascertain whether or not this was so. 
Jermyn informed Digby that Fitzwilliam believed he could 
raise the troops ’’if the Peace be made in Ireland’’, ibid. 
This could mean by the time he arrived there. It is also 
perhaps significant that Henrietta Maria’s entourage were 
expecting peace in Ireland to be declared at any moment 
during the sumnier of 1645; see below chapter YUl.
3. Digby to Ormond, June 19, Carte, VI, p.302.
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in by the baseless optimism that pervaded the court of
Charles I and was led to believe that the differences between
the King and the Confederates might easily be overcome.
As for O ’Hartegan, he must have been counting on the Queen
to persuade the King to accept Fitzwilliam’s terms.
At Court, furnished with a letter of introduction
from Jermyn, Fitzwilliam duly obtained the King’s support
and found himself henceforward collaborating with Digby,
who quickly despatched him to Ireland. All Digby would
say in his favour when explaining his mission to Ormond
was that the King thought him worthy of a ’noble charge’.
But it was up to Ormond to use him or not as he saw fit^
As on so many occasions, Digby’s words cannot be
taken at their face value. There is no minute of his
conversations with Fitzwilliam but it would seem that he
took the mission more seriously - or, at least, pretended
to do so - than he led Ormond to believe. This may be
inferred from Fitzwilliam’s first report from Ireland
which reveals only too plainly that Digby had given him
a highly coloured appreciation of the situation there,
for he wrote,
’’I find all things contrary to what your Lordship 
expected, and much more to the ^Articles past between 
the Queene and me."
So far from the Confederates’ ’just demands’ having been
conceded, they had been offered merely a free parliament
1. ifci gtgc t.n Ormrmd 1 gttr? , . . . . 1 %
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and the removal of incapacities. Ormond had told him
that he had received no authority from the King either
to grant the removal of the penal laws or to allow them
to retain the churches in their possession. This
information had clearly come as a surprise to Fitzwilliam
who had inferred the opposite from Digby. Indeed:
"had you told me of this before my comraing from' you, 
I could have told you, that in all probability, 
there would be no peace, having heard much of the 
Irish resolution before ere my comming out of 
France."1
Fitzwilliam arrived in Ireland while Ormond and the 
peace commissioners were still in the middle of their 
negotiations. It may be deduced that he personally 
found Ormond's position rather inflexible, since he took 
it upon himself to explain the appalling gravity of the 
King’s affairs, as if Ormond were in some need of this 
reminder. He had pointed out the same fact to the peace 
commissioners. Both sides had promised to let him. have 
summaries of the difference between them. When these 
came to hand, he intended to see whether the Confederates 
were justified in declining to settle for the concessions 
so far offered them.
In view of the critical note informing the first 
part of his report, Fitzwilliam concluded with remarkable 
optimism.
1. Fitzwilliam to Digby, July 16, Husband, pp.856-7.
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"I have inquired of the particular affairs 
spoken of and find all feasible."
What happened next is unknown since Fitzwilliam
now disappeared from sight for some time. There is
no further reference to him either at Kilkenny or at
Dublin until November 13th, 1645, nor does he appear
2
to have corresponded again with Digby. Presumably his 
optimism was soon shattered by a rational assessment of 
the prospects for peace.
His short-lived intervention in the negotiations 
between Charles and the Confederates raises several 
questions. How did Ormond react to his coming? What, 
if anything^had it to do with Glamorgan’s mission?
What significance has it for the negotiations as a whole?
It has been observed several times previously that 
Ormond had much to endure from visitors from England.
His reaction to Fitzwilliam requires little imagina^##, 
especially as the Colonel arrived under the impression 
that he already had authority to concede the Confederates’
1. T.C.P. XVI, p.140.
2. It is remarkable that there should be only one reference 
to Fitzwilliam’s adventure outside the correspondence 
found in Digby’s captured baggage.
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fundamental requests. Nonetheless, he was obviously 
at least polite, however little support he intended to 
give. Perhaps he refused to treat the matter seriously, 
particularly as Fitzwilliam came originally from Paris 
where the rarefied political atmosphere, to Ormond’s way 
of thinking, encouraged a distorted viev/ of the state of 
Ireland.
Even Ormond, however, must have been slightly shaken 
by the appearance of Fitzwilliam in Ireland at a time 
when Glamorgan was long overdue on a precisely similar 
errand. What was the King up to? Hov/ many more shots 
did he wish to keep in his locker?^
And, indeed, the most arresting fact about Fitzwilliam’s
mission is that it coincided with that of Glamorgan - that
is, tv/o ' men apparently unacquainted with each other sailed
2
into Ireland at about the same time to try to obtain the 
same number of troops from the same source. The coincidence
is apparent rather than real. Fitzwilliam’s plan had 
been endorsed by the Queen and was more or less public 
knowledge, whereas Glamorgan’s was either much less than
1. Atfbhis time both Sir Marmaduke hang dale and Daniel 
O ’Neill were also sent to Ireland on similar errands.
See above pp.24^ -6; .
2. Fitzwilliam must have sailed for Ireland on or shortly 
after June 22nd. Cf. Prince Rupert to Ormond June 22nd, 
1645, Carte Papers, XV, p.68, in which he recommends 
Fitzwilliam to Ormond for employment.
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he was shortly to claim it to he or so secret as to be 
known only to the King. Thus, as Digby and presumably 
the world saw it, it was Fitzwilliam alone who was going 
to raise troops; Glamorgan was merely concerned with 
giving what help he could to Ormond. Only Ormond and 
the Confederates may have known of Glamorgan’s commission 
also to raise troops.
The King’s part in the affair was characteristic. 
Given that Glamorgan’s mission was all that he claimed 
it to be, the King alone knew that Fitzwilliam was bound 
to fail. Y/hy then did he bother to send him? To avert 
suspicion from Glamorgan, perhaps? As the Queen had 
sponsored Fitzwilliam, some good reason would have been 
required for turning him down. Of course, such a reason 
could easily have been come by. For example, Charles 
might have siad that he did not wish to offend Ormond.
But he preferred to use Fitzwilliam as ac dupe.
It might have been thought that the experience of 
Fitzwilliam would have put the Confederates on their 
guard against all agents who came from the King. On 
the contrary, they signed a treaty with Glamorgan barely 
a month after Fitzwilliam had abandoned hope. If this 
bears witness to the authentic ring of Glamorgan’s 
pretensions, it does little credit to their judgment.
A King who would so lightly abuse the trust of one agent 
might just as easily deceive another.
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The Earl of Glamorgan probably appeared in Dublin
about the end of June. Our last glimpse of him was in
the County of Monmouthshire, where, it was suggested,
he may have been trying to procure supplies in preparation
for a campaign such as that outlined in his commission of
April 1st, 1644. Since then, much had happened to him,
though the details of his itinerary are scattered
wholesale in obscure references and there are unfortunate
gaps. The question of the use Charles intended to make
of him has already been discussed in relation to the
1
letter to Ormond of December 27th, 1644. Thereafter he
would appear to have received a number of commissions.
The first was dated January 2nd:-
"Oxford this 2nd of January, 1644.
Several heads whereupon you our right trusty 
and right well-beloved Cousin Edward Earl of 
Glamorgan may securely*proceed in execution of 
our commands. First, you may engage your 
estate, interest and credit, that we will most 
really and punctually perform any our promises to 
the Irish, and as it is necessary to conclude a 
peace suddenly, whatsoever shall be consented 
unto by our Lieutenant the Marquis of Ormond.
We will die a thousand deaths rather than disannul 
or break it; and if upon necessity anything be 
to condescended unto, and yet the Lord Marquis 
not willing to be soon therein, or not fit for 
us at the present publicy to own, do you endeavour 
to supply the same. If for the encouragement of 
the Lord Marquis of Ormond you see it needful to 
have the Garter sent him, or any further favour 
demonstrated from us unto, we will cause the same 
to be performed. If for the advantage of our 
service you see fit to promise any titles, even 
to the titles Earls in either of our Kingdoms, 
upon notice from you we'will cause the same to 
be performed.
1. See above p.J-t^h
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For the maintenance of our army under your 
commands, we are graciously pleased to allow 
the delinquents’ estates where you overcome to 
be disposed by you, as also any our revenues 
in the said places, customs or other, our profits, 
woods, and the like with the contributions.
Whatever towns or places of importance you shall 
think fit to possess, you shall place commanders 
and governors therein at your pleasure.
Whatever order we shall send you (which you are 
only to obey) we give you leave to impart the same 
to your council at war, and if they and you approve 
not thereof, we give you leave to reply; and so far 
shall we be from taking it as a disobedience, that 
we command the same. At your return we will accept 
of some officers upon your recommendation, to the 
end no obstacle or delay may be in the execution of 
your desires in order to our service, and our 
commands in that behalf.
At your return you shall have the command of 
South Wales, Herefordshire, and Gloucestshire of 
the Welsh side returned to you as in ample manner 
as before.
In your absence we will not give credit or 
countenance to anything which may be prejudical 
to your father, you, or yours.
C.R.
Only the two first clauses, 'here quoted, can have any
bearing on the peace negotiations, the remainder being
concerned with purely military matters, which, yet,
singularly confirms the genuineness of the commission
of April 1st, 1644. Gardiner points out that in the
first of these clauses there ’’is no one word authorising
2
Glamorgan to treat independently of Ormond’’. This 
claim seems too categorical. ’’And yet the Lord Marquis 
not willing to be seen therein’’, certainly appears to
1. Lircks, p.72.
m,
2. E.H.R.^p.697.
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suggest that Glamorgan was to perform only those tasks 
which Ormond’s position would not allow him to undertake 
himself. But it can mean something quite different if 
Gardiner’s total theory is not accepted. This sentence 
may well refer not to the future but to Ormond’s known 
disposition to oppose those concessions which were 
preventing a settlement with the Confederates. In which 
case the phrase simply means that if the Confederates 
should demand concessions which Glamorgan knows to be 
unacceptable to Ormond, he is to act without reference 
to Ormond.
Strikingly significant, however, is the second of
these clauses, which Gardiner omits to quote:
’’If for the encouragement of the Lord Marquis 
of Ormond you see it needful to have the Garter 
sent him, or any further favour demonstrated 
from us unto him, we will cause the same to be 
performed. ’’
Glamorgan, who has been described in the postscript of 
a letter to Ormond as having a dubious judgment, is 
nevertheless to decide whether Ormond needs ’’encouraging’’ 
or not, and if so, to recommend that he be given the 
garter or some other favour. It is strange that he who 
is to act under the tutelage of Ormond, is to decide 
whether or not his tutor is in need of encouragement, 
and suggest what treatment his tutor needs. Gardiner 
also suggests that this commission is Charles’ ’’mode" 
(sic) of answering Ormond’s request through Barry to be
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superseded. Surely this was an odd "mode" for a King 
to adopt towards his Lord Lieutenant - to respond to a 
letter of resignation by issuing instructions to a gentleman 
who, according to Gardiner, may or may not travel to 
Ireland for several months and who is never asked to 
present those instructions to Ormond. The obvious, 
normal and business-like procedure was to write through 
one of his secretaries of State to the Lord Deputy 
explaining why his resignation could not be accepted, 
and stating that he would, however, receive assistance^ 
Gardiner's suggestion seems even more unsound when 
it is considered in the light of the letter to Ormond; 
so far from sending Glamorgan to Ireland to assist,
Charles specifically states, "My Lord Herbert having 
business of his own in Ireland (wherein I desire you 
to do him all lawful favour and furtherance)". In 
other words Ormond is to assist Glamorgan. And if this 
point were not conclusive, how inappropriate it would 
have been to answer Ormond's heartfelt plea for release 
from a painful office by sending him an assistant for 
whose judgment it was impossible to answer. Whatever
1. Gardiner suggests that as soon as Charles discovered 
that Ormond would not insist on resigning, whether he 
were sent an assistant or not, he saw no further necessity 
for employing Glamorgan. This seems an unwarranted 
supposition, for as a loyal subject, Ormond would have 
felt compelled to remain in office until Charles released 
him. In any case Charles could have ordered him to remain.
2. This extract is also omitted by Gardiner.
317.
the true extent of the powers contained in this
commission, it is impossible to see how they were intended
to assist Ormond. The conclusion seems inescapable that
they were intended to be secret powers.
Glamorgan was given a further commission on January
6th, 1645,^of which we have only a Latin translation and
2
which was concerned with the levying of troops. His 
next commission, dated January 12th, was more important; 
"Charles R.
Wheras we have had sufficient and ample testimony 
of your approved wisdom and fidelity, so great is 
the confidence we repose in you, so that whatsoever 
you shall perform, as warranted under our sign 
manual, pocket signet, or private mark, or even by 
word of mouth, without further ceremony, we do on 
the word of a King and a Christian promise to make 
good to all intents and purposes, as effectually as 
if your authority from us had been under the Great 
Seal of England, with this advantage, that we shall 
esteem ourself more obliged to you for your gallantry, 
in not standing upon such nice terms to do us service, 
which we shall, God willing, reward. Aid although 
you exceed what law can warrant, or any powers of 
ours reach unto, as not knowing what you have need 
of; yet it being for our service, we oblige ourself, 
not only to give you our pardon, but to maintain 
the same with all our might ; and though either by 
accident, or by any other occasion, you shall deem 
it necessary to deposit any of our warrant, and so 
want them at your return, we faithfully promise to 
make them good at your return; and to supply anything 
wherein they shall be found defective, it not being
1. Com. Rin., 1, pp.545-7. The Marquis of Worcester was 
given a patent for the dukedom of Somerset on the same day. 
If genuine (?), it may have been Glamorgan’s reward for
the services he was about to render. Lircks, p.104.
2. On January 5th, Glamorgan was given a warrant in which 
he was designated Lord Herbert (sic) granting him lands 
to the value of £40,000. Signet office, Locquet Book, 
1663-4, F.d. 293.
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convenient for us at this time to dispute upon 
them; for what we have here set down you may rest 
confident, if there is faith and trust in man.
Proceed, therefore, cheerfully, speedily, and boldly; 
and for you so doing this shall be your sufficient 
warrant.
Given at our Court of Oxford under our sign manual 
and private signet, this 12th January, 1644."1
Glamorgan did not produce this commission as his authority
to the Confederates, presumably because it was superseded
2
by that of March 12th; he did, however, show it to Ormond 
later during his confinement as additional proof of his 
credentials. Gardiner again points out that there is no 
mention of the Irish peace. This omission can prove 
either, as he suggests, that Glamorgan was to negotiate 
for money, loans and troops from the Pope and foreign 
princes, or that it was taken for granted that Glamorgan 
was to give the Irish private assurances and therefore 
was not explicitly stated. It is in any case, just as 
much a pointer to an Irish peace as to a European 
negotiation that Charles fails to specify either the one 
or the other.
The powers contained herein are wide ; indeed could 
scarcely be more so. It is difficult to believe that 
Charles could have run.theirisk of^giving such extensive 
powers to a man of doubtful judgment, even if he did intend
1. Lircks, pp.79-80; Lingard had a MS. copy of this 
commission in his possession, VII, app., p.625; Com. Rin., 
pp.547-8.
2. See below p. 45^
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them to be interpreted in the light of other instructions,
of which we have no record, making them dependent on the
will of Ormond. A King of 'tryventy years' experience,
engaged in a desperate civil war, in which to take one
false step in the direction of Rome could be fatal, might
surely be expected, as the least precaution, to limit,
if not to specify the powers of his envoys. If Glamorgan
was to assist Ormond, why not say so simply and explicitly?
If Glamorgan's commissions bestowed no extraordinary powers,
as Charles' apologists claim, why were they kept secret
from the King's most intimate advisers? Whj not, in short,
as a mere precaution of business routine, add a rider to
at least one of them, saying in so many words "subject to
the consent of the Marquess of Ormond", or some similar 
' 1
qualification? The only reasonable rejoinder to these
questions seems to be that Charles granted Glamorgan wide
powers knowingly, willingly and without provisos.
A further point about this commission of January 12th.
Gardiner quotes a statement in a letter from Glamorgan to
Clarendon in 1660:
"The maintenance of this army of foreigners was 
to have come from the Pope and such Catholic 
princes as he should draw into it, having engaged 
to afford and procure 30,0001. a month: out of 
which the foreign army was first to be provided 
for; and the remainder to be divided among other 
armies. And my instructions for this purpose
1. Of. the instructions given to Lnni el.r^  ' Neil 3 which 
carefully prescribed what he might do; see below p.Gob.
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and my powers to treat and conclude thereupon, 
were signed by the King under his pocket signet, 
with blanks for me to put in the names of the 
pope or princes, to the end the king might have a 
starting hole to deny the having given me such 
commissions, if excepted against by his own 
subjects; leaving me as it were at stake, who for 
his majesty's sake was willing to undergo it, 
trusting to his word alone."1
Gardiner uses this to buttress his contention that the 
commission did not refer to the Irish Treaty. Of this 
there is no proof at all, and in any case it is much more 
probable that Glamorgan was referring to his very first 
commission, that of April 1st, especially as he is con­
cerned to justify his claim to the dukedom of Somerset 
which had been promised in expectation of the services 
he was to perform under the terms of that particular 
commission, not under that of January 12th, issued eight 
months later.
Given that the commission of January 2nd was concerned 
with raising troops, what was the purpose of this one?
If Glamorgan were to persuade the Confederates to agree 
to terms with Ormond, then it may be assumed that this 
was his authority to confer honours and to give private 
assurances on the King's behalf as a means of doing so.
Several weeks elapsed, during which Glamorgan 
remained in England, presumably still arranging supplies 
and transport, until on February 12th Charles sent him
1. E.HAR., p.698.
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several despatches for Ireland, chiding him to make 
haste and sending him the "Blue Ribbon, and a warrant 
for the title of Duke of Somerset, both which accept 
and make use of at your discretion".^ Charles* injunction 
to him to make haste dispels the notion that Glamorgan 
was going to Ireland primarily to settle his private 
affairs. VHiy Charles should have sent the letter of 
December 2?th to Ormond implying that Glamorgan was 
going to Ireland on personal business and might incidentally 
assist him and yet afterwards should have shown in this 
letter and in another written a month later that Glamorgan 
was going primarily on the King's business and only 
incidentally, if at all, on his own, is a question that 
Gardiner and the King's supporters have to answer. Will 
they say that Charles had conveyed an impression that he 
did not intend to convey - a most improbable explanation, 
or will they face the implication that Charles deliberately 
gave Ormond the wrong impression, in order to keep him in 
the dark about the real purpose of Glamorgan's visit?
On March 12th Glamorgan received what was to be his 
most important commission, the one used later as the
1. Dircks, pp.74-75.
2. See below p. 33.1.
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authority for his Treaty with the Confederates^ which
Digby was to produce as evidence of his treason:
"Charles.*. .to. . . Glamorgan Greeting.
V/e reposing great and special trust and 
confidence of your approved wisdom and fidelity, 
do by these (as firmly as under our great seal, 
to all intents and purposes) authorise and give 
you power, to treat and conclude with the 
confederate Roman Catholics in our Kingdom of 
Ireland, if upon necessity any be to be 
condescended unto, wherin our Lieutenant cannot 
so well be seen in, as not fit for us at present 
publicly to own. Therefore we charge you to 
proceed according our warrant, vd.th all possible 
secrecy; and for whatsoever you shall engage 
yourself, upon such valuable considerations as 
you ih your judgment shall deem fit, we promise 
on the word of a King and a Christian to ratify 
and perform the same, that shall be granted by 
you, and under your seal and hand; the said 
confederates and Catholics having by their 
supplies testified their zeal to our service.
And this shall be in each particularly to your 
sufficient warrant.
Given at our Court at Oxford, under our signet 
and royal signature, the 12th of March in the 
twentieth year of our reign. 1644."2
1. For a long time great confusion arose because of the 
difficulty of confirming this point. As J.H. Round 
pointed out: "It is here that Mr. Gardiner has rendered 
as inestimable service to the student by narrowing the 
controversy to certain points and clearing the ground of 
others. On the one hand, he has shovm that, of all the 
warrants and commissions granted to Glamorgan, only that of 
March 12 1645 was really cited by him as the power for his 
famous treaty..." Peerage and Family History, p.401;
cf. also: "... the said Earl of Glamorgan shewed us under
the private signet a faire and large commission he had 
from the King, authorizing him to conclude a peace with 
us and to graunt us such favourable conditions for religion 
as Ormond the King’s Lieutenant (who also had a commission 
under the great seale) could not publickly graunt, or be 
seen in". Bp.French, op.cit., p.38; cf. also Plunket- 
Dunne MS., Carte's Abstract, p.783: "The Earl of Glamorgan
came unluckily at this time with a letter of trust, granted 
(as some will have it) at the Q's persuasions."
2. Dircks, p.80. Lingard had the original warrant in 
his own possession, VII, app., p.627.
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Considered v/ithout regard for its authenticity and 
without reference to any other documents, this commission 
has only one meaning - it is, as Glamorgan claimed it to be, 
a valid authority to treat for peace. It3 terms are 
vague; the pov/ers it conveys are unlimited. Whatever 
Charles may be said to have intended it to mean, the 
proof of what in effect it conveyed even to shrewd and 
suspicious men lies in the fact that later the Supreme 
Council readily accepted it and never doubted its force.
To say the least Charles was extremely stupid to phrase 
a commission in this way if he intended it to have a 
limited meaning^
It is Gardiner again, however, who seizes on one 
phrase in this document to show that it can have an 
interpretation totally different from that just given.
He takes the words, "wherein our Lord Lieutenant cannot 
so well be seen in", to be another point in favour of his 
theory; for if these words are to be regarded as the key 
to the interpretation of the whole commission, then
2
Glamorgan was to do nothing without Ormond's approval.
But these words support Gardiner only if they are considered
1. J.H. Hound believes that this patent did authorise 
Glamorgan to treat independently of Ormond for the simple 
reason that it was forged for the very purpose I Bince, 
however, his close argument depends on a minute examination 
of documents that bear dates later than March 12th, it 
would be needlessly complicating to discuss it here.
It is therefore intended to postpone discussion until 
all the relevant evidence has been assembled,
2. E.H.R., pp.698-9.
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in isolation. In context, they can be taken to mean 
that if Ormond could not bring himself to conclude a 
treaty, then Glamorgan was to do so.
In any case, if the commission were genuine, and 
this Gardiner does not question, what was the point of 
issuing it if it did not bestow extraordinary powers not 
already provided for in previous commissions?* The 
commission of January 12, for instance bestowed maximum 
powers short of making peace. why duplicate it?
Surely, between January 12 and March 12, Charles must 
have decided to instruct Glamorgan to go further than 
giving mere private assurances and to arrange a treaty 
on his own initiative. In other words, this commission 
was either what Glamorgan claimed it to be or it was a 
forgery I =
Accompanying the commission of March 12 was a letter 
of the same date, which seems to be formidable evidence 
in favour of Gardiner's theory and which, inexplicably, 
Gardiner does not quote, although Re does refer to it in 
his h i s t o r y T h e  letter is printed in full:
"Herbert,
I wonder, you are not yet gone for Ireland, 
but since you have stayed all this time, I 
hope these will overtake you, whereby you will 
the more see the great trust and confidence I 
repose in your integrity, of which I have had 
so long and so good experience; commending you 
to deal with all ingenuity and freedom with our
1.Round also expressed surprise at this omission, op.cit., 
p.405.
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Lieutenant of Ireland the Marquis of Ormond, 
and on the word of a King and a Christian I will 
make good anything, which our Lieutenant shall 
be induced unto upon your persuasions; and if youn 
find it fitting, you may privately show him these 
which I intend not as obligatory to him, but to 
myself; and for your encouragement and warrantise, 
in whom I repose my chiefest hopes, not having in all 
my Kingdoms two such subjects; whose endeavours 
joining, I am confident to be soon drawn out of 
the mire, I am now enforced to wallow in; and then 
shall show my thankfulness to you both; and your 
have never failed me, so shall never fail you, 
but in all things show how much I am...
Oxford, the 12th March."2
It does not seem to state that Glamorgan will be Ormond's
assistant in the strictest sense. Rather it implies that
Glamorgan must use all his ingenuity to persuade Ormond
to do something, perhaps offer better terms to the
Confederates than he is apparently willing to do. But
Charles will only make good anything which Glamorgan
persuades Ormond to do, not anything which Glamorgan
himself does, independent of Ormond. Glamorgan is being
given a task which is quite incompatible with the opinion
expressed about him in the famous postscript, but which is
also incompatible with the apparent freedom of action
given in% the above commission. None of the events examined
so far have furnished any cause to show that Glamorgan's
powers were different form what he claimed them to be.
This letter does. It is possible to argue, contrary to
1.Presumably the warrant enclosed. These is no definite 
evidence that Glamorgan ever showed Ormond any of his patents 
before his arrest, but it may be inferred that he had done 
so. See below.p.438.
2.Lircks,pp.7 5-6.
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general belief, that Charles interviewed Glamorgan on or after 
March 12th and gave him wilder powers verbally.^ This would 
be mere speculation. Either the letter has a meaning which 
cannot be detected, or else Glamorgan did later, wittingly 
or otherwise, claim powers to which he was not entitled.
On the other hand, it is strongly in Glamorgan's 
favour that the letter and the commission bear the same 
date. If he forged the commission five months later for 
the benefit of the Supreme Council, why did he choose to 
date it March 12th? That it was mere coincidence seems 
most unlikely; and yet what subtle purpose would be served 
by giving it the date on which he happened to have received 
a letter from the King? There is much to be said for 
accepting the vobvious explanation, namely that the king 
on March 12th sent Glamorgan some despatches which con­
tained both the letter and the commission.
Glamorgan finally set sail for Ireland on March 25th, 
but he was fated not to arrive there for several months.
The details are obscure, but it is at least clear that a
2
storm blew up and his ëiip foundered on the Cumberland coast.
1.There is nothing to show that Charles did not give 
Glamorgan verbal instructions. A certain Edward Bythell 
reported the arrival at Beaumaris at about March 20th 
of great men ferom Oxford with Glamorgan at their head.
Letter Book of Sir William Bereton, 1645, B.M.,Add.MSS., 
11,338-43.
2.Lircks, p.60.
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Previous commentators have not attempted to explain 
what happened to Glamorgan between the date of the shiprf 
wreck and his eventual disembarkation at Lublin, which 
they put wrongly at about the end of July^ This was a 
serious omission because, as Gardiner was quick to realise, 
if Glamorgan really did have a secret and urgent commission 
from Charles, which various historians had alleged, why 
did Charles allow him to squander almost four precious 
months in England?
There are several valid answers, so far unnoticed,
to a question which was intended to be rhetorical. In
the first place, Charles was extremely anxious to speed
Glamorgan on his passage to Ireland, as we know from the
letters of February 12th and March 12th, previously quoted,
and from a letter which he sent to Glamorgan on June 23rd 
2
following, saying he is relieved that Glamorgan has at 
last gone to Ireland. It is fairly certain therefore 
that if Glamorgan indeed delayed it was not for lack of 
urging from his master. Secondly, historians have 
exaggerated the delay which was rather less than three 
months and far short of four months. Apart from Charles'
1. The reason for this is obscure. Presumably an early 
writer guessed it was the end of July and subsequently no 
one saw fit to query the date.
2. The Letters of King Charles I,, ed. Sir Charles Petrie, 
p.154V ‘ '
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letter of J-une 23rd. above quoted, the following extract 
fixes the date of Glamorgan's arrival in Dublin before 
June 50th;
’’And he said that on Monday morning, the 50th 
June, the said Brian, being attached, made 
suite to the Earl of Glamorgan that he would 
be a mediator to the Lord Lieutenant to take 
the matter privately into his hearing.”1
Thirdly, Lord Digby wrote to Ormond on May 21st;
”As for my tord Herbert^hetmade a dangerous^ 
escape; but I hope is now well on his way towa^d^ 
you from Skipton in Yorke^hoM. ”2
Glamorgan was on his wey to Ireland some time before
May 21st. Moreover, he has had an "escape". Can this
refer to his being rescued from the sea or has he had to
evade parliamentary troops on the Lancashire coast?
In either case delay was natural: a man rescued from
the sea might not be fit to travel for some time.
Then between May 21st and June 50th he could have been
searching for a ship. Indeed he may actually have
sailed on or about May 51&t and have already been in
Ireland for some time before June 50th since there is
no jot of evidence to the contrary. In the fourth
place Glamorgan himself never intended to linger in
England. Wlien he first set sail on March 25th, he
not only expected to return before the end of May,
but intended to bring back with him the promised army.
1. The Examination of V/illiam Brent, July 1, 1645, 
T.C.P., XV, p.110.
2. Carte, VI, p.288.
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On March 21st he sent a messenger to the King to
remind him of his commission. The instructions were
subscribed Edward Bosden and entitled "The Earl of
Glamorgan’s instructions to me to be presented to
your Majesty". The first clause was as follows:-
"That God willing, by the end of Ma^ or
beginning of June, he will land with 6,000
Irish."1
A man who intended to come to terms with the wary
Confederates, to raise an army of 10,000 men, and to
transport 6,000 troops to England, all within the span
of two months, would certainly not wish to waste time.
After his shipwreck some serious hitch must have
prevented him from taking another ship at once, unless,
as seems likely, he never delayed at all.
Glamorgan’s arrival could have been no surprise to
Ormond, whose regular English correspondent, Trevor,
had written to him on April 9th from Bristol:
"The Lord Herbert with many of his religious 
great philosophers of faith are gone into 
Ireland...religion being his design: but 
1 am very doubtful, he hath none to the M. 
of Ormonde, nor others that eat often with 
the M. of Ormonde”.
Then,Trevor would appear to gainsay his opening remarks:
"Yet I believe good use may be made of Lord 
Herbert, as the Marquis of Ormond may trust 
him. He certainly loves the King as much as 
any man of religion now do, and will not think 
himself ill entertained to have the opportunity 
given him of making the inventory of his doing 
for the King."
1. See above p.<?'5
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Obviously it was known that Glamorgan had some sort of
commission from the King:
"I hear much of /Lord Herbert’s/ commission.
As I hear it, /the Marquis of Ormonde/ is not 
taken notice of in it. If it be so, beseech 
you get me a copy of it /Daniel 0 ’Heil]/ told me, 
he was to pass into /Ireland/ upon very important 
affairs; but that resolution is now over. I 
cannot imagine what this matter of weight should 
be, unless it was to have a share in that commission; 
tq_which I am induc’d, because that Piddling fellow 1 
/erf his name/ was, and went into/lreland v/ith Lord 
Herber/7 and the fest of the philosophers of faith."2
Apart from the very suggestive remark ’As I hear it,
/the Marquis of Ormonde/ is not taken notice of in it’,
the reference to Daniel O ’Heill is significant, for that
lively adventurer was to play an active, though mysterious,
3
part in Glamorgan’s mission. According to Pather Cregan,
Charles was so confident that he would have Irish troops
in the immediate future that he issued lengthy instructions
to Daniel to go to Cornwall in order to procure the
necessa;ry shipst
Ormond’s own reaction to the news of Glamorgan’s
mission may be divined from a letter he wrote to Digby:
’’Though I hassle noe full knowledge of whaty(£ord 
Herbert was to bring with him; yet^ by his letter 
to met out of Wales, I guesse his missing this 
place was a great misfortune to the King’s 
service, even in relation to the credit I found
1. Presumably Sir Bryan O ’Neill.
2 . 3'*rck , .
5. See below pp. 34-3 "M-.
4. Irish Historical Studies, 1941, p.405.
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the Irish weocteapt to gic^ e to his advices and
vndertakings
Unhappily, there is no record of the letter which Ormond 
had received from Glamorgan, atherwis-e-Ahffrr hiT'
we learn is that Ormond did not discourage Glamorgan’s 
visit, in spite of the warning from Trevor, and indeed 
hoped that much good might come of it: that Glamorgan’s
credentials had had the expected effect on the Confederates, 
and that, in some way, the Irish knew of Glamorgan’s 
impending visit, either because Glamorgan had written to 
his friends telling them to expect him, or because Charles 
had told them the previous year at Oxford that Glamorgan 
would be coming as soon as he could. Finally, it is 
apparent that Ormond and Glamorgan started off on good 
terms, an important point to note in connection with 
their future relationship.
It is not easy to piece together a coherent account 
of Glamorgan’s career in Ireland. , The difficulty springs 
mainly from the absence of any regular correspondence with 
England, although, as an affectionate husband, he must 
have written frequently to his wife who did not leave 
Wales until the summer of 1646 when Eeglan Castle was 
almost the last royalist strongpoint to surrender to the 
Parliamentarians. In any case, it was inevitable that
,yYVÂY If,
1.^Carte, VI, pp.^84-5.
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his letters should exclude any reference to the secret
work upon which he was supposed to be engaged. With
regard to this point, there is some significance in the
letters which he sent to Ormond, for they were written
in the conspiratorial style of melodrama and were so
vague and mysterious as to elude exact interpretation.
He appears to have remained in Dublin until August
6th, on which day he set out for his first residence at
Kilkenny in company with the peace commissioners.
Initially, he must have conferred with Ormond about his
mission, though what he alleged its purpose to be can
only be deduced from their subsequent correspondence.
One thing only is certain: he was to assist Ormond in
his negotiations with the Confederates and in this capacity
took part in the final stages of the session that ended
inconclusively on August 6th.
Arrived at Kilkenny he reported to Ormond the presence
of syiaptoms against peace.^ In spite of this, within
three weeks, he had negotiated and concluded his own
treaty. The ground may have been prepared in clandestine
meetings with the Commissioners in Dublin, since Rinuccini
was to record that the terms of the Treaty had already been
2
discussed there. This would certainly account for the
1. T.C.P., XV, p.280; Gilbert, V, p.66.
2. Embassy, p.72.
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speed with which he was able to act. Those who 
question Glamorgan’s honesty are forced to date his 
negotiations from his arrival at Kilkenny and to argue 
in the following way. Seeing that peace could never 
be obtained on the basis of Ormond’s proposals, Glamorgan 
decided to interpret his limited instructions as giving 
him carte blanche and excused his disobedience by reflecting 
on the urgency of the case and assuming that the success 
of his scheme would disarm criticism. Against this 
argument, it is curious that he had ingratiated himself 
with the Confederate Commissioners to a remarkable extent 
before leaving Dublin. Two pieces of evidence may be 
adduced to suostantiate this view.
The first has hitherto been neglected. On July 26th 
Glamorgan informed the Mayor of Waterford that Lord 
Muskerry and the other Commissioners had asked the 
Supreme Council,
'^for twenty barrels of powder to be forthwith 
delivered at Waterford or Wexford for his 
Majesty’s service to such person as I shall 
appoint to receive the same-^ ^
He (Glamorgan) had appointed the Mayor of Waterford who
was to have the powder conveyed in carts to Dublin.^
The question arises whether the Commissioners would
have issued such an order had they not expected Glamorgan
1. N.L.I., Ormonde MSS., May 16, l645-Nov.l, 1645, f .145.
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to offer some sort of exchange on the King's behalf.
The answer must be in the negative because it was for 
this very reason that they had rejected so many previous 
requests for supplies from the King himself, from Ormond 
and from Prince Rupert.
In the second place, the Confederate Commissioners 
themselves requested Ormond to 'act in concert' with 
Glamorgan at some time before their departure from 
Dublin^ Not too much need be read into this evidence.
It is, however, valuable in that it weakens two of the 
arguments of Glamorgan's critics: that his mission was
not particularly urgent; that he began discussions with 
the Confederates only after he had witnessed the adjourn­
ment of the Dublin negotiations. At the same time, it 
is another small indication that Glamorgan was empowered 
to satisfy the Confederacy's conditions from the beginning 
Ormond evidently agreed to collaborate with Glamorgan 
since he sent a letter after Muskerry in these terms:
"My Lord,
Though I am persuaded, that the points, which 
you and the other Deputies have agreed to in the 
presence of my Lord Glamorgan and myself are still 
fresh in your memory:... and observing that in our 
meeting on this affair you expressed a desire that 
I should act in concert with my Lord Glamorgan:
I think it necessary, that I should remind, and 
in this way acquaint your Lordship with that, which 
I could not insist on in his Lordship's presence, 
without offending his modesty and incurring the 
imputation of flattery. What I have to say in 
short is this, that I know no subject in England,
1. Ormond to Muskerry, Aug.7, 1645, Gilbert, V, p.59.
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upon whose favour and authority with his Majesty, 
and real innate ability you can better rely, 
than upon his Lordship’s: nor (if that has any 
weight with you) any person whom I would more endeavour 
to serve in those things which he shall undertake for 
the service of his Majesty, or with whom I shall 
sooner agree for the benefit of this kingdom,"1
As Ormond was not given to being demonstrative,
this was a remarkable testimonial of Glamorgan’s
character and abilities. So it appeared to the Supreme
Council which presumed that he had promised Glamorgan 
2
his support. What inspired Ormond to use such glowing
expressions? He had two possible motives. First, he
believed that Glamorgan might well influence the Con­
federates to accept his latest terms. Secondly, 
suspecting that Glamorgan carried secret instructions 
to arrange an agreement with the Confederacy he was 
anxious not to stand in his^way.
Not to stand in his way, however, was not to believe 
that his secret powers were of any use. Like all the 
King’s proteges Glamorgan would find the facts of the 
situation at Kilkenny more unpalatable than he had 
bargained for. But while he was making this discovery 
his undoubted prestige with the Confederacy could be used 
to facilitate the sort of settlement that was practicable 
and to obtain men and materials. His letters to Dublin
1. Ibid.^
2. This letter was shown subsequently to Rinuccini as 
evidence of Ormond’s approval of Glamorgan’s concessions ; 
Com. Rin., 1, pp.549-50.
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and Ormond’s to Kilkenny, certainly show that he was 
occupied with these two tasks whatever else he was 
concerned with.
On August 7th Oimond reminded Muskerry of a 
promise the Supreme Council had made to restore the 
Earl of Thomond to his estates. The matter was now 
urgent because Thomond could not "give content" to 
Glamorgan unless in receipt of his rents.^ Reference 
to Thomond and his estates not only accounts, incidentally, 
for one of the sources from which Glamorgan was always 
optimistic he would obtain the necessary capital for his 
expedition but associates Ormond with this particular 
plan. Again, within a fortnight of Glamorgan’s 
departure for Kilkenny, Ormond asked for details of 
the Confederates’ military .sources. Glamorgan’s letters, 
in so far as the fog enveloping them can be pierced, 
were also preoccupied with plans for raising troops and 
the state of opinion at Kilkenny with regard to Ormond’s 
peace terms.
A cardinal point in connection with the events 
immediately preceding the Treaty that has not attracted 
any attention was the part played by the Marquis of 
Clanrickard. As on a previous occasion Clanrickard
1. T.C.P., X*., p.569; Gilbert, V, p.59.
2. Ibid., pp.55-6; T.C.R., XV, p.297.
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accompanied the Commissioners hack to Kilkenny so as to
hold a watching brief for Ormond^ Shortly after arriving
he ended his lirst report with this cryptic note,
"If my Lord Glamorgan have imparted his intentions 
and désignés unto your Lordship, I humbly desire 
to receive your Lordship’s commands, how far, in 
what manner I am to comply with him, or second 
his propositions at Kilkenny."2
Evidently between leaving Lublin, probably on August 6th,
and the date of this report, August 9th, he had become
aware of certain proposals Glamorgan was about to make
or was already making to the Supreme Council. Of Ormond’s
reply to his request for instructions there is unfortunately
no record. But useful inferences may be drawn from an
examination of Clanrickard’s position during this crucial
month of August, the whole of which he spent in Kilkenny.
First of all, it would be astonishing if he had no
inkling of what Glamorgan’s conversations with the Supreme
Council were about. Kilkenny was not a large place, he
was on more or less close terms with all the principals,
above all he was supposed to participate in whatever
discussions went on. Besides, according to Glamorgan’s
account, some of the deliberations involved a nuBiber of
people. How could Clanrickard have failed to guess
there was something in the wind? Did Glamorgan tell
1. See below pp. 7-3",
2. Gilbert, V, p.54; T.C.P., XV, p.258.
5. The next letter in the Carte Papers from Ormonde to 
Clanricard was dated August 18th and contained no reference
to Glamorgan’s plans, nor does any letter appear in 
Clanrickard’8 own collection.
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him from time to time that his presence was not called 
for? Common sense indicates that Clanrickard not only 
knew what Glamorgan was up to, but, at least, turned a 
blind eye to it. Clanrickard had already informed Ormond 
two months before this how he had come to sympathise v/ith 
the Confederates’ reluctance to surrender the churches 
in their possession and how unrealistic it was to ask 
them to do so^ May he not have come also to consider 
Ormond’s attitude to be so intransigeant as to destroy 
any prospect of compromise on this and the other out­
standing points in dispute?
Here it is not necessary to rely on speculation 
alone, for at about this time Clanrickard had been forced 
to do some hard thinking about Ormond’s whole approach 
to the negotiations. The need arose through the 
circulation at Kilkenny of a letter, printed by the 
English Parliament, which was supposed to have been sent 
by the King to Ormond. This letter empowered him to
2
promise the repeal of the penal laws to the Confederates. 
At Kilkenny, Clanrickard had to report, it had excited 
the suspicion that Ormond was deliberately neglecting to 
carry out the King’s instructions, since they had never 
heard of this concession. For whatever motive Ormond’s
1. See above p . ^
2. From internal evidence it is clear that the letter in 
question was sent by the King - the letter of Feb.2^ 1645, 
see above p 40.^14-7^ -though Ormond saw fit to cast doubt on 
i1s authenticity.
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comments on this letter, which was in fact an authentic
copy, and on the speculation it had evoked, were so
markedly shifty that Clanrickard could not have failed to
take note and draw his ovm conclusions^ Did he then wink
at or actively support Glamorgan’s negotiations? \Vhen
Glamorgan w a s  subsequently charged with high treason f o r
arranging the Treaty and i m p r i s o n e d ,  Clanrickard put up
2
£10,000 bail for his release. That m a y  point to the ansv/er.
Glamorgan could have wasted no time at Kilkenny for it 
was a remarkable achievement to dispel the suspicions and 
satisfy the doubts of men who were by now seasoned negotiators 
- . j i n  under three weeks. His efforts were assisted by 
the belief of the Peace Party, the Ormondists as they have 
c o m e  to be called, that he was secretly backed by Ormond 
himself - but his personal influence and the authority of 
his credentials must have been decisive. Glamorgan must 
have presented himself convincingly as a prominent English 
Catholic and confidant of the King who had c o m e  to offer them 
concessions strictly confined to religion. No doubt he 
pointed out the King’s difficulties, surrounded as he was 
by e n e m i e s  of the Catholic Church and having to correspond 
with the Confederacy through the Protestant Council in Dublin.
1 .  C l a n r i c k a r d ’ s  o w n  r e p o r t  c a n n o t  b e  t r a c e d .  T h e  f o r e g o i n g  
a c c o u n t s  o f  t h e  e p i s o d e  h a s  b e e n  r e c o n s t r u c t e d  f r o m  O r m o n d ’ s  
r e p l y .  O r m o n d  t o  C l a n r i c k a r d ,  A u g . 2 5 ,  C a r t e ,  V I ,  p p . 5 1 4 - 5 .
2. Jan 20, 1646, Gilbert, V, p.251.
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It would seem also that he informed them of the King’s
intention to appoint him, Glamorgan, as Ormond’s successor
as Lord Lieutenant^
Of what took place before the treaty was agreed, there
2
are only a few slender records. Still, it is possible to 
establish three points. First, the Assembly only agreed 
to enter into negotiations v/ith^Ji'^^J^^Sfter they had 
finished considering Ormond’s latest propositions on
3
August 14th. Secondly, although Glamorgan held discussions 
with some members of the Committee of Instructions as well 
as other interested persons at Kilkenny, he was concerned to 
insist that only the Peace Commissioners were fully engaged 
in the negotiations. And, thirdly, Scarampi, the Pope’s 
agent, hotly opposed the treaty not because he doubted
1. See below pp. 3^- Go
2. The following comment which occurred in the Plunket-Dunne 
MS, p.292, cannot be taken as serious evidence. It was 
prejudiced and based on hindsight:
’’The E. of Glamorgan finding himself caressed by the 
Irish nobility and gentry, called several of them 
cousins though not related, and proceeded to grant 
the Irish conditions downright contrary to Lord Digby’s 
letter; tho ’ his instructions were to do nothing 
material without the advice of Ormond - but out of 
vanity to render himself great on both sides, agrees 
with the Irish to send forces immediately to the King, 
and grants them all the churched they were possessed of."
5. Com. Rin., I, p.551.
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Glamorgan but because it afforded insufficient security
1
for the Church. He urged that it would be more seemly 
to av/ait the arrival of the Pope’s official nuncio, then 
daily expected, and complained that what they were con­
templating was the dissolution of the Confederacy at the 
very moment when the Pope was about to give it formal 
recognition?
According to Glamorgan, the Treaty was drawn up by
3
Geoffrey Barron and concluded on August 25th. Its 
preamble implied strongly that the Confederates recognised 
the futility of the public negotiations with Ormond and
its terms were as follows :-
1. Complete tolerance for all Catholics.
2. All the Churches acquired since October, 1641 
to remain in Conf^ederate hands.
3. All Catholics to be exempt from the jurisdiction 
of the Protestant Clergy. No interference with 
the Catholic Clergy for exercising jurisdiction 
over their flocks.
4. The terms of the Treaty to be ratified by act of 
Parliament.
5. No one, including Ormond, to be allowed to transgress 
these articles.
1. See below p. 4-iO.
2. Com, Rin., I, pp.551-4.
3. The authors of the Commentarius recorded that the treaty 
was arranged partly on August 25th and partly on September 
27th, Com. Rin., I, p.556.
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6. The King's word that the concessions would be 
honoured.
7. The provision of 10,000 men under the command of 
Glamorgan for the King's service anywhere in 
England, Scotland and V/ales.l
The two sides agreed to keep the Treaty secret pending
the despatch of the expedition to England. This was a
necessary precaution since it was manifestly unacceptable
to Ormond,.the Council in Dublin, and Protestant Royalists
generally. It was not, however, a precaution sensibly
observed. Glamorgan alone signed the document on his side.
His brother. Lord John Somerset, witnessed but did not read 
2
it. On the Confederate side it was signed by the eight 
Peace Commissioners who evidently considered themselves 
constitutionally authorised to treat with any representative 
of the King apart from Ormond. Others, however, were also 
involved; the Supreme Council and the Committee of Instructions 
were bound to have known of it, even though Glamorgan later 
saw fit to insist that he had only had dealings with the
5
Commissioners. In addition, copies were printed and 
distributed among the leading ecclesiastics, among whom was 
Maiachy O'Queely, Archbishop of Tuam. With so many in the
1. T.C.D., 3.11. ff.136-8. This is 04e of the original 
copies; see also Gilbert, V, pp.66-75.
2. The examination of Glamorgan, Dec.29, 1645, T.C.P., XV, 
pp.222-31; Gilbert, V, pp.216-22.
3. Ibid.
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secret, there was likely to be a leakage before the 10,000
troops could be got ready, a possibility that could not
have escaped the notice of some of the negotiators.
There were several mysteries connected with the
maintenance of secrecy. The Earl of Castlehaven,
according to his own statement a member of the Supreme
Council, was to disclaim any knowledge of the Treaty until
its existence was divulged by Digby? Even assuming his
absence from Kilkenny about the end of August it is hard
to credit his plea of ignorance. Either he was lying or
business was very badly conducted by the Supreme Council.
Certainly his description of the Treaty as being arranged
by the Nuncio's party pays little tribute to his honesty,
since the Nuncio had yet to arrive in Ireland and Scarampi
had passionately denounced it.'
Then there is the case of Colonel Barry and Daniel
O'Neill. Like Clanrickard they, too, were in Kilkenny
2
throughout most of August as watchdogs for Ormond. Were 
they unaware of what was going on under their noses?
It seems improbable. Given that Barry lacked perception, 
for v/hich there is no evidence, it is scarcely credible that 
the inquisitive and ubiquitous O'Neill went in ignorance.
1. Memoirs, pp.79-80.
2. Barry left Kilkenny on August 29th, O'Neill probably 
left earlier.
344.
e s p e c i a l l y  a s  h e  w a s  i n  G l a m o r g a n ' s  c o n f i d e n c e  a n d  a  
f r e q u e n t  m e s s e n g e r  b e t w e e n  G l a m o r g a n  a n d  O r m o n d .  A n d  
d i d  n e i t h e r  B a r r y  n o r  O ' N e i l  t e l l  t h e i r  f r i e n d  a n d  
p a t r o n  w h a t  t h e y  k n e w  o r  s u s p e c t e d  ?  A g a i n ,  i t  w o u l d  
s e e m  u n l i k e l y .
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  c o n t e m p o r a r y  n e w s  i t e m s  s p o n s o r e d  b y  
t h e  E n g l i s h  P a r l i a m e n t  w e r e  c u r i o u s l y  a c c u r a t e .  B e t w e e n  
S e p t e m b e r  2 n d  a n d  S e p t e m b e r  9 t h  s e v e r a l  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  
G l a m o r g a n  a p p e a r e d ,  s t a t i n g  t h a t  h e  a n d  B y r o n  h a d  g o n e  
t o  I r e l a n d ,  t h a t  p e a c e  h a d  b e e n  m a d e  a n d  t h a t  1 0 , 0 0 0  
t r o o p s  w e r e  b e i n g  f i t t e d  o u t  f o r  E n g l a n d ,  o f  w h i c h  6 , 0 0 0  
w e r e  m u r d e r e d  a l r e a d y . ^
F r o m  t h e  C o n f e d e r a c y ' s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  t h e  T r e a t y  
c o u l d  s c a r c e l y  h a v e  b e e n  m o r e  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  I n  i t s e l f  
t h i s  i s  a  s u s p i c i o u s  f a c t  a s  G a r d i n e r  w a s  q u i c k  t o  s p y .  
I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  h e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  t h e  m a i n  c o n c e s s i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  c h u r c h e s  a n d  t h e  c u r t a i l m e n t  o f  t h e  j u r i s ­
d i c t i o n  o f  t h e  P r o t e s t a n t  C l e r g y  h a d  n o t  u p  t o  t h i s  t i m e  
e v e n  b e e n  b r o u g h t  t o  t h e  K i n g ' s  n o t i c e .  I n d e e d ,  t h e
^  T h e  W e e k l v  A c c o u n t , S e p t .  3  t o  S e p t .  1 0 ;  T h e  M o d e r a t e  
I n t e l l i g e n c e , N o .  2 8 ;  T h e  P a r l i a m e n t  P o s t ; c i r c a  S e p t .  
8 :  " B y  l e t t e r s  f r o m  I r e l a n d  t h i s  p r e s e n t  M o n d a y ,
S e p t e m b e r  8 ,  i t  w a s  a l s o  c e r t i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  K i n g  h a d  
c o n c l u d e d  a  p e a c e  w i t h  I r e l a n d ,  u p o n  w h i c h  i t  i s  a g r e e d  
t h a t  t h e  K i n g  s h a l l  h a v e  a  s u d d e n  s u p p l y  o f  t e n  t h o u s a n d  
h o r s e  a n d  f o o t e  . . . " ;  T h e  K i n g  d o m e s  W e e k l y  I n t e l l i g e n c e , 
B . M .  C o l l .  o f  P a m p h l e t s , 1 6 4 5 •
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K i n g ' s  f i r s t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e m  w a s  n o t  m a d e  u n t i l  J u l y
3 1 s t  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a  l e t t e r  t o  O r m o n d  -  i n c i d e n t a l l y
c o n t a i n i n g  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  o f  a s t o n i s h m e n t  a t  t h e  s c o p e
o f  C o n f e d e r a t e  d e m a n d s . ^  E v e n  t h e n ,  a s  i f  t o  c l i n c h  t h e
m a t t e r ,  t h e  K i n g  o n l y  c o n s e n t e d  t o  t h e  e r e c t i o n  o f
2
c h u r c h e s  w h e r e  C a t h o l i c s  w e r e  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y o  B u t  w h a t  
t h e y  m i g h t  h a v e  o b s e r v e d  f u r t h e r  i s  t h a t  t h e  C o n f e d e r a c y  
h a d  p u b l i c l y  l a i d  c l a i m  t o  t h e  c h u r c h e s  s i n c e  i t s  i n ­
a u g u r a t i o n ,  t h a t  C h a r l e s  m u s t  h a v e  k n o w m  o f  t h i s  a n d  
t h a t ,  i f  a b s o l u t e l y  s e t  u p o n  o b t a i n i n g  t r o o p s ,  h e  h a d  
t o  p r o m i s e  t o  l e t  t h e m  k e e p  t h e m .  H e r e  t h e  m i s s i o n  o f  
C o l o n e l  F i t z w i l l i a m ^  h a s  s o m e  s i g n i f  i c a n c e .  F i t z w i l l i a m  
h a d  a s s u m e d  t h e  t w o  s u s p e c t  c o n c e s s i o n s  w e r e  t o  b e  
g r a n t e d .  K n o w i n g  t h i s ,  H e n r i e t t a  M a r i a  i n  P a r i s  a p p r o v e d  
o f  h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n s . ^  S o  a l s o ,  p r e s u m a b l y ,  d i d  t h e  K i n g  
s i n c e  h e  c h o s e  t o  s e n d  h i m  t o  I r e l a n d .  M o r e  r e m a r k a b l e  
s t i l l ,  G e o r g e  D i g b y  h a d  s o m e h o w  l e d  F i t z w i l l i a m  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n s  h a d  a l r e a d y  b e e n  g r a n t e d .
A s  o n  s o  m a n y  o t h e r  o c c a s i o n s  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h ,  a t  f i r s t
^  S e e  a b o v e  p .  3 . ^ 1  ; C a r t e ,  V I ,  pf>, 3 0 5 * - C > .
^  E . H . R . , p .  6 9 9 ;  C i v i l  W a r , 1 1 1 ,  p .  3 4 .
5  T h e  P a p a l  N u n c i o ,  R i n u c c i n i ,  r e p o r t e d  t o  R o m e  f r o m  
P a r i s  o n  A u g u s t  1 9 t h :  " I  t h i n k  y o u r  E m i n e n c e  w i l l  b e
s u r p r i s e d  t o  h e a r  t h a t  t h e  Q u e e n  o f f e r s  f a r  m o r e  a m p l e  
c o n d i t i o n s  t h a n  t h e  I r i s h  d e m a n d s " j  E m b a s s y , p p .  5 6 - 7 .
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s i g h t ,  a p p e a r s  i n e x p l i c a b l e ,  f a l l s  i n t o  p l a c e  o n c e  i t  
i s  a c c e p t e d  t h a t  C h a r l e s  w a s  a b s o l u t e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  
o b t a i n  a  s e t t l e m e n t  w i t h o u t  t h o u g h t  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  
r e c k o n i n g .
E v e n  i f  i t  b e  d e n i e d  t h a t  C h a r l e s  n e v e r  i n t e n d e d  . 
t o  c o n d o n e  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  t h e  c h u r c h e s ,  i t  s t i l l  
d o e s  n o t  f o l l o w  t h a t  G l a m o r g a n  h a d  n o t  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  
p o v ^ e r s .  I f  t h e r e  w e r e  a n y  p o i n t  a t  a l l  i n  s e n d i n g  
G l a m o r g a n  t o  I r e l a n d ,  i t  w a s  b e c a u s e  h e  m i g h t  p l a c a t e  
t h e  C o n f e d e r a t e s  w h e r e  O r m o n d  h a d  f a i l e d .  T h i s  b e i n g  s o ,  
h i s  t e r m s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  h a d  n e c e s s a r i l y  t o  b e  l o o s e .  B u t  
t o  g i v e  h i m  a n y  l a t i t u d e  w h a t e v e r  w a s  t o  r u n  t h e  r i s k  
t h a t  h e  m i g h t  b e  o v e r - g e n e r o u s ,  t h a t  h i s  e s t i m a t e  o f  
w h a t  w a s  a n d  w a s  n o t  i m p o r t a n t  w o u l d  n o t  c o r r e s p o n d  w i t h  
t h a t  o f  t h e  K i n g .  T h u s ,  G l a m o r g a n  p r e s u m a b l y  s a w  n o t h i n g  
w r o n g  i n  a c c e d i n g  t o  t h e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  t h e  c h u r c h e s .
A f t e r  a l l  h e  w a s  a  s t r o n g  C a t h o l i c ,  a n d  l i k e  C l a n r i c k a r d  
h e  m u s t  h a v e  r e g a r d e d  i t  a s  a  n a t u r a l ,  l e g i t i m a t e  d e m a n d .  
T h e  K i n g  u r g e n t l y  n e e d e d  t r o o p s .  W a s  n o t  t h i s  a  l o g i c a l  
e x c h a n g e  ?  S u r e l y  i t  i s  h e r e  t h e  c a s e  a g a i n  t h a t  m a n y  
o f  G l a m o r g a n ' s  c r i t i c s  h a v e  l o o k e d  a t  t h e  e p i s o d e  f r o m  
t o o  i n g r a i n e d  a n  a n t i - C a t h o l i c  p o i n t  o f  v i e w .  W h a t  t o  
t h e m  a p p e a r e d  s u b s t a n t i a l ,  t h i n k i n g  a s  t h e y  w e r e  i n  t e r m s  
o f  t h e  b i t t e r  h o s t i l i t y  d i r e c t e d  b y  P r o t e s t a n t s  a g a i n s t  
' P a p i s t s ' ,  s e e m e d  o f  m u c h  l e s s  c o n s e q u e n c e  t o  G l a m o r g a n .
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T h e r e  i s  o n e  p o i n t  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  a r r a n g e m e n t  
of t h e  T r e a t y  w h i c h  h a s  n e v e r  b e e n  g i v e n  a n y  a t t e n t i o n  
a n d  y e t  v / h i c h ,  o n  t h e  f a c e  o f  i t ^  i s  f u n d a m e n t a l .  W h y  
d i d  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n e r s  o f  P e a c e  a c c e p t  G l a m o r g a n ' s  p a t e n t  
o f  M a r c h  1 2 t h  w i t h o u t  a p p a r e n t  q u e s t i o n  ?  T h e y  h a d  s p e n t  
o v e r  t w o  y e a r s  i n  n e g o t i a t i o n s  i n  w h i c h  t h e  s m a l l e s t  
d e t a i l  h a d  b e e n  e x a m i n e d  m e t i c u l o u s l y  a n d  y e t  h e r e  t h e y  
w e r e  o n  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  a  s i n g l e  d o c u m e n t  h a s t i l y  a c c e p ­
t i n g  s w e e p i n g  c o n c e s s i o n s  w h i c h  O r m o n d  h a d  r e j e c t e d  o u t  
o f  h a n d  a n d  w h i c h  t h e  K i n g  w a s  s u p p o s e d  t o  b e  p o v / e r l e s s  
t o  o f f e r .  S u r e l y  t h e  d o c u m e n t  m u s t  h a v e  l o o k e d  i r r e ­
p r o a c h a b l e .  M o r e o v e r ,  G l a m o r g a n  m u s t  h a v e  m a d e  a  v e r y  
f a v o u r a b l e  i m p r e s s i o n .  I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  e m p h a s i z e  
t h e s e  t w o  c o n c l u s i o n s  f o r  t h i s  r e a s o n .  T h o s e  h i s t o r i a n s  
w h o  d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  G l a m o r g a n  w a s  a u t h o r i s e d  t o  m a k e  t h e  
T r e a t y  d e p i c t  h i m  a s  a n  e c c e n t r i c  f e l l o w  g i v e n  t o  c o n ­
c o c t i n g  i m p o s s i b l e  d o c u m e n t s .  H o w  t h e n  d i d  h e  m a n a g e  t o  
d e c e i v e  t h e  P e a c e  C o m m i s s i o n e r s
N o t  t h a t  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n e r s  w e r e  s o  i n c a u t i o u s  a s  
t o  g u a r a n t e e  t h e  1 0 , 0 0 0  t r o o p s  w i t h o u t  f u r t h e r  a d o .  T o
^  I n  g e n e r a l  t h e r e  i s  a  t e n d e n c y  f o r  t h o s e  w r i t e r s  w h o  
d o  n o t  b e l i e v e  G l a m o r g a n  w a s  a u t h o r i s e d  t o  a r r a n g e  a  
t r e a t y  i l l o g i c a l l y  t o  c l a i m  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d  t h a t  h e  w a s  
t o o  u n s t a b l e ,  t o o  s c a t t e r - b r a i n e d ,  a n d ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r ,  
t h a t  t h e r e  w a s  n e e d  o f  " a n  a d r o i t  n e g o t i a t o r  i n  I r e l a n d  
( G a r d i n e r ,  C i v i l  W a r , I I ,  p .  1 7 4 )  t o  s e c o n d  O r m o n d ' s  
e f f o r t s .
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s a f e g u a r d  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  t h e y  h a d  G l a m o r g a n  s w e a r  a n  
o a t h :
" I  E d w a r d  E a r l  o f  G l a m o r g a n  d o  p r o t e s t  a n d  
s w e a r ,  f a i t h f u l l y  t o  a c q u a i n t  t h e  K i n g ' s  
m o s t  e x c e l l e n t  M a j e s t y ,  w i t h  t h e  p r o c e e d i n g s  
o f  t h i s  K i n g d o m  i n  o r d e r  t o  h i s  s e r v i c e ,  
a n d  t o  t h e  e n d e a r m e n t  o f  t h i s  n a t i o n ,  a n d  
p u n c t u a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  w h a t  I  h a v e  ( a s  
a u t h o r i z e d  b y  h i s  N I a j e s t y )  o b l i g e d  n Q r s e ] f  t o  s e e  
p e r f o r m ' a n d ,  i n  a e f a u l t , n o t  t o  p e r m i t  t h e  
a r m y  i n t r u s t e d  t o  m y  c h a r g e  t o  a d v e n t u r e  i t s e T f , 
o r  a n y  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p a r t  t h e r e o f  , u n t i l  c o n d i W o n s  
f r o m  h i s  M a j e s t y ,  a n d  b y  h i s  M a j e s t y ,  b e  p e r f o r m e d ,
G l a m o r g a n " ^
M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  a r t i c l e s  a g r e e d  w i t h  G l a m o r g a n  w e r e  
n o t  t o  b e  b i n d i n g  u n l e s s  a g r e e m e n t  w a s  r e a c h e d  w i t h
p
O r m o n d  o v e r  o t h e r  t h a n  r e l i g i o u s  m a t t e r s .
A s  a  f u r t h e r  s a f e g u a r d ,  t h r e e  d a y s  l a t e r  o n  A u g u s t  
2 8 t h ,  t h e y  p u b l i s h e d  t h e  f o l l o ? / i n g  o r d e r ,  p r o b a b l y  t o  
m o l l i f y  t h e  s u s p i c i o u s  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b y :
" T h e  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  o r d e r  a n d  d e c l a r e ,  t h a t  
t h e i r  u n i o n  a n d  o a t h  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n  s h a l l  
r e m a i n  f i r m  a n d  i n v i o l a b l e ,  a n d  i n  f u l l  s t r e n g t h ,  
i n  a l l  p o i n t s ,  a n d  t o  a l l  p u r p o s e s ,  u n t i l  t h e  
a r t i c l e s  o f  t h e  i n t e n d e d  p e a c e  s h a l l  b e  r a t i f i e d  
i n  P a r l i a m e n t ;  n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  a n y  p r o c l a m a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p e a c e " . 5
F o r  h i s  p a r t  G l a m o r g a n  h a d  p r o t e c t e d  t h e  K i n g  b y  d r a w i n g
^  G i l b e r t ,  V ,  p .  7 9 ;  C o m .  R i n . , 1 ,  p .  5 6 4 .  M y  i t a l i c s .
^  G o n i .  R i n . , I ,  p .  5 6 7 #
^  I b i d . , If 5 6 5 - 6 ;  T . C . P . ,  X V ,  p .  4 1 8 ;  G i l b e r t , V ,
p. 7 9 7  T h e  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  s e e m s  t o  h a v e  b e e n  c o o l  
t o w a r d s  t h e  t r e a t y ,  p e r h a p s  s e e i n g  i t  a s  y e t  a n o t h e r  
u n i l a t e r a l  a g r e e m e n t  m a d e  b y  t h e  O r m o n d i s t  p a r t y .
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up a "Defeasance" on t he day following the Treaty 
according to which he did not
" ....  intend thereby to oblige his majesty,
other than he himself should please, after 
he had received there ten thousand men, as 
a pledge and testimony of the said Roman 
Catholics’ loyalty and fidelity to his 
majesty: yet he promised faithfully upon 
his word and honour not to acquaint his 
majesty with this defeasance, till he had 
endeavoured, as far as in him lay, to induce 
his majesty to the granting of the particulars 
in the said articles: but that done, the said 
commissioners discharged the said Earl of 
Glamorgan, both in honour and conscience, of 
any further ei^agement to them therein; 
though his majesty should not be pleased to 
grant the said particulars in the articles 
mentioned; the said earl having given them 
assurance upon his word, honour, and voluntary 
oath, that he would never, to any person what­
soever, discern this defeasance in the interim 
without their consents".1
Both Gardiner and Round* adduce this "defeasance" as
2
evidence that Glamorgan knew he was doing wrong. This 
is a permissible inference, but it is not the only one 
which can be made. The defeasance might again be seen 
as part of an elaborate plan to protect the king in the 
event of the scheme foundering.
Several questions arise out of the precautions taken
^  C o x ,  I I ,  a p p . ,  X X V I I .
^  E . H . R . , p .  7 0 4 ;  C i v i l  Wax, I I I ,  p p .  3 5 - 6 ;  P e e r a g e  
a n d  F a m i l y  H i s t o r y , p .  4 1 5 *
350.
b y  b o t h  s i d e s .  W h a t  e x a c t l y  w a s  d o n e  b y  G l a m o r g a n  t o  
o b t a i n  t h e  K i n g ’ s  a p p r o v a l  o f  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n s  t h a t  h e  
h a d  o f f e r e d  ?  T h e r e  i s  n o  a r i - e i b l e  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  h e  d i d  
a n y t h i n g  w h a t s o e v e r ,  b u t  o f  c o u r s e  t h i s  i s  n o t  p o s i t i v e  
p r o o f  o f  i n a c t i o n .
S e c o n d l y ,  t h e r e  m u s t  h a v e  b e e n  s o m e  a g r e e m e n t  a s  
t o  t h e  b a s i s  o n  w h i c h  t h e  C o n f e d e r a c y  w a s  t o  c o n d u c t  
f u t u r e  r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  O r m o n d .  H e  c o u l d  n o t  b e  t o l d  t h a t  
a  t r e a t y  h a d  b e e n  a r r a n g e d  a n d ,  y e t ,  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  
h i m  h a d  t o  b e  r e s u m e d .  W e r e  t h e y  g o i n g  s i m p l y  t o  d i s ­
c u s s  p o l i t i c a l  m a t t e r s  a n d  a n n o u n c e  o u t  o f  t h e  b l u e  t h a t  
t h e y  w e r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  w a i v e  t h e i r  c l a i m s  f o r  r e l i g i o n  f o r  
t h e  t i m e  b e i n g  ?  I t  w o u l d  s e e m  t h a t  t h i s  w a s  t h e  d e v i c e  
t h e y  d e c i d e d  t o  a d o p t  -  t o  j u d g e  f r o m  a  d e c l a r a t i o n  m a d e  
b y  t h e  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  o n  S e p t e m b e r  9 t h :
’‘T h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  s e n d  1 0 , 0 0 0  m e n  t o  a i d  t h e  
K i n g  a n d  w o u l d  r e f e r  t o  h i s  M a j e s t y ’ s  p l e a s u r e  
s u c h  t h i n g s  a b o u t  R e l i g i o n  a s  O r m o n d  e i t h e r  h a d  
n o t  p o w e r  o r  i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  g r a n t .
I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  w i t h  t h e  c o v e t e d  r e l i g i o u s  c o n c e s s i o n s  
i n  t h e i r  p o c k e t s  t h e y  w e r e  h a p p y  t o  c o n f i n e  t h e i r  d i s ­
c u s s i o n s  w i t h  O r m o n d  t o  e c o n o m i c  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s
T h i s  s u m m i n g - u p  o f  t h e  p l a n  o f  c a m p a i g n  t h e y  h a d  
i n  m i n d  i s  r e i n f o r c e d  b y  a  l e t t e r  f r o m  G l a m o r g a n  t o  
O r m o n d  a l s o  d a t e d  S e p t e m b e r  9 t h  i n  w h i c h  h e  r e p o r t e d
1  T  C  * ^  ) K  V ,  • 3 v d \ .
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t h a t  t h e  A s s e m b l y  h a d  v o t e d  t o  r a i s e  1 0 , 0 0 0  t r o o p s  f o r  
t h e  X i n g  a n d  r e c o m m e n d e d  t h a t  O r m o n d  s h o u l d  r e f e r  a n y  
C o n f e d e r a t e  d e m a n d s  h e  h a d  n o t  t h e  p o w e r  t o  s a t i s f y  t o  
t h e  K i n g .  T o  t h i s  e n d  h e  t h o u g h t  t h e y  w o u l d  p r e s e n t  
t h e i r  p r o p o s a l s  i n  t w o  p a r t s .  O n e  p a r t  w o u l d  b e  a  
s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n c e s s i o n s  a l r e a d y  o f f e r e d  b y  O r m o n d ;  
t h e  o t h e r :
" A s  a  m o s t  h u m b l e  p e t i t i o n  t o  t h e  K i n g ,  Y e t  
c o n f i d i n g  t h a t  y o u r  E x ( c e l l e n c y )  w i l l  w i t h o u t  
t h e y r  i m p o r t u n i t y  g r a u n t  e v e n  a s  m u c h  o f  t h a t  
p e t i t i o n  a s  y o u  s h a l l  f i n d e  w i t h i n  y o u r  p o w e r ,  
g i v i n g  t h e m  l e a v e  t o  a p p e a l e  t o  h i s  M a j e s t i e  
f o r  t h e  r e s t ,  i n  w h o s e  g o o d n e s s e  w i t h  y o u r  
E x c e l l e n c y ’ s  f a v o u r a b l e  a n d  l a w f u l  c o n c u r r e n c e ,  
t h e y  w i l l  s u b m i t  t h e  s a m e ,  a n d  y e t  i n  t h e  
i n t e r i m  p r o c e e d s  t o  p e a c e ,  a n d  s u p p l y e s ,  s a v i n g  
t o  t h e m s e l v e s  t h e  e n s u e i n g  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e y r  
s a y d  m o s t  h u m b l e  p e t i t i o n . " 1
F u r t h e r  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  i t  w a s  g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e di
t h a t  t h e r e  w e r e  n o w  n o  s e r i o u s  o b s t a c l e s  t o  a  p u b l i c  
p e a c e  w a s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  C l a n r i c k a r d ’ s  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e .  
T h u s ,  M u s k e r r y  w r o t e  t o  h i m  f r o m  T h u r l e s  o n  A u g u s t  3 1 s t
" M y  l o r d  /  a c c o r d i n g  t o  m y  p r o m i i s  I  c a m e  h e t h e r  
w t h  m y  i j o r d  o f  G l a m o r g a n  l a s t  n i g h t ,  t h e  A r t i c l e s  
f o r  p e a c e  b e i n g  b y  t h e  A s s e m b l y  a g r e e d  u p o n ,  
b e f o r e  o u r  d e p a r t u r e  f r o m  K i l k e n n y ,  &  n o t h i n g  
l e f t  u n c o n c l u d e d ,  b u t  o n l y  t o  d e s p a t c h  t h e  A g e n t s  
f o r  D u b l i n  w ^ h  ±q r e s o l v e d  t o  b e  a c c o m p l i s h e d  b y  
W e n s  d a y  n e x t ,  o n  w c h  w e e  i n t e n d  t o  b e g i n  o u r  
j o r n y ;  w h e r e o f  I  t h o u g h t  f i t t  i n  p u r s u a n c e  o f  m y  
i n g a ^ e m e n t  t o  y r  L ^ .  , t o  g i v e  y ^  t h i s  i n t i m ­
a t i o n ;  a n d  n o w  t h a t  a l l  t h e  o b s t a c l e s  o c c u r r i n g
1 T.C.P., XV, p. 580; Gilbert, V, pp. 120-1.
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t o  a  h a p p y  s e t t l e m e n t  i s  c l e e r e  a t  K i l k e n n y  . . . " ^  
A n d  C l a n r i c k a r d  h i m s e l f  i n f o r m e d  S i r  G e o r g e  H a m i l t o n  o n  
S e p t e m b e r  4 t h :
" . . .  I  a m  m u c h  j o y e d  t h a t  t h e  t r e a t y  o f  p e a c e  
i s  b r o u g h t  t o  s u c h  a  h a p p y  a n d  s e c u r e  c o n d i t i o n ,
&  t h a t  m y  L o r d  G l a m o r g a n  b y  h i s  p o w e r  &  i n t e r e s t  
i n  t h e  C l e a r g y  h a t h  b r o u g h t  t h e m  t o  b e  f o r w a r d  
i n s t r u m e n t s  t h e r e i n  . . . " ^
T h e  v o t e  t o  a p p o i n t  G l a m o r g a n  c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f  
o f  t h e  t r o o p s  d e s t i n e d  f o r  E n g l a n d  h a d  a p p a r e n t l y  b e e n  
m a d e  a f t e r  C l a n r i c k a r d  h a d  l e f t  K i l k e n n y ,  f o r  S i r  G e o r g e  
H a m i l t o n  i n f o r m e d  h i m  o n  S e p t e m b e r  2 n d :
" T h e  E a r l  o f  G l a m o r g a n  w a s  o n  F r i d a y  L a s t  i n  t h e  
A s s e m b l y  h o u s e ,  w h e r e  i t  w a s  d e c l a r e d  u n t o  h i m  
b y  m ^  P l u n k e t t  i n  a  s h o r t e  s p e e c h  t h a t  b y  t h e  
u n a n i m o u s  c o n s e n t  o f  t h e  w h o l e  a s s e m b l y  t h e y  
h a d  m a d  c h o i c e  o f  h i m  t o  c o m m a n d  t h e  t e n  t h o u s a n d  
m e n  t h a t  a r e  t o  b e  s e n t  i n t o  England".^
T h e  c h o i c e  o f  G l a m o r g a n  ‘s h o c k e d  C l a n r i c k a r d  b e c a u s e  a s
h e  e x p l a i n e d  y e a r s  l a t e r  i n  a  n o t e  t o  H a m i l t o n ’ s  l e t t e r :
"... having beene my owne expectation to have 
the Command of the army to be sent into England".
1  B . M . ,  A d d .  M S . ,  4 2 ,  0 6 3 ,  p .  1 1 0 * 2 l b i d . , p p .  1 1 0 - 1 1 ;  
i n  a  m a r g i n a l  n o t e  t o  a  l e t t e r  h e  h a d  w r i t t e n  t o  T a a f f e  
a b o u t  t h i s  t i m e  C l a n r i c k a r d  l a t e r  c o m m e n t e d :  " T h i s  I r e
w a s  w r i t t e n  i m e d i a t l y  a f t e r  m y  r e t u r n e  h o m e  f r o m  K i l k e n y  
&  a s  I  w a s  p r e p a r i n g  f o r  t o  g o  t o  D u b l i n  w h e r e  o m m i s s -  
i o n e r s  w e r e  e x p e c t e d  f r o m  K i l k e n y  w ^ ^  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
c o n c l u d i n g  t h e  p e a c e "  ( i b i d . ,  p .  1 0 9 ) .
3  I b i d . ,  p .  1 1 0 .
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Indeed, so displeased was he that he:
"did somewhat incline me to absent myself from 
any further attendance, at least it was fitt 
it should appears that I had some resentment 
of the bussnes".1
While Scarampi*s objections had not sufficed to 
prevent the Treaty from being signed, it was presumably 
in deference to the imminent arrival of the Papal Nuncio 
that no orders were given for mustering the 10,000 
troops. Prom now on Glamorgan worked hard to force the 
pace. At the same time, in accordance with his obli­
gation to Ormond, he tried to persuade the Supreme 
Council to consent to^public settlement without further 
delay.
The relationship between Ormond and Glamorgan has 
never been given much attention. To some historians it 
seemed to be of little importance; others were put off, 
perhaps, by the lack of information. This has been a 
serious oversight, for their correspondence contained 
valuable evidence. During his residence at Kilkenny 
between August 7th and December 24th, 1645, Glamorgan 
wrote 14 letters to Ormond and received at least two 
from Ormond in return. Nearly all were expressed in 
such vague language as to be almost incomprehensible. 
Even so, it is possible to state certain conclusions.
^ Ibid.
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First, Glamorgan was so persistently effusive that 
even allowing for his natural temperament it would 
appear he was attempting to put Ormond off his guard.^ 
Secondly, it had been agreed that his stay at Kilkenny 
should be short. Thirdly, he had not told Ormond any­
thing about arranging a private treaty. Even after 
August 25th his letters referred only to the public 
treaty and his labours to further its conclusion. In 
one letter, dated August without the day of the month 
but almost certainly written before August 25th there 
occurred this passage:
" ... and I flatter myself with a confidence that 
I shall bring them for the present to be satis­
fied without putting your Excellency to more than 
eyther you are willing to do, or indeed have power 
to perform, and for the rest to trust in his 
Majestie’s goodness, when they shall have expressed 
their dutys".2
It is to be noted that this is virtually a paraphrase
3
of the first paragraph of the commission of January 2nd. 
Thus, the conclusion seems inescapable that Glamorgan 
had informed Ormond that he had been sent to second his 
efforts to make peace and not to act independently of 
him.
Of. this typical sentiment : " ... there being noe
question but your Excellency hath power to command me 
anything"] Gilbert, 7, p. 119.
2 T.C.P., XV, p. 313; Gilbert, V, pp. 66-7.
5 See above, pp. 3^ 3
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In the same letter Glamorgan remarked that while 
there was little outward hope of peace none the less he 
was optimistic. Then, on August 29th, four days after 
the conclusion of his own treaty, he wrote that agree­
ment to peace terms had now become likely.^ On August 
50th, his optimism was unbounded; it would take Ormond 
but three days to bring off a final settlement.^
But his expectations were not realised and soon he 
was writing in terms of uncertainty.5 Having counted 
upon his acceptance of the Confederates’ demands con­
cerning religion leading immediately to the provision 
of troops and the arrangement of a treaty with Ormond, 
he was now learning that a complex situation could not 
so easily be cleared up., Thus, whereas he had intended 
to return to Dublin as early as September 4th, he was 
forced to remain in Kilkenny until at least the middle 
of the month. Moreover, when informing Ormond on 
September 10th of the Assembly’s vote to supply the 
10,000 troops, he obviously expected difficulties to 
arise in the impending negotiations after all, for he
^ As Colonel Barry, who was returning to Dublin, would 
be able to assure him] T.C.P., XV, p. 550; Gilbert, V, 
p. 78.
^ T.C.P., XV, p. 331; Gilbert, V, p. 78.
5 Sept. 4, T.C.P., XV., p. 351; Gilbert, V, pp. 119-20; 
Sept. 9, ibid., pp. 120-1; Sept. 10, ibid., pp. 121-2.
556.
proposed that if Ormond found he could not agree with 
all the Confederate demands, he should refer those in 
dispute to the King.^
The negotiations between Ormond and the Peace 
Commissioners were resumed on September 10th, much later 
than had been agreed at the time of their adjournment 
on August 6th. The intervening period had been covered 
by several extensions of the Cessation requested by the 
Supreme Council, with the support of Clanrickard, on 
the grounds that it was proving difficult to convene the 
members of the Supreme Council and that the debate in 
the General Assembly was bound to be prolonged.^ It 
might have been added that time was required for con­
sultations with Glamorg^.
Ormond rejected a specific proposal that the 
Cessation should be extended until 10 days after the
3
negotiations for a treaty had come to an end, since an 
indefinite extension of this kind would create the
1 T.C.P., XV, p. 361.
^ Commissioners to Ormond, Aug. 11, T.C.P., XV, p. 240; 
Gilbert, V, p. 55; same to the same, Aug. 23, T.C.P., 
XV, p. 489; Gilbert, V, pp. 64-5; same to the same, 
Aug. 29, T.C.P., p. 526; Gilbert, V, p. 77.
5 Aug. 16, i.e.P., XV, p. 440; Gilbert, V, p. 60.
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impression among the King’s loyal Protestant subjects 
that a final settlement was not seriously being con­
sidered and would seriously depress them.^ This was 
only one reason for rejection. As the Confederates had 
obligingly pointed out, short-term extensions of the 
truce made it impossible to commit all their troops 
against the Scots. Ormond was not disposed to help 
them out of their difficulty.
Perhaps in a further attempt to prevent Ormond 
from being too inquisitive at the delay occasioned by 
their discussions with Glamorgan, the Confederates 
acceded to his request that they should march against 
the Scots. As in the past, however, they suggested that 
Ormond "do appeare in person in the army, to avoide 
dashing between your Excellencie’s general officers and 
t h e m ; l a t e r  on, they had intelligence that the Scots 
were marching out against them and asked that, as they 
had agreed to protect Ormond’s quarters, he should do 
the same for them.^ In fact, neither side took any 
action.
After the last adjournment Ormond had decided to
1 T.C.P., XV, p. 464; Gilbert, V, pp. 62-3.
 ^Muskerry to Ormond, Aug. 18, T.C.P., XV, p. 279; 
Gilbert, V, p. 62.
5 Commissioners to Oimond, Aug. 29, T.C.P., XV, p. 580; 
Gilbert, V, p. 77.
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be more generous over several minor points. This is 
clear from several explanatory notes which he authorised 
Clanrickard to invoke if the Confederates should ask for 
more details of the concessions he had offered: the
Court of Wards should be abolished in return for £15,000
a year; two Roman Catholics would be appointed to each
1 ? judicial bench; Catholics might have free schools.
These ’annotations’ were scarcely calculated to break
any deadlock. The question which concerned Clanricleard
to the exclusion of all others was what should he reply
if they were to ask whether Ormond intended to demand
the restoration of the churches in their possession by
an express article.'^
The new session of the public negotiations lasted
from September 10th until November 21st. Despite a
brisk opening, during which Ormond asked for and received
the assurance that no fresh demands would be presented,
surprisingly little progress was made. Indeed, religious
questions still dominated the discussions which were as
^ The actual number was given in answer to a request 
from Clanrickard, T.C.P., XV, p. 258; Gilbert, V, p. 54.
2
Remembrances for my lord the Marquis of Olanrickard, 
Aug. 8, T.C.P., XV, p. 233.
5 T.C.P., XV, p. 238.
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stuffed with details as ever. This lack of progress
was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that
Ormond, i^ ho might have been expected to raise most of
the difficulties, was for once optimistic at the outset.
The only promising development was that some time was
given to discussion of the system of government that
should be established between the declaration of peace
and the full restoration of the sovereignty of the King
2
in Parliament.
Though certainly not present at the beginning, 
Glamorgan attended the negotiations for a period which 
it is impossible to estimate. "At Dublin" on September 
29th he prepared an important declaration for Ormond’s 
benefit. This disclosed, that he had not only informed 
the Confederates that he was to be Ormond’s successor 
as Lord Lieutenant but that through some unknown source 
Ormond had come to hear of it and had naturally regis­
tered a strong protest. Glamorgan’s defence began:
"For to endeare myself to some, the better to doe 
his Majestie’s service it is true I did declare 
a promise from the King of his assent, that after 
your Excellency’s time, he would make me Lord 
Lieutenant"
^ Ormond to Digby, Aug. 14, ibid., p. 256.
 ^Once again all the documents pertaining to this session 
are to be found among the Carte Papers, vols. XV and 
XVI5 see also Gilbert, V, pp. 80-117, pp. 123-96.
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Of course, he continued, he had never had the slightest
intention of replacing Ormond during his lifetime.^
This incident might be interpreted as showing Glamorgan
capable of any trickery in pursuit of his aims but for
two relevant facts; there is no reason to disbelieve
that the King had said he might be appointed as Ormond’s 
2
successor; Ormond did not report the matter to the
King but continued to look upon Glamorgan as a useful
aide right up to the time when he received a copy of
Glamorgan’s treaty. This indicates that he believed
Glamorgan was telling the truth.
Glamorgan returned to Kilkenny on November 20th.^
Shortly afterwards he received a letter from Ormond about
the recent negotiations:
"Having told your lordship that I am at the 
highest I will venture in this great affair, I 
should beseech your lordship for the accomplish­
ment of those noble ends that induced you through 
so great and apparent dangers to undertake this 
journey now to set all your strength upon bringing 
it to a good that is a speedy conclusion"
Even allowing for some exaggeration this extract shows
that Ormond had still sufficient faith in his judgement
to hope that he might persuade the Confederates to agree
^ T.C.P., XV, p. 428; Gilbert, p. 122.
^ See below, •
5 Cf. a note in one of the Papal Nuncio’s letters to 
Rome, Embassy, p. 89.
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settlement.
to an immediate/ Ormond also required his advice as to 
how he should react to the recently reported arrival of 
a papal nuncio.^
During the period between July and October while 
Glamorgan had been arranging his treaty and trying to 
spur the Confederates into fulfilling their obligations 
promptly and while Ormond and the Confederate Commiss­
ioners had been locked once more in their endless 
dialogue, Charles* movements in England had given the 
impression that he was expecting succour from Ireland.
In July, he marched, as has been seen, into South Wales 
establishing his main base at Eaglan Castle, home of
Glamorgan’s father, the Marquis of Worcester. On August
2
5th he marched north but returned again in September 
for a short stay.^ Professor A.H. Dodd maintains that 
he entered South Wales with the express purpose of 
waiting for Glamorgan to land with his 10,000 troops.^ 
This may have been so but it is not possible to be sure. 
For one thing, both his visits to Raglan were short ; 
the first only lasted until August 5th. Moreover, he 
could scarcely have given Glamorgan explicit instructions
1 T.C.P., XVI, p. 175; Gilbert, pp. 198-9.
 ^A.H. Burne and G. Young, The Great Civil War, London, 
1959, p. 217.
5 iymonds, p. 233.
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to land in South Wales while he was actually there, 
unless, that is they went astray, for Glamorgan’s 
v;hole object in the first instance was the relief of 
Chester; nor is there any evidence that Glamorgan ever 
informed the Confederacy that he must be in South Wales 
at any particular time in order to rendezvous with the 
King.
In fact, Charles* marches between July and the end 
of the year afford anything but an impression of careful 
planning. Encouraged by the irrepressible Digby, he 
was determined to hold out until the last hour in the 
belief that God would not permit his enemies to triumph 
over him. In the first place, it was Montrose or the 
Irish, or a combination of both on whom he depended for 
his salvation. Then, after Montrose’s at
Philipaugh on September 13th, it was on the Irish alone, 
until his hopes of Scotland revived again in mid-October. 
But as to whether the Irish troops should be brought 
over by Glamorgan or by Ormond himself and as to whether 
they should land in South Wales or North Wales, or 
indeed at Chester, he did not care so long as they came.
^ Digby to Nicholas, Nicholas Papers, ed. G.E. Warner, 
Camden Soc., London, 1886, 1, p. b4; Digby to Ormond, 
Sept. 26, Carte, VI, pp. 320-1; apparently there was 
hope of aid even from Denmark, of. Digby to Jermyn,
Aug. 27, Warburton. III, p. 159.
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Por the rest, his movements were dictated by purely 
administrative and strategic factors.^
At Digby’s instigation there was apparently some
scheme for bringing over Ormond even without an army.
As Digby put it, the Royalists were in even greater
need of a general than of reinforcements. Prince
Rupert’s fall from grace had made it possible for
2
Ormond to take his place.
^ Until the end of September, when he established his - 
H.Q. at Newark, he stayed in Wales, apart from one erratic 
incursion into England in the month of August. Wales was 
the only area in the whole kingdom where he could find 
refuge and still pick up some recruits. At first he 
stayed at Raglan but marched north to Denbigh when the 
fall of Bristol made South Wales unsafe (Wedgÿwood, The 
King’8 War, p. 293). Afterwards, he was concerned with 
keeping open the port of Chester since it was the only 
place left to receive the Irish troops.
Parliamentarian intelligence reports attributed the 
King’s movements at this time to his expectation of Irish 
aid. Thus:
"The Peace is now concluded in Ireland, and Letters 
sent over to testifie his Majesty of it, and six 
thousand are already in the field, of the 10,000 
agreed to come over hither, for whose coming its 
believed His Majesty will stay in Wales to joyn with 
them, if he cannot raise a considerable party there 
to relieve Bristol" (The Kingdoms Weekly Intelli­
gence, Sept. 2-9, 16431
Again:
"We understand that the King did the rather march 
into Wales, because he doth expect some supplys from 
Ireland to land in that Dominion, and for that pur­
pose he hath imployed two great Agents of his into 
Ireland, the Lord Herbert of Ragland, and the Lord 
Byron" (The Parliament Post, circa Sept. 8, 1645)
And again:
" ... on the other side, the King thought himself so 
sure of the Ten thousand men from them, that Sir 
Marmaduke Langdale was in July sent withseven hun­
dred horse to Carnarvon, to receive and conduct 
them as there should be occasion" (Cox, II, p. 151)
a. CcirhL .VI, fxf. Sao ' I .
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It is hard to believe that the King shared this 
opinion of the relative value of a oomnander as against 
troops. In his only letter to Ormond between August 
1st and December 1st that has been preserved he made 
no bones about stating his prime need. Having first 
commanded Ormond to apprise the Council of all the con­
cessions he was prepared to make to the Confederates - 
previously he had always wanted the Council to know as 
little as possible - so as to satisfy Ormond’s scruples 
about taking action without the Council’s knowledge, he 
continued:
"But the Irish peace is of such absolute neces­
sity, that noe complements or perticuler respects 
v/hatsoever must hinder it. V/herjÿfore I absolutely 
com^und you (and without reply) to execute the 
directions I sent you the 27th of February last; 
glueing you leave to gettthe approbation of the 
councell soe as, and noe otherwise, that by 
seekeing itt you doe not hazard the peace, or soe 
much as an affront by theire foolish refuseing 
to concuihwith you"
This letter was sent on October 22nd.^ By the 
beginning of December no Irish troops had come to his 
rescue nor had he received any news from Ormond. The 
absence of news was particularly distressing because he 
could not wait for ever for the troops to come and must
Ibid., p. 325. In his published collection Carte 
placed this letter immediately after one from Ormond to 
the King dated October 18th, 1644, as though it were 
sent in reply. This could scarcely have been the case.
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be prepared, however reluctantly, to make an altern­
ative plan. Accordingly he sent an urgent message to 
Ormond demanding to know exactly what aid he could 
expect.
There was now, however, a pronounced change in 
his attitude towards the negotiations with the Irish. 
Unless he could be assured that ten thousand well-armed 
Irish horse and foot would land in England before the 
first of March:
"a peace with our Roman catholique subjects there 
will not bee of so much advantage to us, as a 
continued cessation"
Thus, Ormond must either arrange a treaty at once and
insure that the requisite force was despatched before
the prescribed date or play for time.^ It is not
difficult to divine what was in the King’s mind. If
he were not to benefit from Irish assistance after all,
it was essential not to impair negotiations with the
Scots. For, having been defeated in the field, he was
hoping to emerge triumphantly from his tribulations
through the skilful exploitation of the divisions among
his enemies.
^ Oxford, Dec. 2, Carte, VI, pp.328-9. Shortly after 
this, on the 8th of the month, Nicholas informed Ormond 
while enjoining the greatest secrecyby that it was 
intended to send the Duke of York to Ireland; ibid., 
pp. 329-30. This intention was never carried out, 
perhaps because Ormond advised against it] Ormond to 
Nicholas, Jan. 19, 1646, ibid., pp. 34^-4.
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The most extraordinary feature of these months 
when Charles had been anxiously awaiting troops from 
Ireland was that to all appearances Ormond was obliv­
ious to the commands which he received. Thus, on July 
he had been ordered to raise what troops he could and 
lead them in person to England, and yet there is no 
evidence whatsoever that he made any effort to obey.
In August, he had been anxious to hasten the peace but 
it is scarcely possible to detect any uncommon urgency 
in his conduct of negotiations during the period Sept­
ember 10th to November 20th. Plainly he was still not 
prepared either publicly or surreptitiously to make any 
further concessions in spite of the fact that the King 
was on the verge of total defeat. His honour, and, as
he chose to conceive it, that of the King also, could
1
not be sacrificed for the sake of expediency. In any 
C8.se, whatever prospects he had of a quick settlement 
with the Confederacy were about to be dashed by the 
untimely disclosure of Glamorgan’s treaty and the 
opposition of the Papal Nuncio, who had arrived at 
Kilkenny in October.
1 An inkling of his state of mind at this time may be 
obtained from a letter he wrote to Sir Philip Percivall 
on October 29th; Carte, VI, pp. 323-7.
 ^He did not reply to the King’s letter of December 2nd 
until January 19th; ibid., pp. 344-7. By that time 
Glamorgan’s arreiat had put an end to negotiations with 
the Irish.
Chapter VIII
Negotiations in Paris between the Papal Nuncio 
and Henrietta Maria, 1644-5.
An account of the negotiations between Charles I 
and the Confederacy would be incomplete without reference 
to events in Paris and Rome, for not only were the Pope 
and the French government interested parties but Charles 
frequently acted through Henrietta Maria after she had 
taken up residence at St. Germain in the autumn of 1644. 
Henrietta Maria held discussions with the Irish agents 
in Paris and occasionally corresponded directly both 
with the Supreme Council at Kilkenny and Ormond in 
Dublin, particularly after the King had given himself up 
to the Scots. Moreover,, on his way to Ireland, the 
newly appointed papal nuncio, Rinuccini, delayed for 
several months in Paris in the vain belief that Charles 
and the Confederacy might be reconciled through nego­
tiations between Henrietta !Maria and himself.
Innocent X, who became Pope on September 15, 1644, 
was keen to exploit the struggle between King and Parlia­
ment with a view to restoring Catholicism not only as 
the national religion of Ireland but of England as well. 
Not trusting in the spiritual honesty and determination 
of the Confederate leaders and following a suggestion
3 6 8
of Wadding, he decided in March 1645, to appoint a 
Nuncio to Ireland and to supply him with arms and 
money to be distributed at his discretion.^ The cleric 
chosen for what was commonly expected to be an arduous 
and unrewarding mission, was a man of strong metal.
John Baptista Rinuccini, Archbishop of the small dio­
cese of Fermo, a Roman by birth and a distinguished 
canonical scholar, had refused promotion to the splendid 
see of Florence out of loyalty to and affection for his 
flock.5 His credentials were impeccable. Hewas intell­
igent, pious, selfless and of unquestionable integrity. 
Though the second choice for the Embassy, his must have 
seemed a sound appointment. Unfortunately, he had 
certain defects of mind and temperament which had passed 
unnoticed in the comparatively unruffled world of Fermo. 
He lacked breadth of vision, a sense of humour and an 
essential generosity of mind, he was inclined to make 
hasty judgments and, above all, he was spiritually 
arrogant. These defects were rapidly to be exposed.
1
Franciscan Fathers, op.cit., p. 50.
^ The Supreme Council had before this requested tha# 
Scarampi be given the status of nuncio. Com. Rèia., I, 
p. 429.
^ M.J. Hynes, The Mission of Rinuccini, 1645-9, Dublin,
1932, p. 16.
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Perhaps he himself had some presentiment of disaster, 
or perhaps it was simply that the prospect of a long 
residence in a rugged and remote country inhabited by 
barbarians did not appeal to his Italian imagination, 
ageing and sick as he was. At any rate, he took the 
precaution of requesting that his see be kept vacant 
against his return. For good or ill his mission was 
to shatter the transparent unanimity of the Confederates 
and to bedevil yet more the tangled negotiations with 
the King.
The Pope’s purpose in sending him to Ireland was
summed up in his instructions. His main duty was "to
establish in Ireland an unalterable right to the’ public
exercise of the Catholic religion",^ as the pre-condition
of any declaration of peace. The body of his instructions
is notable for its insight into remote as well as recent
Irish history and for its surprising objectivity. It
was probably the work of Invernizi, who had accompanied
Scarampi to Ireland, and Father Luke Wadding, perhaps
2
the most distinguished Irish cleric of this period.
Though resident in Home, Wadding was the hub of the
^ Embassy in Ireland, ed. Annie Hutton, Lublin, 1873, XL. 
2
Wadding had been put forward by the Confederates as a 
candidate for a red hat but he himself had suppressed the 
letter of request, Franciscan Fathers, op.cit., p. 248.
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Confederates’ negotiations abroad. Rinuccini was to 
apprise the Archbishops of the object of his mission and 
of the assistance that they were to receive from the Pope 
and the Catholic Princes. At all costs, he was to per­
suade the clergy to adopt a common programme. He was 
to apply all his skill to wooing those Roman Catholics 
who were content with private v/or ship, and he was to 
allay the fears of those other Catholics who feared that 
a restoration of the public exercise of their religion 
would bring with it the rigorous enforcement of the dis­
ciplinary decrees of the Council of Trent. To facilitate 
his mission, he was to have the power of presentation to 
vacant sees.
He was particularly warned against two sources of 
opposition - those Catholics in possession of Church 
lands and Ormond: Ormond and the Ormondists.^ This was 
a necessary, but, as it turned out, an injudicious war­
ning, owing to Rinuccini’s habit of making impulsive 
judgments. For Rinuccini behaved from the outset as 
though he were dealing with irreconcilable and malignant 
enemies, thus denying himself the diplomatic advantage 
of remaining above the battle in the role of a fair- 
minded referee. The warning against the Lord Lieutenant
^ Embassy, XXVII-L
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was particularly ill-starred. It was said that Ormond 
would never give an inch except under duress, that his 
deliberate strategy was to blunt the edge of the Confed­
erates’ enthusiasm by delaying tactics, and that he 
sought to sow dissension between the Old and the New 
Irish. Paradoxically, it was also pointed out that as 
he sprang from a Catholic family some slender chance 
might yet remain of bringing him back to his natural 
spiritual home, if, for example, his Catholic brother, 
Richard, were to approach him.^ This characteristic 
havering was probably intended to encourage Rinuccini 
to proceed with finesse and to leave himself freedom to 
manoeuvre. In the event it had the contrary effect, 
perhaps by inducing Rinuccini to feel contempt for a 
lapsed catholic. At any rate, he developed a dislike 
for Ormond which crippled his judgment and made his re­
jection of any peace to which Ormond was a party inevit­
able. None of this is to overlook either the tepid 
Catholicism of the Ormondists or the Protestant obstrep- 
erousness of Ormond. But the task of Rinuccini was to 
regard them as two of the many factors in the situation 
and not to take immediate sides against them.
While the Pope obviously feared that the Irish might 
submit to a peace that would leave their religion in
^ Ibid., Secret Instructions, Iv.
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jeopardy and so desired to have his personal represen­
tative on the spot to hold them steadfast, he realised 
that the very appointment of an official Nuncio was 
bound to suggest to Charles that he planned to make 
Ireland a Papal fief, especially as doubt had been cast 
from time to time upon the validity of the donation of 
Ireland to Henry II by the English Pope, Adrian IV, and 
there were still those who believed that the King of 
England had no title to Ireland.^ Rinuccini was care­
fully to dispel this impression. Any tendency to under­
mine the King’s basic sovereignty, which was always a 
possibility, seeing the Irish inclination to extreme 
courses, was to be avoided. One wonders whether it 
occurred to Innocent that he was thus saddling Rinuccini 
with a difficult burden from the outset, for he was to 
enjoin the Irish not to accept terms which failed to 
guarantee full and permanent freedom of religion and 
simultaneously he was to avoid giving the impression that 
this involved any diminution of the authority of the 
Crown. The ambiguity of his instructions concerning the 
King’s sovereignty only ceased to weigh heavily on 
Rinuccini when, in August, 1646, he committed himself
2
irrevocably to directing the Confederate movement himself, 
^ Hynes, p. 23.
 ^See below, p.S^O pP.
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an act for which he was to receive no approval from the 
Pope.
In addition, Rinuccini received special instructions^ 
with regard to Henrietta ï\îaria, whom he was to visit on 
his way through Paris. He was to assure her and her 
chief minister. Lord Jermyn, who was rightly considered 
in Rome to be very influential, that his business in 
Ireland portended no threat to the King of England but 
was concerned only with the propagation of the Catholic 
religion in his kingdoms. In support of this assurance, 
he was to present her with a brief from the Pope and a 
letter from Cardinal Pamphilio, the Pope’s nephew and the 
day-to-day supervisor of Rinuccini’s mission. Even so, 
he was to make the telling point that the King could 
expect relief from no other source than Ireland. In 
corresponding with the Queen he was to employ as go- 
between some discreet person of comparative unimportance 
so that suspicions about the purport of the traffic might 
be averted; he was also to make shift to convince the 
Queen that his mission was essential to the restoration 
of her husband to his throne, and to try to persuade her 
to use all her influence with the King so that he might 
come to an understanding with the Confederates, and all 
her influence with Ormond so that he might surrender
^ Embassy, 1 i - 1 ii.
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Lublin and the other strongholds under his control to 
the Confederates rather than to the Puritans. In partic­
ular, he was to dissuade the Queen from going to Ireland, 
it being known that Sellings had invited her to do so.
The Pope was entirely opposed to this proposal on the 
grounds that the Confederates could not afford to maintain 
the Queen’s household and that her Protestant advisers 
would create mischief.^
As Rinuccini was going to journey through Prance, 
he was to be v/ary of attempts to detain him. He was to 
assure the French Queen Mother and Mazarin, who were 
hostile to the Pope because they believed him to be sym­
pathetic to Spain, of the Pope’s friendship and regard 
2
for them. This was no doubt considered an essential 
precaution; if Mazarin were to think for one moment 
that the Nuncio’s mission to Ireland was likely to bene­
fit Spain, he would endeavour to hinder it.
As the Pope and Pamphilio had foreseen, Charles and 
Henrietta Maria assumed that Rinuccini’s embassy boded 
no g o o d . 5 At the very least he would unite the Catholic
^ Embassy, 1 v.
2 Ibid., 1 ii.
5 On a previous occasion Charles had protested to Rome 
about the activities in Ireland of a priest who carried 
papal credentials. Cardinal Barberini had quickly assured 
him that the Holy See had no designs on Ireland but, far 
from it, wished to see the royal authority maintained. 
Albion, p. 377.
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clergy. Moreover, Henrietta Maria and her circle at 
Saint Germain seem to have been convinced throughout the 
greater part of 1645 that a declaration of peace in 
Ireland was imminent. This being so, it was important 
to keep Rinuccini out of the way in case he raised diffi­
culties.^ It must also have occurred to the Queen that 
once a declaration of peace had been made his mission 
would cease to have any purpose.
Henrietta Maria had been soliciting aid for her 
husband ever since her arrival in Paris in November of
the preceding year. At first she had bargained for the
2
mercenary services of the Luke of Lorraine, and nego­
tiated at some length with the Dutch. But both these 
efforts had failed and she found herself dependent in 
practice upon the Vatican, the French, and the Irish 
Catholics. To France and to the Pope she appealed as a 
co-religionist and as one whose husband in fighting for 
the ideal of absolute monarchy was serving their inter­
ests as well as his own; to the French King she added
^ It is important to notice that in so far as Charles was 
concerned this is only an inference. There is no direct 
evidence whatsoever of such a purpose, except, that is, 
the Commentarius ! 1, pp. 652-3.
o
Upon the suggestion of Mazarin who spoke of arranging 
the necessary payment. Henrietta Maria to the King,
Nov. 23, 1644, Green#, pp. 268-9.
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the additional plea of kinship.
She would doubtless have preferred to receive aid 
exclusively from one or other of these two and to have 
avoided negotiations with the Irish altogether, but this 
proved to be impossible. Both the Pope and Prance inten­
ded to include the Irish question in any dealings with 
Charles.^ Here they were supported by the Irish agent 
in Paris, O'Hartegan, and the English Catholics, by now 
a fairly large colony resident there. All hoped for the 
victory of the Confederacy, not only, though primarily, 
for the sake of the Church in Ireland but because they 
envisaged the triumphant Confederates setting sail for 
England on condition that the King guaranteed complete 
toleration for the English catholics. They saw that if 
all available resources were ceded to Charles and, with 
their help, he defeated Parliament, he might not repeal 
the penal laws against the English catholics. Rescued 
by the Confederacy, on the other hand, he would be obliged 
to do so. Moreover, if he overcame Parliament without 
Irish intervention, he would owe the Confederates nothing 
and might even agree to take punitive action against 
them. In any case, so slight were available funds - the 
bulk of the income of the French treasury was earmarked 
for the Thirty Years War - that, divided, they might prove
^ This was also a major concern of the Earl of Glamorgan.
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inadequate to the needs of each recipient. Undivided, 
they might be of decisive use to one or the other. The 
case for concentrating all aid upon Ireland was strong.
It is to be added that in the eyes of Cardinal 
Mazarin, the prospect of a weakened England alongside a 
free, Catholic Ireland owing its independence to France, 
was by no means displeasing. Against this, his sus­
picions of the pro-Spanish leanings of the Pope disposed 
him to refrain from giving any assistance to Rinuccini, 
lest Spain’s influence in Ireland should thereby be 
enhanced.^ Of course, lÆazarin had to conceal the direc­
tion of his thoughts: it was hardly fitting that he
should appear to support rebellious subjects against 
their sovereign, especially in view of the close relation­
ship between Charles I and Louis XIII.^ So successful
^ The French might have given much more aid to the Irish 
throughout the Rebellion but for the suspicion of their 
connexion with Spain; of. Com. Rin., I, p. 651; see also, 
Gilbert (Sellings), IV, p. 4^ " ••• so now it was dis­
covered, that unless the Confederates would wholly decline 
Spaine, and cast themselves intirely on France, nothing 
which would be considerable was to be expected from thence."
 ^After Naseby, Mazarin privately considered the King to 
be doomed. He was anxious therefore to display no undue 
warmth either for the King or the Irish for fear of 
incurring the official displeasure of the English Parlia­
ment, ibid., IV, p. 5-
^78
was he in this concealment that Henrietta Maria wrote 
enthusiastically for some time on the theme of his gener­
osity and zeal for the royalist cause.^
As for the English Catholics, they had no particular 
love for the Irish, whom they regarded as an inferior 
race, but they appreciated the benefits which they might 
obtain from a royal victory achieved through Irish help 
for which toleration had been a precondition.^ And, 
lastly, the Irish agents anxiously lobbied the Pope and 
the French to insure that the King should not be strength­
ened at their expense nor indeed without their help.
So it was that Henrietta Maria had no choice but to 
take the Irish into account. It may be that this neces­
sity did not greatly disturb her, though some would have 
it so. Writers with catholic sympathies regard Henrietta 
Maria as having been influenced by her protestant advisers 
to take a hostile view of the Confederacy. Thus Belleshedm 
wrote,
"Influenced by Ormond*s creatures in Paris, 
she was most deeply prejudiced against the 
Irish cause 1*3
^ Cf. her letter to Mazarin, 1 Jan. l646,Creenf, p. 310.
On the other hand there is no doubt that the sympathy 
shown for Henrietta Maria by the Queen Regent was genuine.
^ See their memorial to the Pope, below pp Ml -*1.
5 A. Bellesheim, The Papal Huncio among the Irish Confed- 
erates, trans., Dublin, 1908, p. 8.
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We have also the contemporary aside,
"except that the Queen goes to Mass she 
has no other religion than that of Lord 
Jermyn."
from the Franciscan, Barron, to his uncle Fr. Wadding.^ 
Such comments may be only partly justified. It is true 
that Henrietta Maria had some contempt for Irish speech 
and customs and that she referred to the Confederates on 
several occasions as rebels. And yet she had been
p
urging the use of Irish troops in England for some time 
and in proportion as the King* s strength declined so she 
increased her efforts to obtain them. Indeed, more than 
once she accused Charles himself of hanging back in his 
negotiations with the Confederacy.^
The correct explanation of Henrietta Maria*s^was to 
be found in her impulsiveness. She was temperamentally 
out of tune with slow-moving and intricate negotiations 
of any kind and never pursued any policy through thick 
and thin. Thus, her interest in the Irish simply varied
^ Cardinal Moran , Spicilegium Ossoriense, II, p. 25.
^ In April, 1644, she had suggested that she might use 
her good offices to facilitate a settlement during the 
Oxford Conference; see above, p.i7^,P-«-x.
 ^Cf : **I am astonished that the Irish do not give them­
selves to some foreign King; you will force them to it 
at last, seeing themselves offered in sacrifice".
Dec. l/ll, 1645, Oreenf, p. 336.
66(
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with the urgency of her husband's need of them. Belle­
sheim's innuendo that she was under the thumb of 'Ormond's 
creatures' is nowhere borne out by the evidence. Far 
from supporting Ormond she regarded him as the main 
obstacle in the way of agreement with the Confederates.^  
Her occasional testy comments were probably inspired 
more by frustration at her failure to obtain aid than by 
any deep feeling of dislike. After all, she was a woman 
of spirit whose considerable energies were entirely 
absorbed in fighting her husband's battles. She would 
speak vexatiously of anyone who stood in the way of her 
helping him. Besides, it is difficult to cast the 
urbane Jermyn and the rest in the roles of zealous 
anti-Papists. Whenever they impugned the Confederates, 
it was for the material reason that they wished to attract 
to England all the Continental subsidies which might be 
forthcoming rather than that they were exercised by 
tender consciences. They were, moreover, always sanguine 
about the prospects for an Irish peace and quite ignorant 
of the factiousness of the parties involved.
Just before Henrietta Maria's arrival, a joint 
committee of Irish and English Catholics had been formed 
in Paris to co-ordinate their efforts and to avoid the 
danger of damaging each others prospects. Their first
^ See below, pp.Wi-'gr
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resolution underscored this object: they agreed that
the first essential step should be to assure the freedom 
of the Catholic religion in Ireland, from which freedom 
for Catholics in England might be expected to follow.^
Her coming sparked off a series of meetings between 
this committee and the French ministers to discuss terms 
for a settlement with the King and also the question of 
her going to Ireland. Of this period we have a slender 
account in the letters from O'Heirtegan to the Supreme
^ The two parties on the committee may not have trusted 
each other wholeheartedly. On Hovember 27th, 1644,
0'Hartigan wrote to the Supreme Council:
"That my Lord (Abbot) Mountague said to him 
in his Ear that he should write to Your 
Lordships, not to trust most of the English, 
even the very Catholicks, who have more 
Rational than Religious thoughts."
This same letter also contained the following cryptic 
remarks :
"That the Queen, talking of Ormond, said, it 
was hard to trust. Believe, or Rely upon any 
Irish-man that is a Protestant, for every such 
Irishman that goes to Church, does it against 
his conscience and knows he betrays Cod - that the 
King is easie and not to be trusted - That the 
Queen will be cast upon the Irish, and therefore 
advises them to play the cunning workmen to take 
measure of her."
Cox, pp. 149-50; Husband, part 2, p. 833; Cl. S. P .,
11, p. 176.
Rinuccini was also warned against the English Catholics 
in his instructions - both their advice and their motives 
were to be treated with suspicion. Embassy, 1 ii.
382
Council and from the Queen to Charles.
The first approach came from the Irish side.^ The 
Confederates were always inclined to expect much from
p
the Queen merely because she was a sister Catholic. As 
for Henrietta, she could not have taken the first months 
of negotiations very seriously, for during this period 
Mazarin continued to be full of promises while the Dutch 
and the Lorrainers appeared still open to persuasion.^
At the same time, she did not want to alienate the Irish 
agents but rather to keep them on leading strings which 
could be shortened or lengthened at will. Consequently, 
she gave restrained encouragement to O'Hartegan.^
On Rovember 27th O'Hartegan reported that she had 
stated her conviction that the King's restoration depen- 
ded on Irish assistance. And, on December 4th, in the
^ On December 3rd Henrietta Maria informed the King that 
the Irish had made her many offers; G-reene, p. 269.
p
Their very first approach to the King had been made 
through her; see above, p. Go . It is also interesting 
to note that whereas Sellings, who had been sent abroad 
in Rovember, 1644, v/ith a series of commissions to the 
Pope, Louis XIV, Mazarin, Henrietta ÏÆaria, and others, 
(Gilbert (Sellings)), IV, pp. 69-77, had been instructed 
to avoid a meeting with Mazarin he was to make a point 
of seeing Henrietta Maria; ibid., p. 2.
3 She was still optimistic as late as March 21st; cf. 
her letter of that date to Charles, Green#, p. 298.
^ O'Hartegan to Geoffrey Browne, T.C.P., XII, p. 338; 
Gilbert, IV, p. 45-
3 Same to the Supreme Council, Clar. S. P., ii, p. 176.
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course of an interview she had impressed upon Mazarin 
the need to succour the King through Ireland.^ A fort­
night later Henrietta herself enjoined the King to hasten
e 
3
2
the Irish peace and almost simultaneously she urged th
Supreme Council to be more conciliatory towards Ormond.
Shortly after this, Henrietta complained sadly that 
Charles was keeping her in the dark. Her anxiety was 
particularly acute because she feared that the King in 
his negotiations with Parliament at Uxbridge might commit 
some serious e r r o r . I n  a further letter she warned him 
specifically against any reconciliation v\hich would 
oblige him to deal harshly with his Catholic subjects:
"for if you do agree upon strictnesse against 
the Catholiques, it would discourage them to 
serve you; and if afterwards there should be no 
Peace, you could never expect succours either 
from Ireland, or from any other Catholique Prince, 
for they would believe you would abandon them 
after you had served yourself."5
^ Same to the same. Carte, VI, pp. 216-8.
2 Gilbert, IV, XIX-XXI; Green*, p. 270.
^ Com. Rin., 1, p. 495, Dec. 28. They should be satis-_ 
fied with the concessions specified in Ormond's commission, 
Scarampi sent her letter to Rome where it was given to 
Rinuccini on May 8th; cf. Embassy, pp. 553-4.
^ Dec. 30, Green^, pp. 276-7.
 ^ January, ibid., pp. 279-80.
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Charles denied that he was hiding things from her. 
According to his own lights he was no doubt being truth­
ful, but Henrietta had legitimate cause for complaint.
He had neither the time nor, perhaps, the inclination 
to keep her infoimed of all his plans. Moreover, there 
were occasions such as this one when it was physically 
impossible to maintain regular communications with Paris 
Thus, Henrietta frequently had to eat her heart out for 
news of her husband and such policies as she had in hand 
were always in danger of being undone by events in 
England.
That she continued to hold discussions v/ith the 
Irish agents may be inferred from the next exchange of 
letters between herself and Charles. On February 28th 
Charles warned her not to have too much to do with the 
Irish.^ Was he afraid that she might impulsively con­
clude some wild agreement or was he merely alarmed at 
the rumours then current in England that the ' Catholic ' 
Queen was consorting shamelessly with the rebel Irish ? 
We shall never Icnow. Certainly his warnii]g angered 
Henrietta Maria who, by an ironic coincidence, had 
written to him on the very same day to say that she was 
much troubled for fear he had no intention of making
^ Green#, p. 290.
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peace with the Irish *%hich is ruinous for you and me".^
At any rate he was soon trying to mollify her. He did
not question the soundness of her judgement, he wrote,
"for I desire nothing more than a peace there, and never
2
forbade they commerce there."
And, indeed, it is a remarkable fact that exactly 
seven days after he had cautioned her to be careful in 
her relations with the Irish, he sent her sweeping 
authority;
"to promise in my name (to whom thou thinkest 
most fit) that I will take away all the penal 
laws against Roman Catholics in England as soon as 
Cod shall enable me to do it ..."3
This authority may have been sent at her own request,
because almost immediately after receiving it she made
4
a direct approach to the Pope for assistance. It soon 
became clear that she intended to use this authority as 
a bargaining counter without reference to the Irish.
Only after the catastrophe at Raseby does she appear to 
have used it in negotiations with the Irish.
Henrietta was made inactive in April by an attack 
of the ague.^ Then in May she heard good news from
^ Ibid., pp. 290-1.
2 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 291.
^ Green*', p. 299.
5
Cf. Jermyn to Digby, Ibid., pp. 301-2.
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Charles. Ormond had hesitated to offer the latest 
concessions to the Irish which he, Charles, had instruc­
ted him to make. However, Charles had overcome his 
scruples so:
" ... that nothing but his disobedience 
which I cannot expect) can hinder speedily the 
peace of Ireland ".1
This may well have been the source of the prevailing
optimism at Saint-Cermain. It may also explain why the
Queen thought it possible to reach agreement with the
Pope without bringing in the question of the Irish
p
Catholics.
Meanwhile, the one positive outcome of the dis­
cussions that had been taking place between the Irish 
agents and the English Catholics in Paris was the 
decision to send a delegate to the Pope with their 
proposals for a settlement between Charles and the Con­
federacy. Either by accident or design, Henrietta Maria 
appointed the same delegate to plead for aid for the
^ May 12, ibid., pp. 303-4.
^ At about this time Henrietta Maria sent Pr. G-eorge 
Leyburn to Ireland with instructions to further a 
settlement between Ormond and the Irish; cf. her letter 
to Clanrickard, conveyed by Leyburn, P.M., Add. MS., 
42,063, p. 117. Later ^  Leyburn played a major part 
in Anglo-Irish relations; see below Chapter XiV,
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King,^ namely the versatile Sir Kenelm Digby, a key 
figure among the English Catholics resident in Paris 
and an old intimate of Charles. The curious feature 
of this mission to Rome is that Digby appears to have 
carried contradictory instructions. Though both the 
Queen and the committee wished him to point out that 
the causes of the King and the Irish stood or fell 
together, the former directed that all available aid 
should be destined for the King, the latter for the 
Irish. Nevertheless, Digby, who shared the romantic 
temperament of his cousin George, apparently foresaw no 
difficulty in discharging his duties to the satisfaction 
of both sets of clients. At the very moment when he 
set out for Rome, Rinuccini was about to leave it on 
the first stage of his long journey to Ireland.
Having set his affairs in order and having made a
^ It is possible that Henrietta Maria hit upon this plan 
in order to obstruct the Nuncio's mission to Ireland.
If so, it was a boomerang. Later on, when the Nuncio 
had reached Kilkenny, he was able to delay the declar­
ation of peace for months on the plea that he was 
expecting news of a peace arranged in Rome between 
Kenelm Digby and the Pope. See below, p. 449" fP'
2
Digby bad been imprisoned by Parliament but released 
through the intervention of the Queen Regent of Prance - 
who, according to Digby, was in love with him - on 
condition that he did not engage in any business likely 
to be prejudicial to the parliamentary interest. H.M.C.B., 
Portland MSS.. p. 126; see also D. J.. . VI, p. 153, P* 163, 
p. 206. Evidently he did not treat this pledge very 
seriously.
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slow pilgrimage through France, paying his respects to 
notabilities along the way, Rinuccini arrived in Paris 
on May 22, 1645; he was to stay there for over two 
months. He seems to have believed that a peace might be 
concluded between the King and the Confederates through 
the medium of Henrietta Maria and himself, although 
malicious writers have insinuated that his delay was 
dictated solelytya mercenary design to replace the 
Nuncio in France.^ He hoped also to improve the un­
happy relations that existed between France and the Pope 
in the hope that France would lend her moral and material 
support to his embassy. A careful reading of his re­
ports from Paris to Rome suggests that he was by no means 
anxious to depart for Ireland but, in fairness, it should 
be said that he genuinely believed that the key to 
success lay in Paris, and that he was encouraged inthis
belief by the promise of a settlement dangled before him
2
by Henrietta Maria. Mazarin also contrived to postpone 
his departure, perhaps at the Queen's request but more 
probably because he feared that Rinuccini would govern
1 Cf. Gilbert (Bellings), IV, p. 51.
2 Any lack of enthusiasm for going to Ireland on Rin­
uccini' s part seems to have developed in late July or 
August. Before this time he had on several occasions 
reported to the Secretary of State his haste to depart 
for Ireland.
389
Ireland in the Spanish interest. His method was to 
offer to supply money on condition that peace had 
previously been arranged with the King. As it turned 
out, however, Rinuccini*s stay in Paris was to prove a 
waste of time.
His first intention was to present the Pope's 
brief and Cardinal Pamphilio’s letter to the Queen. 
Accordingly, he requested an interview as soon as 
possible. The Queen refused to grant one on the grounds 
that it would give rise to the suspicion that she and 
her husband had made a treaty with the Pope, and that 
Rinuccini had been sent to her, acting in the King's 
name, rather than to the Catholic Confederacy.^ More­
over, she feared that the charge of conspiring with the 
Pope would be put into circulation by Parliament with 
the intention of attaching some of the King's Protestant 
supporters to their own side. Nonetheless, she was 
careful not to repel Rinuccini's advances altogether - 
for two reasons: she wanted to keep him in Paris; and
she did not want him to become inimical to the King's 
cause - detaining him in Paris must have seemed partic-
^ Birch, p. 36; it is interesting to note that in the 
course of a second visit to Rome in 1648 Kenelm Digby 
blamed Rinuccini for the refusal to meet ! Hynes, p. 23.
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ularly necessary because at about this time she sent 
Colonel Pitzwilliam to Charles with his propositions 
for obtaining Irish troops. Accordingly, she judged it 
best to invite him to pay her an informal visit. Rin­
uccini, very conscious of the solemnity of his embassy, 
refused to accept this proposal, and wrote to Pamphilio 
for advice. Pamphilio's reply was important as a clear, 
categorical statement of the papal position; it was 
dated 17 July:
"That the Pope's orders to the Nuncio were, that 
by the intervention of the Queen's confessor, or 
some other person, whom he should think more 
proper, he should inform her Majesty that the only 
design of his Holiness in sending him to Paris 
before he went to Ireland, was that he should 
show his regard for her Majesty as sovereign of 
that Island, and receive such orders from her, as 
she should judge necessary for the promotion of 
the Catholic religion in Ireland. That His Holin­
ess was influenced in this affair by no political 
motive, and that if the Queen thought it would be 
any prejudice to the interest of the King her 
husband, or in any other respect inconvenient, to 
admit the Nuncio to a public or private audience, 
his Holiness had not the least intention to 
expose them to such an inconvenience. Upon the 
whole, his Holiness left it to the discretion of 
the Nuncio, whether he would accept of a private 
audience ..."1
Meanwhile Henrietta Maria had sent her Confessor 
to Rinuccini in order to apologise again for her inabil­
ity to countenance a solemn visit, to repeat the reasons 
for it, and to add the novel argument that the law ^
^ Embassy, pp. 563-4.
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of England did not permit the reception of the repre­
sentatives of foreign powers without the prior appro­
bation of the King and Council. Though encouraged by 
this overture Rinuccini nevertheless deemed it wise to 
show his displeasure at not being granted a formal 
invitation. ^
Shortly afterwards a new development took place. 
According to Rinuccini's own report Jermyn came to Paris 
from St. Germain, the residence of the Queen, with a 
request that Mazarin should exert his authority to bring 
about a peace between the King and the Irish, the King 
having empowered his wife to act as his agent.^ What 
seems to have happened was that the Queen, having re­
ceived news of the calamity at Naseby, had determined to 
negotiate a treaty with the Irish agents in Paris, in­
voking the King's letter of March 5th as her authority 
for doing so. Up to this point, she may have been cool 
to the 'rebels', as she had sometimes described them, but 
it was now plain to her that they were the King's only 
remaining hope of assistance.^ She hoped that Mazarin
^ Ibid., pp. 27-9.
^ Ibid., pp. 35-6.
^ It was also beginning to dawn on her that in the absence 
of an Irish peace Catholic princes would prefer to help 
the IrishTtither than the King. Cf. Jermyn to Digby,
Birch, p. 54; Husband, p. 852.
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would act as the intermediary, realised that Rinuccini 
would have to be drawn in, and intended that the Queen 
Regent, on behalf of France, should be the guarantor of 
any agreement reached. Some historians have regarded 
the plan simply as a device for retaining Rinuccini in 
Paris and persuading him to devote the moneys at his 
disposal directly to the King's needs. Doubtless this 
thought was present in the Queen's mind but it was 
probably an incidental consideration; the Irish agents 
discerned no guile in her proposal and welcomed it with 
alacrity;^ in any case, why should not the Queen have 
regarded it as logical to conclude a treaty with the 
Irish in Paris? She herself had more right than any other 
person to act for the King, the Irish agents were on the 
spot, the Papal Nuncio could attend meetings in person, 
the French could play the part of the honest broker, 
and, best of all, it would put an end to Rinuccini's 
mission, since he could scarcely go to Ireland once the 
lord lieutenant's authority had been restored..
On being approached Mazarin, with typical caution, 
referred the matter to O'Hartegan and Bellings^ asking
1 If the Queen herself is to be believed, they had in fact 
mad.e her many offers even before December, 164-4. Of. 
Greene, p. 269.
2 Bellings arrived in Paris on May 25 and it was arranged 
that he should journey back to Ireland with Rinuccini, 
Embassy, p. 10; the author of the Aphorismical Discovery 
(p. 79) made the dubious allegation that Bellings obtained 
£30,000 from the Pope which he gave to the Queen.
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them to draw up a list of their demands. In turn they 
consulted Rinuccini who tendered some excellent advice on 
the art of drafting documents; the conditions should be 
restricted to as few headings as possible lest their 
very length might make them appear exorbitant, and the 
number of clauses should be reduced to a minimum lest 
prolixity should lead also to obscurity. Had Rinuccini 
already grasped the simple truth that the differences 
between the King and the Confederacy were fev; but funda­
mental, and that up to that time the truth had been 
buried under a mass of minutiae ? At any rate O'Hartegan 
and Richard Bellings, who, Rinuccini observed, were most 
anxious to make peace with the King and to use their 
combined forces against the common enemy, expressed their 
willingness to participate in a conference with Jermyn 
and emphasised their unalterable loyalty to the Grown, 
always saving the security of their religion. Rinuccini 
feared that the whole transaction might be a fresh arti­
fice for delaying his departure.^
O'Hartegan prepared the peace proposals, of which 
the main points were: retention of the churches and
church lands; repeal of the penal laws; freedom from 
the jurisdiction of the Protestant church; an independent
^ Embassy, p. 36.
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Irish Parliament; places for Catholics in the government 
of the country.^ These terms struck the Queen as exces­
sive, though they must have been much as she expected, 
and she asked the Nuncio to intercede with the Agents to 
abate their demands and not to leave Paris before a 
treaty had been concluded.
She conveyed her requests through Sir Dudley Wyatt, 
a man of some standing at court who had been ordered by 
the King to join the Queen shortly after the battle of 
Naseby on June 14,  ^and who frequently acted as a royal 
messenger. Wyatt visited Rinuccini on 3 August. He 
began courteously as well as shrewdly by assuring him of 
the high esteem in which the Queen held him, and went on 
to say how much she relied upon him to effect an early 
peace between the King and the Irish. Though making no 
effort to disguise the gravity of the King's situation, 
he pointedly stressed the fate that awaited the Confeder­
acy if the King should be destroyed, and the wisdom of 
mutual assistance. Out of self-interest the Irish should 
modify their demands and agree to terms. In the course 
of his argument Wyatt made the significant observation
^ Hynes, n., pp. 24-3.
 ^Wyatt reported his arrival in Paris to Digby in a 
letter dated July 12th, C S P. -'7^
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that for the time being, at least, the Confederates 
should not attempt "to extort the whole at once", presum­
ably seeking to imply that the King dare not accede to 
all their demands for the sake of present expediency but 
would be willing to do so once restored to power with 
their help. Finally he said that the Queen desired that 
Rinuccini should remain in Paris until the business had 
been concluded, since she believed that his influence 
would be decisive in getting the Pope to take a favour­
able view of the negotiations. To all this Rinuccini 
replied that he saw little difficulty in arranging a 
durable peace provided that the security of religion was 
first assured. Yet he had been impressed as we gather 
from his report of the interview to Pamphilio, in which 
he remarked how great the honour to his office would be 
and how much it would facilitate his mission, if the 
principal points of a satisfactory peace had been settled 
before he quitted France. He ended with a reference to 
his own view of the purpose of his mission; if he went 
to Ireland with the peace settled and if the King and 
the Confederacy were to make common cause, then he would 
be able to devote his whole attention to the restoration
of the church.^
A few days after seeing Wyatt, Rinuccini sent Domenico
Embassy, pp. 46-8.
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Spinola, his chosen go-between, to the Queen with assur­
ances of the Pope's and his own zeal in her service.
Having expressed her satisfaction at this demonstration, 
the Queen proceeded to complain about O'Hartegan and 
Bellings for insisting on intolerable conditions and 
threatening to fight to the last drop of blood if their 
terms were not met ; they had no intention of making 
peace unless compelled to i t H o w e v e r ,  she trusted 
Rinuccini to persuade the Confederates to be more com­
pliant, and repeated her wish to see him in private, 
explaining that she appreciated the reasons for his un­
willingness to pay his respects except in full solemnity. 
On the following day she sent Wyatt again to inform him 
that she would write to the King to request that she be 
given complete powers to negotiate a peace. Receiving 
further instructions as to the attitude he should adopt, 
Rinuccini in his turn again sent Spinola to the Queen to 
let her know of the Pope's concern that she should not 
suffer the least inconvenience as a result of granting
^ Both the Queen and the King had already conceived the 
impression that O'Hartegan was not to be trusted. Thus, 
the Queen had written: "As to the Irish agent, that is
here, ^ £ 7  is a Knave. V (Greene, p. 299). The King simil­
arly described himf^ K^. (^ M#^ .^ v^ lWhat had happened was
that O'Hartegan's optimistic reporr on the Queen's atti­
tude to the Confederacy and his hopes of seeing Ireland 
ruled as a Catholic country (see above p. n.iT ) had
been intercepted and published by Parliament, much to 
Charles' embarrassment.
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an interview to his Nuncio. During the same visit 
Spinola delivered to the Queen the Pope's brief together 
with the letter from Pamphilio.^
At about this time Rinuccini received from Rome the 
memorial that had been submitted to the Pope by Kenelm 
Digby on behalf of the English Catholics with a request 
for his comments. In this they tabulated their griev­
ances and expressed the hope that any Irish peace would 
contain conditions to the benefit of Catholics in England 
as well as insuring the total security of religion in 
Ireland and making provision for an Irish expedition to 
assist the King's cause in England. They envisaged a 
conjunction of the forces of the Irish and English Cath­
olics and specified the conditions under which this
o
operation should be effectual; these conditions were as 
follows:
1. That the Irish do not come to England with less 
than ten or twelve thousand men; that they may 
subsist of themselves without any fear of being 
cut off even by those Erglish Protestants, who 
serve under his Majesty.
1 Embassy, pp. 49-52.
2 This was an unrealistic project. Many English Catholics 
had fled to Paris and Flanders; others were in the hands 
of Parliament ; while those who remained free in England 
were scattered throughout the King's regiments and would 
find it difficult to leave their posts. Probably it was 
merely hoped that the Catholic gentlemen would assemble
in some such predominantly Catholic area as South Wales.
It was in that region that Glamorgan counted on obtaining 
support for his Irish expeditionary force.
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2. That two sea-port garrisons be delivered up to 
them.
3. That the General and all the officers be named by 
the Irish.
4- That the General be subject only to the immediate 
orders of the King.
5. That this army be kept together in a body, and 
not obliged to go upon any particular service, 
except by order from the General and council of 
war.
6. That the English Catholics, by the King's command 
and authority, have a power of meeting in a body, 
and with a corps of horse, answerable to the 
Irish foot, forming one army.
7. That the Catholic General of this body of English 
horse be such a man, as shall not be distrusted 
by the Irish, but approved of by the Irish 
General.
As to the question of the peace between the King 
and the Irish, they emphasised the importance of leaving 
out no detail vhich would imperil the security of their 
religion in Ireland, but asseverated that no demand 
should be made involving a change in the political govern­
ment as this would impel the King to agree with Parlia­
ment rather than the Irish to the ruin of the Catholics 
alike in England and Ireland. The peace might be the 
more easily procured if the Queen were to use her influ­
ence with the King to promote the negotiations. Here the 
Pope might exercise weighty influence by admonishing the 
Queen as to her duty and by making any material assistance
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he might be willing to of f er cont ingent upon the King
surrendering to the demands of the Irish Catholics
beforehand. They explaiiWthe need for such caution with
a slighting comment on the King's integrity who,
"was not to be trusted, when once his interest 
might tempt him to agree with his Parliament, 
to whom he had often solemnly declared his 
resolution to consent to any severities against 
the Catholics: and his word was not to be
relied on, as appeared from the case of the 
Earl of Strafford and the Bishops, whom he 
sacrificed, after he had sworn to protect them'. "
If the Pope should decide to aid the King, then His 
Majesty should be first obliged to agree :
1. That all the penal laws against the Catholics in
Ireland be abrogated.
2. That the oath of allegiance be abolished.
3. That the Catholics be as capable of any honours,
posts, offices etc., in the Kingdom and Parliament, 
as any other subjects.
4. That the King^not agree with the Parliament, unless 
the latter should ratify the articles above-mentioned,
3. That to confirm these articles, all the strong places 
in Ireland be put in the hands of the English and 
Irish Catholics.
Should the first three of these demands be conceded it
would be reasonable to look forward within a few years
to the reconversion of the whole Kingdom, and this might
well be the prelude to the absolute extirpation of
heresy in tire Northfi^Uv
^ Com. Rin., I, pp. 664-70.
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In promoting the case of the English Catholics 
Kenelm Digby by no means neglected the Queen's business: 
indeed, he seems to have been personally of the opinion 
that the interests of the Crown and of the Catholics 
might be made to coincide though only by neglecting 
some of the salient provisos contained in the above 
memorial, especially with regard to the necessity for 
securing the absolute supremacy of the Catholic Church 
in Ireland as the vital preliminary step. For he pro­
posed that the Pope could best contribute to the revival 
of the faith in England by granting all subsidies to the 
King and the united English Catholics, and made great 
play of the alleged interest of the royal pair in propa­
gating the faith in England. He emphasised that whereas 
the structure of the pre-Heformation Church remained 
substantially intact, it would be dismantled irreparably 
by a victorious English Parliament. Thus, far from en­
couraging heresy by supporting Charles, the Pope would be 
in fact preserving the true faith. The Catholic cause 
in Ireland and the cause of the monarchy in England were 
complementary. Vf hen the Irish had expelled the Scots 
and the Parliamentary forces from Ireland, they would fall 
upon the English rebels and restore the King to his 
rightful place. Then, Digby insinuated, England would be 
restored to the true faith and the counter-reformation
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would sweep irresistibly across the rest of Protestant 
Europe. All that threatened the realization of this 
dramatic Catholic recovery was the temporary poverty of 
Charles I - who had been reduced to this plight just 
because he had shown clemency to Roman Catholics. In 
the light of these facts he pleaded for a grant of money 
to the Church.^
Digby' s statement on the King's behalf was based 
manifestly on fancy rather than fact, and there is little 
point in examining it seriously since the Curia correctly 
appraised its worth. But his mission to Rome is not 
therefore to be taken lightly. It affords yet one more 
illustration of the King's slackness, not to say dis­
honesty, in allowing delegates of questionable integrity 
and palpable irresponsibility to negotiate in his name.
It is true that it was Henrietta Maria who actually 
instructed Digby to go to Rome, but Digby was in Rome 
for almost a year during vhich time Charles had frequent 
reports about his progress from Saint Germain. In any 
case, Digby was to return to Rome on a second mission in 
1648 with Charles' blessing.
It is difficult to see why those who dispute Glamor­
gan's sincerity fail to take these embassies of Digby 
into account. By any scale of reckoning loyalty and
^ P.R.O., Roman Transcripts, B.L. 8616, ff 115-22.
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personal integrity, Digby must be placed below Glam­
organ. If Charles could use Digby in this way, then 
why should he not also use Glamorgan ?
Pamphilio, who had not been impressed by Digby's
1 o
rhetoric, although Digby had believed him to be, was
very doubtful whether the Church in Ireland would bene­
fit from granting the Queen the aid she sought. Never­
theless, the Pope was not willing to cold-shoulder the 
Queen altogether and when Digby's entreaties became more
^ It v/as probably with the worldly attitude of such men 
as Kenelm Digby in mind that the Pope had warned the 
Nuncio to be on his guard against many of the Catholics 
at Court ; for their zeal for their faith was not so 
strong as to enable them to hear with pleasure news of 
the Catholic successes in Ireland, because they liked 
to regard Ireland as a chattel of the English government 
and the Irish as an inferior race. Embassy, L ii.
^ To judge from the following letter from Jermyn to 
Digby, May 30/June 9, 1645;
"Sir Kenelm Digby is arrived at Rome, and has 
had audience with the Pope, who has given him 
the best reception that the first visit was 
capable of, that is, the fairest promises in 
general that can be wished; if he may be 
relied on there are good hopes of money there, 
but you Icnow he is of a sanguine family, and 
himself yet the melancholiest of it; he has 
visited some other of the petty princes of 
Italy's but they are a frugal generation."
Husband, p. 851.
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ardent after the news of ïïaseby had arrived, he decided 
to make a grant of 15,000 Crowns to the Queen,^ as a 
token of his good will. Aware that even this limited 
generosity might cause alarm and offence to the Confed­
eracy he instructed Rinuccini to assure them that it 
signified no falling-off in his enthusiasm for their 
cause, but rather was intended to benefit them by pre-
p
disposing the Queen in their favour.
Rinuccini^s commentary on Kenelm Rigby’s several 
representations to the Pope was on the whole adverse.
He deplored the parcelling out of Papal subsidies in 
the belief that the King’s allocation would be too 
trifling to be of any use, and, in any event, would be 
uselessly squandered by the bad management of the King’s 
Protestant advisers. He likewise condemned the proposal 
to put the cause of the English Catholics first, adver­
ting on the foolishness of expecting anything from the 
King so long as he was surrounded by Protestants and 
reiterating that the English Catholics in Paris acknowl­
edged that their well-being depended entirely upon the 
assistance to be expected from the Irish when that
^ The grant actually given was 20,000 Crowns, Embassy,
p. 560.
 ^Ibid., pp. 559-60.
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island should be at peace.^ Por these and other reasons 
it was unwise to place any trust in the good intentions 
of the King and the Queen since even if they were genuine, 
they would avail nothing in the juncture of affairs that 
had been reached. And Rinuccini himself could detect 
no real concern for the Catholics in the King’s behaviour, 
nor, for that matter, in the behaviour of the Queen.
Indeed it had to be reported that the Queen had spoken 
harshly of the Irish, stigmatising them as rebels and 
stating that she refused to receive the ITuncio, because 
he was bound for the kingdom of rebellious subjects.
In short, Rinuccini tartly concluded, before His Holi­
ness thought of giving subsidies to the King would it 
not be better to await some concrete manifestations of
o
his solicitude for Roman Catholicism ?
Rinuccini’s observations apparently confirmed the 
Pope and Pamphilio in the suspicion which they enter­
tained as to the sincerity of Rigby, and they decided
3
to be more cautious in the answers they would give him.
^ According to Rinuccini, the English Catholics in Paris 
disapproved of Rigby’s conduct as their representative 
in Rome and believed that he was furthering his private 
interests rather than the Queen’s oft their cause. 
Embassy, p. 38.
2 Ibid., pp. 38-41. 
5 Ibid., p. 565.
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They also referred unkindly to the treaty planned by 
the Queen between the King and the Irish, saying that 
they ’knew it must soon vanish in air, even if it did 
not cover ... some artful design or other.’ In general, 
they were coldly realistic about the prospects of the 
King ever concluding any settlement, seeing that he and 
the Queen listened to the counsel of their Protestant 
advisers. As for the negotiations through Mazarin, whose 
regard for his religion was so low that he would do 
little to promote it, these were futile.^ Altogether 
the impression emerges that the sympathy of the Pope 
for the Royal cause, never warm from the outset, steadily 
evaporated during the months of June and July as he per­
ceived more and more indications that they had no really 
firm intention of assisting the Catholic religion. By 
the beginning of August he had come to the conclusion 
that Rinuccini was wasting his time in Paris and that he 
must proceed without delay to Ireland. Moreover, it is 
probable that Scarampi’s reports from Ireland were loud 
with alarms of peace being made by the Ormondists before 
the Nuncio could arrive. Accordingly he sent him several 
letters in the course of August in which he made it 
plain that the Catholic cause had only suffered harm
1 Ibid., pp. 565-6 .
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from the negotiations in Paris and in which he peremp­
torily ordered Rinuccini to go to Ireland at once, b y
way of Flanders if necessary, should Mazarin be unv^illing
1
to supply a ship.
Stung by the Pope’s reproof and at last aware of 
Henrietta Maria’s real motives, Rinuccini decided that 
the Irish peace could only be settled in Ireland. And 
so, he left Paris and went to La Rochelle to find a 
ship. There he was met by an agent of the Supreme 
Council, G e o f f r e y  Baihton, on his way to Paris, who informed 
him that nothing had been done about concluding a treaty 
and that everyone was impatiently awaiting his arrival. 
Batron gave him a letter from G l a m o r g a n  in which Glamorgan, 
t o o ,  expressed impatience for the Nuncio’s arrival and
p
the pleasure he hoped to have in working with him. On 
the surface, it would appear that both Badon and Glamor­
gan deliberately refrained from t elling Rinuccini about
kfrjtte, (-0
Glamorgan’s treaty. Yet, what could thej^gain from such 
concealment ?
Rinuccini e n t e r e d  Kilkenny amid acclamation on
^ Ibid., pp. 5 6 5 - 7 ;  Com. Rin., I, p p .  7 1 3 - 1 6 ;  cf. also: 
" T h e  displeasure of His Holiness increases at your 
E x c e l l e n c y ? 8  d e l a y  in your departure for Ireland ..." 
Embassy, p. 5 6 9 .
 ^fînibassy, p. 74.
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November 14th, eight days before he reported the return 
of the Peace Commissioners and Glamorgan from Dublin. 
His arrival in Ireland marked the beginning of the 
decisive split between the Anglo-Irish and the Native 
Irish and the appearance of the party names, Ormondists 
and Nuncioists.
Meanwhile, Henrietta Maria and her entourage had 
continued to expect news that an Irish peace had been 
arranged.^ Viewed from Paris the obstacles to such a 
peace assumed trivial weight when balanced against the 
King's desperate situation. The long delay was attri­
buted to the clumsiness or downright opposition of 
Ormond. On one occasion Jermyn wrote to Digby:
" ... I will not believe it possible there can 
be so great an error committed, as to leave 
any way unattempted for the Irish Peace, & 
more from thence."2
It was no doubt for this reason also that Jermyn for­
cibly recommended that the proposal to treat with the 
Irish agents in Paris should be adopted. He was con­
fident that a treaty could be arranged there with the
co-operation of the Queen Regent and careful to note 
that Henrietta Maria could be limited by the same
^ Their intelligence service seems to have been very poor 
while wishful thinking was common in the Queen's circle.
 ^Aug. 22, 1645.
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restrictions as those placed upon Ormond. "The only 
thing I fear is, that the King’s party in Ireland might 
possibly not acquiesce in such a peace, as would be fit 
for the King to make, and then he would have the scandal 
of it (for it would be a scandalous one, that is unavoid­
able) without the benefit of an assistance from Ireland."^ 
Digby replied:
"And whereas you write that perhaps my Lord 
Ormond is not the fit person to conclude that 
business, but that the management of it should 
be remitted to the Queen; I am much afraid, 
that the expectation of that in the Irish hath 
much retarded the hoped for issue of the peace."
There is no evidence that Digby had any grounds for
what he said and it may be that he simply wanted a
pretext for keeping the negotiations out of the Queen’s
hands, especially as he added a note that peace had now
been concluded !  ^ At any rate Saint Germain was silent
for the next few months.
^ Jermyn to Digby, August 5, Birch, p. 54; Husband, 
p. 852.
2 Aug. 27, 1745, Warburton, III, pp. 157-61.
Chapter IX
The Imprisonment and Release of the Earl of 
Glamorgan, November,1643 - January,1646.
Scarampi’s criticisms of the Glamorgan Treaty, es 
especially his charge that it was insulting to conclude any 
agreement before the Papal Nuncio had arrived, disturbed the 
Supreme Council. Accordingly an explanatory statement was 
prepared for Rinuccini. Spinola, who had been sent on in 
advance, evidently considered that Rinuccini might have 
sailed from Prance before the statement could reach him and 
therefore held it back against his arrival at Kilkenny.
The Council had two objects: to show that they were 
not weakening in their resolve to obtain formal ratification 
of their religious demands in a free parliament; to urge 
Rinuccini to join them as soon as possible. Negotiations were 
proceeding v/ith the Royalists but no agreement had yet been 
reached. They were in such urgent need of his advice and the 
stimulus of his actual presence that if he did not come soon 
their cause would suffer. As an obvious inducement, they 
reminded him that the large question of the re-establishment
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was awaiting his attention. Finally, he could be sure that
9
even if peace had been arranged before his arrival, he would 
find himself in a Catholic country governed by a predominantly 
Catholic administrattion - a country in which the Papal 
representative would command automatic respect and in which 
the Church freely exercised its rightful authority. Only 
because it was impracticable were they not insistent upon 
having an exclusively Catholic government.^
Obviously framed by the Ormondists, this statement 
was skilfully designed to insinuate that, while the Nuncio 
was very welcome, the conduct of negotiations was already 
in good hands and should be no concern of his. By slyly 
associating him. with religious matters they also wished to 
v\rarn him not to meddle in national politics. Their hints 
were not taken, though Rinuccini's manner towards them was 
ingratiating.
In a formal address at a ceremonial reception given 
by the Supreme Council he outlined the purpose of his mission. 
Remembering the Pope's admonition he named assistance to the 
King as his primary object and begged them to ignore the 
slanders of those who put a sinister construction on his 
appointment. Naturally, he also desired to see them released 
from the yoke of the penal laws as well as to see the churches
1. Com.Rin., I, pp.728-31.
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and church lands restored to their rightful owners.^
On the whole his speech was well received. Sellings
recorded that his observations on allegiance to the Grown
3Lcame in for special applause. His anxiety to see the penal 
lawsywas also unexceptional. But his reference to 
ecclesiastical property must have fallen harshly on the 
ears of some members of his audience, not just because they 
feared for their own interests but also because they had 
prevision of a threat to the peace negotiations. And, indeed, 
Rinuccini's private impressions were far from encouraging.
Soon after his arrival at Kilkenny, the last of the 
Peace Commissioners returned from Dublin to report progress 
and frankly to recommend as satisfactory the concessions 
from Ormond which they brought with them. In an attempt to
i
gain his support they submitted a memorandum to Rinuccini 
explaining why it was essential to eonclude the treaty 
without delay. Ormond had consented to the removal of 
penalties affecting the free practice of their religion as 
well as to the reduction of the privileges of the Protestant
clergy. Several other important concessions had also been
1. Com.Rin., I, pp.728-31.
2. Gilbert (Bellings), IV,p.7.
3.Cf.Plunket-Dunne MS.,p.780: "...but in a few days managed 
by the factious party and finding the Assembly inclined to 
peace, he called one of the bishops to him, and told him he 
heard the Council was going to conclude a peace with Ormond, 
but if they do, says he, 1*11 depart from them immediately 
and bring with me all the bishops of the nation. Happy, had
he then gone."
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obtained; the laws of inheritance were to be altered in 
their favour; upon taking a new oath of allegiance to be 
devised by the King Catholics would become eligible for 
state appointments; they would be allç^èd to establish at 
least one Catholic university; lastly, there would be an 
act of oblivion. Alive to the particular worry of the 
clergy they reminded Rinuccini of the General Assembly’s 
resolution never to surrender the church property in the 
Confederacy's possession. As to the further protection of 
religious interests they referred to the conditions of the 
Glamorgan Treaty. Y/ith a view to forestalling criticism of 
the secrecy of that treaty they pointed out how damaging 
to the King’s cause its premature publication would be. 
Further to allay his fears ;for the Church, they commented 
that Catholics could always feel secure under the government 
of Ormond who might yet return to the faith of his birth.
This last observation introduced a note of sham 
into their argument, for no one seriously envisaged Ormond’Ô 
reconversion. On the other hand, their final remarks came 
from the heart. Having first contrasted the strength of 
Parliament with their own material weakness and pointed to 
the King’s desperate plight, they concluded that the only 
way to save both the King and themselves from certain 
destruction was to combine the resources of Catholic and 
Protestant Royalists. Vidiat alarmed them above all other fears
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was the evident intention of the English Puritans to mass 
all their strength against Ireland once they had destroyed 
the King.^
Unconvinced, Rinuccini attacked these arguments in 
2
the Supreme Council. Both treaties, the one to he arranged 
with Ormond and the one already arranged with Glamorgan, 
should be published simultaneously. If this were not 
immediately expedient, then they they should wait for a 
suitable opportunity. To announce a political settlement, 
v^hile suppressing the religious treaty - which was, in any 
case, of dubious value - would dismay the Pope and the 
Catholic Princes.
Rinuccini also rebutted at length the o b j e c t i o n s  
which had been raised to simultaneous publication. It might 
well be true that news of the Glamorgan concessions would 
lead some Royalists to desert the King, but such defections 
would be more than offset by the assistance which they would 
receive from abroad. He did not share their trust in ÿhe
fair dealing of Ormond, who carefully limited his concessions
so as not to weaken the Protestant supremacy. Thus, there____
1 .  Com.Rin., I I ,  p p . 4 5 - 6 3 .
2. Scarampi’s report to Rome of the objections he had raised 
to concluding a treaty with Glamorgan had prompted 
Pamphili to warn Rinuccini, whose v^hereadouts were then 
unknown, not to set sail for Ireland unless he were sure that 
the treaty had not been signed. Should he have already sailed 
-  a s ,  of course, he had - he was to strive to extract better 
terms from G l a m o r g a n .  If, however, the treaty had been 
concluded, he was to p l a y  a passive part. Pamphili to 
Ëinuccini, Nov.3, Embassy? pp. 370-2.
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was no mention of a Catholic succeeding Ormond himself and
np provision for the bishops to sit in Parliament. Their
university would be controlled in practice by Protestants.
In leaving the real power with Ormond they would be vainly
throwing away their advantages.
These were strong words. Even so, Rinuccini privately
1
believed that they had had little or no effect.
In reply, the Council fell back for the most part
upon their previous arguments. They did add, however, that
a special article in the political treaty would alio?/ for
further concessions to be made by the King at an appropriate
time. Rinuccini, they suggested, underestimated the strength
of the Protestants. And once again they asserted that only
union with Ormond could preserve the Crown and hence the
2
Irish Catholics from destruction.
3
Still unimpressed, Rinuccini reported his assessment 
of the situation to Rome. As he saw it, many people were 
content with Glamorgan’s concessions and desired peace. 
Others, including most of the clergy, were inclined to war. 
Even this second group did not object, however, to giving 
assistance to the King "without concluding peace or even
insisting on conditions from him." But as to the eventual____
1. Com.Rin., II, pp.7Z-^T.
2. Ibid., pp. 79-84.
3. V/ith the help of Scarampi who had been ordered to remain 
in Ireland as his informant. Pamphili to Scarampi, Sep.4,
1645, P.R.O.E., Trans. Archiv. Vat., Inghil.,8.
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outcome of the debate uncertainty prevailed.
It is significant that Rinuccini did not apparently
regard the Glamorgan Treaty as binding but referred to it
as though it were an informal rather than a formal agreement.^ 
If this were the general attitude at Kilkenny, it goes far
towards explaining why there had been no attempt to fit out
the expeditionary force called for by the terms of the treaty.
Rinuccini’s appearance at Kilkenny undoubtedly
interfered with Glamorgan’s plans. It had been difficult
enough trying to persuade the Ormondists to agree to the
public treaty. Now he was faced with the additional burden
of having to convince the Nuncio that his very commission
to make religious concessions was valid. He also discovered
that it would be necessary to obtain Rinuccini’s approval
before troops could be sent to England.
In practice, the price of Rinuccini’s support turned
out to be doing whatever Rinuccini wanted done. So desperate
v/as Glamorgan, however, to obtain the troops for England
that he did not seem to notice this fact.
2
Within a few days of Glamorgan’s return from Dublin 
a meeting took place at which Glamorgan pledged himself to 
co-operate with the Nuncio and to do nothing without his 
consent. For his part, the Nuncio expressed warm sympathy 
for the royalist cause and assured Glamorgan that he had been
1. Embassy, pp.95-5.
2. November 22nd.
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sent to Ireland not only in order to re-establish the Church 
but also to use Ireland as a vehicle for the restoration of 
Charles I.^
Sanguine as always, Glamorgan assumed that he had made
2
a conquest of the Nuncio and wrote in this vein to Ormond. 
The latter, disconcerted by the Nuncio's arrival, had 
inquired how it was likely to affect him.''^
On December 23rd Rinuccini submitted his first 
comprehensive report to Rome. He divided the articles for 
peace into kinds: those concerning the political government 
of the country which were being discussed with Ormond; 
secondly, the ecclesiastical articles contained in 
Glamorgan's treaty. These concessions of Glamorgan he 
described as 'really good' and as authorised by two ample 
but secret powers. The Supreme Council was most anxious to 
publish the Ormond articles, which he believed to have been 
agreed already, but desired to keep the Glamorgan Treaty 
secret. It had not yet occurred to him apparently that 
having secured possession of the church lands recovered 
since 1641 under the terms of the Glamorgan Treaty, the
lay members of the Supreme Council could not see why they
1. Com.Rin., II,pp.88-9.
2. T.C.P., XVI, p.182.
3. Ibid., p.75.
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should not sign an agreement with Ormond.
Like Scarampi, Rinuccini was dissatisfied with 
Glamorgan’s treaty. His concessions did not afford sufficient 
security for the re-established Church and in any case 
depended too much on Glamorgan's ability tôtinsure their 
application. He insisted to Glamorgan, therefore, that 
further safeguards were required: the next Lord Lieutenant 
must be a Catholic; Catholic bishops must be allowed to 
sit in Parliament; the Catholic university which it was 
planned to establish must be self-governing; the Supreme 
Council must not be dissolved until the King had formally 
ratified the religious concessions which he had made. The 
two vital points - the question of Ormond's successor and 
the right of Catholic bishops to seats in Parliament -
1
had been omitted during the discussions with Glamorgan 
which had taken place in Dublin, whereas political matters 
had been given every attention. Rinuccini concluded his 
report:
" I have induced the Earl of Glamorgan to promise 
me all the conditions which your Eminence will 
see in the enclosed papers signed by him. "2.
The ease with which Glamorgan succumbed to Rinuccini's
influence has been adduced as evidence both of his weakness_____
1. This must have been a verbal slip - 'Glamorgan' for 'Ormond'.
2. Embassy, pp.94-100; Glamorgan's Engagement, Com.Rin., II, 
pp. '4.
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of character and the improbability of his credentials. There 
are also other explanations of his behaviour . To begin with, 
it was instantly clear that Rinuccini would wreck his treaty 
if he could not be reassured about the future of the Church. 
He happened to know that the King himself wished to appear 
friendly to the Nuncio.^ It was also now vital for the 
relief of Chester that a small force be despatched without 
delay. Finally, he believed that Rinuccini was prepared to 
withdraw his opposition to a political settlement with 
Ormond and to lend his support to the relief of Chester only 
on condition that the position of the Church was made more 
secure.
Glamorgan’s overriding concern to obtain Rinuccini’s
consent to the public treaty and relief for Chester was
revealed in the letters written to Ormond after his return
to Kilkenny. Even the Supreme Council apparently relied
2
upon him to soften the opposition of the Nuncio. On
November 28th, he wrote:
"before Sunday night I am morally certain a total 
assent from the Nuntio shall be declared to the 
propositions for peace." 3
Later on, he spoke of being engaged in preparing a force of
3,000 men for Chester.^ And on December he stated:
  ; ;
1. See below p^, 4:10-1
#R., XVI, p.237. He has undertaken to the Council to 
obtain the Nuncio's consent to the public treaty.
3. Nov.28, ibid., p.182.
4. Ibid., p.236.
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"30,000 (sic) foote and 500 horse will be ready 
any time after January 1stVI
These and other letters written to Ormond at about
this time also leave little room for doubt that, as far as
Ormond was concerned, Glamorgan was assisting his own
efforts to arrange a treaty by exerting his influence at
Kilkenny; nothing more. For his part, Glamorgan obviously
had something to hide. Always diffuse, his style now
became so absurdly involved that he could not have been
writing with a clear conscience. Since it would be
pointless to examine all his letters in detail, the
following extract i,m as a characteristic example:
"Kilkenny December 12th,
... The pains and industrie used to bring that 
pass which your Lordship will understand by my cosin 
(Daniel O ’Neill) and Mr. .;elsh, is not by me to be 
related who have had the honour therein to have my 
share, and perhaps more than was fit for me to 
discover even to those I trusted unto most; but 
for your Excellency's better information, when I 
have the honour to wayt on you, nothing of consequence 
shall be concealed, and as freely, in order to his 
Majestie’s service in England, I am confident you 
will be pleased to deal with me, who am so much 
yours. I expect orders out of this day for the 
gathering together of three thousand good men from 
their winter quarters in expectation of your resolution 
in the main, which after you have taken and privately 
signified as you think best, yet in the execution 
thereof it may be I may serve you, which shall be 
always my endeavour making no question but your 
Lordship will be cautious that, under the power you 
have over me, others be not sheltered, unawares of 
your Excellency, to prejudice me and the King's 
service, which is all unto, and forewarned by having 
had it often wounded through my sides, my desire and 
intention of wayting upon your Excellency, my cosin 
O'Neale can tell, whom not to stay longer..."1
1. T.G.D., XVI, p.207; Gilbert, V, pp.208-9.
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Rinuccini’s next report to Rome, dated December 27th, 
described an important meeting that had taken place exactly 
one week previously, at which Glamorgan had shown him two 
secret commissions from the King empowering him to conclude' 
a peace with the Irish on whatever terms he thought advisable. 
Glamorgan had also produced a letter, the contents of which 
he had not allov/ed Rinuccini to examine, but which was 
addressed to the Pope in the following manner :
"Beatissimi Patri Innocentis Decimo."
The Nuncio’s report then stated that Glamorgan had 
next produced a letter addressed to Rinuccini himself, 
dated April 30th,^and "sealed with a small superscription 
in French". The letter, written in French, had been 
transcribed by Rinuccini and ran as follows:
"Sir,
Hearing of your resolution for Ireland, we do
not doubt, but that things will go well; and
that the good intentions begun by means of the
last Pope will be accomplished by the present,
by your means, in our kingdom of Ireland and
England, your joining with our dear cousin the
Earl of Glamorgan, with whom whatever you shall resolve,
we shall think ourselves obliged to, and perform it
at his return. His great merits oblige us to this
confidence, which we repose in him above all, having
known him above twenty years ; during which time he
has always signally advanc’d himself in our good
esteem, and by all kind of means carried the prize
above all our subjects. This being join’d to the
consideration of his blood, you may well judge of
the passion, which we have particularly for him,
and that nothing shall be wanting on our part, to
1. If the letter was forged, its date was, as usual, well 
chosen. Rinuccini was appointed in March. Charles would 
probably hear of the appointment some time in April,
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perfect what he shall oblige himself to in our 
name, in consideration of the favours received by 
your means. Confide therefore in him.; but in the 
mean while, according to the directions, which we 
have given him, how important it is, that the 
affair should be kept secret, there is no occasion 
to persuade you, nor to recommend it to you, since 
you see, that the necessity of the thing itself 
requires it. This is the first letter, which we 
have ever wrote immediately to any minister of State 
of the Pope, hoping, that it will not be the last; 
but that after the said Earl and you shall have 
concerted your measures we shall openly show ourself 
as we have assured him,
Your Friend,
Charles R. -,
From our Court at Oxford, 30th April 1645."
Two comments upon this incident are called for.
First, if genuine, the letter of April 30 was written at
the very time when Charles and Henrietta Maria, supposedly
shocked by the news of Rinuccini’s appointment, were planning
2
to keep him out of Ireland. The explanation of this could
be that Charles at least, had not really been dismayed;
in any case, it was sound insurance to placate the Nuncio
if he should get to Ireland after all.
Secondly, Rinuccini was mystified for three reasons ;
(i) V/hy in the month of April, when he was not faring
too badly, should the King have wanted peace so
desperately v/ith the Confederates?
(ii) Whj should he have given such large powers to 
Glamorgan?
3
(iii) Y/hy had the letter to the Pope not been sent?
1. Embassy, pp.103-5; Birch, pp.130-1; I have used Birch's 
translation from the French.
2. See above pjp.
3. Embassy, pp.103-5.
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The first two of these questions have been considered
elsewhere. Lingard in his History of England had this
to say about the third:
"The King, on his return to Oxford, after the 
disastrous campaign of 1645, still placed his 
principal reliance on the mission of Glamorgan 
and to induce the Court of Rome to listen to the 
proposals of that envoy wrote with his own hand, 
the two following letters, of which the originals 
still exist in the Archive Vaticano, one to the 
Pope himself, the other to Cardinal Spada, requesting 
of both to give credit to Glamorgan or his messenger, 
and engaging the royal word to fulfil whatever should 
be agreed upon by Glamorgan,in the name of his 
sovereign".1
And it is indeed a fact that the letter to the Pope is
still to be found in the Vatican archives. It promised
to fulfil whatever arrangements Glamorgan should make
in the King's name and was accompanied by a letter
addressed to Cardinal Spada. The two letters -are
printed below:
Beatissime Pater,
Tot tantaque testimonia fidelitatis et affectus 
consanguine! nostri Comitis Glamorgan!ae iandudum 
accepimus, camquo in illo fiducian, uerito reponimus, 
ut Banctitas Vestra ei fidem merito praebere possit, 
in quacunque re, de qua vei per se, vel per alium 
nostro nomino cum Sant Vestra tractaturus sit.
Quaecunque vero ab ipso certo statuta fuerint, ea 
munire et confirmare pollicemur. In cujus rei 
testimonium brevissimas has scripsimus manu et 
sigillé nostro munitas, qui nihil magis habemus in 
votis, quam ut favore vestro in cum statum redigamur, 
quo palam profiteamur nos,
Sanctitatie Vestrae 
Humillimum et obedient!ssimura 
Apud Curiam nostram servum
Oxoniae Octob: 20.1645. Charles R.
(size, 17 X 10.7 cm.)
1. VIII, app., pp.627-8.
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Erninentisseme Domine. Pauca scripsimus mo Patri 
de fide adhibenda censanguineo nostro Gomiti 
Glamorganiae, vei quilibed ab co delegate; quam ut 
Emin^ Va pariter omni favore prosequatur, rogamus; 
certoque credat now ratum habituros, quiequid a 
raedicto Comite, vel sue Delegate cum Sanct^o patro, 
vel Eminent!a Vestra transactum fuerit.
Emin^® V^®
Pidelissimus Amicus
Charles R._ .
Apud Curiam 
nostram Oxoniae 
Octob: 20.1645.
(sixe, 9.5 X 8.5 cm. with the seals intact)
Glamorgan must have taken the step of producing the
King’s alleged letters to Rinuccini and the Pope at this
time in an attempt to soften Rinuccini’s opposition to his
Treaty. Throughout his time in Ireland he regarded
Rinuccini as the most influential man at Kilkenny, not
only because his opposition held up the passage of troops
to England, but also because his prestige with the continental
princes and the Pope, who were expected to furnish supplies,
was judged to be much greater than if fact it was.
Were the letters forged? It is impossible to say.
The date, October 20th,was appropriate, since, at this
2
time, Charles was still relying on the Irish. Moreover, 
if the King had sent the letters to Glamorgan to be forwarded
to Rome, as he would have to do, by whom else dare he forward
them? Glamorgan would have received them probably in about
1. Ibid; the two letters are printed therein; similarly
6. Albion, app., p.423; the originals bear the reference 
Arch.Vat., Instrumenta Miscellanen, No.6655.
2. See above
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the middle of December. This would also help to solve 
Rinuccini’s problem: why had the letters not, in fact,
been sent?^
There is, however, one disconcerting fact which tells
against Glamorgan. Charles was not in or even near Oxford
during the whole month of October and yet this letter to
the Pope reads ’Apud Curiam nostram Oxoniae, Octob: 20,
1645.’ On the date October 20th he was in fact at Newark •
planning, however, on the very evening of that day to make
his way to Oxford. The plan fell through and it was not
until November 4th or 5th that he actually returned to 
2
Oxford. It is of course not inconceivable that he thought 
it more convenient to despatch a messenger from Newark than 
from Oxford and that, anticipating his return to Oxford 
within a few hours, he saw fit to subscribe his letter 
’Oxford’. It is also possible that he considered it 
more dignified to locate himself at Oxford rather than 
give the impression that he was on the run.
By December 20th, despite frequent and protracted 
discussions with the Supreme Council, Rinuccini had 
despaired of obtaining acceptance of his views and decided 
to take the important step of rallying the Catholic clergy 
behind him. To this end he summoned the bishops to his
1. J.H. Round argued that these two letters were forged; 
see below p$*. j -3.
2. Cf. Great Rebellion, IV, pp.127-8, p.134, and pp.137-9; 
of. also Symonds, p.248, p.268.
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residence and prevailed upon them to sign a protest
against the treaty contemplated with Ormond and to
promise to oppose it with all their strength. It was
resolved to produce this protest only when the Council
appeared to be on the point of concluding a treaty^
Then on New Year’s Eve Rinuccini had startling news
to report. Glamorgan had been arrested in DublinI
He accused Ormond and Digby of conspiring to deprive him
of his military command and stated that those members of
the Council still resident at Kilkenny - apparently the
majority had joined their families for Christmas - regarded
the arrest as a personal affront and angrily talked of
marching against Dublin in order to release him. He
himself had been in favour of this action but considered
it wise to express his views with caution. However, in'
the middle of the uproar members of the Ormondist faction
2
had returned from Dublin and soothed the passions aroused. 
Nevertheless, there was confusion and dismay at Kilkenny, 
particularly as it was rumoured that Digby had heatedly 
informed the Peace Commissioners in Dublin that those 
about Charles would ’’throw him out of the window" rather
1. Com. Rin., II, pp.87-8.
2. News of the arrest was apparently brought to Kilkenny by 
Plunket and Brown who had been visiting Dublin as peace 
commissioners. T.C.P., XVI, p.243. According to one 
questionable source (Aphor.Disc., I, p.100) Plunket and 
two (sic) others managed to^slip away from Dublin in order 
to convey the news to Kilkenny. This was plainly untrue.
To which members of the Ormondist faction Rinuccini was 
referring it is impossible to say. Perhaps, his report was 
inaccurate.
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than consent to religious concessions^ Eventually it 
was decided to convene a General Assembly in order to
determine what should be done?
At least one of Rinuccini's statements concerning 
Glamorgan's arrest was false, for Ormond, and Digby had 
done no more than they believed to be their duty. The 
occasion and circumstance of the arrest were dramatic, 
exemplifying the complex character of the war in Ireland 
and the difficulty in preserving any political secret for 
long. Copies of the Glamorgan Treaty had been circulated 
among the leading ecclesiastics, among whom was kalachy 
O ’Queely, Archbishop of Tuam and Confederate President of 
Connaught? On returning to his diocese soon afterwards, 
O ’Queely and his party collided with a force of Scottish
troops outside Sligo and he lost his life in the ensuing
skirmish. His captured baggage contained, among other 
inflammatory documents relating to the Supreme Council's 
peace negotiations, his copy of the Glamorgan Treaty and 
this quickly passed through the hands of the parliamentary 
commissioners in Ulster into the possession of the Parliament 
in London? It came as a welcome surprise, for it seemed
1. This rumour, like so many then current, was a travesty 
of the truth. What Digby had said was that the Council 
would have taken him personally by the neck and thrown him
out of the window had they thought he approved of such articles.
2. Embassy, pp.108-111.
5* Embassy, p.108. The Archbishop of Gashell informed 
Rinuccini that he had personally drawn up a copy of the 
Treaty for the Archbishop of Tuam.
4. Husband, p.787; Rushworth, part IV, 1, p.239; L.J.,VIII, 
p.103. ^
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to confirm the suspicion long entertained that the King
was engaged in clandestine dealings with the rebel Catholics.
Edward Husband, official printer to Parliament, was ordered
to print copies. Meanwhile, exactly four months after
the signing of the treaty, someone in the North of Ireland
had sent a copy to Dublin where it came into the hands of 
1 2
Ormond and Digby, recently arrived from the Isle of Man. 
Aghast, they decided they had no choice but to confront 
Glamorgan and charge him with treason. Conveniently, he
had just been invited to Dublin.
It appears that Digby, whose coming had been fortuitous^
ffrom the time of.his arrival^^had urgedythe need for obtaining 
relief fdrt^ m the King. Ormond, now assuming that the Con­
federates would find his latest concessions acceptable, had 
thought it appropriate to ask the Peace Commissioners for 
particulars of the assistance they were planning to give
3
the King. They had sent John Walsh to answer for them 
and Glamorgan had seized the opportunity to inform Ormond 
through Walsh that 3,000 troops were about to be marched 
to the sea-side enroute for Chester.
1. According to the Plunket-Dunne MS., p.794, this copy was 
sent "in order to alien him from any conjunction with the 
Irish and she?/ him the King was inclined to Popery".
Very successfullyI
2. Digby had landed at Carlingford on or before December 
7th; cf. N. loftus to Sir Philip Percivall, Dec.8., Egmont 
MSS., I, 1; Clanrickard to Deyburn, Dec.7, Add. MS.,
%2T063, p. _ . .
3. Brief given mee by John Welsh Esq the 15 December, 1645, 
T.C.P., XVI, p.208.
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Walsh had been unable give the precise ini'ormation 
required nor could he amplify Glamorgan's message. Digby 
had then written to the Peace Commissioners, pointing out 
that timely aid to the King would be the surest means of 
obtaining concessions and proposing that Plunket and Brown 
be despatched to Dublin at once with full instructions^
At the same time Glamorgan had been also' invited to explain
p
his plan for the relief of Chester;
Accompanied by Plunlœt and Brov/n, Glamorgan reported
at the Castle on Christmas Bve and was cordially greeted
by Ormond. Shortly afterwards, however, he was placed
under close arrest and on December 26th he was summoned
before the Council and charged with treason by Digby.
In his defence, Glamorgan stated that he had done
nothing without Ormond’s knowledge. This was coolly
denied by Ormond who asked:
"can his Lordship produce any writing under my 
hand which in prudence you ought to have demanded 
to excuse you to the King my master."
Glamorgan could only refer to a sealed paper which he had
given to Ormond some time previously, putting him on his
honour not to break the seal until,he, Glamorgan, had been
1. Ormond to Muskerry, Dec.15, T.C.P., XVI, p.210.
2. The Old Irish interpretation of this invitation was 
that Digby wished to supplant Glamorgan as the commander
of the expeditionary f o r c e  going to iizngland; of. Embassy,p.9 9
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to England in order to obtain fresh instructions from
the King. At first Ormond could not remember the incident
but eventually he recalled that under Glamorgan’s own eyes he
had put it away carefully in a drawer of his desk.
"And there it lives", he added. Giving his keys to Sir
Paul Davis he asked him to go and bring it.
When Davis returned, Ormond asked him to break the
seal. Davis did so and drew out a sheet of paper on
which were inscribed "many hundred figures of cartwheels,
pot hooks, stars, demi-circles and such hieroglyphics".
With masterly aplomb Ormond passed the paper round the
table so that the councillors could help him with their
advice in solving such a complicated problem. v/hen the
paper reached Glamorgan, all he could say was that he had
1
forgotten to leave the key to the cypher with Ormond.
1. Among the Carte Papers there is an undated letter from 
Glamorgan to Ormond (T.C.P., XVI, p.238). It is printed 
in Gilbert (V, p.209) immediately after another letter 
dated December 12. In fact, it would seem to refer to 
this strange document. It runs thus;
"My Lord,
And I further protest that this paper contains a 
true represen of my zeal towards your Lordship, 
under my hand and seal, desiring it be kept private 
by you, yet so long only until either word or deed 
of mine derogates from what I herein express, 
grounded upon the passion you show to his Majestie’s
service and if that time shall ever come (which
a thousand deaths shall sooner prevent) then I do 
not only disengage your Lordship from keeping this 
private but do desire it may be published, so that 
I may to the whole world as will appear a perfidious 
dissembler as my ambition till then is to be esteemed
II
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That seemed to put an end to the dangerous suspicion
that Ormond had been informed of v/hat Glamorgan was doing.
Relieved, Digby jumped up and asked that Glamorgan be
removed to an adjoining room. Thereupon he proceeded
to substantiate his charge. The Treaty, he pointed out,
embodied the transcript of a commission dated March 12th,
1645, purporting to be signed by the King, which Glamorgan
had cited as his authority. Digby declared the commission
to be either forged or additional to other instructions
narrowly restricting its application. Turning to the
two Confederate Commissioners who chanced to be present
he observed that the disclosure was fortunate since the
King could never have sanctioned the concessions made by
Glamorgan. At worst Glamorgan was a common forger; at
best he had deliberately misinterpreted his instructions^
2
The Council resolved to keep Glamorgan in custody.
Further details of the occasion of the arrest and 
of subsequent developments are contained in the report to 
the King’s council in England, despatched on January 5th; 
since it was sent officially on behalf of the whole Privy 
Council it need not be regarded as an accurate reflection 
of Ormond’s ov/n views. It stated that Digby had produced 
copies ofithree documents: the agreement between Glamorgan 
and the Confederates; certain other concessions; and a 
copy of Glamorgan’s alleged authority of the 12th March.
1. For the whole of this account, cf.
2. Order of Dec. 26, T.G.P., XVI, p.222. "
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The coniment of the Privy Council is typical of their 
attitude towards the Catholic Irish. The articles, 
they asserted, amounted to the abolition of the royal 
supremacy and the permanent loss of Church lands; it was 
impossible that the King could ever have suggested them. 
There had, the report continued, been no alternative 
but to imprison Glamorgan in Dublin Castle. On December 
50th, when he had produced his counterparts of the 
original articles, he had been released from close 
confinement. Certain discrepancies between the counter­
parts and the originals had been noted. I or example, 
Glamorgan had sworn under oath not to engage the Con­
federates to fulfil their part of the terms until 
conditions from his Majesty, and by his Majesty, be 
performed; in his own copy, the v/ords "or his pleasure 
known" had been added. As the privy councillors pointed 
out, these words "doe make a wide difference in the sense 
It is possible that the addition was trivial, depending on 
vfhen Glamorgan made it; for if'he made it immediately 
before handing over the copy to the Privy Council, he 
intended to deceive, by implying that the conditions of 
the treaty were not obligatory on the King. This would 
still be no proof that Glamorgan was acting independently, 
since his whole purpose may have been to protect the King,
1. Carte, VI, pp.333-8.
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but it does reveal that he was guilty on at least one
occasion of tampering with a document which, though only
S' copy, was so important as to merit being kept intact.
The report mentioned that a copy of the interrogation
of Glamorgan by a sub-committee of the Council consisting
of Roscommon, Lambart and Ware, which had taken place on
the 27th, was enclosed. Glamorgan had been questioned
at great length, but his answers had been non-committal
and he disclosed very little new information. His main
worry seems to have been to insist that the King was not
in any way bound by the Treaty, and that his own honour
remained inviolate. About his authority,
"and he sâith humbly conceived he hath don 
nothing herein, but what he hath warrant for, 
and don as the examinât humbly conceives, without 
intention of prejudice to his Majestie’s honor or 
service or to the Protestant religion, all 
circumstances considered."
His last qualification indicates that he held to the
opinion that the established church was likely to fall
with the King unless aid was received from Ireland.
Hater on he reiterated:
"...that what he did therein is not obligatorie 
to his Majestie as he conceives."
He then claimed that he had kept the Treaty secret,
"(he did not) communicate or impart the same or 
the substance thereof to any person whatsoever".
And, two days afterwards, he insisted on protecting his
own honour by adding to the report of the proceedings.
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"And without any just blemish of my honour my 
honesty, or my conscience." 1
Glamorgan’s answers convey the general impression of
a man who was trying to protect his king while saving himself
from disgrace. It is to be noted thaÿ there was no a£lgf^ ?ssfcdQ>n
2
whatsoever of his being guilty of disobedience.
Digby’s version of the circumstances of Glamorgan’s 
arrest added some interesting information. The Confederates 
had been encouraged by it to stiffen their demands, he 
reported, and it was quite clear that the three thousand 
troops earmarked for the relief of Chester v/ould not be 
despatched uhless consent were given to Glamorgan’s articles.
He even proposed, with his customary regard for political 
expedience, that the indictment of Glamorgan should be
a
deferred until these troops had embarked.
On the surface, Digby was seething with indignation at
Glamorgan’s treachery, but there\good reasons for believing
that he was at least doubtful of the King’s innocence. To
/
Nicholas he gave an equivocal account of what had happened.
On the one hand, he emphasised that Glamorgan’s alleged 
commission was improperly attested as though this were 
sufficient proof of its being forged. On the other hand, he 
observed that he had had no choice but to arrest Glamorgan 
for the sake of protecting the King’s good name, as though 
there were some doubt about the justification of the arrest._____
1.T.C.P.,XVI, pp.224-8; Gilbert,V,pp.216-21.
2.Cf. "... but the harl stands stiffly to what he has done and 
justifies his actions at full." W.Ioftus to Sir Philip Peroivall,
. Jan.14, l646,Egmont MSS. , 1,1, p.277. __________
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Again, he remarked that it would have been madness for
anyone to enter into such a treaty with the Irish without
authority from the King. ^
Digby was very conscious that he v/ould be blamed for
the arrest. He asked Y/alsingham to inform his friends the -
Babylonians, namely the English Catholics, that he intended
2
no harm to Glamorgan. And to Hyde he wrote in wry amusement:
"... have I not carried my body swimmingly, who 
before being so irreconcilably hated by the 
Puritan party have thus seasonably made myself 
as odious to the Papists. Weill ray comfort is 
that the very few honest men in the world v/ill 
love me the better, and while I do the part of 
a man of integrity and honour I am willing to 
trust ^od for the rest." 3
It is noteworthy that in these and subsequent remarks about 
Glamorgan there is no hint that he regarded Glamorgan as 
a traitor.
Two facts about Digby's part in Glamorgan's arrest can 
be firmly established. First, he had no knowledge of any 
secret understanding between Charles and Glamorgan. This 
may be inferred from his correspondence with Ormond and 
Nicholas. Some time later, moreover, Hyde informed Nicholas 
that he was convinced of Digby's complete ignorance of the 
ulterior purpose of Glamorgan's mission to Ireland.Secondly, 
while his references to Glamorgan were always derisive, he
was not actuated by malice - although a number of people,______
1.Beland. III, p.268; see also Rushworth,pt.IV,pp.240-2; for a 
^comment on the absence of the signature of a Secretary, see 
below p4>-bqc— 7-
2. See below pi>.&^^'%where the letter is printed.
3 . Clar.S.P.. 11. p.199.
4. Ibid., p.345. On March 7th,1647.
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apart from Rinuccini and the Old Irish, b e l i e v e d  that he was.^
O n  January 2nd,1646, Rinuccini protested against
Glamorgan's arrest in letters to Henrietta Maria and Mazarin.
On January 3rd, the Supreme Council, in demanding his release,
contracted to be answerable for his appearance on summons to 
TKhjî. VV\ouscva,oV.
a trial. :'jr^OG troops were standing by for the relief of
Chester; nothing was wanting but shipping and the release
of their commander.^ On January 6th, they stated flatly
that they would not resume negotiations until Glamorgan
had been freed. At the same time, they pointed out that
the relief of Chester was being dangerously delayed.^
The suggestion that Ormond heeded these injunctions
does not c a r r y  much weight. He had always presented a firm
front a g a i n s t  the Confederates and would have considered it
demeaning to yield to such obvious pressure. In any case, he
did not authorise Glamorgan's release for another fortnight. 
Glamorgan himself never doubted his imprisonment
would be s h o r t .  On the 5th he wrote to his wife:
"this cloud (his imprisonment) will be soon dissipated 
by the sunshine of the King, my m a s t e r . "
_____ This letter to his wife is extremely interesting. In the
1. Of. "Vfe be all lost in Wales by the business between you and 
my Lord of Glamorgan...Rupert is in great enmity with D i g b y .
The oculist (Lord Astley) does likewise lay much blame on the 
said Lord because of Glamorgan his business... Sir Nichplas 
Byron reports D i g b y  to be the cause of our misery, that Glamorgan 
has done nothing but with your consent and the Kings'.'
Archbishop Williams to ^rmond, Jan., :.izr GtD>■ ~
2. Embassy,pp.111-12.
3 . T T O T F T T X V l ,p . 243 ; G i l b e r t , V , pp. 233-4.
4 .Î.C.P.,XVI,p.243.
5. Glamorgan had in fact been released from close confinement 
on December 30th ( T . C . P . , X V I , p.231).
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first place, it was written in a style so much clearer than
that of the letters addressed to 0rmond that it would seem
he had been deliberately obscure. Secondly, it revealed none
of the misgivings of a guilty conscience. Glamorgan claimed
that he had bfeen;
"guilty of nothing, that maÿ testify one thought 
of disloyalty to his Majestie."
His conscience was untroubled:
"And believe it, Sweetheart, were I before the 
Parliament in London, I could justify both the 
King and myself in what I have done."
He also made a declaration scarcely to be expected from a 
petty schemer:
"But I must needs say, from my Lord Lieutenant, 
and the Privy Council here, I have received as 
much justice, nobleness and favour, as I could 
possibly expect." 1
Unless Glamorgan were an unconscionable liar, there is no
longer any question that he believed he had carried out
at least the spirit of the King’s intentions.
Ormond privately interviewed Glamorgan on January 6th,
/
urging him to produce the commission authorising him to 
treat with the Confederates. Glamorgan claimed that the 
commission was being kept as a pledge by the Supreme Council.
As they would be vexed if he v/ished to show it to Ormond,he
2
would be grateful if Ormond would withdraw his request. Ormond
1.Husband, p.827; Rushworth, pt.IV, I, p.246.
2.Gilbert, V, p.240.
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must be presumed to have agreed to do this since, in a letter 
written to him,after his release, Glamorgan thanked him for 
his forebearance.^Of what further took place at the interview 
nothing is known, but on the next day, January 7th, Glamorgan 
sent this note to Ormond:
"Sir, I have here enclosed sent to you a copy of 
the power which your Excellency saw last night 
and did yourself transcribe. I have likewise 
attested it, which I should not have done but 
but I am confident that your Excellency is therewith 
satisfied, and that you will make no other use of 
it but for your own satisfaction, and your future 
warrantie to his Majestie if need should require, 
but otherwise not to show it to any as you tender 
his service, and the good of one so much devoted 
to you as myself,who yesterday wayted upon you 
provided to declare and manifest to your 
Excellency many other powers and favours from 
his Majestie which havw both enabled me and 
encouraged me to doe his servide, and next to 
him and his your Excellency, to whom I shall I 
hope, have conveniency hereafter to enlarge 
myself...And give me leave to say without vanity 
that if I be not now nipt in the bud I hope to 
produce such a blossom of loyalty and zeal to the 
King, my master’s service...as may render my 
memory considerable to future ages." 2
The warrant to which Glamorgan here referred was that of
3
January 12th. His later reference^to having produced other 
favours from the King suggests that he had shown Ormond the 
rest of his patents. Obviously he believed that Ormond had 
been not unimpressed by the appearance of these and would 
very shortly release him.
The concluding flourish apparently referred to his efforts
1. See below p. 9-61^ /where the letter is quoted.
2. T.C.P., XVI,p.233; Gilbert,V, pp.244-3.
3. Confer Ormond’s memorandum on Glamorgan’s papers, ibid., 
p.251; Gilbert, V,pp.240-1.
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to raise troops, upon which he elaborated three days later^in 
another letter seeking to hasten his release. Having first 
commented on the serious effects of his imprisonment on the 
King’s cause, he went on;
"...at Kilkenny I had gotten credit for £15,000 
sterling...by this, to be imployed in his 
Majestie’s service, and had also taken order... 
of shipping to be imployed in the transportation 
of the forces intended...(for the) reliefe of 
Chester, and the armye designed for England...
I doubt not that I shall make it to his Majestie 
...the whole world, that I have done nothing since 
my comeing... but with great care and regard unto 
the honour of his Majestie and the... preservation 
of hms Protestant subjects." 2
Here again is the guarded implication that he could explain
JL
everything but dar^ not do so.
Glamorgan’s assertion that he had gone far to prepare
an expedition for the relief of Chester may have induced
Ormond to release him. ivhether he was being truthful or
not, it was plain that his continued imprisonment would be
damaging to the King’s interests. Even so, Ormond was
characteristically slow in making up his mind. Onÿy after
/
a space of 12 days did he issue an order for Glamorgan’s 
release. Of course he may have been waiting for instructions 
from the King.
Although concern for the relief of Chester was an 
important consideration, it may well be that Ormond’s chief 
reason for releasing Glamorgan without waiting for the King’s
orders was the conviction that Glamorgan was innocent. To______
1. Between the 7th and 10th he wrote yet another letter which 
contained a cryptic reference to his self-sacrifice (Gilbert,V,
2. Ibid.,pp.245-6. p.245).
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begin with, he allowed a fortnight to elapse before writing
to inform the King about his interview with Glamorgan. Again,
on January 9th, with the interview still fresh in his mind
he actually told Nicholas that there was "nothing worth your
trouble" to report pertaining to the "Glamorgan proceedings".^
Now there may be several explanations of this curious behaviour
but surely the most likely is that he recognised that
2
Glamorgan was telling the truth and had no sense of urgency 
about communicating with the King. It is to be noticed that 
when he did so he made no reference to the "other favours" 
shown to him by Glamorgan; and, yet, if he thought they were 
forged, he might have been expected to ask the King to 
verify them.
It has already been stated that while it is difficult
to determine the precise meaning of Glamorgan's correspondence
with Ormond during his stay at Kilkenny, it as at least
evident that Ormond knew.of the commission empowering
Glamorgan to raise an army. This could explain why he was
/
so easily convinced of the legitimacy of the commission of 
January 12th. For he would surely not have taken on trust a 
commission that bore a close resemblance to that of March 12th 
which every member of the Council in Dublin presumed to be 
forged, if he had not some previous knowledge of a special
1. Gilbert,V, p.247.
2. For what it is worth Father George Deyburn subsequently 
attributed the statement to Rinuccini and the Bishop of Clogher;
"he (Glamorgan) had exactly followed his Instructions; and ;
particularly that concerning my Lord Lieutenant, whom he had ! 
made acquainted with all, that he had transacted with the Irisjj 
of which he could produce proof." Memoirs,p.295.
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relationship between Charles and Glamorgan. In other words,
he would have tried to avoid charging Glamorgan with treason
in the first place had he not believed him guilty and would
not have freed him within less than a month without the
strongest of motives. Again it must be emphasised that he
was deeply concerned about the delay in relieving Chester,
but given his consistent regard for constitutional propriety
it is hard to believe that this was the deciding factor. It
is also true that Glamorgan was released on bail but there
was no guarantee that he would appear for trial and in any
case it was, to say the least, unusual to allow bail to
Cl
someone charged with tr^son.
The Supreme Council wrote yet again to Ormond on January
16th pointing out how prejudicial to the assistance destined
2
for the King was Glamorgan’s continued confinement. No help 
whatsoever would be given to the King until he was released. 
The Council also sent Sir Robert Talbot to Dublin to reinforce
3
their protest. Glamorgan himself made a further plea to be 
released on bail in an uncharacteristically lucid letter. It
1. On December 12th he had notified Archbishop Yfilliams at 
Conway and Lord Byron at Chester that 3,000 troops were about 
to sail under Glamorgan's command; cf. Y/illiams to Ormond,
Jan.2, 1646; T.O.P.,XVI, p.242; YYilliams to Lord Astley, Jan. 
25, Tanner MSS.,lx,f.386; Williams to Ormond,n.d.,T.C.P.,
XVI,p.443.
2. Ibid., p.276; Gilbert,V, pp.246-7.
3. Garte,III,p.222.
4. This letter contained the statement:
"It is not unknowen to yo^ Excy, or any of the 
Councill, thay my comeing into this Kingdoms
was in obedience to his MaTiesQommands who was 
pleased to imploy me hither."
Gilbert, V, p.248.
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is probable that these various petitions and the tough 
attitude of the Supreme Council served to hasten Ormond's 
decision.^
Glamorgan was formally released from custody on
January 22nd, twenty-eight days after his arrest. Rinuccini
for one was astonished. In his words, which were no doubt
typical of what many people were saying:
’’.. . to set at liberty a prisoner arrested on 
a charge of high treason, without the knowledge 
and commands of the King is an unheard of 
proceeding.' 2
Bail was fixed at the enormous sum of £40,000, £20,000 being 
subscribed by Glamorgan himself and the other half being 
shared equally between Clanrickard and the Earl of Kildare.
It is doubtful if this were a completely serious arrangement. 
No attempt was made to bring Glamorgan to trial in spite of 
the fact that the charge of treason was never officially 
withdrawn and yet none of the guarantors forfeited their
i
recognizances.
1. In one of his reports to Pamphili Rinuccini stated that 
Ormond had sent messengers to Kilkenny to apologise for 
Glamorgan's arrest (Embassy, p.113). It does not follow of 
course that Ormond had been intimidated.
2. Embassy, p.115.
3; T.C.P., XVI, p.285.
Chapter X
The Glamorgan Treaty disavowed by the King,
January - March, 1646.
Within a few days of Glamorgan’s return to Kilkenny
the King had publicly repudiated his treaty. The news
penetrated so slowly into Ireland, however, that two months
were to elapse before it reached the Supreme Council. In
the meantime, Glamorgan continued to play an active part in
the political life of the Confederacy.
Before leaving Dublin he had promised Ormond that he
would try to persuade the Supreme Council to consent to
the declaration of a public agreement without further delay.
This should not have been difficult for the Ormondists were
entirely in favour. Indeed, Rinuccini likened their
impetuosity to reach agreement to^a river in flood^ And
certainly Browne and Darcy were immediately sent to Dublin
2
to clear up the remaining difficulties.
But whereas the Supreme Council welcomed Glamorgan’s
release as confirmation of his authority to offer religious
1. Embassy, p.115.
2. Muskerry to Ormond, Jan.28, Gilbert, V, p.254; same to the 
same, Jan.29, ibid., pp.254-5; Ormond to Glamorgan, Feb. 3, 
ibid., p.257; see also T.C.P., XVI, p.290; ibid., p.291
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concessions, Rinuccini argued that as a man charged with
treason and only released on bail Glamorgan could scarcely
be regarded as an accredited envoy. It followed that there
could be no question of coming to terms with Ormond over
political matters. Rinuccini’s opposition was a serious
stumbling-block at a time when the Assembly was in session,
for though the Old Irish deputies were still disorganised
he could be counted upon to mobilise their resistance.
According to Rinuccini himself the Council was afraid of his
whipping up a hostile majority and tried in vain to postpone
or even cancel the first meeting of the Assembly. When this
attempt failed they not only sought to pack the Assembly
with their own supporters but drew up a doctored version of
the latest terms put forward by '^rmond^
(Coming from Rinuccini, such an allegation is suspect
and, to judge from the fact that the Assembly was convened as
early as February 7th, the delaying tactics and jerrymandering
of the Council could not have been either skilfully or
energetically executed^/^e opening of this sixth General 
1
Assembly afee marked the beginning of the decisive conflict
betv/een those who wanted public agreement with Charles I
even if it meant trusting to his word for future benefits
and those v/ho would not consent to agreement without cast-))
1. The sixth General Assembly had been summoned originally to 
determine v/hat action to take follov/ing Glamorgan’s arrest. 
According to Rinuccini the Council and the Peace Commissioners 
wished to cancel the summons after Glamorgan had been freed on 
/ the plea that there was now nothing the Assembly to discuss.
# 5
iron guarantees. After three months, the conflict was to 
end (iBlDWLptly with both sides irreconcilable.
During this period Rinuccini steadily organised the 
opposition by giving it a champion in himself and a platform.
It was no coincidence that at about this time the term 
"Nuncioists" was first used to designate the anti-peace 
party. In the Ormondist view the clergy, inspired by 
Rinuccini, broke up the Confederacy. Consider, for example, 
this estimate of their responsibility;
"The Roman Catholic clergy raised that hellish 
distinction of Old Irish and English which 
multiplied our miseries by a retrospect into 
ancient titles of some 100 years, and raised 
animosities that bàew up a war soon among 
ourselves; and this meerly to varnish their 
ecclesiastical pretences, & secure their 
church livings." 1
This was far from being a narrowly sectional judgement. With
the virtual eclipse of the King the Confederacy was no longer
at war with but one of two parties to a civil war but with
a united England. In this new situation it was therefore
essential to rally the v/ho le of Ireland by pooling their
resources with those of Ormond. By preventing union with
Ormond the clergy were guilty of fractionalism.
Looked at from one angle only this line of reasoning 
was sound. As the clergy saw it, however, it was the Ormondists 
themselves who were prepared to sacrifice their fellow 
Catholics for the sake of private gain.
______ At first, Rinuccini played a strong card. On November
1. Plunket-Dunne MS., p.790.
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30, 1645, Sir -^‘^enelm Digby^had at last procured the draft
of a treaty between the King on one side and the -^glish
and Irish Catholics on the other. The draft was signed by
Cardinal Pamphili and Digby promised to obtain the King’s
signature also and have it conveyed to Ireland. In due course,
the Queen rejected it without bothering to refer to to the
King but -tiinuccini was to remain ignorant of this until the
midsummer of 1646. Meanwhile, Pamphili had forwarded tae -
copy of the draft to Rinuccini empowering him to add to or
alter it as he saw fit and implying that the draft would
receive the royal approbation. The draft was to be produced
by Rinuccini if through any mishap the Glamorgan Treaty
2
should be dishonoured.
The ’’Roman" treaty, as it came to be called, was
most attractive. A distinction was drawn between the claims
of Irish and English Catholics. As far as Ireland was
concerned the Church was,to be completely re-established;
the penal laws were to be revoked; a free parliament was to
be summoned. Catholics were to be given high command in the
army; Dublin and other strongholds were to be placed in
Catholic hands; lastly, Ormond was to join forces and help
to expel the Scots and the Parliamentarians from Ireland.
3
________As for England, the penal laws were to be repealed by
1. See above pp.397-404; Embassy, p.576.
2. Ibid., p.572.
3. The English Catholics later made several amendments to
the clauses affecting them. These were forwarded to Rinuccini 
(Com. Rin..II. pp.121-3).
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act of Parliament. For their part, the Confederates were to 
send 12,000 troops to England under the command of Irish 
officers. This army would he supported by 2,500 horse 
commanded by English Catholics. In the first year the Pope 
would finance the expedition to the tune of 100,000 crowns ; 
he would also provide subsidies for two further years if 
they should be required. Charles would be allowed ten months 
grace in which to implement the terms concerning the English 
Catholics.^
Rinuccini always behaved as though this draft treaty 
had already received the royal assent, thus drawing upon 
his head the condemnation of his opponents who believed 
that he was trying to deceive them. Their criticism was 
not justified by the facts. The most serious charge that 
could be levelled against Rinuccini was this readiness to 
claim that the draft from Pamphili was the copy of a treaty 
already arranged in Rome, the original of which he would 
have shortly in his own hands. In several letters to 
Pamphili, in which to dissimulate would have been pointless, 
he expressed anxiously the hope that the original was on 
its way. On May 3rd, for instance, he complained that Digby 
had still not sent him the peace articles and wondered what
1. Com.Rin., pp.118-9-
2. Historians such as Carte subsequently accused Rinuccini 
of this deception.
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had gone wrong.^ It must be added, also, that for Rinuccini,
a devout and obedient churchman, any document signed by
his superiors in Rome had the force of holy v/rit.
At any rate he insisted that nothing further
1. Embassy, p.162. It is interesting to note that Rinuccini 
also laboured under the delusion that Kenelm Digby was 
bringing the original draft to Ireland in person. How he 
obtained this impression it is hard to say. Never in any of 
the accessible documents did Pamphili state that Digby was 
going to Ireland. Of course a letter from Pai^li might have 
gone astray. Alternatively Rinuccini might have derived feis 
information from some quite different source - a correspondent 
in Paris, for instance. In one letter to Pamphili Rinuccini 
wrote:
"And still the wonder continues that we have 
nothing from Digby since the 1st of February
nor from Invernizi since the 6th of January,
yet on that day the Nuncio of France wrote 
to me that he was about to set off immediately."
(Embassy,p.149)- But was he referring to the expected arrival 
of Invernizi rather than Digby? And yet again on March 5th 
he informed Pamphili that Digby was rumoured to be at Nantes
on his way to Ireland (Embassy, p.128; see also Com.Rin., II
pp.206-9).
The odd thing is that Digby himself never seems to have 
had any intention of going to Ireland. It maÿ be reliably 
inferred, therefore, that Rinuccini unwittingly misunderstood 
something which Pamphili had written.
/
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could be done in Ireland by way of negotiations until the 
original of the Roman treaty had been received. As on a 
previous occasion he assembled the bishops on February 6th 
and got them to sign a declaration in support of the Roman 
treaty. This declaration was to be kept secret unless it 
should become necessary to produce it. ^
On February 7th he appeared before the Assembly for
the first time. After presenting letters from the Pope and-
2 3
Pamphili he recommended the Roman treaty for their adoption.
It was at once apparent, however, that the majority were
disposed to vote for the Ormond treaty. Bellings considered
that Rinuccini*s speech made little impression;^ even the
norMiern deputies disliked the Roman treaty since it
contained no provision for the restoration of their lands ;
and many deputies believed that Rinuccini’s only purpose
5
was to obstruct the negotiations with Ormond. So strong was 
this feeling that in retrospect at least one chronicler was 
prepared to accuse the Nuncio of lying in order to curry
favour for the Roman treaty.______________________________________
1. Embassy, p . 178.;- . r?i nv
£o‘^ Both dated March 2nd, 1645, Com.Rin., II, pp.126-8.
3. Embassy, p.116 . He claimed that the Supreme Council had 
already received a copy of the treaty from their agents in 
Paris but deliberately suppressed it so as not to cLmpair
the chances of agreement with Ormond (ibid., p.117).
4. "it appears very strange (when I reflect on it) how little 
impression it made on the audience." (Gilbert, V,p.lO).
5. Ibid.
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According to this hostile source Rinuccini claimed 
that he had 4 frigates, arms for 4,000 men and money to 
underwrite the annual expenditure of any one province. If 
necessary, His Holiness would provide more. With regard 
to this allegedly false statement:
"The Author of Vindiciae Catholicorum Hibernia 
conceals these practices out of respect to the 
Pope or begat who knew he abused the people 
with lies, for he had neither arms nor money 
nor more than one frigat, nor any probability 
of either." 1
Convinced that it would require little persuasion to 
reduce the hostile majority Rinuccini prepared an oration 
which he delivered on February 9th. The gravamen of his 
argument was that, as Catholics, their first obligation 
must be to the treaty transacted in Rome, the original of 
which was shortly expected in Ireland. The Glamorgan Treaty 
was neither "honourable nor safe" whereas this one was not 
only "honourable and -%t rus tv/or thy " but "much more full and 
better", stipulating for a separate parliament for Ireland, 
for Catholics to hold various officés, and for the "absolute 
authority of the Nuncio in all ways". Mistakenly he stressed 
this last point, for while it seemed to him advantageous 
to possess so much power, the last thing the Ormondists 
wanted was to be subject to his control, especially in view 
of the close association he had already formed with the 
Old Irish.
1. Plunket-Dunne MS., pp.802-3.
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To advance his argument Rinuccini made one curious 
point. He declared that the peace would help the King’s 
cause on account of the yearly subsidy promised to him. It 
would also please Ormond and George Digby (1) as the latter 
had told Glamorgan through Deyburn during his imprisonment 
that he would obtain consent from the King to the free 
exercise of the Catholic religion in exchange for an 
annual papal subsidy.
Rinuccini invariably exaggerated the importance of 
papal grants in general and the size of the particular 
sum he had brought with him. As a result his frequent 
attempts to influence the policy of the Confederacy by 
representing the papacy as a source of largesse weakened 
rather than strengthened his prestige and laid him open 
to the charge of being deceitful.
After several practical comments on the best way of
waging war against Parliament, Rinuccini came at last to
his peroration. He contrasted the unpleasant fate that
/
awaited them if they contracted any treaty except that 
sponsored by His Holiness with the bright future otherwise 
in store. Finally, he proposed that while waiting for 
the original of the Roman treaty they should arrange a 
truce. ^
In advocating that treaty Rinuccini carefully
refrained from mentioning the clause referring to the_______
1. Com.Rin.,11, pp.135-8.
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surrender of Dublin and other strongholds to the Catholics.
His motive was that Ormond’s followers would never consent
to this proposal and that Ormond himself would reject it
even if the King approved^ ^Mere is an excellent example
of the partisanship of so much of the reasoning connected
with these negotiations. In suppressing the provocative
clause, Rinuccini considered himself to be acting with
2
justifiable circumspection. Yet Ormond’s alleged
oÇ covvCtSSlovx*?»
suppressioiywhich the King had empowered him to grant 
had always been ascribed to malice and self-interest. 
Similarly, at this very time, the peace commissioners 
were being accused of deliberately concealing the terms 
they had agreed with Ormond. If was permissible for 
one side to play the tactician but never the other.
Even so, Rinuccini’s eloquence still failed to move 
the Assembly and his opponents were able to enumerate 
several good reasons for concluding peace with Ormond 
at once. In the first place, Ormond had authority from 
the King only until April 1st. / If no arrangement had 
been made in the meantime, his authority might be 
permanently revoked. Then there was the desirability 
of combining forces with Urmond. Rinuccini’s suggestion 
that tliey should rely on a truce pending receipt of the
1. Ibid., p.129.
2. Hynes, p.54, paraphrases Rinuccini’s report of the 
suppression to Rome but makes no comment, as usual, on 
its ironic overtone.
i\
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Roman treaty was rejected on the grounds that the troops
earmarked'for service in England would refuse to embark
for fear of being treated as rebels in England; their
failure to come to the King’s aid at this time would be
disastrous. Among other points, they promised to abide
by any agreement made between the Nuncio and Glamorgan
should the Roman treaty fail.
On his side also, Rinuccini could put forv/ard
strong points besides easily rebutting some of the
arguments used by his opponents. His main objection was
to arranging a political peace v/hile ecclesiastical matters
were left in abeyance. It was all very well to talk
of trust, but what, guarantee was there that Ormond would
2not find pretexts for rejecting the Roman treaty?
It is plain that the exchanges were made with some 
heat. Father George Deyburn, an English priest attached
to the Queen’s household, and by her sent to Ireland to
woo the Confederates, resorted to provocative language.
The Nuncio, he said:
/
’’had slandered the Queen and imposed on the Irish
nation; that her Majesty had neither agreed nor
. would consent to any such articles, and that the 
fine story told them about the Roman treaty was 
only an idle representation, invented to ruin  ^
his'Maj.esty, and hind er the peace of the kingdom. ’’
In fact, the Nuncio was acting in good faith.
So also was Deyburn, for his assessment of the Queen’s
1. Embassy, pp.125-6.
2. Ibid., pp.126-8.
3. Ibid., p.119.
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attittfde to such articles was correct. The Queen still
contMtued to suspect that the covert purpose of Kinuccini’s
mission was to make Ireland a temporal appanage of the
papacy. hinuccini made an effort to bring a process
against Leyburn. He was unsuccessful; Leyburn claimed
to be a missionary. Asked for advice, Pamphili wisely
cautioned that Leyburn be gently encouraged to quit
Ireland} Leyburn did leave Ireland,only to return a
■year later to play a major role in Irish affairs.
Heated charge and^-countercharge continued for four
days until the Earl of Glamorgan offered to mediate by
bringing together Hinuccini and seven representatives
of the Assembly. Glamorgan had already consented to
2
shelve his own treaty in favour of the one from Rome.
Superficially this v/ould seem further proof of 
Glamorgan * s weakness of character. But he had good 
reasons for doing what he did. lifter all, one of the 
parties to the Roman treaty was the Queen herself and it 
was logical to suppose that negotiations conducted by 
her took precedence over his own. As he wrote to Ormond 
on 8th February:
' ’’Neyther need I use many words to persuade your 
Lordship that the expectance of a more advantagious 
peace wrought by the powerful hand of her Majestie, 
soone wipes out the clandestine hopes of my en­
deavours to serve the nation.”3.
1. Embassy.;- p. 119;
2. Embassy., p. 117.
3. Gilbert, V, pp.258-9.
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In any case, his own articles were to be permanently
abandoned only if the articles from Rome arrived before
May 1st. Otherwise, they were to be resumed. he was
also perfectly aware of what he was doing.^
Moreover, Glamorgan seems to have reasoned that
troops must be sent to the Ring immediately or not at all.
Chester was being besieged and its capture would entail
the loss of the only port where it was still possible
to land troops. In a letter to Rinuccini, dated 6th 
2
February, he offered to go to Rome and to visit the other 
Catholic princes in the hope of obtaining help and 
transport for the expedition, which is some indication of 
his desperation. He further explained the necessity of 
his deference to Rinuccini in the letter to Ormond just 
noted. Unless Rinuccini gave his consent, the Irish 
would never send help to the King. In any event, the 
Irish could furnish only troops; money and supplies had 
to be sought from the Catholic princes who would resent 
any disrespect shown to the Papal Nuncio. He proposed 
that Ormond should officially employ himself and others 
as agents to the Nuncio for the purpose of arranging 
favourable terms. Ormond apparently refused.
1. This may be inferred from Rinuccin’s own account;
"... though the Earl at First excited much indignation 
among his friends and relations who strongly opposed him." 
Embassy, p.117.
2. Com.Rin., II, p.f3(
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Glamorgan's correspondence with Ormond after his
return to Kilkenny sheds further light on their discussions
before his release. In his first letter, dated January 29th,
he acknowledged his debt to Ormond:
"... for my^re 1 easement, which I owe to your 
Excelèncye, and the King my master, will, I am 
confident, hereafter acknowledge it unto you...
That night I could doe nothinge, but the next morneinge,
I endeavoured to perform that part, for which I had 
received your commands..."2
The words "that part" referred to Glamorgan’s efforts to
facilitate the Confederates’ acceptance of Ormond’s terms,
because three days later Ormond wrote to ask how preparations
3
for the peace negotiations were proceeding. Glamorgan 
replied a few days later on the 8th to tell him that news of 
Her Majesty’s treaty had arrived to change the situation
4
completely.
Ormond dispatched his reply to this information on the
11th:
"(I) doe ^ot) at all vnderstand what ground there is 
for# the expectation your tordship mentions of 
advantagious conditions by meanes of her majestie..."5
and continuing,
1. I have amended the text as it stands here by adding a 
comma after ’Excelencye’. This is clearly the true meaning 
of the passage.
2. Gilbert, V, p..255.
3. Ibid^ p.257.
4. Ibid., p.259.
5. Ormond was obviously mystified by Glamorgan’s reference 
to her Majesty in reference to the Treaty negotiations.
He knew nothing of events in Paris.
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"My Êord, my affections and interest are soe tyed 
to his majestie’s cause, that it weare madnesÿ in 
mee to disgust any man that hath power and inclination 
to releêve him in the sad condition he is in, and 
therefore your tordship may securely goe on in the 
v/ayes you have proposed to youi^elfe to serve the 
king without feartof interruption from mee, or soe much 
as enqui:nti.ng into the meanes you worke by. My coiq/ission 
is to treat with his majestie’s confederate catholique 
subjjects h e ^ e  for a peace, Vpjpn. conditions of honor 
and assistance to him, and of advantage to them; 
which accordingly I shall pursue to the best of my 
skill, but ^  shall not venture v^pon any new negotiation^ 
foralgne to the powers I have received..."1
Taken in conjunction with the fact that Ormond released
Glamorgan on his own initiative, this letter confirms beyond
any reasonable doubt the view that Ormond took of Glamorgan’s
credentials. He accepted them as genuine, but disapproved
of the powers they conveyed; yet he would not interfere with
Glamorgan’s work. Officially he would proceed on the
authority of his ovm commissions to seek an ’honourable’
peace, as if no other negotiations v/ere going on simultaneously.
All Glamorgan’s efforts were now bent on securing the
promised troops for the King at all costs. His sense of
urgency v/as perhaps sharpened by a justifiable anxiety to
restore his good name, which could not be done until he set
foot on English soil with Irish troops and enabled the King
to publish the true story of his mission. In an attempt
to Êpeed up supplies for the King he drew up a lengthy
memorandum in Italian for Rinuccini’s benefit representing
the King’s acute need and giving for the first time à fairly
1. Carte, VI, pp.352-3. See also Ormond’s friendly letter 
of February 27th, T.C.P., XVI, p.340.
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clear description of the purpose of his own mission.
Treating took plaee both in public and in private; that 
in private was intended for the benefit of all Catholics, 
but particularly the Confederates. The latter should be 
content with the concessions already made by him, or "to 
be made by him, according to the circumstances of affairs 
at that time", which should be added to the articles 
offered by Ormond, "since in the ports, which he (Ormond) 
now holds, he can be of the greatest service or disservice 
to our a f f a i r s " H e  also made a speech to the General 
Assembly in which he appealed for immediate assistance 
to the King.^
Glamorgan’s efforts as a mediator were crowned with 
success, at least to all appearances. Actually he obtained 
support for a compromise, ’a kind of tripartite instrument’,  ^
to which each side only consented because it appeared to 
redound to its own advantage. For instance, on discovering 
that the Supreme Council had never revealed the conditions 
of the political treaty to the Assembly, Rinuccini believed 
he had seized the advantage. It was not clear whether he 
threatened to inform the Assembly that it was being kept 
in the dark or whether he merely let slip the possibility
1. Com. Rin., II. vM-i-?).
2. Com. Rin., II, pp.138-9.
4. Ibid. , ^
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of his doing so, but the councillors took their cue, or
pretended to do so, and in the ensuing conference were
conciliatory. They agreed not to announce the Ormond
peace unless the Roman Treaty were announced at the same
time. Rinuccini still insisted that no peace of any
kind should be ratified before the Roman treaty had been
received. A compromise, favourable to Rinuccini, as he
believed, was at last reached on February 16th. It was
agreed to prolong the cessation until May 1st, to postpone
publication of any treaty, to make no changes whatever in
the civil government, in the meantime, and to do nothing to
hinder negotiations between Rinuccini and Glamorgan.
All this provided that by the same token no obstacle should
be placed in the way of further negotiations with Ormond
over political matters. When the time did come to publish
a treaty, it would be done through the Assembly and upon
the recommendation of the Nuncio and Glamorgan} In a
separate agreement, Glamorgan ratified the articles
between the Pope and the Queen an^ guaranteed to persuade
the King to ratify them also,on condition that if the
original of the Roman treaty were not delivered before
2
May 1st, his own treaty should be resumed.
Rinuccini reinforced his position on February 19th by 
extracting an oath of adherence from Glamorgan "against
1. Embassy, p.118; Com. Rin., II3 <
2 . TV)lCl ; '(? .
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all the relations and favourss of the Marquis of Ormond".
His satisfaction with his week’s work was completed by
the acclamation which greeted him when he appeared before the
Assembly on February 21si.
Though entitled to some feelings of self-satisfaction, 
Rinuccini over-estimated his success. He had certainly put 
off the final settlement with Ormond for the time being - 
for good, as he thought - but only because his opponents 
considered it worth avoiding a head-on clash by waiting 
until May 1st. Bellings was sufficiently confident to
3
assure Ormond that peace was virtually assured. Even so, 
he had scored a decided tactical victory over the Ormondists. 
There is no question, too, that he had loosened their grip 
on the General Assembly; so much so that if his own evidence 
is to be trusted pressure was put upon the Supreme Council, 
vainly as it happened, to relinquish the free hand to
A
negotiate which they had been given by the General Assembly. 
And, certainly, it was at his prompting that the Assembly 
resolved to reduce the numbers of/ the Supreme Council to 
some eight members and the secretary , and to leave the
5
management of ecclesiastical property entirely to the clergy.
Having got his way, Rinuccini agreed that 3,000 troops 
be mustered instantly for the relief of Chester. He:
1. Embassy, pp.117-8, > n, ygp.i<o-i
2. Embassy, p.118.
3• He also had news of a ’plot’. T.C.P., XVI, p .337•
4. Embassy, p.137.
5. Com^Rin, pp.148-9.
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"thought it well to made no opposition, 
in order to show that the Pope really wishes 
to assist His Majesty, a necessary point to 
keep constantly in view." 1
Obviously, he was anxious to counter the kind of attack
made upon him by Leyburn.
While the debate had been proceeding at Kilkenny,
Ormond,had been wondering why there was so much delay
when so little had. to be done. He knew that the surrender
of Chester was imminent unless a relief force could be sent
over speedily and he had always in mind the King’s warning
of December that if no aid came before April 1st it would 
2
be too late. Thus, when the Supreme Council informed him 
that the Scots were on the point of starting a major attack
3
and asked for his advice, he refused to give it on the 
grounds of being ignorant of their intentions and the 
strength of their forces, and urged them to speed on the 
business of the peace}
Ormond’s plea to the Supreme Council to hasten their 
discussions arrived when they were already at an end.
On March 6th a fresh authority was issued to the Commissioners
5
to carry on with the negotiations, and a few days later the 
delegation departed for Lublin. Shortly after their 
arrival, Ormond received an urgent request from Glamorgan 
to put off the conclusion of a treaty for the time being
1. Embassy, p.120.
2. See above p.StîT.
3. Feb.26, Gilbert, V, pp.261-3.
4. T.C.P., XVI, p.352.
5 . Ca-v-hz., Îu j p. X^O .
4 6 2 .
and to prolong the current truce until the middle of June}
Glamorgan had set out for Waterford about February 24th 
to arrange for the transportation of troops to England.^
Here he used, only for the second time so far as is known, 
the powers granted to him to create one earl, two viscounts 
and three barons, nominated by the Nuncio.  ^ On what must 
have been the second or third day after his arrival he 
wrote to the King, announcing that he was preparing transport 
at once for 6,000 troops and that he hoped to arrange for 
the supply of 4,000 more in May. The cause of so many 
delays was not fitted to be committed to paper, but he had 
sent a gentleman to the King during his recent conf inement, 
and was now sending his brother. Between them, they might 
give him true knowledge of his "faithful servants". He 
hoped that his affairs might run more smoothly for the 
future, without hindrance from many "seeming friends".
His fear that the King may receive false reports about his 
activities is patently very real, and he is at pains to dispel 
them.^ ^
By now the goal that he had been set almost two years 
before was within reach. A strong contingent would sail 
for England any day to relieve Chester, the first step 
towards the King’s restoration. On the 27th he wrote to
1. See below p.463.
2. Glamorgan to Ormond,Feb.24,T.C.P.,XVI,p.330.
3. Com.Rin., II,p.153.
4. Rushworth,pt.IV,I , p.249.
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Lord Culpepper,
"Having overpast many rubs and difficulties, . 
the long-expected work is at last compassed..."
And on the next day, he wrote to Lord Hopton a letter which
seems to prove that he regarded the raising of troops as
the purpose of his mission,
"...Now, God be thanked, the business is brought to 
that upshot, that the ten thousand men are designed 
for his Majesty’s service, six thousand of which are 
ready for transportation..."2
He wrote also to Ormond on the 24th with the intelligence
that he was "morally certain" of shipping for six thousand
3
troops. Shortly afterwards, the Supreme Council published 
a proclamation declaring him Lord General of the 10,000 men 
destined for the King’s service in England} On March 10th 
he announced that the sailing date had been fixed for March
18th J
1. Husband, p.825.
2. Ibid., p.824. t .q .P., XVI, p.338.
3. Gilbert, pp.260-1^ Of. his letter to Vice-Admiral Von 
Hasenduck, G.S.P.^ T* p.439: 6,000 troops are already 
assembled and four thousand more will soon be ready.
Please help with their convoy and-^transportation.
Gx
4. , pp.279-80.
5. Glamorgan to Ormond^ T.C.P., XVI., p.372. In the same
letter he added "... of late Three Shipps come into Waterford 
w^^ with the rest there, and at Wexford, and one that Cometh
about from Gallwaye will car rye the 6000 men and some horse
besides the convoyé w is dayly Expected".
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And then everything went wrong. First, the shipping
of which he had been ’morally’ so certain failed to appear.
He was also short of money. Finally, news arrived of the
fall of Chester} Hence his suggestion to Ormond that the
cessation should be prolonged so as to give him time to
to France where he was sure he could obtain both ships and
money and still return by the middle of June? Ormond saw
the point of extending the cessation but regretted that he
could not consent to it because he would be unable to
maintain his troops until June. Nevertheless, he was
sending Ligby to consult with Glamorgan and decide what
3should be done,
Ormond’s inability to agree to a further period of 
truce was unimportant as it turned out, for scarcely had 
the news of the fall of Chester shocked Kilkenny than a 
report was received of Charles’ repudiation of Glamorgan’s 
commission to arrange a treaty} The Supreme Council 
informed Glamorgan that unless Onnond were now to join 
forces with them there could be no peace and they would
5
send not one soldier to England. In tte momentary anguish 
Glamorgan swore he would transfer the troops who had been 
assembled to the service of France?
1. March 9th, TrfPrP-r-, XYJ.
2. I-bMTC-^j).376; see also the declaration of the Supreme 
Council and Glamorgan, March 9, ibid.,p.370.
3. Ibid., p.388.
4. Cf. Glamorgan to Ormond, March 18, ibid., p.399, "though 
any such thinge be true, which I cannot believe at all".
6 . Du Moulin to Mazarin , f ^ o . WP. kirr.
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But then he made a remarkably rapid recovery from 
his initial disillusionment. In a statement of his 
position, he asserted that the King’s repudiation of his 
treaty had been involuntary. The King had ordered him to 
ignore anything which he, Charles, said or did under 
compulsion contrary to his instructions. To Charles he 
would send a kinsman^at once to obtain confirmation of his 
authority. If the Supreme Council would continue to 
trust him, he would use the troops and shipping already 
prepared to assist them in Ireland until "we can all 
jointly succour his Majesty in England".^
The Supreme Council V\^ ere sufficiently impressed by 
his apparent sincerity to recommend to their Commissioners in 
Dublin Glamorgan’s proposal that the peace articles should 
not be published until mid-June, especially if Ormond would 
declare against the common enemy. Indeed, if Ormond would 
make such a declaration they would supply his forces on the 
same scale as their own and would advance him the sum of 
£3 ,OOO^immediately} /
Unfortunately, the Commissioners were less impressed.
1. Presumably his brother. Lord John Somerset.
2. Com.Rin., II, pp. .
3. On March 24th, T.C.P., XVI, p.415, Ormond informed 
Glamorgan that EehiielL had come to tell him he might have 
£3,000 thanlcs to Glamorgan’s efforts.
4. March 18, ibid., p.401. Glamorgan himself informed 
Ormond that the Council were resolved not to make peace
or send away the men encamped at Waterford unless he would 
declare against the common enemy; ibid., p.399.
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Rinuccini also clearly considered that Glamorgan's
commission, though genuine enough, was worthless in view
of the King's rejection of it. In the circumstances
there could be no question of permitting any troops to go
to England} The troops encamped at Waterford were
themselves reluctant to &A41 . Fortuitously, perhaps, the
report at this time of the landing of Parliamentarians at
Bunratty made the Munster men, who numbered 2,000, unwilling
to sail. Even Glamorgan realized that the expedition to
England must be postponed.
On March 18 he informed Ormond that it would be
necessary to clear Munster of enemy troops. He was going
to look into the situation. Meanwhile, he had arranged to
meet Digby at Kilkenny in order to hear Ormond's commands.
2
He must be back soon at Waterford. So he hoped. In fact 
his opportunity had gone. A few months later Rinuccini 
noted that his credit had fallen so low among the Confederates
3
that even the merchants had abandoned him.
/
1. Embassy, pp.153-4.
2. T.C.P., XVI, p.402. It is plain that the expedition 
to England had reached the final stages of planning, for 
with Glamorgan at this time were General Preston, Sir 
Marmaduke Langdale and two members of the Supreme Council.
3. Embassy, p.167.
Chap ter XI
Gbarles 1 and the Earl of Glamorgan
Charles I first heard of the public disclosure of 
Glamorgan's treaty at about the end of January. Immediately he 
despatched a letter to Parliament repudiating Glamorgan's 
alleged authority and stating that Glamorgan bore a commission 
only for the purpose of raising troops for service in England.
He went on to announce "his resolution of leaving the managing 
of the business of Ireland wholly to the Houses, and to make 
no peace there but with their consent"^ This statement, at 
least, was demonstrably untrue.
This instant disavowal by no means satisfied his friends, 
failed utterly to convince his enemies, and proved nothing.
1. Gilbert, 11, pp.252-4.
2. C.S.P. Yen. , p.248. It was the opinion of Sir Thomas Fairfax 
that the King was lying (cf. his letter to Lord Hopton, March 9 
1646, Rushworth, part IV,I,p.107). The fact that Glamorgan was 
released from custody proved to be damning. Cf., for example:
".. .v/hereas.. .men should think the Marquèsse of Ormond 
abused, and cousened, by the King's giving that 
secret Commission, it is evidence enough, tnat - tW.
Marquesse was privy to Glamorgan's Transactions, 
as well as Ligby, seeing he and Ligby have' acted 
their parts equally in this rare Tragi-Comedy, 
both agreeing as easily to release Glamorgan (when 
the pageant was over) as they did to accuse and 
imprison him."
"The consideration of this, and the sudden enlargement 
of Glamorgan, together with the contents of his 
commission (now visible to the world) are sufficient 
to convince any man, that he did nothing but by 
authority form the King." (B.M., Coll. of Pamphlets,
1645-6, Mercurius Britannicus, March 16- March 23rd).
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Many attacks have been launched on the character of Charles I,
but it is difficult to see what else he could have done
in this particular circumstance, whether he were innocent
or guilty. Y/hat, as Horace Y/alpole observed, could they
expect the man to do when his crown, was at stake?^ To
vindicate Glamorgan was to lose the allegiance of his
own supporters; to keep silent or to equivocate was no
better. Charles may have been guilty, in so far as the
good name of Glamorgan was concerned, but he made sure
that Glamorgan should not suffer more serious hurt than
personal humiliation. Neither Charles himself nor any
member of the Council on his behalf, seems to have written
to the Irish Privy Council about the publication of the
Treaty in England; and Ormond's report of Glamorgan's
arrest might well appear to have been their first
intimation of it. The King and Nicholas replied to the
report in separate letters on January 31st. Charles'
official letter to the "Lord Lieutenant and Council"
/
expressed astonishment at Glamorgan's pretensions, 
stated that he had been restricted to acting as Ormond's 
assistant and continued:
1. Cf. "It requires very primitive resignation in a monarch to 
sacrifice his crown and life, when persecuted by subjects of 
his own sect, rather than preserve both by the assistance of 
others of his subjects who differed from him in ceremonials or 
articles of belief. - His fault was not in proposing to bring 
over the Irish, but in having made them necessary to his
affairs. Everybody knew that he wanted to do without them, 
all that he could nave done with them." (Neal,III,p*223,n.).
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"it is possible we might have thought fit 
to have given unto the said marl of Glamorgan 
such a credential as might give himcredit 
with the Roman catholiques, in case you should 
find occasion to make use of him.
and fuf^k^r on,
"This is all, and. the very bottom of what we 
might have possibly entrusted unto the said 
Earl of Glamorgan in this affair.....".1
Phrases like "such a credential as might" and "possibly
entrusted" might be used about a mere letter of introduction,
hastily scribbled down, but seem curious when applied
2
to six more or less formal commissions. From whatever 
motive, Charles was surely skirting the truth.
mvidently feeling that he owed Ormond a personal
explaiafcion, Charles wrote to him under cover of his official
letter. He again employed some significant phrases:
"Ormond, I cannot but add to my long letter, 
that on the word of a Christian, I never 
intended that Glamorgan should treate any­
thing without your aprobation, much less 
without your knowledge...".3
speaking of his distrust of Glamorgan's capacity,
"which you may easily perceive by a postscript 
in a letter of myne to you, that he should 
have delivered you at this his last (voming 
into Ireland; which if you have not had, the 
reason of it will be worth the knowing...";
of Glamorgan's arrest,
1. Carte, VI, pp.347-9-
2. Even if two of them were forged, four had still to be 
accounted for.
3. Ibid.V, p.16; Cl.C.P., I, p.300.
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"And albeit I have too just cause, for the 
clearing of my honour, to command (as I have 
done) to prosecut Glamorgan in a legall way; 
yet I will have you suspend the execution of 
any sentence against him untill ye informe me 
fully of all the proceedings. For, I believe, 
it was his misguyded zeall, more than mallice, 
which brought this great misfortune on him and 
us all".
The first stai^ment is quite categorical and the foundation of 
8.R. Gardiner's case. It is, however, inconsistent with what 
follows. Having failed to recall in the covering letter 
that he had issued Glamorgan v/ith commissions, Charles distinct­
ly remembers the postscript to a letter v/ritten over twelve 
months before. An achievement of memory of this kind must have 
some explanation; and the most likely one is that he had appended 
the postscript for the very purpose of invoking it later if 
the need sehould arise. This explanation is supported 
by a statement made to Clarendon sixteen years later by 
Glamorgan. It had been arranged, he said, that if news 
of his negotiations should leak out prematurely Charles 
should have "a starting-hole" from^which to disclaim all 
knowledge of them.^ Charles' insinuation that Glamorgan 
might have suppressed the postscript letter rings false. 
Considered a^ongside his bidding to suspend sentence 
against Glamorgan, these three extracts leave little doubt 
that he intended to clear himself of connivance 
with Glamorgan, while insuring his release.
1. Cl.S.P. ^ II. .
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It is at last clear that the maximum sin of Glamorgan was 
"misguyded Xeall".
Nicholas dispatched letters to Ormond and to the Council 
simultaneously. Both confirm this conclusion, and reveal, 
incidentally, the Secretary’s ignorance of Glamorgan’s com­
missions.^ Charles denied issuing the patent
2
of March 12th, and wished Ormond to be informed that Lord 
Herbert had no right to the title of Earl of Glamorgan. The 
significance of this request seems to have escaped notice 
and yet it is one of the few occasions when Charles 
is not merely blurring the truth, but definitely lying; 
for he himself had frequently employed the title in his 
despatches to Glamorgan.
According to Rinuccini Glamorgan had written to Charles
during his imprisonment.  ^ There is no trace of such a
letter, but soon after his letters to Ormond, Charles
was writing to Glamorgan on the 3rd February:
"Glamorgan, I must clearly tell you, bothe 
you and I have been abused in this business; 
for you have beene drawen to consent to con­
ditions much beyond your instructions and 
your treaty hath been revealed to a 11 the 
world. If yoq had advised with my Lord 
Lieutenant (as you promised me), all this had 
beene helped. But we must look forv/ard. 
wherfor in a word I have commended as much 
favour to be showed unto you as may possibly 
stand with my service or safty; and if you 
will yet trust my advice (which I have com­
manded Ligby-to give you freely), I will
1. Carte, VI, pp. 349-32.
2. Ibid., p.330. In spite of the fact that it was written in 
Charles 'own hand. (Ling#oiand others).
3. Embassy,p.130.
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"bring you so off, that you may be still 
useful to me: and I shall be able to recompense 
you for your affection..." 1
The reference to exceeding his instructions and failing to
consult Ormond would appear to substantiate Gardiner’s theory
but Gardiner did not take into account both the fact that
2
this letter was to pass through Ligby’s hands and therefore 
could not be an overt expression of approval of Glamorgan, 
and the implications of other phrases used. The general 
tenor of the letter is, in any case, by no means unfavourable 
to Glamorgan. If he had flagrantly contravened his instructions 
- and failure to act under Ormond’s aegis, if that were 
indeed his duty, was an outrageous offence - why did Charles 
merely say ’we have both been abused’, why did he not upbraid 
him as a disobedient and disloyal subject? The only 
explanation would seem to be that Charles had no real cause 
for complaint against Glamorgan.
This conclusion is strengthened by the contrast
between the above letter and that which Charles sent to
Glamorgan by private messenger:
"...I am confident,that this honest trusty bearer 
v/ill give you good satisfaction, why I have not 
in everything done as you desyred; the v/ant of 
confidence in you being so far from being the cause 
thereof,that I am every day more and more confirmed 
in this trust, that I have of you. For, believ me, 
it is not in the power of any to make you to 
_____ suffer in my opinion by ill office..." 3______________ _____
1. Lircks, p.134.
2. Birch, p.338. 
Ibid., p.339.
472
In another letter Charles wrote:
" Herbert, as I doute not but ye have too much 
courage to bee dismayed or discouraged at the 
usage ye have had; so I asseure you, that my 
estimation of you is nothing diminished by it, 
but rather gets in me a desyre of revenge and 
reparation to us bothe, for in this I hould 
myself equally interested with you..." 1
These are scarcely the letters which a would-be absolute
monarch might be expected to address to a subject who had
flouted his instructions in a crucial affair of state.
Apparently it is Charles who has not done "everything...
as desyred." Furthermore, if Glamorgan can bear witness in
his bwn case, Charles continued to correspond v/ith him
secretly and to place his best hopes in him.
One more argument advanced by Gardiner needs to be
considered. This was that Charles assured Henrietta Maria
that Glamorgan had exceeded his instructions. He cited two
extracts from their correspondence to prove his point:
" March 3, 1646 - And now I come to answer the 
particular concerning the E. of Glamorgan... 
the same reason which mad^ me refuse my consent 
to the establishing of the Presbyterian government 
in England, hath likewise made me disavow 
Glamorgan in his giving away the Church lands 
in Ireland, and all my ecclesiastical power there, 
besides my exposing all my friends to ruin, both 
being equally and directly against my conscience..."
" March 2 2 - 1  find that Sir Edw. Nicholas his
gloss upon the Lord Glamorgan’s business hath  ^
made thee apprehend that I had disavowed my hand ___
1. Ibid., p.361.
2. See below pp.S"4?.^^ ^
3. It is interesting to note that there is no reierence to
this, or for that matter any episode connected with Glamorgan, 
in the recent well-documented biography, Mr. Secretary Nicholas, 
by Lonald Nicholas (London, 1953).
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"but I assure thee I am very free from that 
in the understandings of all men here, for 
it is taken for granted the Lord Glamorgan 
neither counterfeited my hand, nor that I 
have blamed him for more than not following 
his instructions, as Secretary Nicholas will 
more at large show thee." 1
Assuming that Charles wrote honestly to his wife Gardiner
claimed that here we have incontrovertible proof that
Glamorgan had no right to act independently of Ormond.
Gardiner claimed too much. It is just not true that
Charles explicitly accused Glamorgan of disobeying his orders;
on the contrary, it would seem that he was very careful
to avoid doing so. The remark, ’the Lord Glamorgan (sic)
neither counterfeited my hand’, is particularly interesting,
V\
for it shows that Charles had no ^ention of casting doubt 
on the validity of Glamorgan’s commissions.
But the basic wealmess of Gardiner’s argument is the
assumption that Charles was always frank with his wife. No
one would deny that Charles was very fond of Henrietta Maria
aor that he confided in her a grpat deal. This does not
mean, however, that he always told her the truth. It seems
quite clear from an analysis of their correspondence in the 
Z
year I646 that Charles shrank from the Queen’s criticism of 
3
his behaviour. Frequently he apologised for having neglected
1. E.H.R.,pp.707-8.
2. Cf. John Bruce, Charles I in I646, Camden See. (London,1856).
3. Cf. "Indeed, it would have broken my heart, if thou had 
thought me wilful, as everyone here doth." Again:"For if she 
lance should openly condemn me for wilfulness, but in one point,
not be able to support my daily miseries." And again: 
tnat I shall not be in any kind lessened in thy opinion, which 
IS the only thing that can make him truly miserable who is 
eternally thine."
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to consult her or to follow her advice. It would not he at 
all surprising, therefore, if he withheld information about 
Glamorgan's negotiations either because he had not taken 
her into his confidence from the beginning or because he 
could not bring himself to confess to a serious mistake. 
Subsequently she strongly criticised him for having 
abandoned his principles in discussions with the Scots; 
she was unlikely to have criticised him less for allowiing 
Glamorgan to tender his particular concessions to the 
Confederates.
Moreover, there are two quotations from Charles' letters 
v/hich tell against him:
"Oxford, March 16th,
... and yet I believe I did well in disavowing 
Glamorgan (so far as I did) " 2
and:
" Newcastle,
As for the things of the 12th July accuse me
of, I only say this; I believe the Queen will
find upon good examination^that I have not erred, 
unless it were concerning Ormond, for which I 
have since amends." 3
There is something odd about the Queen’s obvious anxiety to
knov/ more about the Glamorgan affair and the King’s equally
obvious anxiety to avomd giving her a straight answer.
1. Ibid., xxi; of.also "I know the pains you are suffering 
and so great is my compassion that it causes me suffering no 
less than your own. But since we have thus suffered, we must 
resolve to go through with it with honour."
2. Ibid., p.25.
3. Ibid., p.55.
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At about the same time Glamorgan's hopes had soared
high only to be cast down, a gentleman, by name Allan
Boteler, had left Oxford bound for Ireland carrying
despatches from Charles to Ormond. In order to avoid
falling into the clutches of an enemy patrol on the Welsh
border he took refuge v/ith the Marquis of Worcester at
Raglan Castle. His narration of his encounter with the
Marquis is quoted at some length, for it has a bearing on
Charles' guilt or innocence
"... and in the first place my Lord asked me whether 
in my despatches I had any letters from his Majestie 
to his sonne, Glamorgan. I answered not that I 
knew of, but there might be within the Lord Marquess 
of Ormonde's. On that I delivered to his Lordship 
his Majestie's most gratious and comfortable message 
concerning my Lord his sonne with thanks for their 
former loyall expressions. (That message I will 
remember, and soe will his Majestie, I haveing sett 
it down soe soon as I went out of the bed-chamber). 
Unto v/hich my Lord Marques se answered that it was 
the grief of his hart that he was enforced to say 
that the King was wavering and fickle, and that on 
his Majestie*s last being there he lent him a book 
to read in his chamber, the beginning of which he 
knowes he read, but if he had ended it, it would 
have showed him what it was to be a fickle Prince. 
For it was not enough, said his Lordship, to suffer 
him the Lord Glamorgan to be unjustly imprisoned by 
the Lord Marquesse of Ormonde for what he had his 
Majestie's authority for, but that the king must 
in print protest against his proceedings and his 
own allowance, and not yett recall it. But I will 
pray for him, and that he may be more constant to 
his friends, saith my Lord, and soe soon as my 
other imployments will give leave, you shall have 
a convoy to fetch securely your despatches..."1
1. Gilbert, V, Preface, X-XI. This extract seems to 
indicate that the Marquis of Vi/orcester knew about Glamorgan’s 
negotiations in Ireland.
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■The main events and the documents relevant to the 
Glamorgan Treaty have now been examined, and, as far as 
possible, interpreted. It remains to consider whether 
they can reveal a satisfactory answer to the essential 
question - whether or not Charles I gave the Earl of 
Glamorgan secret powers to treat with the Confederates.
Since the middle of the eighteenth century no one
has accepted the arguments of Carte and others, who claimed
that. Glamorgan forged all his commissions. At the same
time, neither the reasoning nor the solutions of Birch
and Gardiner are valid. Birch’s assumption that Charles
gave Glamorgan secret powers to conclude a peace v/ith the
Confederates is justified, but his belief that Glamorgan
accurately interpreted the King’s instructions is false.
Gardiner is justified in saying that Glamorgan misinterpreted
his powers, but wrong to presume that his error lay in
failing to act under the orders of Ormond. The argument
outlined by Gardiner has, it is hop^d, been disproved
pari passu. There remains the more Ipj^rmidable case of
J.H. Round, who arrived at Gardiner's conclusion by a
different route. Unlike Gardiner, he maintained that the
key commissions were forged. Thus, while he agreed
ultimately that Glamorgan was sent to Ireland in the role
CùxAà./
of assistant to Ormond, he ea^ot believe that the warrant 
of March 12, 1645, which he produced as his authority to 
arrange a peace did "not contemplate any action independent
-^1
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of the Lord Lieutenant"; on the contrary, he believed it 
to have been forged by Glamorgan for the "express purpose" 
of permitting himself independent action.
Round’s theory was briefly this. Charles instructed 
Glamorgan to assist Ormond in the negotiations with the 
Confederacy in the belief that he would find it easy to 
convince his co-religionists of his King’s good faith. 
However, when Glamorgan got to Ireland, he found the neg­
otiations at a standstill because of Ormond’s refusal to 
grant "abolition of the jurisdiction of King and clergy, 
and retention of the churches". To him these seemed small 
matters in the light of the King’s desperate need for 
military aid. So he concocted a commission which would 
seem to give him absolute powers torconcede the two troublee 
some religious concessions, independent of Ormond}
The arguments used by Round to justify this theory are
2
examined in detail elsewhere and rejected. ^ome doubt must 
always remain. Even so, it can be^ stated that while the 
objections raised against the King’s use of Glamorgan as a 
secret envoy have been refuted, the weight of evidence 
appears to support it.
On the basis of the evidence here assembled the sequence 
of events may be reconstructed tentatively as follows.
1. Reerafce and Family History, p p .
2. See below app.l.
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On April 1st, 1644, Charles I appointed Glamorgan, a 
Catholic whose qualifications seemed specially suitable, 
Commander-in-Chief of a combined force of 10,000 Irish 
troops, which he counted on receiving as the outcome of 
the Oxford peace negotiations, and any foreign troops which 
it might be possible to recruit in addition. When these 
negotiations ended in failure he still instructed Glamorgan to 
proceed with the project or raising an army, and to that end 
Glamorgan spent many months in South Wales collecting money 
and military supplies. Meanwhile he commanded Ormond to 
resume discussions with the Confederates in order to prevent 
them from taking up arms once more and invading the Pale.
Ormond requested that he be allowed to resign and 
this transformed the situation. It was already quite clear 
that the maximum terms Ormond could be persuaded to offer the 
Confederates fell far short of their minimum demands, and 
that he would not take part in the covert negotiations which 
Charles judged to be necessary in order to secure Irish support. 
Inconvenient though Ormond’s scruples might be, his departure 
from Ireland would be far more so. Charles therefore 
pointed out to him in a series of letters, that aid from, 
and consequently peace with, the Confederates was essential 
if the royalist cause was to triumph, and as an inducement 
to him to remain he extended the terms to be tendered to the 
Confederates, even though he knew them to be still inadequate.
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Por he now had a further motive for persevering with Ormond 
and the public negotiations ; he had decided to send Glamorgan 
as a secret envoy to the Confederates, and wanted to insure 
that no one knew about it. Ormond’s open discussions were 
to be a cover for Glamorgan’s secret negotiations.
Charles may have reasoned that his only likely source
of external aid was Ireland, but that the Confederates
would not assist him unless offered terms which would be
condemned alike by Ormond and his ov/n supporters. He
must therefore deal with them in secret, and obtain aid
without arousing suspicion by continuing with the public
negotiations in Dublin. Any odium incurred through using
Irish troops in England and making lavish concessions to
Catholic rebels would be forgotten in the flush of victory.
Should the v/ar be lost, even with their aid, it would have been
worth the attempt. In brief there was everything to be
gained and nothing to be lost by coming to terms with the
Confederates. Details and unpleasant problems could be
/
shelved until victory was won. It only remained to select 
a suitable intermediary.
Glamorgan would come to mind as the right man for the 
mission; if indeed he had not already volunteered for such 
a task. Charles knew him to be quixotic enough to risk 
any danger, and suffer any pAnalty, for his King and his 
religion, and a man was needed who would keep faith at all 
costs. To conceal the real object of Glamorgan’s impending
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discussions with the Confederates, Charles pretended to 
send him primarily on his own business and, only secondarily, 
as an unofficial assistant to Ormond. As a precaution 
against failure he prepared an elaborate deception, one 
part of which he probably concealed from Glamorgan himself.
He left ”a starting-Hole", as Glamorgan later described it, 
from which to save himself should Glamorgan be prematurely 
unmasked. first, he appended a postscript to his letter 
of recommendation to Ormond, in which he disparaged 
Glamorgan's ability, and which he could later invoke as 
proof to Ormond that he had not abused his vice-regal 
authority. Secondly, he arranged that Glamorgan should 
not implicate him under any circumstances. The improper 
form of the commissions themselves would conveniently 
support the deception, for they were to be witnessed by 
no one save Charles and Glamorgan, and perhaps the latter's 
secretary. Whatever happened Charles foresaw no difficulty 
in exculpating himself.
When Glamorgan arrived in Ireland^he informed Ormond 
that he had come to raise an army and to help him in the 
negotiations. This v/as in order to account for his 
impending close dealings with the Confederates. He did 
not show him any of his commissions. Ormond promised 
support for what must have seemed to him a vital mission, 
although he may well have suspected that Glamorgan carried
other instructions from the King.
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Then came the premature announcement of the Treaty, 
Glamorgan was arrested and charged with high treason,
Ormond interviev/ed him, was shown one of the commissions, 
was convinced, if not immediately then upon reflection of 
its authenticity, and released him. Glamorgan kept faith 
with the King, in so far as he could, resolutely refusing 
to implicate him during a protracted inquiry, and eventually 
showing Ormond only sufficient proof to -mrhdzest his innocence. 
Even that disclosure was forced upon him, for he believed 
that his continued imprisonment was likely to be more 
harmful to the King's cause than breaking silence. Before 
a message could arrive from the King ordering his release 
the Confederates might change their minds. Worse still, 
Chester, the only port still open to receive the troops 
might fall.
Henceforth Ormond disapproved of Glamorgan's aims but
would not interfere with his activities. The King,
meanwhile, unaware of Glamorgan's release, had to clear
/
himself while insuring that no harm befell Glamorgan. 
Accordingly he published a statement of repudiation for 
the benefit of his friends and supporters and dispatched 
a letter to Dublin invoking the carefully prepared postscript 
to prove he had not empowered Glamorgan to malie peace, but 
at the same time, ordering Ormond to suspend proceedings. 
Keither Charles nor Ormond ever re-opened the case against 
him.
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Charles wrote to Glamorgan, censuring him mildly in
one letter passing through Dighy’s hands and in a second
thanking him for his services and apologising for having
had to disavow him. At the same time he insinuated a
note of criticism. Prom Charles’ point of view it was
probably true that Glamorgan had been rash. It has been
noticed that his commissions did not restrict him to offering
specific terms. Charles must therefore have discussed
proposals with him in a general way. Unfortunately,
Glamorgan was by nature given to exaggeration and splendid
gestures and it was his way to cut any ^ordian knots tha,t
he encountered. In any case it was not uncommon for a
servant of Charles-to be confused by his instructions.
Strafford had hinted at dissatisfaction with the vagueness
1
of the royal policy towards Ireland and on several occasions
%
Ormond had pleaded for definite commands. To one such plea, 
indeed, Digby had advised him not to expect clear directives
g
from England but to act in all tilings as he sav/ fit*. It is 
not in the least surprising that Glamorgan with his romantic 
imagination and less insight than most should have overshot 
the mark. In any case, Charles was only annoyed because 
the plot had miscarried.
1. Cf. C.V. Wedp;4wood, Strafford, p.222.
2. See above p^. -
3. See above p.242.
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Prom the outset Charles apprehended failure, which 
explains why he took such pains to guard against being 
implicated in the giving of concessions to Catholics.
Nor is it necessary to believe that he had much respect 
for Glamorgan's ability. It seemed worthwhile to sponsor 
the mission for if the likelihood of failure was great, 
the risk was slight. It is to be emphasized that he was 
also seeking foreign aid through Henrietta Maria who had 
sent Kenelm Digby to the Pope on his behalf, that he had not 
discouraged Pitzwilliam's mission, that he had^commissioned 
.ilntrim to command Irish Catholic troops, Ulstermen at that, 
W i e c  on his behalf, and that the crossing to Ireland was 
the highroad for petitioners and careerists galore.
Charles was prone to countenance the v/ildest schemes 
without bothering himself overmuch with the details of 
their operation.
It is informative at this stai^e to compare Glamorgan's 
part in the relations between Charles and the Confederacy 
with that of the Marquis of Antrim, especially vfith regard 
to the contrasting treatment which they received at the 
Hestoration. Both had influential connections in England 
and Ireland, both were Catholics, both assured the King they 
could conciliate the Confederates and obtain troops for 
service in England, both eventually became closely 
associated with the government in Kilkenny and field 
commanders, both sought to justify their actions to
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Charles II by claiming that they had loyally obeyed his
father’s instructions, and, finally, both fought almost
alone against a battery of enemies to clear fhÊfâr names^
There the parallel ends, for whereas Antrim successfully
exonerated himself, Glamorgan failed.
However, when we turn to Charles II’s final ruling
on Antrim’s petition to be restored to his estates, we
find that it reads like a defence of Glamorgan's mission:
"Our Lord Referees, upon severall meetings and 
perusall of what have been offred to them by ye 
Ld. Marque8se, have informed us, that they have 
seen severall letters, all of ye handwriting of our 
Royall PPather to ye Ld. Marquesse, and severall 
instructions concerninge his treating and joyneing 
with ye Irish, in order to the King's service, by 
dividing them amongst themselves, and by draweing 
forces from them for ye service of Scotland, That 
-besides ye letters and orders under his Maji-ss hand, 
they have received sufficient evidence and testimony 
of severall messages and directions, sent from our 
Royall PPather, and from our Royal Mother, with ye 
privity and by the directions of ye King our PPather, 
by which they are persuaded that whatever intelligence 
or Correspondence the Ld. Marquis se had v/ith ye 
Confederate Irish Catholiques, is directed or allowed 
by ye s^ letters, instructions, and directions, and 
that it manifestly appears to them that he King our 
ffather was v/ell pleased with what ye Marquis se did 
after he had don it, and approved ye same".1
This reflected the finding of the council of inquiry:
"... what he (Antrim) did by way of correspondence 
and compliance with the Irish, was in order to the 
service of the late King, and warranted by his 
instructions and the trust reposed in him, and the 
benefit thereof accrued to the service of the Crown 
and not to the particular advantage of the Marquis".
1. Somer's Tracts, V, p.62^; Hill, p.469.
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Clarendon, who Icnew that Ormond wished to see Antrim 
punished, wrote to Ormond:
"I know not whether you have yet received the 
King’s letter about my lord Antrim, of whom you 
know I was never fond. But really upon examination 
of that whole affair, I know not how he can be destroyed 
with any shadow and colour of justice; except you have 
something there against him which v/e do not know; 
and then it is as strange, that you have never sent 
the information to us; for we know the King was not 
more inclined towards him than law and justice 
required".1
Finally, Charles II himself wrote to Ormond:
"And the Queen asks how the King can refuse the 
like certificate for the Marques? When not only 
all the King’s letters are produced, but what else 
v^ as done, was by her order upon the King’s in­
structions to her".2
Against this background Glamorgan’s mission ceases 
to be something to which Charles I gave close attention. 
Glamorgan promised relief. Very well, let him try and 
get it. But Charles did not probe deeply into the 
methods to be used.
Nor is it necessary to believe that he would have 
confirmed the concessions made ^y Glamorgan had the 
troops duly arrived in England. Probably he would have 
whittled them down until they were no more generous than 
those offered by Ormond after Naseby, on the plea that 
his Protestant Councillors would not endorse them.
Charles was tempted to support any scheme no matter how
1. Ibid., p.296.
2. Ibid. This statement was all the more remarkable
considering the attitude of Antrim when he went to Paris 
to see Henrietta Maria as a delegate of the Confederacy 
in 1648. See below pf).GC>Z.3,
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light-minded especially if he could escape any unpleasant 
consequences. The theory of sovereignty to which he 
clung enabled him to intrigue with the Irish at one 
moment, the Scots the next, to exploit the generous 
loyalty of such as Glamorgan, to dissimulate and 
prevaricate even in letters to Henrietta Maria, while 
invincibly sure that what he did was both necessary 
and right.^
As at the beginning of this inquiry, Clarendon
provides a fitting commentary. Reflecting on the King’s
misplaced trust in 1^ \c^ loy he observed;
"The King himself was the unfittest person alive 
to be served by such a counsellor, being too 
easily inclined to sudden enterprises, and as 
easily amazed when they were entered upon."2
Publication of the Glamorgan Treaty damaged
Charles’ reputation but it scarcely impaired his already
1. Charles habitually saw no wrong in duplicity so long as 
it was practised by himself. He remark to Prince Rupert 
has been quoted already: "As for the Irish C x 2  assure 
you, they shall not cheats me; but it is possible they 
may cossin themselves" (see abdve p.3oo). There are 
many other examples. Cf. his letter of Jan.18, 1646,
to his wife. After admitting that he had given Parliament 
"leave to hope for more than he had intended" he referred 
triumphantly to the way the words in his message had been 
couched (Btmre, Charles.. I in 1646, XXVII-XXVIII). Again, 
commenting upon a message relating to Ireland: "... for 1 
much desire thy opinion concerning Ireland; and yet I have 
so penned that article, that if the Irish give me cause,
I may interpret it well enough for them; for I only say 
that I will give full satisfaction as to the managing of 
the war, so that if I find reason to make peace, there 
my engagement ends’.’ (ibid. p.84).
2. Great Rebellion, X V . , I I ,
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desperate position. His -^ pomainin.r: English supporters 
remained faithful and he had received virtually no 
assistance from Ireland even when his promises had been 
accepted as sincere. In any case, both sides at Kilkenny 
assumed that his disavowal of Glamorgan had been made 
under duress and that Glamorgan had obeyed his instructions. 
Where they differed was over the action to be taken in the 
future. The Ormondists argued that the King’s good 
intentions as conveyed to them by Glamorgan were ample 
security for religion. The Nuncioists insisted that 
good intentions were worthless; what the King had repudiated 
once he could repudiate again.
Surprisingly the Glamorgan Treaty continued to be 
used for some time as a focal point of negotiations while 
Glamorgan himself went on planning and discarding further 
schemes and enduring more vicissitudes. Charles also 
continued to place at least some reliance upon him.
But the troops, which had cost hÿn so much money and personal 
distress were never embarked.
Chapter Xll
The First Ormond Peace. March - July,1646.
Ormond had rejected Glamorgan’s proposal to prolong the
current truce until June for several reasons. One was that the
King’s plight demanded an earlier remedy. Another was that he
needed money desperately to support his army and could not
possibly maintain it for an extended period. Glamorgan tried
to overcome this second objection by guaranteeing to provide
^2,500 immediately and a further ^2,500 on May 1st. He also
tried to conmiit Ormond by warning him that the Council was
determined not to arrange a treaty unless he joined with them
2
against the Scots. Simultaneously, he asked the Council to 
agree to an extension of the truce and persuaded them to offer 
to maintain Ormond’s army on condition that he declared
3
against the Scots by a specified date. Ormond managed to
avoid an outright rejection of their offer by obtaining a
promise from the Peace Commissioners of £3,000 before April 8th
/
and by getting the treaty arranged at once.
The Council had pledged/^on February l6th not to conclude a 
treaty before consulting Rinuccini. It is all the more 
astonishing that they should not only have broken the agreement
lo T.C.P., KVl,p.388.
2. Ibid., p.399.
3. Ibid., p.401.
4. Mar.28, ibid., XVll,p.l5
4
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but that they should have broken it so soon, for the treaty
was signed on March 28th.^ There were two possible explanations
for their haste: first, they were convinced that the Rome
treaty would never arrive and saw no harm in anticipating
May, 1st; secondly, sticking rigidly to the King’s instruction
to obtain aid before April 1st or not at all, Ormond
threatened to abandon negotiations altogett^er. Certainly it
may be inferred that Ormond adopted a strong line, for just
before the treaty was signed he made a note of the concessions
which he was prepared to make and the unhappy consequences
if the Confederates were to reject them:
’’...then his Majestie now longer kept in hope of the 
advantages he hath hitherto promised himself by a 
Peace here, and soe he will be at liberty to propose 
to himselfe and prosecute such other ways of preserveing 
Peace. And if what shall be now offered come so 
far short of satisfieing that it will not soe 
much as divide the Irish. I conceive if he give them up 
a sacrifice to his ovn safty, the sin of their 
extirpation will be equally shared betweext the Parliament, 
that (srovet their land and thirst for their blood and 
themselves that will accept of noe conditions but 
such as for noe earthly consideration his Majestie can 
graunt, nor any honest Protestant Minister of his can 
be an instrument to convey unto them, whilst his Majestie, 
thus prest on the one hand and liis offers on the other 
not only rejected but raising continual prejedices upon 
him, shall be cleere to God and the world. ’’2
The treaty was formally signed on March 28th by Ormond in 
the King’s aname and by Mountgarrett, Muskerry, Sir Robert Talbot, 
Dermot O ’Bryen, Patrick Darcy, Geffrey Brown and John Dillon
on behalf of the Confederacy. It consisted of thirty articles
1. In a pamphlet by Dr.Walter Enos, published in the next year, 
one reason for condemning the treaty was ’’the serruptitious 
and clancular concluding of peace contrary to promise made to 
the Lord Nuncio.’’ (see below
2.T.C.P.,XVI,p.358.
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arranged in no particular order. Five rough divisions could be
distinguished; political, agrarian, religion, enforcement of
the peace, safeguards against reprisals. Politically, the
Confederates obtained the right to hold public office and to
sit in a free parliament. The question of the application of
Poynings* Law (clauses 2 and 11) was not specifioâLly mentioned
but it might be assumed that it was to be rescinded. Titles
to land in Connaught, Clare, Limerick, Tipperarÿ and the
district of Thomond were to be confirmed, while rights to the
lands in Kilkenny and Wicklow forfeited to the Crown as the
result of Strafford’s inquiries were to be adjudicated in a
free Parliament. Over religion, the main issues in dispute were
simply ignored. Thus, Catholics would no longer be obliged
/of supremacy but an oath 
to take the oath of allegiance instead, and the penalties
previously inflicted upon them for practising their religion
were to be removed. That was c . l l .
As regards acts committed since the rising there was to be 
a general pardon except in the case of murder. Finally, plans 
were laid down for the administration of the country by the 
Lord Lieutenant assisted by Commissioners of Trust nominated 
by the Confederacy between the date when peace was formally 
declared and the restoration of normal government.^
By the terms of an additional agreement the Confederacy 
was bound to transport ten thousand troops into England, six 
thousand by April 1st and four thousand by May 1st. Failure
L. Gilbert, V, pp. 286-308.
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to despatch these troops in the absence of some compelling
reason would invalidate the whole treaty. Pending their despatch
the original copy of the treaty was to be kept in the hands of
Clairickard. Under no circumstances was it to be published
before May 1st.^ On his side, Ormond promised to appear in the
field against anyone who invaded their quarters before the
2
Treaty was published.
To most Royalists this agreement was very pleasing. As
Ormond informed the King with rare undertones of satisfaction:
"... all-r matters of reUigion are submitted to 
your majestie; in other things your regall power is 
preserved, and your majestie is obleeged to nothing,
Vnless you be assisted in the proportion and tyme _
sett dov/n in your letter of the first of December last..."
None the less several councillors remained so blinded v/ith
hatred for the Irish Catholics that even these terms stuck in
their Ahroats.^
The Ormondists also had cause for gratification. They
had settled, broadly speaking, for precisely those concessions
they had requested at the beginning of the Rebellion. The
/
Court of Wards was to be abolished, they would be able to 
educate their children as they wished, and they would have the 
opportunity to become judges and councillors of state. In brief, 
they would enjoy the same privileges and prosperity as their
1. Gilbert, V, pp. 308-10.
2. Mar., 30, T.C.P., p.18.
3. April 7, Carte, VI, p.368
4. Cf. Ormond to Digby, April 3, Carte, VI,pp.363-6: "...the 
suply of the king and this defeasance, makéing it a condition 
of the peace, were the main/hrguments, indeed the only, that 
could beat down the obiections of those that found fault 
with divers of the articles;..."
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ancestors in the sixteenth century. To be just, it must be 
added that they sincerely hoped to protect the wider interests 
of the Church through the King’s confirmation of the Glamorgan 
Treaty.
From the point of view of the Old Irish and the Church
the terms of the treaty were wholly unacceptable. Even today,
a contemporary Catholic historian felt their inadequacy so
strongly as to describe the treaty as;
’’the black betrayal by which the interests of the 
Catholic Church and of the Old Irish were delivered 
into the enemy’s hands to purchase the security of 
the Anglo-Irish gentry. ’’1
This is too summary a judgement, nven so, it should have been
no surprise to the Ormondists v^ h^en the majority of their
countrymen violently rejected the treaty when it was eventually
announced on July 31st.
But if the terms of the treaty appeared to be so
favourable to the Royalists in the short run they were
worthless. When Ormond sent commissioners to inspect the fovce
supposedly assembled at the ports /they found that the troops
had dispersed. Nor did Ormond receive the money which he had
been promised by the stipulated date.
1. Coonaa, p.219.
-bttt- -or- Ti-e-ef^ e-e-jHri'es- -f-or- 4>he4.-r- t-ranoport-
the- Hr” "Cri'— — pHHmii-sed.—— &©— that— -the— dei-ay— -e-auaad- -the
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The failure to send troops to England was due to many
reasons beyond the control of the Eupreme Council. In the
first place, Glamorgan had not obtained shipping, although he
had contracted to do so.^ Secondly, the fall of Chester and
the absence of any assurance that the troops would be
supported by Royalist cavalry made it too dangerous to risk
2a landing on English soil. These were such sound reasons
3
that Digby felt compelled to support them. None the less, 
there is some evidence that the troops themselves refused to 
sail under such inauspicious conditions and that this may 
have been the decisive factor.^
For the failure to supply the promised money Glamorgan again 
bore at least some responsibility. Apparently he had borrowed 
from the French agents £2,500 which he had contracted to give
to the Supreme Council for transmission to Ormond. When
1. Of."However, the peace was concluded, part of the Irish
army brought to V/aterford, and intended to relieve Chester, 
but no ship or necessities provided for their transport which 
the E of Glamorgan promised, so that the delay caused the 
surrender of Chester." (Plunket-Dunne M S .,p.802).
2. Muskerry to Ormond, April 3, T.d.P., XVll,p.32.
3. Digby to Ormond, April 3, Carte, VI, pp.363yl%ee also same to 
the same, April?, ibid.,p.369.
4. Cf."Besides they are so daunted by the Prince of Wales his 
disaster and flight as they term it to Scilly, that they do 
in a manner mutiny against their going, as apprehending 
themselves sent to sacrifice unless there may be more 
certainly for a secure landing place for them and of a 
conjunction of horses on the other side..." (ibid.,p.364).
It is also curious that Muskerry sent a letter to Ormond 
asking him to order his commissioners to muster *ithe troops 
on the very same day that he gave lengthy reasons why
the troops could not sail (T.C.P., XVll,p.34).
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asked for it, however, he prevaricated for several days,
then finally admitted that he no longer had it
In two respects the Supreme Council tried to be helpful in
answer to Ormond’s requests. They provided 300 troops as a
guard for the Prince of Wales who had been sent for safety
2
to the Scilly Isles. They v/e re also favourably d.isposed to
sending assistance to Montrose and the hard-pressed Royalists
in Wales, but could not overcome the opposition of Rinuccini,
who strongly disapproved of such aid.
It is as usual difficult to find fault with the reasons
given by Rinuccini for his opposition. His chief argument was
that the Confederacy needed to conserve all its strength
so that when Ormond was forced to give up Dublin they would
be poised to seize it before Parliament could do so. He was
still prepared to unite with Ormond against both the Scots
and the Parliamentarians, however, provided Ormond was
3considered solely as an ally.
In the event, he was able to have the troops earmarked 
for England transferred to the siege of Bunratty. Thvs 
assembling of the nucleus of an army in the area of Waterford 
proved to be the nearest the Confederates ever got to 
sending aid to England.
1. Ibid., p.70; the information was given by Fennell to whom 
Ormond had complained about their failure to provide the 
money (ibid.).
2. This was planned by Digby with Ormond’s blessing; see 
below p.g^b .
^ " Embassy, pp.166-7.
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Rinuccini*s dislike for and distrust of "the creatures"
Gfif Ormond, as he described them, had steadily increased until,
by the end of March, he was viewing all their actions in the
worst possible light. His annoyance had first been engendered
by their flagrant packing of the Supreme Council and the
various peace commissions sent to Dublin, which he singled
out as the primary cause of the "turbulence and misery of
the kingdom." The series of truces arranged to please Ormond
seemed to him particularly misguided since they:
"interrupted the course of victory, checked the first 
ardour of the people, and wasted the means which should 
have been employed against the Puritans."
He believed that large sums had been donated to Ormond to the
detriment of the Confederate armies.^ The Ormondists were
motivated by pure self-interest and cared not at all for the
rightful claims of their religion. So long as they continued
to be slaves of Ormond there was no possibility of
achieving a national settlement satisfactory to the Catholic
Church.
/
Rinuccini detested Ormond, whom he considered to be a 
cunning intriguer bent on furthering his personal ambitions 
and obstructing any agreement not arranged by himself. His 
instructions for trying to convert Ormond he had found to 
be useless, because the several intermediaries recommended 
v/ere all for various reasons ruled out. The Bishop of Ossory
1. The allegation that members of the Supreme Council linedd
Ormond's pockets was frequently made b^y the Old Irish. It 
is not born out by any evidence. Maybe it found its source 
in the help given to Ormond by such as Pennell to raise 
money from his estates.
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was too old, Mountgarret incapable, and Richard Butler too 
unpractical.^ Nevertheless, on his own initiative, he had 
asked Ormond through Dr. Pennell what he proposed to do 
should the King settle his differences with Parliament and 
consent to the destruction of the Irish Catholics. He had
pointed out through various people the advantages to be
2
gained from becoming a Roman Catholic. Ormond replied 
cagily that he was prepared to adopt any honourable means to 
help the King but delicately avoided any reference to his 
proposed conversion. Pennell was to use this information
3
cautiously as circumstances should require.
The truth was that Rinuccini n w e r  envisaged the possibility 
of a favourable agreement with the Royalists after his first 
appraisal of the situation at Kilkenny. To Pamiphili he 
suggested that such an agreement was likely only if the 
conflict in England were to end in the decisive victory of 
one side or the other. Por his part, he would prefer the
4
victory to go to Parliament. While it was admittedly true
that the King was more inclined to yield to Catholic
pressure than Ormond, he was to inconsistent and so
1. Report on the State of Ireland, Mar.l, 1646, Embassy, 
pp.132-47.
Embassy, p.132.
3. Com Inin. .ll.DP,
4. Cf. "Therefore, I am disposed to believe that in considering 
the subject of religion, which grows and is purified by 
opposition, the destruction of the King would be more 
useful to the Irish."
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untrustworthy^ that having deluded the Confederates into
disarming he might be induced by his Protestant ministers
to wreak vengeance upon them for having started the rebellion.
On the other hand, if the English Parliament were to triumph,
all Irishmen would stand fast together. Many feared that
the Kingdom would then be rapidly destroyed. He did not
think so. Efficiently organised, ably commanded, and inspired
by the will to victory, the Confederacy could give a noble.
account of itself provided it could rely on the support of
2
its friends abroad.
Rinuccini adumbrated this argument early in March
at a time when he was anxiously awaiting the appearance of
Sir Kenelm Digby with the Rome treaty and fearful lest the
Ormondists should suddenly proclaim a settlement with Ormond.
How far he intended it to be taken seriously, it is not
therefore possible to say. But merely to muse in this way
was obviously dangerous. Once the idea had been sown in his
mind that it might not be a bad thing if the King were to
/
be defeated, it is hard to visualise him supporting any 
movement aimed at obtaining victory for the King.
By May 1st, the date set for publishing the treaty, not 
one soldier had embarked for England. Afraid that Ormond would 
interpret the defeasance literally and nov/ declare the treaty
1. Even before leaving Paris Rinuccini had informed Pamphili 
that he had seen a document form Digby* s captured baggage 
in which "The King feigns to be favourable to the Irish
until his circumstances change."
(Embas.sfi % p.60).
2. Ibid., pp. 145-7.
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void, the Supreme Council sent Plunket to explain their
difficulties to Ormond.^ Ormond had agreed that it was not
pract icable to send the troops but had refused to consent
to publication of the Treaty in the absence of fresh
2
instructions from the King.
May 1st was also the date which had been fixed at 
Kilkenny for reversion to the Glamorgan Treaty failing receipt 
of the treaty from Rome. The Supreme Council had become so 
apprehensive of the clergy’s reaction to the impending 
announcement of the political treaty that they had decided 
they must publish Glamorgan’s treaty similtaneously. Wtien 
informed of this by Plunket, after the decision had already 
been taken to defer the political treaty, Ormond firmly pointed 
out that he would have refused to recognise the validity of
3
Glamorgan’s concessions.
Both sides were evidently already distrustful of each
other. Ormond had continued to press ±n vain for money,
supplies and troops. In particular, he was concerned to obtain
/
reinforcements for Lord Byron in North Wales, this being the
1. Instructions for N. Plunkett, April 16, T.C.P., XVll,p.90;
these included an offer to pay the rents of those 
Protestants who would support Ormond; see also further 
instructions to Plunkett April 17, ibid., p.96.
2. April, n.d., T.C.P.,XVll,p.99. Plunket returned to Kilkenny
about April 22; of. Ormond’s letter to Muskerry in praise
of him, ibid.
3. Ibid; see also j^ . Gilbert (Bellings), VI,p.2
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only remaining area of contact with England.^ He was 
threatened, too, by the English and Scots Commissioners 
who had warned him in the middle of April against making
peace with the Irish and had offered to discuss plans for
n 
3
2.strengthening Dublin. Parliame tary ships were also
ominously active in Dublin Bay.
For their part the Confederates were alarmed b y  reports
that Charles had surrendered either to the Scots or
Parliament. On May 10th Plunket was instructed to return
to Dublin and ask Ormond for a clear statement as to whether
he would join with them if the King had indeed been captured
and had declared for Parliament. In the meantime, they pressed
for an immediate union of forces a g a i n s t  the S c o t s p  At the
5
same time, they were obviously concious of b e i n g  in a strong 
position, for they wished Ormond to record in writing his 
recognition of the impracticability of despatching troops 
to England, and warned him that they would have to cease 
r e l y i n g  upon him if he continued to keep them in suspense.^
■ "-------- - -------- - — —  ' 7 " " ' """
1. Ormond and D i g b y  both thought it n e c e s s a r y  that two or 
three thousand troops should stand by for the possible relief 
of North Wales; o f .  O r m o n d  to Lord Byron, April 7,T.C.P.,XV11, 
p.35, 2,300 troops r e a d y ;  O r m o n d  to Muskerry, ibid.,p.39, 
imperative that three t h o u s a n d  troops be kept in readiness; 
same to the same, April 27,T.C.P., XVll,p.l42;same to the same. 
May,n.d.,ibid., p.131; Muskerry to Ormond,May 6,ibid.,p.172
- impossible to send the troops in the short time available.
2. April 13, T.C.P., XVll,p.82; On May 3 the E n g l i s h  and 
Hootch Commissioners sent him a safe-conduct for an agent to 
come and discuss with t h e m . O r m o n d  w a r n e d  the C o n f e d e r a t e s
that he was expecting the Scots to descend on them(ibid.,p.146)
3. O r m o n d  to Muskerry, May 6, ibid.,p.182.
4. Muskerry to Ormond, ibid.,p.211; Additional instructions 
for N.Plunkett, ibid.,p. 221.
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Presumably as an earnest of good will they instructed
O ’Neill to place his forces at Urmond’s disposal for dealing
with the Scots^ and notified him that 2,000 weight of
2
powder was ready for him. But Muskerry protested that it was 
not possible to send troops to relieve Byron in the short
3
time available.
The need to commit Ormond against the Scots in the light
of reports that the King had. been captured is evidenced by
u
the fact that the Goncil got Clanrickard to write to him
4
in support of Plunket’s instructions. This need almost 
certainly haa( as much to do with fear of Rinuccini as with 
fear of the Scots. What would he do when he heard of the 
treaty with Ormond? The vital thing was to insure that 
their military forces were already under Ormond’s command 
w#hen that time came. Even then, they again warned Ormond 
that they would have no choice but to stand by the Glamorgan
5
articles.
While Ormond was still considering his answers to 
Plunket, the news was confirmed of the King’s surrender to 
the Scots.^ Any definite commitments tE the Confederates
1. Muskerry to Ormond, May 3, ibid.,p.172. O ’Neill furnished 
Ormond with a statement of his forces on May 10th (ibid., 
p.212), Ormond having warned him on the day previously of 
the danger from the parliamentary advance into Connaught.
2. May 8, T.C.P.,XVll,p.195.
3o Ibid.,p.172.
4o May 11, B.M., Add.MS. 42,063, pp.132-3.
5. T.C.P., XVll, p.221.
6. Charles to Ormond, April 3, Carte, VI, pp.361-3; see 
also Carte, III, p. 231.
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must now be avoided until it could be seen how the situation 
in Ireland was to be affected by this unexpected development. 
So, temporising, Ormond instructed Plunket to report back 
to the Committee of instructions, then installed at 
Limerick, and to inform them that they could expect his 
answers by the end of the following week.^
The Committee was obviously impatient, for before Ormond 
had even prepared his answers Plunket had returned to Dublin 
proposing speedy publication. Plunket had again insisted 
that the Glamorgan articles must also be published and had 
made:
"...some other propositions of equail wildnes...wch 
I have extracted & herew"^^ sent yr LP, 
that yo may fudge how endless a Labour it 
is like to be to come to a conclusion wt^ men 
that sett no Limitts to their proposings."
None the less, he intended to give the best possible answers
These were conveyed to the Supreme Council by Barry and
3
Sir George Hamilton. Their gist was that a union of forces 
was out of the question until the ^ing authorised it or 
until they agreed to publication of the Peace. Further, 
that they had caused him hardship by their failure to 
provide troops and to find money for the upkeep of Dublin, 
and that it was impossible to give any countenance to the 
Glamorgan Treaty in view of the King’s rejection of it.
1.Ormond to Clanrickard, B.M., Add.MS.42,063,p.148.
2. Same to the same, May 30, ibid.,pp.150-2.
3. Barry and Hamilton arrived at Limerick on June 7th; 
of. Darcy to Clanrickard, ibid.,p.157,
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Finally, that if they did not soon publish his own treaty he 
would be compelled in his extremity to look elsewhere for 
support.^
This strong line encouraged the Supreme Goncil to brave
the wrath of the Nmicioists and declare their willingness
not only to publish the treaty without referentce to
Glamorgan’s articles but to send 1,000 troops for the relief
2
of Carnarvon as soon as peace had been proclaimed. Sellings’
3
narrative reveals that the Committee of Instructions 
which had been in session since the beginning of May at 
Limerick, where the Nuncio and the Concil had gone to 
supervise the siege of Bunratty, had been anxious to take this 
action ever since Ormond had made his position clear to 
Plunket. But the Nuncio had vigorously opposed them and 
they had been constrained to give w a y T h e i r  Committee’s 
decision was to be conveyed to Dublin by Plunket and Brown. 
Before they could depart, however, there was a clash 
with Rinuccini.
/
The non-arrival of Sir Kenelm Digby with the Rome Treaj*y
l.T.C.P., XVll,p.247.
2.Instructions for Plunket and Brown, June 12, ibid.,p.276.
3.Bellings account of the period April-July is difficult to 
follow since he did not bother to date the events he 
described.
4.Gilbert (Belling), VI,pp.2-3. Rinuccini had two written
two letters to the Council (Com.Rin.,II. pp.203-5,pp.212-15) 
protesting against an agreement with tliOrmond. 1. Much to 
his annoyance they had not replied but had he but known 
it they were duly impressed. He had also made two speeches 
to the Council (Embassy, p.177).
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had weakened Rinuccini*s authority^ and made nonsense of 
his insistence that Ormond had been superseded as the King’s
agent in negotiations. 'Technically, moreover, there had
been a reversion to the Glamorgan Treaty on May 1st. This
meant that the Confederates were on the brink of
subscribing to a political treaty containing few benefits in
the faint hope of obtaining the King’s eventual endorsement
of Glamorgan’s religious concessions which, in any case,
were unsatisfactory.
When Barry and Hamilton had appeared, Rinuccini had
suspected at once that the Council was resolved ’precipitately’
to proclaim the peace. This had been the signal for him to
despatch to the Supreme Council the document, signed
secretly by the bishops in February, in which they had
declared their opposition to the conclusion of peace before
the arrival of the Rome Treaty. In two letters he forcibly
2
justified his ovm opposition.
These letters, so he believed, caused consternation 
in the Council and provoked a viofent argument with the 
two bishops who were present. So abashed were the;^, however, 
that they replied formally in writing that they would do
1. Cf.Rinuccini to the Nuncio in Prance, May 3,"...it is 
impossible to tell you how prejudicial it has been to me that 
Sir Kenelm Bigby has neverforwarded the packet containing 
the signed articles of the Pontifical Treaty entrusted to 
him by Cardinal Pamphili; as evil disposed persons declare 
that I have acted without authority and delayed the peace 
for purposes of my ov/n (Embassy, p.163).
2. June 8, Cem.Rin., II,pp.219-20; Cam.Rin., II,ppo222-4.
504
nothing without previously consulting him.^
In fact, the Council were thrown into consternation for
another reason. They had never reckoned with such opposition
and were genuinely shocked that Rinuccini should have
suppressed the bishops’ declaration for so long and sprung
it on them v/ith such suddenness. They also considered that
it was proper to assume that they had had power to settle
with Ormond after the Rome Treaty had failed to arrive by -
May 1st. Indeed, if the evidence of Boilings can be taken at
its face value, they could not understand why Rinuccini was 
2
so annoyed. At any rate, they intended to go on with the treaty.
But v/hen Plunket and Brown went to take leave of the
Nuncio and to ask for his blessing, and he finally grasped
that the peace had already been concluded and it was now
only a question of proclaiming it, the full storm broke.
Rinuccini was incensed because they had slighted his opinions
and insulted his office. He would neither give them his
blessing - "nec benedico, nec benejâicam vobis" - nor have
3
anything to do with the treaty.
Rinuccini described Plunket and Brown as mortified by his
1. June 13, ibid., pp.225-6, Embassy, p.178.
2. Gilbert (Bellings), VI, pp.3-4. The Council sent the Bishop 
of Limerick and Father Robert Nugent, Provincial of the 
Jesuits, to find out the reason for Rinuccini’s indignation. 
Apparently they brought back the answer that he was annoyed 
because the Council had failed to reply to his letters(ibid.).
3. Ibid., p.5; Embassy, pp.178-9.
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justifiable anger, Plunket so shocked that he took to
bed with a fever, and the Council stunned into admitting the
1
error of which they had been guilty. But Rinuccini
exaggerated the effect of his magisterial rebuke. If he
had one fault above all others, it was to equate the respect
felt for his apostolic office v/ith respect for his opinions,
especially by the members of the Supreme Council. On this
occasion, his error of judgement was to have serious 
2
consequences.
His fulminations were conveyed to the Council by Browne
and formally expressed ina a letter which he himself sent
on the following morning. The Council were so anxious to
appease him that Bellings and eight others came as a
deputation to explain that they had nothing but respect
for his person and to plead the necessity of proclaiming 
3
the peace.
A few days later Rinuccini insisted on appearing before the 
council-board in person.^ Again h^ asked them not to conclude 
the peace before they had received the Pope’s approval. In 
reply, the Council furnished many reasons why they should:
1. Embassy, p.179.
2. Cf. Bellings’ moralising on this subject:"... so it is no 
wonder he (Rinuccini) should be confident a people who, 
from the highest to the lowest of them, revered him v/ith 
unusual respects, such as he had not seen in other nations, 
would have depended entirely upon his directions, nand 
this probably was an encouragement for him to venture upon 
those high oppositions he gave the government."
(Gilbert,VI,p.5.)
3. Embassy, p.179; Gilbert(Bellings), VI,p.5.
4. In Bellings’ version (ibid.,p.6). It is interesting etc note 
that the Committee of Instructions had been dissolved,
get-tl-0d(■ibi.d.^the business for which it had been summondd.
________________________ ______ I» <L<ûv\:iidji^i/(LcK J iL irH ilA  i  i h lA - )  .
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the King might make common cause with Parliament and the
Scots against them; the intended peace was devised for tne
purpose of making possible a union with the Royalists -
the major issues were to be settled later; in any case,
the ecclesiastical conditions they had secured were substantial;
they were fully determined to take to arms again, should
any of the conditions be violated.^
Rinuccini was unimpressed by such considerations. In -
particular he exposed the emptiness of their promise to take
up arms once more, seeing that they were trembling before
Ormond even when he was bereft of men, money and materials.
As far as Rinuccini was concerned, this riposte was
unchallengeable, "silenced them completely", and obliged
them to send Brov/n^to Dublin with his instructions "entirely
changed". Now he was merely to ascertain Ormond’s intentions
and to state plainly that until the King’s precise wishes
were known there could be no announcement of the treaty.
But Rinuccini was unhappy aboyt the future. He hoped
that the Council was not deceiving him. He had used many
devices for eight months to delay the Treaty, but at last
wearied of the struggle. He had abandoned hope of seeing
Kenelm Digby, his powers of invention now failed him, and
he had no sprit left for keeping up his opposition. Yet he
2
would look to God for aid and comfort. This mood of
1. Gilbert (Bellings), VI, pp. 6-13*
2. Embassy, pp.1 7 9 %  -81.
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pessimism was surprising, for his policy of reliance upon God,
the Papacy, and the stren# of the Irish in arms, had just
apparently received glorious justification. In the middle
of his controversy with the Council news had been received
of a great victory won by O'Neill over the Scots at a place
~]
called Benburb.
O ’Neill’s victory had not pleased the Ormondists. In
their view it harbingered the ascendancy over them of the
Native Irish, and made the proclamation of peace all the
more urgent. In any case, wheras Rinuccini thought that he
had convinced them, they themselves believed that they ahad
convinced him. They v/ere encouraged in this belief by his
general demeanour as well as by his parting words at the end
of their discussions :"Video ex ista pace multum posse
provenire boni, multum autemjnali, Deus providebit."
Accordingly Browne and Plunket were despatched to Dublin
2
with their original instructions.
This misunderstanding between the Gounciljand the Nuncio 
was to have fatal consequences for the Confederacy. When 
peace was finally proclaimed each side blamed the other - 
indeed, Rinuccini believed that the Council had knowingly 
deceived him. The trouble seems to have been that it was
1. News of the battle, which had taken place on June 5th, was 
received at Limerick on June 13th.
2. Gilbert (Bellings), V%,pp.13-4. Clarendon (Historical Vjaew .^lcjf-^  ^
claimed that Rinuccini gave his blessing to the two
commifLS si oners when they left for Dublin.
5o8
not possible to have frank and. free-ranging discussions. 
Rinuccini evidently preferred declaiming to listening 
and he was in any case a formal sort of man. There was also 
the difficulty previously mentioned that the Councillors 
felt constrained to wear an outward show of deference in 
their dealings with the Pope’s representative, which 
Rinuccini took to signify agreement with his point of view. 
Moreover, though all the Councillors knew Latin, it must 
have been a disadvantage to use it as the sole language of 
C ommunication.
On their arrival at Lublin, Plunket and Browne were 
regretfully informed by Ormond that he could not give them 
his decision at once because he had yet to hear nev/s from the 
King of the outcome of his flight to the boots. In fact, 
Ormond had been seriously worried, for it seemed impossible 
to get in touch with the King. Eventually, he had begged 
Monro to give permission for a messenger to pass through his 
lines.^ And on June 9th he had written to the King a long 
letter, opening with the remark that it was necessary to run 
the risk of its being intercepted.
This letter revealed that Ormond had little faith 
in the Confederates ’’who hould continuait intelligence 
& dangerous correspondence with forreine Nations, and have 
at this time amongst them ... a Nuntio from the Pope, & 
Agents from france and bpaine... ’’ a s the Confederates had
1 . Ï.C.P., XVll,p.254.
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failed to fulfil all their obligations, the concessions 
made to them were null and void. The Parliamentary Commissioners 
had urged the necessity of entering into a treaty with them 
and indeed agents had been nominated. Apparently, hov/ever, 
news of the King’s surrender at Nev/ark had caused the 
Commissioners to leave Northern Ireland and so that particular 
treaty had come to an and. The Royalists were lamentably 
short of supplies, they no longer knew how to maintain the 
army, and Dublin was bound to fall into the hands of the 
Confederates or of Parliament. All that they could hope for 
now was:
’’to keepe up some face of Government heere, for 
yor Majties Honor untill wee may receive your 
gracious pleasure. ’’1
This letter was not sent immediately in the hope that Monro
would issue a safe-conduct for a messenger, for v/hich two more
requests were made. In a personal letter, dated June 12,
Ormond explained that there could be no peace without the
2
King’s express command. z
Monro had made no comment upon the matter of the safe- 
conduct, but had asked Ormond to join forces against O ’Neill 
in the light of the disastrous defeat at Benburb^ bo also 
had the Parliamentary Commissioners. Ormond and the Council 
had tactfully refused.
1. T.C.P., XVll,p.269.
2. Carte, VX,pp.392-3. 
g. Ibid.) pp.394-94.
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By June 22nd Oinnond decided that to communicate v/ith 
the King was imperative. Accordingly, he despatched the 
letter of June 9th, together v/ith a secona letter describing 
the exchanges with the Scots. He pointed out hov/ it had 
been necessary to prolong the truce with the Irish until 
July 13 and affirmed that it v/ould be necessary to prolong 
it again beyond that date since his forces were in no 
condition to repel an attack on Dublin.^ Y/hat Ormond really 
required from the King was a positive order to throw in either
ci
with the Scots or the Irish. For the time being he dare^ show 
favour to neither and yet he had not the resources to stand 
alone.
Unfortunately, the King was .Iso in difficulties. In
March the fall of Chester, followed by the surrender of most
of the remaining Royalist units, had reduced him to his
lowest point of despair since the beginning of the war. As
he informed Ormond tnrough Nicholas:
"...V/ee have been at a great losse diuers v/eek-es for v/ant 
of advertisement out of Ireland, and our condition is 
now very low and sad, by the late disbanding of our army 
in the vest ^ (which, if succours of foot had arrived in 
tyme from Ireland, might have been preserved to our most 
certaine advantage)..."
He had done all he could to offer reasonable terms of peace
2
to Parliament.
While aid from Ireland might now do him "more harme 
l.Ibid.,pp.394-99.
2.Mar.26, Carte, VI,pp.356-7. Nicholas echoed this dirje-like 
note in a personal letter of the same date (ibid.,pp.358-9).
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than good", he still desired peace there. Such troops as 
had been intended for England should be used to pacify the 
whole island, so that later on Ireland might be instrumental
in helping him to regain power in England and Scotland or^in
/ providing -,
a place of refuge for himself.
The King’s letters at this time repealed a lack both of
plan and purpose. He talked, for instance, of trying to get
to London in order to exploit the rising enmity between the
Presbyterians and the independents. Again, having just stated
that troops from Ireland would do him more harm than good
he added a postscript that he co^ld use three or four
2
thousand after all.
But only one week later, hope had been rekindled.
Encouraged by the French agent, Montreuil, he had decided to 
surrender to the Scots, who, he was assured, would accord 
him a favourable reception. In his head a new grandiose 
plan had been born. The Scots and Montrose should unite.
In the meantime, Ormond would continue to hold the fort in 
Ireland.^ It is significE^, however, that on April 4 he informed 
Ormond that commands to Digby were commands to himself^ and 
on April 6th he wrote to Glamorgan that he placed his trust 
in him and in the Nuncio. To the unlikely combination of
1. The King to Digby, March 26, ibid.,pp.357-8.
2. Ibid.
3. April 3, Carte, VI,pp.361-3.
4. Cal.Cl.S.P.,l,p.309.
5. B.M., Harleian MSS; 6988, f .121; Embassy, p.185
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Montrose and the Scots was he# hoping to add the Irish
Catholics also? It would seem probable.
If Charles rode into the Scottish camp at Newark full
of optimism, he was quickly undeceived. The Scots as always
proved relentless negotiators and pressed harsh conditions
upon him. Among these conditions was the severance of
negotiations with the Confederates, to which Charles simulated
agreement. At their instigation he wrote to Ormond on June
11th ordering him instantly to break off negotiations
with the Confederates and never henceforth to tender
concessions on his behalf.^ The boots forwarded the letter
to the Parliamentary Commissioners in Ulster who passed
2
it on to Ormond. The latter had no choice but to inform 
Plunket and Brown that though he was personally convinced 
that the King had written under duress there could be no 
question of proclaiming the peace for the time being.
Instead he proposed that ,the cessa&ion be extended until 
August 13th and Plunket and Browne returned to Limerick
3
to obtain the approval of the Supreme Council.
There the matter might have rested indefinitely if 
George Ligby had not appeared dramatically early in July to 
report that the King, a close prisoner, hade contrived to 
notify the Queen that he desired peace with the Irish.
1. Carte,VI,p.392.
2. Jun.22,T.C.P., XVll,p. 321.
3. Jun.27, ibid., p.343.
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Digby had been scheming hard for months to bring the Prince 
of Wales to Ireland in the belief that his presence there 
would facilitate the conclusion of peace and would make it 
possible to launch a united Confederate-Eoyalist assault against 
the Parliamentarians.^ It was with this object in view that he 
had conveyed the guard of 300 men contributed by the Confederates 
to the Scilly Islands, where the Prince of Wales had taken 
refuge.
When Digby arrived at the Scilly Islands, he found
that the Prince had moved to Jersey. Having followed him
thither, he drew an attractive picture of the advantages of
going to Ireland, but the Prince’s advisers although they
professed sympathy with Digby’s arguments wished him to stay
where he was. The Prince himself was attracted by the pleasures
of Paris and, for other reasons, his mother also desired to
have him there. With characteristic audacity Digby pr^pnood-
6(/P
proposed kidnapping the Prince^ ho one was prepared to
2
to support the plan. /
From Jersey, Digby dashed to Paris with the intention 
of persuading the Queen to support his plans for the Prince.
The Queen expressed willingness to give all the help she could
1. Cf. Digby to Clanrickard, April 18, B.M., Add.M.8.42,163, 
p.136;"as the only expedient that can possibly give a happy 
setiement to the distractions of it & unite the English wv^ 
the Irish in his service. "
2. Clarendon, Great Rebellion, IV,p.193.
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but she was reluctant to send the Prince to Ireland.
Digby turned for advice to Mazarin, who now fully supported
the restoration to power of Charles I because he was afraid
that the English Parliament was about to enter into friendly
relations with Spain. Mazarin believed that there were
excellent prospects of forming an alliance of the Scots,
Montrose and the Irish Catholics and therefore strongly
supported the need for an early settlement in Ireland.^ He
was willing to provide financial aid and gave Digby 10,000 
 ^2pistoles to take back with him.
Even so, it was decided that the Prince should remain where
he was for the time being and Digby had to be content with
a firm promise that he would be sent to Ireland at some future
date. In the meantime, Digby could inform Ormond and the Council
that the King wished them to make an agreement with the 
3
Confederates.
Armed with his money and friendly letters for Ormond
4 5 ■from both the Queen and the Prince^ enjoining him to conclude
the peace Digby returned to Dublin and at once assured the
1. Of. Du Moulin to Ormond, Jul.27,O.S.P.I., pp.480-1.
2. More, as the Confederates complained, than they kkd been able 
to obtain since the beginning of the Rebellion.(Embassy,
p.186). Only 6,00dpistols according to Clarendon (Rebellion, 
IV,p.196).
3. Digby to Ormond, dune 17, Carte, VI,pp.394-99. There is a 
witty description of Digby’s travels in History of the . 
Rebellion, IV,pp.190-200.
4. "carte, VI,pp.399-400.
5. Ibid., p.404.
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Council that the King:
"having with much skill and difficulty obtained the 
secret means of expressing in short his sad 
condition, he thereupon declared his will and pleasure; 
that the queen, the prince, and all his faithful 
ministers, to whom it was to be imparted, were to 
understand this as the last free direction which they 
could expect from him; and that they should in all 
things pursue steadily those orders which he had given 
before the time of his unfree condition... that 
particularly for the business of Ireland, he had, 
whilst he was free, sent positive and repeated orders 
to the lord lieutenant for concluding the peace, upon 
the terms expressed to him by nis excellency, since 
the mutual signing of the articles."
The King had further said they were to put no credence in any
instructions purporting to come from him unless they were
in cipher. In the absence of truch cipher instructions Ormond
was to take‘his orders form the Queen and the Prince who would,
however, continue to support Ormond in his handling of the
negotiations with the Irish.^
After this, Digby obviously urged immediate action.
Clanrickard was summoned to Dublin posthaste and the Confederate
2Commissioners were invited to send agents to conclude the peace.
/
YVhen the invitation to Dublin was received, the Supreme
Council, now back at Kilkenny, had already agreed to an
3extension of the cessation until August 13th. Geoffrey Brov/ne 
was again nominated to agree to the proclamation of peace on 
their behalf.^
Even now, there was to be a further delay. Many people 
in Dublin and several councillors were still reluctant to
1. Carte, HI)
2. B.M., Add.MS. 42,063,p.161.
3. Jul.5, Gilbert, VI,p.52.
4. He arrived in Dublin on Jtily 11th. B.M. ,Add.MS. ,p.l6l.
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approve peace with the Irish. Ormond himself remained uneasy.
The Parliamentary Commissioners seized the opportunity to
ask him v/hat he was doing about the Kmng’s declaration of
June 11th against the Irish.^ Finally, hov/ever, Ormond
resolved to override the opposition, despite his own misgivings.
He was helped by Digby who, sharing none of his doubts, signed
a statement, which was duly entered in the Council Book on
Jul^ 28th, to the effect that
"the said letter of the 11th of June is either a 
surreptitious letter, or a forced one from his majestie, 
or procuredvjïpon some false information of the state of 
his affaires, and most contrary to what I knov« to bee p 
his free resolution and vnconstrained will and pleasure."
On the following day Ormond added a further declaration:
"that he was satisfied he had full authority and 
command from his majesty to conclude a peace 
upon the articles desposited with the Marquis of 
Clanrickard ..."3
He also added that he understood that the King had dispensed
with the condition that the Confederates should send 10,000 troops
to England.^
/
And so, after more than two years of negotiations, 
peace was officially proclaimed on July 30th. On the Royalist
4
side it was welcomed with relief, though there was some 
opposition to it in Dublin. On the Confederate side it pleased 
one party but infuriated the other.
1. Jul.14,T.C.P.,XVIII,p.27.
2. Carte, VI,pp.419-20; Gilbert, VI,pp.55-7.
3. T.C.P., XVlll,p.73; Gilbert,VI,p.57.
4. Ibid., pp.57-8.
5. Ibid.,pp.58-60.
Chapter XIII
The Rejection of the Ormond Peace, August, 1646-Pecember, 1646.
On August 6th, 1646, Dr. Roberts, Ulvester King
of Arms, set out for the principal Confederate towns to
proclaim the peace. Everywhere he encountered hostility.
\'Vaterford and Clonmel refused him admission, while at
Kilkenny he was able to read out his proclamation only
when the son of Viscount Mount garret at the head of an
armed band intimidated the townsfolk. At Limerick he
and the Mayor were so roughly handled^ that it was
decided to cut short his itinei^.
V/hether the solid opposition of the towns was to be
expected or whether, as Carte subsequently complained,5
the Supreme Council dithered while the clergy, inspired
by Rinuccini, acted promptly and vigorously to stir up
opposition,"^ it is hard to say. But from a comparative
analysis of the supporters and the critics of the Ormond
/
Treaty, it would seem that most people were bound to be 
dissatisfied. A settlement that could inspire the
^ Poor Roberts obtained a medical description of the cuts 
and contusions inflicted on him at Limerick (T.C.P.,
XVIII, p. 186).
^ Cf. Roberts’ Relation of his Journey to proclaim the 
Peace, Sep. 1, ibid., p. 213.
3 Carte, III, p. 256.
4 As they certainly did. The Mayor of Limerick recommended 
the Supreme Council to recommend the herald’s progress 
"untill yor honnors take some course to appease the 
Cleargie, wch will be a meane to free the whole Kingdome 
from a great deale of confusion (Aug. 18., T.G.P., XViII, 
p. I6l).
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Protestant clergy to move a vote of thanks to the Lord
Lieutenant^ was scarcely likely to please the Irish
Catholics as well.
Nearly all the New Irish were naturally pleased.
Security of tenure was what they had wanted and what they
believed they had now obtained. Bellings was doubtless
expressing a popular sentiment when he v/rote how happy
he was "to againe become Master of that littel patrimonie
2
descended upon me." Some of the regular clergy also 
welcomed the peace.
In Clanrickard’s opinion only a small but vocif­
erous group by which he meant Rinuccini, some of the 
bishops and the Ulster chieftains, really opposed the
3
Treaty. This opinion is contradicted by the evidence. 
The opposition comprised three main sections, the clergy, 
including some of the orders, most of the towns,^ and 
virtually all the Ulstermen, and must have numbered 
roughly five-sixths of the population. It is not even 
certain that all the gentry were content.^
^ Carte, VI, pp. 423-4.
^ Bellings to Ormond, Aug. 4, T.C.P., p. 102.
^ Clanrickard to Ormond, Sep. 18, Carte, VI, p. 430.
^ Ibid., Ill, p. 3.
5 Rinuccini reported many of the barons of Munster as 
being aggrieved because there was no guarantee that they 
would be restored to their estates (Embassy, p. 196).
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The clergy attacked the treaty root and branch 
as containing none of the essential safeguards for 
religious freedom upon which they had always insisted.
The townspeople tended to follow the clergy’s leader­
ship out of respect but they also relished the indepen­
dence which they had recently gained. For their part, 
the men of Ulster considered they had been thrown to the 
wolves, since there was no mention of rescinding the ' 
plantation of their native land or of protecting them 
against reprisals.^
Considering the violence of the opposition provoked, 
the Supreme Council had been strangely casual in making 
plans for ensuring observance of the peace. Apparently, 
it was assumed that the spleen of the Ulstermen could be
ignored, and that, while unenthusiastic, Rinuccini was
2
at least acquiescent. In any event, they could have 
had no intimation of =the influence exercised by the
Church when galvanised into action by the Nuncio. As
%
late as August 11th, the Commissioners of T r u s t c o u l d
^ See below p.S^S^for a fuller account of the grievances 
of Ulster.
^ See above p.tTQ7.
^ With the proclamation of the Treaty the Supreme Council 
had become officially defunct and Commissioners of Trust 
had been appointed to govern the country in conjunction 
with Ormond. Nevertheless, to avoid the pedantry of 
"former members of the Supreme Council" it v/ill still be 
convenient to refer to the "Supreme Council,
b20
still inform Ormond that the clergy "might (sic) infuse 
a dislike of the peace into the minds of the people."
Even so, they were not so complacent as to dismiss the 
likelihood of some armed insurrection and they advised 
Ormond to hold troops in readiness to extinguish the 
small fires likely to break out.^ They also urged the 
necessity of proclaiming the peace in Kilkenny before
p
they did so in any other town.
Unhappily for them, Rinuccini had started a forestfi/e 
By chance or design. Congregation was about to assemble 
at Waterford v/hen news of the proclamation in Dublin was 
released.^ Roberts was sent first to Waterford - not to 
Kilkenny - presumably with the object of silencing the 
clergy, but the town firmly refused to allow him in to 
deliver his proclamation.^ This ensured that nothing 
should prevent the clergy from preparing an assault on 
the treaty - this action and the dynamic leadership of 
Rinuccini. /
There is a fascinating contrast between the long, 
unspectacular career of the Archbishop of Fermo, the
1 T.C.P., XVIII, p. 129.
^ Muskerry and Browne to Dr. Roberts, ibid., p. 117.
^ See below pp.
^ Roberts to Ormond, Aug. 9, ibid., p. 119.
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sedate, canonical scholar, and the meteoric embassy 
of the papal nuncio to Ireland. Rinuccini tried to 
disparage his own part in organising a national party 
in opposition to the OrmondistsJ but there is no doubt 
that he was almost entirely responsible for it. Through­
out his time in Ireland, he was formulating policies and 
energetically compelling their adoption. But for him 
agreement with Ormond would have been reached months 
before, and the opposition to the Treaty now declared 
would have been as ineffectual as the Supreme Council 
had predicted to Ormond and as easily quenched. But for 
him, also, there would have been no hostile assembly of 
the clergy.
Nominally the purpose of the Congregation at Water­
ford was to discuss the establishment of a national synod, 
But whereas in his report - composed amid the heat of 
the events described - Rinuccini stated that it was
, p
meeting by accident when the treaty was announced, in 
the retrospective account of his mission drafted several 
years later he confessed to having summoned the clergy 
for the express purpose of denouncing the treaty.^ And
^ Cf. his report to Rome, Embassy, p. 498.
^ Ibid., p. 197.
^ Ibid., p. 498.
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certainly. Congregation’s first act was to give reasons 
for rejecting the treaty.
The shameful defect of the Treaty as far as they 
were concerned, was that it contained no concrete guaran­
tee for the security of religion, but relied on a vague 
reference to concessions which the King could be relied 
on implicitly to make at some future date. Rinuccini 
also emphasised the fact that its proclamation involved 
two serious breaches of faith: the promise made in the
previous October not to arrange a treaty without taking 
his advice and the agreement made in February to ascer­
tain the opinion of the Pope. In anticipation of alle­
gations that he himself had endorsed the treaty he caused 
all his correspondence with the Supreme Council over the 
question of peace to be read out to the assembled clergy.^
Never having perused the treaty hitherto in its 
complete form was a special source of grievance to the 
clergy. It also presented them with an excellent pre­
text for demanding the suspension of its publication 
within the Confederacy until they had had time to discuss 
its terms. They submitted their demand not only to the
p
Supreme Council but to the town corporations as well.
^ Goni.Rin., II, pp. 324-5? cf. also Rinuccini’s report 
to Pamphilio, Aug. 18, Embassy, pp. 195-200.
2 Gilbert, VI, pp. 67-8.
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They also wrote to Queen Henrietta Maria explaining 
their position.^ This was a shrewd way of countering 
accusations of disloyalty.
If the swift action of the clergy effectively stif­
fened the spine of the opposition, it filled the Ormond­
ists with dismay. Clerical intransigeance might yet 
destroy their careful handiwork. Bent on appeasement 
they sent two noted moderates, Patrick D a r c y  and Nicholas 
Plunket, who took with them a copy of the original arti­
cles, to put their case to Congregation. Plunket and 
Darcy concentrated on allaying fears for religion. They 
insisted that the article c o n c e r n e d  with future con­
cessions to be obtained from the King referred to the 
Glamorgan Treaty. They drew attention to a p l e d g e  by 
which the Supreme Council undertook to reconvene the 
General Assembly and to take up arms once more if ever 
the terms of the treaty should be violated. They claimed 
that they had a private assurance from Ormond that the 
Churches which had fallen into their possession since 
1 6 4 1  would not be restored to the Protestants. G e o r g e  
Digby was prepared to agree to the same degree of relig­
ious freedom as had been a r r a n g e d  in R o m e  by his cousin, 
Kenelm D i g b y .  In any c a s e ,  the present settlement was
^ Aug., 15, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 144.
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not to be regarded as definitive. Essentially it was a 
temporary device to enable them to co-operate with 
Ormond against the Puritans. The theme running through 
their arguments was that the King had every intention of 
giving them full satisfaction but dare not do so publicly 
at the present time. And yet it would be tragic to 
vnthhold their support from him merely because he would 
not make an open declaration in their favour.^
To the bishops these were specious arguments. "They 
had no security for their future maintenance except 
empty words and promises" and "came to the conclusion 
that the Catholic religion was in greater danger than
p
ever." They proposed to the Supreme Council, therefore, 
that the Glamorgan articles should be added to the polit­
ical agreement and that protestant governors and garrisons 
should be prohibited from taking over Confederate strong­
holds. ^
In reply the Council took refuge in a legal quibble, 
asserting that since the treaty had been approved by the 
clerics in the Assembly and the Supreme Council, Congre­
gation had no right to controvert an agreement arranged
^ Com.Rin., pp. 325-30.
 ^Embassy, pp. 197-8.
 ^Qo^^»Riu., II, pp. 330-1.
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by the secular government.^ Congregation retorted with 
a list of critical comments upon this and other points 
raised by the Council in its justification. Those 
clerics who had voted for the treaty on March 6th had 
done so in their private capacity as barons of the king­
dom and not as delegates of the Church. Next, they taxed 
the Council with having deliberately misled the Assembly 
by pretending that Ormond’s concessions were much more 
generous than they were - in particular, by conveying 
the impression that they allowed for the retention of 
the churches seized since 1641 and that they embodied 
Glamorgan’s articles. The articles as now published 
contained no reference to several clauses which had been 
included in the list read out to the Assembly.
They recalled, that the Glamorgan Treaty had been 
conditional upon 10,000 troops being sent to England.
Yet, Ormond was now agreeable to waiving this condition. 
How then could the Glamorgan Treaty be considered still 
valid and how could it possibly be implicit in the 
present treaty ? They would not believe that the Glam­
organ Treaty was to be included automatically in any 
future concessions from the King.
Apparently Plunket and Darcy had returned to Kilkenny 
with the clergy’s answer. Then they had returned to 
V/aterford with the answer of the Supreme Council; cf. 
Walsh to Ormond, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 158.
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Their riposte to the argument concerning the 
reaction of the King’s supporters to an over-generous 
peace was unanswerable, \7hat supporters remained to 
him ? On weaker ground, they claimed that the distinc­
tion the Council had tried to make between the juris­
diction of the Church and the State ran counter to canon­
ical teaching.
On reports that France supported the peace they 
commented that Digby had been spreading the rumour that 
the nation was solidly for peace.^ The French and Hen­
rietta Maria had been misled as to the true state of
Irish opinion. It was not true, as had been alleged,
2
that the clergy were pro-Spanish. On the contrary the 
Catholic Church in Ireland was demonstrably more loyal 
to the Crown than the Protestants.
Finally, Congregation dismissed as worthless the 
vague assurances given for religion. Everything was to
Rinuccini detested Digby who, he had reason to believe, 
had slandered him during his recent visit to Paris.
Cf. Hynes, op.cit., p. 98.
p
This allegation obviously originated in Dublin. Ormond 
was intensely suspicious of the activities of foreign 
Catholic agents in Ireland because he feared that the 
Confederates might be tempted to offer the Kingdom either 
to France or to Spain. Rinuccini’s suspected connexion 
with Spain may have given rise to the rumour that he was 
working on behalf of Philip IV.
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depend on Ormond who would be served only by yes-men, 
his critics having been eliminated from the government.
Having thus disposed of the Council’s plausible 
arguments to its own satisfaction Congregation made two 
proposals for averting an irreparable rupture. The 
Supreme Council should either suspend publication of the 
treaty until the views of Rome had been obtained or 
summon the General Assembly so that the will of the 
people might be ascertained.^
According to Rinuccini it was only after dispatching 
this formidable reply to Kilkenny that the Clergy decided 
that observance of the peace was a breach of the oath 
of association, since that oath called upon the swearer 
to uphold the ’True Faith’ and to do nothing directly
p
or indirectly to harm it. In fact. Congregation had 
already declared on August 12th that any one who had 
taken the original oath and now subscribed to the peace
^ Congregation to Bellinis, Aug. 22, Com.Rin., II, 
pp. 330-9. This statement was followed by ai other 
lengthy letter to the Supreme Council two days later 
which the clergy threatened to publish if it evoked no 
response. A new objection to the Treaty was that the 
names of O ’Neill and Preston had been left off the list 
of Commissioners of Trust: a new proposal that the con­
cessions which the King had been prepared to offer but 
which Ormond had suppressed should be published. Aug.
24, Gilbert, VI, p. 97; T.C.P., XVIII, p. 176; C.S.P.I.,
pp. 497-8.
^ B m P a s s y , p. 198.
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had coimnitted perjury.^ Nor in general had they relied 
on a war of words alone.
The threat of excommunication was held over the 
heads of any Commissioner who should go to Dublin to
p
assist in implementing the Treaty. This was followed 
by draconian ecclesiastical sanctions. On August 17th^ 
Congregation formally excommunicated the Commissioners 
who had arranged the Treaty, placed an interdict on all 
the churches, cities and towns recognising it, and sus­
pended from their sacramental duties any priest who spoke 
favour of it or granted absolution in the confessional 
to one of its adherents.
In order to cripple the Council financially, they 
threatened with excommunication any official who should 
spend money or collect taxes on its behalf and any 
soldier who should carry out its orders. They also 
framed a new oath of association which bound the swearer 
to approve of a peace whi^ch should be:
•‘honourable in the view of the world; secure to 
their conscience according to the oath of asso­
ciation and so approved by the congregation of 
Ireland.
Decree of Congregation, Aug. 12, Com.Din., II, pp. 340- 
1; Cilbert, VI, pp. 69-72. The original declaration is 
preserved in Trinity College, Dublin, 3-H-ff *143-4-
^ Com.Rin., II, p. 346.
3 The Congregation had broken up on the previous day 
leaving the Nuncio and eight Others to act in its name.
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Finally, they declared that the Supreme Council had 
forfeited the right to exercise sovereignty over the 
Confederacy.^
There vms nothing more that could usefully be said 
or done although both sides shrank from the consequences 
of precipitating a civil war. The clergy refused absol­
utely to put their trust in promises while the whole 
case of the Council was based on the assumption that 
Ormond and Charles I could be trusted. All the Council 
could do was to reiterate their determination to go on 
with the war against the Puritans and the Scots - pro­
vided they could collect taxes. They were ready to work 
v/holeheartedly for the cause of religion as soon as a 
free parliament had been summoned if only the clergy 
would v/ithdraw their declaration against the peace. In 
the meantime, they could give no reply to the last
communication of August 24th until Ormond had come to
2Kilkenny and Plunk et and Darcy had returned Waterford.
The Council now tried to collect taxes. The clergy 
retaliated by issuing a decree of excommunication against 
all those who should pay as well as collect taxes and
^ Com.Rin., II, pp. 343-4»
2 Ibid.;* T.C.P., XVIII, p. 174» Ironically, instead of 
winning over the clergy Plunket and Darcy were themselves 
persuaded to accept the peace. This change of heart 
elated the clergy (Com.Rin., II, pp. 325-30).
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any soldiers who should happen to accompany the tax 
officers.^ The Council, vhich had so lightly discounted 
the volume of opposition likely to be raised against its 
policy, found itself completely outmanoeuvred. Even so, 
the position would not have been so serious had the 
Council commanded the loyalty of the Confederate armies. 
But, by this time, 0 ‘Neill had aligned himself with the 
clergy and viiile Preston had not committed himself one 
way or the other he was obviously not going to come to 
their rescue.
The attitude to be adopted by these two generals 
had been the crucial factor from the beginning. Y/hat 
0 ‘Neill decided to do was all-important, for in the last 
resort the clergy were powerless to overcome the Ormond- 
ists without his military backing although they might 
achieve a position of stalemate by using spiritual 
sanctions. Knowing this, both sides sought to win him 
over. Indeed, Ormond had^for some time been careful to 
keep in touch with him through his nephew Daniel, with 
the object of coaxing him into a frame of mind favourable 
to the Treaty. 0 ‘Neill, a canny man, had been polite
Decree of Aug. 26, Com.Rin., II,j^ .i'^ :^ Even the threat
had apparently had some effect - cf. Bellings to Ormond, 
Aug. 21, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 165, the Corporation of Water­
ford has ordered that no monies be paid to the receivers.
but non-cominital.^
As soon as the Treaty had been proclaimed Ormond 
invited him to Dublin for a conference.^ O ’Neill sent 
back an evasive answer. ^  It was not simply that he had 
already resolved to side with Rinuccini; he would 
never be an out-and-out nuncioist. Indeed, the clergy 
were on tenterhooks for fear he should hold himself 
aloof from the conflict and both the Ormondists and 
Rinuccini never ceased to complain to Rome of his inde­
pendent attitude. He deplored the treaty on personal 
grounds. It ignored him completely and he had good 
reasons for distrusting the intentions of the Ormond­
ists with regard to his future status in Ireland. None 
the less, behaving in character, he took his time in 
making known his decision. Although Rinuccini had sent 
tiassari to solicit his support on August 5 t h , h e  did 
not declare his allegiance to the clergy until August
^ Of. O ’Neill to Ormond, Jul. 19, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 41; 
he has received Ormond’s friendly letter brought by his 
nephew Daniel and has discussed it at length. For the 
rest, the reply is subtly non-commital, even ironic.
^ Ormond to O ’Neill, Aug. 3, ibid., p. 100.
^ O ’Neill to Daniel O ’Neill, Aug. 7, ibid., 109; one 
of his reasons for feeling that he should not visit 
Dublin was that he had not any suitable clothes!
 ^Gom.Rin., II, p. 319.
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17th.^ His decision, welcomed joyfully by Rinuccini, 
assured the non-enforcement of the treaty as it stood.
Evidently Ormond, pressed by Daniel O ’Neill, was 
loath to regard his adherence to the clergy as final.
On August 28th, he instructed Daniel to offer him several 
handsome concessions, in return for his support. These 
included confirmation of his command and a disingenuous 
proposal that he should take possession of the lands of
p
those who opposed the peace in the O ’Neill tribal area. 
O ’Neill declined the bribe.
During his visit to his uncle, Daniel O ’Neill sounded 
the Ulstermen on their reactions to the peace. The 
results of his inquiry appeared in a memorandum, "Y/hat 
I understand of the grievances of the Ulster-men", which 
he showed to Ormond. Among other grievances, they pro­
tested against their exclusion from state offices and 
the denial of their right to appeal against the expro­
priation of their lands, ^hey also thought it only just 
that Protestants who had not submitted to the peace by 
October 31st, 1646, should forfeit their estates to 
themselves. ^
1 Ibid., pp. 319-21.
^ Remembrances for lilr. Ranlell O'Reill, Aug., 28, T.C.P., 
XVIII, p. 189; Arbor. Disc., 1, pt. II, p. 700.
 ^Arbor. Disc., I, pt. II, p. 702; T.C.R., XVIII, p. 226.
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Y/hereas O ’Neill was slow to make up his mind but 
steadfast once committed to a particular course of action, 
Preston was impulsive and unsteady.^ His natural sym­
pathies lay with the Ormondists but he would have iden­
tified himself with their policy in any case just because
O ’Neill was regarded as the champion of the other side. 
Consequently, he had greeted the news of the peace with 
”a salvo of artillery that caused rejoicings in the air
which found no echo on the earth.
The Supreme Council relied upon his support to 
cancel out O ’Neill’s likely attachment to the clergy,^ 
but were afraid that he might be intimidated by the 
threats of Congregation. And so, they assured him:
’’that all inconveniences which may spring from 
any letters and declarations of theirs (the 
Congregation) may be suppressed, and the 
affection both of the army and the people con­
served to our King. We are convinced you will
be diligent in this matter. ”4
^ Cf. ’’(Preston) was much fitter to be guided by others
than Grovern anything absolutely of himself. ” (Plunket- 
Dunne MS. p. 502).
2
Embassy, p. 500.
3 The author of the Aphorismical Discovery recorded that 
Preston had been committed to support the peace from the 
time of the capture of Bunratty. Moreover, when the 
Council invited Ormond to Kilkenny they guaranteed the 
assistance of 10,000 foot and 1.000 horse, namely Preston’s 
and Muskerry’s (op.cit., p. 123).
C.S.P.I., p. 489.
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At Ormond’s request, or at least with his cognisance, 
Olanrickard warned Preston against Rinuccini and the 
Old Irish:
" . . . I fear the old national feuds will be 
kept up, under the guise of zeal for religion.”!
Preston chose to regard these two communications as
binding him to observe the peace but true to form he was
2
soon vacillating.
Apparently the Bishop of Perns wrote to him on
behalf of Congregation to ask why he had proclaimed the
peace in the light of their objections to it. Preston’s
reply was sulky but he lacked the courage to stick to
his guns; he was even prepared to pretend that he had
thought the clergy were in favour of the peace:
”If the Catholic Clergy were opposed to the peace 
why did they not tell me so.”3
Not that the clergy could now count on his loyalty.
Very soon he was again listening to the siren songs of
the Ormondists. Neverthele/ss, during those vital few
^ 0.8.P.I., p. 492.
2
There is no question that Preston’s character was an 
open book. This makes all the more remarkable his long 
tenure of command, especially in view of his frequent 
set-backs in the field. Indeed, the only reasonable 
explanation of his survival is that it suited the Ormond­
ists to support him - though there must have been occa­
sions, like the present one, when they probably wanted 
to dismiss him.
5 C.S.P.I., p. 499.
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weeks immediately following the proclamation of peace 
he refrained from supporting the Supreme Council which, 
v/ithout him, was powerless to enforce its authority.
And so, deprived of coercive power and realising 
that nothing would induce the Nuncio and his party to 
aclmowledge the peace, the Council implored Ormond to 
come promptly to its assistance before O ’Neill moved 
against Kilkenny. Ormond was fully apprised of the 
situation. On his own account he had been pulling 
strings to weaken the opposition. Apart from the feelers 
he had put out to O ’Neill he had kept in touch with 
Preston.^ He was also not averse from exploiting the 
notorious ill-feeling between Owen Roe O ’Neill and Sir 
Phelim O ’Neill^ and invited Sir Phelim to send a repre­
sentative to discuss with him.^
But he did not welcome the invitation to Kilkenny. 
His forces were small and he shrank from putting too 
much distance between himself and Dublin and running the 
risk of capture. This was a practical consideration.
He was also dispirited by the existence of so much hos­
tility towards the peace settlement. In the past, if
^ Ormond to Preston, Aug. 7, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 108.
^ Of. Com.Rin., II, pp. 187-90.
^ Aphor. Disc., I, pt. II, p. 700.
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he had never been sanguine he had remained imperturbable, 
as though success and failure were all one to him. But 
from now on his equanimity was shaken and he faced his 
task with deep repugnance. His references to the Con­
federates became progressively more contemptuous and his 
comments on the futility of dealing with such an unstable 
and fragmented body more frequent. At the back of his 
mind was a fixed conviction that many of them, if given 
half a chance, would gladly deliver Ireland over to the 
Pope or to Spain. ^  All his dislike for Catholicism and 
his sense of English superiority rose to the surface.
Yet he had no choice. Reasons of prestige compelled 
him to go to Kilkenny. Besides, it was just possible 
that the adventure might turn out well. He still had 
hopes of restraining, if not of buying off, O ’Neill,
Preston was wavering but might still have the courage
2
to show his hand, he was expecting to rally the Butler 
clan, his friends at Kilkenny assured him all would be 
well if only he would join them.^ In any case, he was 
morally bound to proceed against those who were violating 
the peace by the conditions of the treaty."^
^ This conviction was steadily strengthened; see below p.S'S’Si
2 Preston to Ormond, Aug. 26, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 181, des­
cribed the dispositions he had made at Ormond’s request.
5 Gf. his report to the King in the following year,
Carte, VI, p. 554-
4 Of. Ormond to Lord Polliot, Sir W. Stewart and others,
Aug. 22, T.C.P., p. 56, inviting them to join him against 
"violent opposers of the peace."
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Even so, he hesitated to take the plunge. Although 
he informed Yfalsh that he was prepared to march to 
Kilkenny within a few days, ^  he put off his departure 
until August 28th. In the meantime, he was left in no 
doubt as to the rapidity with which the situation was 
deteriorating for the peace party. Eirst Walsh raised 
the alarm: ”yo^ beinge upon the place heare suddenly
is it that will do any t h i n g e . T h e n  Bellings implored 
him to come at once.3 Eor Muskerry it was a matter of 
desperation.^ Finally, on August 28th, Castlehaven per­
emptorily warned Ormond that reports that he had post­
poned his marchout would do - had done - serious harm,
A
"all face of Government being amongst us desolved excepte 
that the nuntio and Glergye doe usurpe at W a t e r f o r d . "5 
Prepared for the worst,^ Ormond began his march on 
August 28th at the head of 1,200 horse and foot. At 
first, all seemed to be well. "The Court and Castle 
were newly decorated for ^ is reception. New gates v/ere
Ibid., p. 155. Having previously signified his in­
tention of coming soon (Ormond to the Supreme Council, 
ibid., p. 147).
^ Aug. 19 Ibid., p. 158.
5 Ibid., p. 156.
^ Aug. 21, Ibid., p. 164.
3 Ibid., p. 187.
 ^ Cf. Ormond to Edmund Butler, Aug. 22, p. 168.
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created splendidly gilt. Welcoming at Kil-
g
k e m y  acclaimi^ag. him as a returning hero. ^  But scarcely 
had the applause died away when intimations of disaster 
began to flood in. One of his kinsmen. Piers Butler, 
complained that he had become an. object of distrust be­
cause of their relationship and pinpointed in a single 
sentence the source of Rinuccini’s power:
"this terrible excommunication threatened by our 
cleargie, does so terrifie me, that I had rather
be out of the world than liable to it. ’’5
His testimony to fear was all the more significant since
Congregation did not formally excommunicate the adherents
of the peace until September 1 s t two days after his
letter was written, as an obvious counter to Ormond’s
march-out to the Confederate capital.
So much for the family feeling of the Butler clan.
Soon it also became only too plain that Preston, using
a feigned indisposition as his excuse,3 was not intending
to rally to his side as he had been requested. ^  Mean-
/
while, alarming intelligence of O ’Neill’s movements was
^ Petrie MSS., R.I.A., p. 130.
2 Castlehaven, Memoirs, p. 71.
5 T.G.P., p. 195.
4 Com.Rin., II, p. 356.
5 Sep. 5, Ibid., p. 232; Castlehaven, Memoirs, p. 72.
6 Sep. 3, C.S.P.I., p. 503.
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being received. According to some reports he was 
advancing against Kilkenny; according to others he in­
tended to bar the return road to Dublin.^ The most 
disturbing account concerned a plan to assault Dublin 
in Ormond’s absence.
What was to be done ? To stand fast might be dis­
astrous. O ’Neill would have little trouble in destroying 
Ormond’s small force. On the other hand, his departure 
would entail loss of prestige, leave Rinuccini and the 
Old Irish in complete command of the situation and lead 
to the permanent severance of relations with the Confed­
eracy. Persuaded by Digby, Clanrickard and the Ormondist 
leaders, Ormond decided to hang on as long as possible 
in case the clergy might even yet listen to reason.
There was obvious reluctance at Kilkenny to make a 
clean break with the militant clergy at Waterford. Some, 
if not all, the Supreme Councillors still clung to the 
hope that the clergy were^susceptible to the argument 
that religion could be safeguarded by other means than 
the Ormond Treaty. It is clear from subsequent events 
that Digby and Clanrickard were also prepared to try the
p
same argument. But Ormond felt he had strained his
! Daniel O ’Neill sent an urgent warning to this effect 
to the Earl of Roscommon in temporary command of Dublin 
during Ormond’s absence (Anhor. Disc., I, pt. II, pp. 701- 
2). This message dated September 1st, must have been 
transmitted urgently to Ormond.
 ^See belowp S'IS' PP-
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commission to the uttermost in signing the present treaty 
and had no intention of getting himself entangled in "a 
new treatye with the clergye." He was willing, however, 
to reassure the clergy on certain points: unless he
received a countermanding order from the King - which 
had been given freely - they could retain the churches 
in their possession and continue to exercise juris­
diction in Confederate quarters ; he would also carry 
out any instructions he received from the King which were to 
their advantage.!
Ormond also tried the desperate expedient of sending 
Castlehaven to imyre Rinuccini to acknowledge the valid­
ity of the treaty but, as Castlehaven related, Rinuccini 
announced "his Resolution to oppose it to the uttermost.
The last hope was a personal approach to the clergy to 
be made by Lucas Dillon and Dr. Fennell. As far as Ormond 
was concerned, these two councillors, who were very optim­
istic,^ were to present Congregation with the reassurance
/
he was prepared to give concerning instructions from the 
King, but, as it turned out, they intended to go very 
much further.
Cf. Ormond’s report to the King in the following year, 
Aug. 1647, Carte, VI, p. 534.
2 Memoirs, p. 72; Castlehaven to Rinuccini, Com.Rin.,
II," "pp." '556-7; Rinuccini to Castlehaven, ibid., pp. 357-8.
 ^ Clarendon, Historical View, p. 1055.
541
Ormond originally meant to delay his withdrawal 
until Fennell and Dillon had reported back and to spend 
the intervening time in collecting recruits.^ With the 
object of recruiting he marched out of Kilkenny and 
roamed the surrounding district. All in vain. No one 
would help him. The Mayor of Cashel pleaded with him 
not to enter the town for fear of the consequences. ^  In 
the end, he was forced to choose between losing face by 
returning to Dublin and exposing his troops - for whose 
lives he felt personally responsible - to massacre by 
staying where he was.
Even then, it was a measure of his recognition of 
the adverse consequences, psychological as well as polit­
ical, of an enforced retreat that he did not march back 
directly to Dublin but sought to re-enter Kilkenny. 
However, the magistrates advised him that to do so would 
be dangerous.3 The news that O ’Neill was about to spring 
a trap^ and further reports of an imminent threat to the
^ Cf. Ormond to Barnaby O ’Toole, Sep. 9, T.C.P., XVIII, 
p. 243; Ormond to Col. Piers Fitzgerald, Sep. 10, ibid., 
p. 253.
2 Ibid., p. 256.
3 Castlehaven, Memoirs, p. 74.
4 Ormond included the Nuncio in a plot to seize him, 
alleging that the clergy were only pretending to negotiate 
in order to give O ’Neill time to cut him off from Dublin. 
Later on, he included Preston in the plot. Some of the 
councillors were only pretending to appease the clergy!
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capital only served to accelerate his retreat under
duress from the very city which, less than two weeks
2
previously, had ceremonially welcomed him. "The 
sumptuous feasts v/hich had been prepared in honor of 
the Earl of Ormond were now distributed among the youths
of Ulster."3
After several alarms and after following an erratic 
course Ormond regained the capital on September 13th"^ 
with nothing accomplished. The experience at Kilkenny 
left a bitter memory. His pride was hurt and for a long 
time he was distrustful of any person or proposal connec­
ted with the Confederacy. It is in fact virtually certain 
that but for the intervention of Clanrickard and the
^ lord Lambert to Ormond, Sep. 9, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 248. 
Lambert reported that O ’Neill intended to move against 
Lublin or Kilkenny. Roscommon warned Ormond of a great 
plot to invest Lublin (ibid., p. 263)-
^ The account of this Kilkenny episode which Ormond gave 
to the King at Hampton Court in August, 1647, contained 
several embellishments added in the light of subsequent 
events. Oddly enough. Carte’s own account did not paral­
lel that of Ormond (ibid.. Ill, pp. 258-69). Another 
curious fact is that Belling’s account is almost a para­
phrase of Ormond’s. It is not even accurate. For exam­
ple, Ormond was supposed to have returned to Lublin on 
September 30th when in fact he arrived back on the 13th 
(of. Bellings, VI, pp. 17-20).
3 Petrie MSS., pp. 135-6.
4 Here O ’Neill missed an excellent opportunity of cap­
turing 0 rmo nd.
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fertile plotting of Ligby^ relations between the Royal­
ists and the Confederates would have been broken off for 
good.
Ormond’s departure left his supporters at Kilkenny 
in despair. Scenting the imminent triumph of the clergy 
many people rushed to change sides. A number actually 
betook themselves to Waterford^ in order to be near the 
new centre of power. The mission of Dillon and Fennell, 
never likely to succeed anyway, was now doomed, even 
though it had begun more auspiciously than might have been 
expected.
The reason for this apparently promising beginning 
may have been connected with the clergy’s desire to refute 
the allegation that they were extremists intent on the 
separation of Ireland from the English crown. At home 
and abroad, this charge, of which Digby was believed to 
be the source, was doing much damage. Seriously dis­
turbed, Congregation published a manifesto of their aims 
and principles on September 10th. They affirmed that they 
were neither in opposition to the King nor questioning 
his temporal authority, but simply protecting Church
! It has usually been presumed that Digby remained behind 
at Kilkenny to keep an eye on the situation. In his 
report to the King, (Carte, VI, p. 556), however, Ormond 
stated that Digby returned with him to Dublin.
^ Com.Rin., II, p. 586.
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interests, interests which had been overlooked in the 
Ormond Treaty, Specifically they objected to the treaty 
on three grounds: it had been contracted by a minority
on their side; Ormond had not had power to act for the 
King because his commission had been revoked: it had
been superseded by the Glamorgan Treaty. Once Church 
rights had been secured, they would give all possible 
aid to the King. In the meantime, they had no intention 
whatsoever of giving up Ireland to any foreign power.^
It was with a desire to show themselves reasonable, 
therefore, that the clergy chose to discuss at length 
the propositions made by Dillon and Pennell. As in their 
manifesto they ascribed all their actions to their con­
cern for religion. There was some talk of instructing 
O ’Neill to refrain from hostile acts, even of requesting 
him to return to Ulster, provided Ormond would promise 
not to use force to see that the peace was observed.
Consequently, Dillon and Pennell were at first mildly
/
optimistic. Their own proposals, which, after protracted 
discussions, they were asked to commit to paper, would 
have been quite unacceptable to Ormond and therefore pre­
supposed as always that it was safe to rely on the King’s
2
good intentions.
! Com.Rin., II, pp. 383-5. 
 ^ Gilberti VI, pp. 136-7.
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Dillon and Pennell presented their written proposals 
on September 11th. By the next day an abrupt change had 
occurred in the attitude of the clergy, probably because 
the news of Ormond’s flight from Kilkenny had been 
received. Even those clerics who had leaned towards 
peace - there were some apparently - were now in doubt. 
The discussion broke off and on September 15th Congre­
gation produced its unyielding ansv/er. Any authority 
ever possessed by Pennell and Dillon had been invalidated 
by Ormond’s flight from Kilkenny. In any case Ormond 
himself should have made direct proposals. In con­
clusion, they restated the principle upon which they now 
stood firm, namely that no settlement could be ratified 
except by the General Assembly.^ The rout of the Ormon­
dists was thus complete. On September 17th Preston infor­
med Ormond that those who had gone to win over the Clergy 
had themselves been converted.^
Ormond’s enforced retreat and the military weakness
of the Commissioners of Trust opened the way for the
%
Nuncio’s triumphant return to Kilkenny. His first act
^ Oomj^Rin., II, p.3b*^ ; Gilbert, VI, pp. 138-9*
^ T.G.P., XVIII, p. 281.
^ On September 17tb, The Kilkenny garrison invited the 
Nuncio ! Aphor. Disc., pp. 127-8.
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was to incarcerate the principal sponsors of the Peace, 
except for Darcy, Plunket, and Mountgarret, who was 
spared only because he was sick.! A new Council was then 
installed consisting of four bishops and eight laymen, 
with Rinuccini as President. Upon receiving news that 
Ormond had opened negotiations with the English Parlia­
ment Rinuccini had Glamorgan designated the next Lord 
Lieutenant in anticipation of Ormond’s dismissal.
Glamorgan’s standing among the Confederates had been 
restored at about this time, largely, it may be inferred, 
through the backing of Rinuccini v/ho had ceased to harbour 
any doubts as to his intimate relationship with the King. 
Indeed, his belief that Glamorgan had been employed to do 
what Ormond himself could not or would not do must account 
in part for his readiness to denounce Ormond’s attitude 
towards the Irish. One reason for nominating Glamorgan 
for the Lord Lieutenancy was precisely that he would be 
acceptable to the King. Glamorgan was obviously also the 
only person fitted to command the expedition which it was 
still intended to send to the King’s relief. The legal 
foundation for his nomination was the commission from the 
King which he himself had produced. To an objection
that he was English Rinuccini apparently replied that an
2
Irishman might become involved in the national feuds.
1 Plunket Dunne MS., p. 842.
2 Embassy, pp. 205-6; ibid., pp. 211-12.
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Rinuccini*s revived respect for Glamorgan’s author­
ity may have stemmed from tv/o letters Glamorgan had 
received from the King. The first, dated April 5th,^ 
referred him to Digby for directions and assured him of 
constant friendship. It concluded:
"you cannot doubt but that I will perform all the 
instructions and promises made to you and the 
Nuncio. "2
Since this letter was conveyed by Walsingham, Digby’s 
secretary, it was obviously not forged. In this case it 
would seem unquestionable that the letter addressed to 
the Nuncio, previously received by Glamorgan, was also 
genuine.^
The second letter, dated July 20th and headed
Newcastle, was simply produced by Glamorgan and could
therefore have been forged. It contained the astonishing
proposal that Glamorgan might :
"raise a large sum of money by pawning my kingdoms.
for the purpose, presumably, of raising forces. There
/
was also a suggestion that Charles would try to join 
Glamorgan and the Nuncio in Ireland. From these two
! See above p.Sir 
 ^Embassy, p. 185*
^ See above pp. 4-^0-i.
4 An incredible statement in the opinion of Round; see
below, app., pp 
5 Com.Rin., II, p. 292.
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letters it was inferred by Rinuccini that the King’s 
repudiation of Glamorgan had been for public consumption 
only and that Charles continued to rely upon Glamorgan 
to extricate him from his difficulties with the help of 
the Irish.
At any rate, Glamorgan had been in the wings at 
Waterford throughout August and early September making 
suggestions to Congregation. During the early stages he 
had offered to go abroad and collect €50,000 to be used 
by them in enforcing their authority over all Ireland, 
provided that 10,000 men should then be sent to the King. 
He would also visit Rome vhere he would speak well of the 
Nuncio. In these and further proposals there was a note 
of bombast, but as so often he also made two sensible 
suggestions: the Clergy should allow the Treaty to be
published and invite several prominent laymen to join 
with them in administering the country.^
% e n  Glamorgan was nominated for the Lord Lieutenancy, 
the plan to go abroad had to be abandoned. His brother, 
Lord John Somerset, ^  v/as sent in his stead armed with
^ Coni.Rin., II, pp. 345-4-
^ Cf. "His brother who accompanied hnjn into Ireland was 
a creature more insignificant still, so as both of them 
v;ere easily found out to be fit instruments for the 
mischief of foolish and knavish councellors." (Plunket 
Dunne MS., p. 890).
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letters of introduction.^
Meanwhile, assisted by Rinuccini, Glamorgan had 
drafted a memorandum in Latin designed as though it were 
addressed to the King, and outlining reasons for inviting 
the King to Ireland. This was apparently prompted by the 
King’s letter from Newcastle. It contained a curious 
ambiguity, arguing on the one hand that Ormond’s proclam­
ation enabled the King to receive Ireland back into his 
allegiance and, on the other, that when the King should 
come to Ireland he would see how little his interests
a
were regarded by the Marquis of Ormonde and Lord Digby." 
All Ireland would be at his disposal. The Catholic 
Princes, especially the Pope, would support him. Glam­
organ would obtain 120,000 crowns for his use. To the 
objection that if he took their advice his remaining 
Protestant supporters would desert him, they put forward 
several answers, of which the gist was that Protestants 
who were truly loyal would^not fail to recognise that he 
was driven by necessity. As for the admitted difficulty 
of escaping from his gaolers, Glamorgan would hazard his 
life to contrive it.
In conclusion, Glamorgan asked the King to state 
clearly whether he wished to be helped or not ; if so, 
to issue him with full powers.
1 Embassy, pp. 202-3
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"without impediment or the being liable to the 
fraudulent practices of those, who pretend to be 
attached to your Majesty and to whose machinations 
against me your Majesty knows me to have been 
exposed in England"
With obvious reference to his having been disavowed
earlier in the year, he added:
"And my affection and duty is such, that I cannot 
but regard your Majesty’s safety, without calling 
to mind past injuries, or considering the dangers 
I have undergone, or the money I have expended, 
since I do not think, that what I have suffered 
arose from your Majesty or was willingly permitted 
by you."1
Whether Glamorgan sent this memorandum is not known. 
Certainly there is no evidence to show that he, or anyone 
else,ever planned an escape route to Ireland for the 
King. And yet, presumably, he was serious. Of course 
the paper may have gone astray in transit; the King may 
have been unable to send a message back or have given a 
negative response.
What is significant is Rinuccini’s interest in the
project. Either he was treating Glamorgan as a dupe,
/
which seems very unlikely in view of the fact that he 
reported the transaction to Rome, or else the allegation 
that he deliberately tried to separate Ireland from the 
English Crown is not entirely justified.
Besides becoming Lord Lieutenant apparent, Glamorgan 
was also appointed General of Munster.^ To set the seal
! Com.Rin., II, pp. 393-4.
 ^Com.Rin., II, p. 392.
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on his attachment to the clerical party he swore an oath 
on September 29th to obey the commands of Rinuccini, 
even to forfeiting the right to succeed Ormond if Rin­
uccini should so decree.^ Although thus committed up to 
the hilt to those who had wrecked the Ormond Peace, 
Glamorgan continued to behave as though he were not pur­
suing a policy diametrically opposed to that of Ormond. 
Throughout his career it never seemed to enter his head 
that people might impute his actions to dishonesty or the 
pursuit of personal gain. In this instance, for example, 
he continued to write to Ormond in a guileless fashion. 
Thus, on August 30th he asserted that he had not made any 
new proposals to the Confederates and that he had repu­
diated those contained in his treaty.^ Then on September 
22nd he sent a message complaining that he load been 
expecting but had not received instructions and explaining 
why he could not visit Dublin, namely because friends had
warned him that he would be detained there. In spite of
/
several reassuring letters and messages from the King, 
especially through Walsingham, his recognizances had not 
been delivered to him. For another thing, a visit to 
Dublin would offend the clergy and thereby weaken his
^ Com.Rin., II, p. 399.
2 T.G.P., XVIII, p. 196.
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influence over them. He could not afford to allow this 
to happen because he had come to the conclusion that the 
one way he could help the King was by keeping in with
the Nuncio and his party. Through them he would obtain
assistance "though I have fay led to doe it amongst his
own subiects." As though aware of Ormond’s belief that
Rinuccini was plotting to alienate Ireland to the Spanish 
Grown, he announced that he was going to put to the test 
Rinuccini’s claim that he did not desire the King’s 
overthrow. Presumably this was a cryptic reference to 
his hopes of bringing the King over to Ireland. In order 
to forestall criticism he declared that he was taking 
over command in Munster by virtue of the King’s commiss­
ion and not with the commission of the clergy^ - He would 
have found it much more difficult to explain away the 
oath he was on the point of swearing to the Nuncio.w» All 
this makes it clear that he was still preoccupied with 
ways and means of raising troops for Charles.
The belief that Ormond would neither support nor 
condemn his activities is further illustrated by his 
reply to the above letter:
" . . .  I vfrLderstand not what your tordship’s 
authorities from his majesty are, or what wayes 
you meane to take to serve him) and therefore
^ T.G.P. , XVIII, pp. 300-1.
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can gitfe no Judgement of either. But I must 
assure your lordship (what^ever you hedre) I am Soc 
a reverencer j)f the King’s authority, and soe. 
desirous to advice his Service, that if your 
Eordship v;ill leitme see the one, and instruct 
meein the wayfis of the other, you will find€ from mee 
rq^^dy obedience. " (L
V/hen the new council had firmly established its
authority, Rinuccini considered the time had come to
launch the great enterprise which should restore the
Catholic Church to its rightful place - t h e  assault and
capture of Dublin. Bor the operation he intended to rely
exclusively on O ’heill’s loyal Ulster army but against
his better judgement he consented to Preston’s army also
taking p a r t T h e  plan of campaign required the two
armies, Preston’s being much the smaller, to advance along
parallel routes to a rendezvous just outside Dublin, v;here
a council of v/ar would devise a plan for the decisive
attack. Rinuccini and the Council were to follow in the
wake of the armies - if only because Rinuccini intended
to keep his eye on Preston.
/
If a combined operation was ill-advised in view of 
the clashing personalities of the two generals, the 
timing was well chosen. The defences of Dublin were so 
weak that one sharp thrust was bound to pierce them.
Ormond himself was reconciled to the city’s fall.
The only question was: to whom should he surrender it ?
f CcA.v“\r^i V*U Ip (4 ‘ Embassy, p. 501.
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To the English Parliament, the Ulster Scots or the 
Confederacy ? His choice was inevitable; first the 
Scots and, failing them. Parliament. To some extent he 
v/as prompted by a practical consideration. The Scots 
might yet be instrumental in restoring the King to power. 
The English Puritans might eventually be reminded of 
their duty to the Crown. Either might be prepared to 
help him in order to keep the Irish out, without neces­
sarily insisting for the time being on taking possession 
of the city. But the simple truth was that when obliged 
to choose between rebels Ormond much preferred to deal 
with those who happened to be English - or Scottish - 
and Protestant to those who were Irish and Catholic.^
His identification of himself v/ith the English aristoc­
racy and his Protestant convictions transcended any 
affection^? he may have had for Ireland. It is also only 
fair to record that he put no trust in the declarations 
of devotion to the Crown imde by all shades of opinion 
in the Confederacy.
^ Castlehaven, Memoirs, p. 78, claimed some credit for 
helping Ormond to make up his mind. The argument he used
is significant in view of his own position in the Confed­
erate government: '* ... my advice was ask’d by his Excel­
lence in this extremity, with which of his Enemies he 
should treat ? I answer’d, that I was confident he had 
resolved that before, there being no question in this case 
For giving up to the Parliament, when the King should have 
England he would have Ireland with it; but to the Nuncio
and his Party, it might prove far other ways, and the two
Kingdoms remain separate. VHiat weight this discourse had, 
I know not. But immediately my lord Lieutanent engaged 
himself in a treaty with the Parliament.
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He feared that under Rinuccini*s baneful influence 
Ireland would become an appanage of the Pope or of 
Spain.^ Rather the rule of Presbyterians and Puritans 
than occupation by a foreign power ! Ormond’s decision 
at this tv/elfth hour is the clearest possible indication 
of the root incompatibility between his conception of the 
place of Catholics in the governments of Ireland and that 
of the Confederacy, and adds weight to the conclusion 
that a compromise between the tv70 parties had been always 
unlikely.
Meanwhile, whether the Scots or Parliament provided 
assistance, Dublin had, somehow, to be defended. Since 
defence by conventional means was excluded, there must be 
room for political manoeuvre. This involved playing off 
the Scots and Parliament against the Confederacy as well 
as against each other. Hence Ormond’s anxiety to hear 
news of the mission of Pennell and Dillon to Waterford 
before taking any positive^ action. ^  Pennell and Dillon 
had reported on the state of their negotiations in two 
letters dated 11th and 12th September at a time when they
^ This fear, though unfounded, was very real; cf. "and 
it had been proposed in the last Assembly by Mr. Anthony 
Martin and others that they should call in a foreign 
prime for their protection" (Historical View, p. 1068).
2 Ormond to Clanrickard, Sep. 23, Carte, VI, p. 432.
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were not unhopeful of success.^ Por an unknown reason 
their letters did not reach Ormond until long after the 
clergy had summarily rejected their proposals on September 
24th. Even though ignorant of the clergy’s rejection, 
Ormond was furious at the news they contained, for he 
dissociated himself completely from the proposals that 
had been made.
It is a remarkable fact that, until now, Ormond had 
apparently not realised that the Ormondists still relied 
upon Glamorgan’s concessions being ratified by the King 
independently of the Peace. Thus he had sponsored the 
good-will delegation to Waterford without appreciating 
what the basis of negotiations would be. Por him, it had 
been the Peace and nothing but the Peace, while the 
Ormondists had naturally assumed that there must be more 
scope for discussion than would be afforded by/^one point. 
On this occasion Ormond had undoubtedly been very short­
sighted; the failure in understanding was entirely on 
his side. Nevertheless, he behaved as though he had been 
unfairly deceived.
If Pennell and Dillon thought for one moment that 
merely by offering their proposals they committed him, 
so he informed Digby, they were sadly mistaken.^ Writing
1 Gilbert, VI, pp. 136-8.
 ^Carte, VI, p. 433.
557
to a correspondent, his secretary, Sir George Lane,
stated that, as it was^Ormond had a l r e a d y  stretched his
concessions to the limit.^ Ormond was explicit in reply
to a letter from Colonel Pitzwilliam:
"If they (Glamorgan’s concessions) be valid in 
themselves, they need noe corroboration; if 
invalid I have noe pov/er to give them strength.
It is significant that on September 23rd Ormond 
informed Clanrickard that he intended to approach Parlia­
ment without committing himself; that on the following 
day, having heard from Pennell and Dillon, he ended his 
letter to Digby with this curt statement:
"Force only my lord, there is noe d e a l i n g  with 
this people but by force";3
that on the same day he received a letter from Pitzwilliam 
in which it was taken for granted that he would approve 
of the Glamorgan articles; and that on the 26th following 
this sequence of events he made a formal request to Parlia­
ment and the Scots^ for aid. That is to say, Ormond only
^  I b i d . ,  p p .  4 3 5 - 4 .
2 T.C.P., XVIII, p. 308.
^  S e e  a b o v e  p . 5 3 4 , .
4  Of. Lord lieutenant and Council to the speaker of the 
House of lords, Sep. 2 6 ,  T.C.P., XVIII, p. 322; see also 
the Instructions of the lord lieutenant and Council to 
Sir Gerrard lowther and others, Sep. 2 6 ,  ibid., p. 3 2 4 ;  
see also Ormond's Propositions to the Parliament of 
England, ibid., p. 325.
5  He asked the Scots for 1,500 troops, cavalry and 
ammunition. Gilbert (Ballings), VI, pp. 27-8.
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finally turned his back on the Irish Catholics when he 
discovered the sort of terms with which the Ormondists 
hoped to placate the clergy.^
Yet how could Ormond have failed to know what was
in the minds of his own supporters ? The only viable
answer is that he was so utterly lacking in sympathy for
the Catholic point of viev/ in any matter concerning 
2
religion that he was incapable of perceiving that the 
Confederate leaders expected certain minimum safeguards 
for their religion - safeguards which seemed so obvious 
to them as not to need spelling out. Given these respec­
tive attitudes, how right the clergy were to reject 
informal promises that their demands would be met.
So contemptuous of the whole Confederate movement
^ Almost a year later in a report to the King Ormond 
claimed that some of the Confederates sought to obtain 
confirmation of Glamorgan’s concessions while he was 
still at Kilkenny and that Darcy and Plunket were in fact 
treating with the clergy while pretending to appease 
them. (Carte, VI, p. 534)^ If this had been so why the 
surprise at the news from Pennell and Dillon and why did 
the Ormondists behave as though they believed him well- 
disposed. Presumably Ormond was being wise after the event.
 ^Cf. his letter to Charles, Sep.27, Carte,VI, pp.435-6; see 
also his letter to Jermyn, Sep.29, ibid., pp.436-7: "... 
the perfidy heere should force mee to counce11^e  contrary 
to my former way of serveing his majestic and to my owne 
inclinations."
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had recent events m a d e  Ormond that,through Pennell and 
Dillon, he asked for a cessation despite his appeal to 
Parliament.^ They did not reply and, on his subsequent 
report to the King, he cited this fact a s  a convincing 
example of their intransigeance. Prom these and other 
indications, it can only be inferred that, after the Ormond 
Peace had been rejected, Ormond was incapable of regarding 
the Irish Catholics dispassionately. In fairness to him, 
however, it must be emphasised that he did not disguise 
his feelings. It was Digby and Clanrickard who managed 
negotiations for several w eeks to come, in spite of rather 
than with his support.^
Clanriclcard had also been hoping that Pennell and 
Dillon would be successful. And so had Preston with whom 
he kept in touch.^ But when Preston heard of the clergy’s
^  C a r t e ,  VI, p. 536.
 ^ Ibid.
^ An important fact. Ormohd has often been accused of 
double-dealing because he negotiated with Parliament under 
cover of treating with the Confederates. In fact, he 
only barely tolerated the dealings of Clanrickard and 
Digby with the Confederates, even when the Parliamentary 
terms had proved to be excessive and the Scots unable to 
help.
4 Clanrickard to Ormond, Sep. 18, Carte, VI, pp. 428-9; 
same to the same, ibid., p. 429-31*
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unfavourable response to the proposals put to them he 
apparently indicated that his hands were now tied, much 
to Clanrickard*s annoyance. Yet Clanrickard did not 
despair. In his opinion the clergy commanded such little 
support that they could easily be overcome if the majority 
could be persuaded to assert their will. Por the moment, 
it was necessary to temporise. Meanwhile, the Prench 
should be requested to give their support and Paris and 
Rome should be persuaded to repudiate Rinuccini. He there­
fore recommended a Truce to Ormond.^
Digby, too, remained optimistic.^ So long as there 
was so much scope for intrigue he saw many possibilities. 
Above all, the animosity between Preston and O ’Neill,, 
described aptly by himself as greater than that displayed 
by the government in Dublin tov/ards either,'^ was crying 
out to be exploited and he intended to make good use of 
the opportunity. He was not dismayed by Preston’s appar-» 
ent adherence to the clergy because he believed that the 
salvo which had greeted the Peace was a more reliable 
indication of where his loyalties lay.
^ Clanrickard to Ormond, Sep. 18, Carte, VI, pp. 428-9; 
same to same, ibid., pp. 429-31*
^ Cf. Digby to Clanrickard, Sep. 22, Add. MS. 42,063, 
p. 170. He saw why Ormond had decided to negotiate with 
Parliament but did not support his action.
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His judgment was sound. Preston loathed O ’Neill 
and disliked collaborating v/ith the Nuncio against the 
Nev/ Irish. But, lacking the courage to take decisive 
action by himself, he had to be led by the nose. At the 
same time, like so many weak-willed men, he needed to 
feel that he was both strong and dependable. Furthermore, 
in one respect he was consistent; he was a devout 
Catholic. Digby and Clanrickard, for whom Preston had 
high regard, realised that they must be prepared to satis­
fy his spiritual scruples while turning his foibles to 
account.
Ormond, however, was reluctant to have any dealings 
whatsoever with Preston. On purely practical grounds he 
did not see how Preston could be seduced without giving 
him assurances which they had no authority to offer. In 
any case he suspected Preston of playing a double game, 
of merely pretending to betray Rinuccini so as to induce 
him to break off negotiatians with the English Parliament. 
Ormond also had a wholesome respect for the terrible 
weapon of excommunication which could be used at any 
moment by the Nuncio to bring Preston to heel. Preston 
himself had unwittingly confirmed Ormond’s fears by 
informing him on September 17th that he was prevented 
from obeying his instructions by the threat of excommun- 
icat ion. ^
m i l ,  p. 281.
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Ormond v/as wrong to suspect Preston of conniving
with the Nuncio but right to think he would require
guarantees for the Catholic Church which could not be
given. What is remarkable is that Digby and Clanrickard
believed so strongly that he was prepared to give such
guarantees that they were astonished and indignant
when he later repudiated them. ^
If Preston had refrained from coming to Ormond’s
rescue at Kilkenny, he had cautiously avoided giving a
categorical refusal by saying he was indisposed. By
keeping up this pretence afterwards he was able to keep
in touch with Ormond, with whom he still wanted an
agreement shocked though he was by the failure of the
(-Koulak
Dillon-Pennell mission and/forced to play a part in the 
arrest of the Ormondists.
fin indeterminate number of his officers - probably 
the great majority - apparently shared his views and 
discussed policy on terms of equality. Even before the 
march-out it was evidently decided to seek agreement with 
Ormond and then combine in an attack on the Ulster army. 
As early as September 22nd Colonel Pitzwilliam informed 
Ormond that Preston would declare for him on hearing that
1 See below pp A
2 Of. Preston to Ormond, Sep. 17, Gilbert, VI, p. 139; 
O.S.P.I., p. 519.
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Glamorgan’s concessions had been confirmed.^ Ormond’s 
rebuff to this overture,^ coinciding with rumours of his 
approach to Parliament, stung Pitzwilliam to a hot reply,^ 
yet failed to deflect Preston from his purpose.
The plot called for Preston to dawdle on the march 
through Leinster so that his army, heavily outnumbered at
the outset by the Old Irish, could attract the disgrun­
tled supporters of the imprisoned Ormondists and appear 
before Dublin equal in size to that of O ’Neill. Then 
Preston, in conjunction with the Dublin garrison, would 
fall upon the Ulstermen.^
Whoever originated the plan, Digby and Clanrickard 
became actively involved in it5, It was by no means
1 T.C.P., XVIII, p. 308; see also Gilbert, VI, pp. 142-3.
2 Sep. 26, T.C.P., XVIII, p. 308.
5 Oct. 5, T.C.P., p. 308.
^ Embassv, p. 226.
5 Ormond later gave an officer. Sir John Don^rgan, credit 
for persuading Preston to break with the Nuncio’s party. 
Donégan had been recomraended to Ormond by the King in 1645* 
Ormond had given him a commission to raise troops and to 
join Preston in suppressing truce-breakers. Presumably 
Don4;gan continued in this work until Preston rejected 
the Ormond Peace. Then, as a loyal subject, he asked 
Ormond what he should do. Ormond evidently saw no wrong
in ordering him to :
"remain among ye Irish, as of ye sd Preston’s
Army . . .  to prosecute such désignés as
wee instructed to his management.
Anparently this was satisfactorily accomplished by Donegan- 
perhaps, he supported the activities of Clanrickard.
m e n  Ormond quitted Ireland in 1647, he ordered Don^gan 
to remain behind and to keep on good terms with the Irish.
The evidence for this secret role among the Confederates is
gleaned from a deposition made in his favour by Ormond in
1661 (Hill, pp. 467-8).
564 ■j
elaborate or rigid, as may be gathered from the several 
overtures about to be made to the Nuncio and even to 
O ’Neill.
When the Confederate armies began their march against 
the capital^ O ’Neill moved swiftly while Preston dallied 
on the way. At Athy, where he was joined by the Nuncio 
and the Council, O'Neill, still far from being as remorse­
less as opinion reported him and perhaps influenced by 
Daniel O ’Neill, invited Ormond to a conference. Ormond
p
declined^ but Digby on his own account had decided already 
to risk having a meeting with him and also with the
5
Nuncio.
Throughout his last year in Ireland Digby was forced 
to live on his wits. The Protestants in Dublin, including 
at least some members of the Council, regarded him v/ith 
suspicion and wished him kept out of the c i t y P a r l i a ­
ment considered him a renegade; and the Confederates, 
especially the Nuncio’s party, looked upon him as treach­
erous and slippery. Even Ormond was reluctant to shelter 
him. At first this isolation led Digby to think of
^ Ormond was warned of the impending attack by Daniel 
O ’Neill. Oct. 1, Aphor. Disc., pp. 708-9.
^ Cf. T.C.P., XIX, p. 56.
5 Digby to Ormond, Oct. 10, Carte, VI, pp. 439-40.
4 Ormond to Digby, Oct. 5, Carte, VI, p. 438.
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escaping to France and managing his plots from there.^ 
IThen, however, he could not find a port from vh ich to slip 
away, it became necessary to request a safe-conduct from 
the Confederates. Being the ebullient conspirator he was 
he could not resist turning the invitation to Ormond to 
his advantage by attending in Ormond’s place.^
Details of the meeting with Digby were provided by 
Rinuccini in a report to Rome. While admitting that he 
had impugned the Nuncio Digby claimed that he had thought 
thereby to help the King, for the rejection of the Peace, 
at the apparent instigation of the Nuncio, had been 
generally interpreted as a sign of friendship for Spain 
and had lost the King many supporters. In a transparent 
attempt to prove good faith he attributed his own depar­
ture from Dublin to Ormond’s decision to join v/ith the 
King’s enemies. Quickly appreciating that this was a 
dangerous statement he hastened to add that even so
^ Cf. Ormond to Henrietta Éaria, Sep. 29, T.C.P. , XVIII, 
p. 355; Ormond provided Digby with a passport dated 
Oct. 8 (ibid., XIX, p. 48).
^ Digby personally requested O ’Neill to give him a safe- 
conduct, ibid., p. 356.
5 It would seem that the meeting was arranged by Daniel 
O ’Neill at Digby’s instigation and that O ’Neill only 
decided to invite Digby after consultation with the Nuncio 
and the Bishop of Clogher. Daniel O ’Neill to Digby,
Oct. 9, T.C.P., XIX, p. 55.
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O r m o n d  c o u l d  s t i l l  b e  r e c l a i m e d .  P r o v i d e d  t h e  N u n c i o  
a n d  t h e  b i s h o p s  o p e n l y  a s s o c i a t e d  t h e m s e l v e s  w i t h  t h e  
P e a c e  h e  g u a r a n t e e d  t o  o b t a i n  l e t t e r s  f r o m  t h e  K i n g ,  t h e  
Q u e e n  a n d  P r a n c e ,  p r o m i s i n g  c o m p l e t e  f r e e d o m  o f  r e l i g i o n . ^  
R i n u c c i n i  w a s  u n i m p r e s s e d  b y  R i g b y ' s  a r g u m e n t s ,  w h i c h  h e  
r i g h t l y  c o n s i d . e r e d  t o  b e  s p e c i o u s ,  a n d  h e  r e j e c t e d  t h e m . 2  
W h a t  h a d  h a p p e n e d  w a s  t h a t  R i g b y  h a d  t r i e d  t o  e n g a g e  
t h e  N u n c i o ' s  w h o l e  a t t e n t i o n  w h i l e  h e  d e v e l o p e d  t h e  p l o t  
w i t h  P r e s t o n  a n d  s p o t t e d  w e a k n e s s e s  i n  O ' N e i l l ' s  a r m y .
H e  i n f o r m e d  O r m o n d  t h a t  P r e s t o n  h a d  o n l y  p r e t e n d e d  t o  
s i d e  ' W i t h  t h e  N u n c i o  i n  o r d e r  t o  h a v e  t i m e  t o  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  s i z e  o f  h i s  a r m y  t o  t h e  s a m e  n u m b e r s  a s  O ' N e i l l ' s ,  
a n  o p e r a t i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  c o m p l e t e d  w i t h i n  a  f e w  d a y s .  
P r o v i d e d  h e  h a d  a s s u r a n c e s  t h a t  C h u r c h  i n t e r e s t s  w o u l d  b e  
s a f e g u a r d e d  a n d  p r o v i d e d  C l a n r i c k a r d  s h o u l d  b e  a p p o i n t e d  
c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f  o f  t h e  j o i n t  a r m y  h e  w o u l d  t h e n  t u r n  
a g a i n s t  O ' N e i l l .  N o  d o u b t  i n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  O r m o n d ' s  
l i k e l y  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t r u s t i n g  P r e s t o n  h e  c l a i m e d  t h a t  e v e n  
i f  P r e s t o n  w e r e  t o  w a v e r ,  m o s t  o f  h i s  a r m y  w o u l d  r e m a i n  
s t e a d y .  T o  a d d  z e s t  t o  t h e  c o n s p i r a c y  R i g b y  m a d e  t w o  
p r o p o s a l s :  f i r s t ,  t h a t  O r m o n d  s h o u l d  s a l l y  f o r t h  a n d
a t t a c k  O ' N e i l l ' s  h o r s e  w h i c h  o n l y  n u m b e r e d  8 0 0  a n d  w e r e
^  E m b a s s v , p p .  2 1 7 - 9 .
^  C o m . R i n . , I I ,  p .  4 1 6 .
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in poor shape; secondly that Rinuccini should be kid­
napped. ^
Digby’8 only fear was that his ingenious plans 
should come to nothing through Ormond's lack of interest 
and determination to surrender either to the Scots or to 
Parliament. Thus, on one occasion he specifically en­
joined Ormond to avoid committing himself to surrender 
and, on another, advised him against destroying the corn 
in the fields adjoining Dublin for to Preston's army this
p
would seem a hostile act.
Ormond, however, shared none of Digby’s enthusiasm. 
The threat from O ’Neill was clearly visible and he con­
tinued to believe that Preston was playing a double game. 
Thus, when he had made a strong protest against the Con- 
federate armies appearing in arms before the city Preston 
had replied e v a s i v e l y . P o r  all Digby’s cleverness he 
was firmly opposed, to the meeting with Rinuccini because 
he feared Digby would be u^sed as a dupe. Certainly he 
was not going to be gulled:
^ Carte, VI, pp. 441-2; see also ibid., p. 446; Rigby's 
instructions for N. Tflaite, T.C.P., XIX, p. 123.
^  G t t t d b B - j V l ^ p .  4 3 3 - 4 .
^ Oct. 8, T.C.P., XIX, p. 42.
 ^Oct. 10, ibid., p. 71; Gilbert, VI, p. 150.
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"îvîy lord, it will be too late to talke of an 
accom/Iodation when they shall force vs to burne 
and destroy our quarters."1
Preston, he warned, would not be so forthcoming when his 
army was actually of equal size with O ’Neill’s. Besides, 
it was neither honourable nor wi se to deal with the Con­
federates until word had been received from Parliament.
As though suspecting Digby of making unwarranted proposals 
he went out of his way to define his own position. He 
would not go beyond the concessions he had been prepared 
to offer while at Kilkenny. Of course, it might be that 
as Secretary of State with special powers from the Queen 
and the Prince of Wales Digby’s authority exceeded his 
own. The only features of Digby’s scheme of which he 
could approve were the proposals to appoint Clanricleard 
as commander-in-chief and to profit from the enmity that 
existed between O ’Neill and Preston.^
All this time Ormond was expecting to hear from the 
Scots and Parliament. As ^ stance from the Scots alone 
was what he would have preferred.
His appeal to them was powerful. If Dublin should 
fall, the full weight of the Irish Catholics would be
^ Oct. 12, Carte, VI, pp. 440-1.
2 Oct. 16, ibid., p. 442; see also T.C.P., XIX, p. 103.
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pressed against them. If, on the other hand, Dublin had 
surrendered to Parliament, their bargaining strength 
v/ith Parliament would be seriously weakened.^ The Scots 
undoubtedly agreed with his arguments but felt they lacked 
the means to help. ^
Ormond’s appeal to Parliament was equally straight­
forward. Unless they wished to see Dublin fall into the 
hands of the Irish Catholics, they must send him instant 
relief. Initially it v/as his hope that Parliament would 
give him material support v/ithout expecting his surrender.*^ 
But Parliament, not to his surprise, refused to extricate 
him from his difficulties on such excellent terms. They 
were not disposed to prop up a beaten general knov/ing that 
at the first signs of recovery he would repudiate their 
support. Instead they welcomed his alternative suggestion 
of discussing the surrender of the city with commissioners 
sent over for that: purpose.^
1 Gilbert (Bellings), VI,/pp. 27-9.
^ Cf. the Scots officers to Ormond, Oct. 9, T.C.P., XIX, 
p. 62; Gilbert (Sellings), VI, pp. 28-9.
^ Although he offered to give up his place as lord 
lieutenant "if my continuance ther/^in shall be the only 
impediment to their sending releefe, provided your majesty 
shall command it;" Ormond to Charles, Sep. 26, Carte, VI, 
p. 436; see also his additional instructions to Sir 
Gerard lowther, Sep. 29, T.C.P., XVIII, pp. 341-5.
^ Cf. AnneSley and. others to Ormond, Oct. 5, T.C.P., XIX, 
p. 29; see also lowther, Willoughby, and Davis to Ormond, 
Oct. 13, ibid., p. 150; C.S.P.I., p. 536.
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There was still no news from England vh en Digby 
decided it was time to force Preston to commit himself 
once and for all. Preston had again invited Clanrickard 
to join his army and Digby went v/ith him, accompanied by 
Taaffe. He assured Preston that Ormond would not surren­
der to Parliament provided he would declare his attach­
ment to the Peace. All the clergy’s terms could not 
possibly be met, but he and Clanrickard pledged repeal 
of the penal laws and undisturbed possession of eccles­
iastical property until the King should otherwise dispose 
of it in a free Parliament.^ On his own initiative, 
Clanrickard tried yet another approach to the Nuncio but
p
to no purpose.^
Meanwhile suspicion reigned in the Confederate camp. 
Ironically Rinuccini distrusted Preston as much on one 
side as did Ormond on the other. Preston, he noted, had 
delayed twenty days on the march. He was also grumbling 
constantly and dropping hints about the desirability of 
co-operating with Ormond.  ^ In an attempt to bind him and
^ C.S.P.I., pp. 532-3.
^ Of. Glanriclcard to Digby, Oct. 20, Add. MS. 42,063, 
p. 174; Instructions for the Nuncio, ibid., pp. 174-5; 
the Nuncio to Clanrickard, Oct. 25; ibid., p. 176, politely 
declining his proposals.
5 Embassy, p. 226.
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to end his dealings with Ormond Rinuccini demanded that he 
and O ’Neill swear an oath of loyalty.^ Preston consented 
only on condition that Ormond be given an opportunity of 
hearing a fresh set of proposals before they attacked 
Dublin.^
It would appear certain that Preston made this
proviso as the only means of avoiding an irreversible
pledge to break off his negotiations with Ormond. But
he was being driven inexorably to bind himself to one
side or the other. While Digby^and Rinuccini were both
trying to corner him, Ormond further embarrassed him by
asking again wliat he intended by his continued advance
4
towards Dublin. Preston, an unsubtle man, plainly did 
not know which way to turn. Through Taaffe^ and by 
personal letter^ he talked of preparing proposals, of 
being willing to support Ormond as soon as security for
1 According to the^oath Preston was to use all possible 
hostility against the King’s forces especially "in the 
present expedition and design upon the enemy in the City 
of Dublin." (C.S.P.I.; pp. 533-4).
^ T.C.P., XIX, p. 131; Gilbert, 71, p. 150.
^T.G.P., XIX, p. 171.
^ Oct. 27, T.C.P., XIX, p. 70; Carte, VI, pp. 448-9-
 ^ Carte, VI, pp. 447-8.
 ^ , Add. MS., 42,063, p. 179-
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his religion v/as conceded.^ Such security was precisely 
v/hat Ormond could not be induced to give. On November 
2nd Digby finally notified Ormond that without it Glan- 
rickard felt doubtful of Preston, although he continued 
to feel optimistic about his army.  ^ Clanrickard himself 
confirmed this.3
On the same day the screws were tightened further 
on Preston. By now the two armies were encamped hard by 
Dublin. Appreciating the city’s defensive weakness 
O ’Neill was in favour of unleashing a surprise attack 
without delay. Demurring Preston pointed out that O ’Neill 
was pledged to treat with the Viceroy before using force. 
O ’Neill considered that this would be a dangerous tempor­
ising gesture but in the interests of solidarity yielded 
to a proposal put forv/ard by Rinuccini,^ who was constantly
^ Gilbert (Bellings), VI, p. 25.
^ Carte VI, p. 449.
3 Ibid., p. Clanrickard also wrote to Preston (B.M.,
Add. MS. 42,063; p. 177) regretting that Preston had not 
accepted Digby’s proposition. Nevertheless; he intended 
to see him on the following Friday.
4 h.
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trying to lessen the friction between them. This was 
that they should deliver a joint ultimatum demanding 
that the garrison of Dublin and a number of other strong 
points should admit Confederate detachments and that 
Roman Catholics should be as free in Ireland as in 
Catholic countries in Europe.^
So far, Ormond’s attempts to obtain reinforcements 
had failed. There were rumours of the imminent arrival 
of troops and supplies from England, but by now he was 
doubtful of Parliament’s good faith and placed little 
reliance on their promises. The Scots, to whom he had 
despatched several urgent requests, would have sent aid 
had they been able.^ Yet, in the event, only the scorched
earth encircling the city and signs of a hard winter
stood between Dublin and capitulation, unless Preston 
could be bullied or cajoled into changing sides. Ormond 
himself considered the situation almost hopeless. Accor­
ding to Clarendon he had written to the King asking what 
he should do.^ This may have been so, but he could
^ According to Bellings (Gilbert, VI, pp. 36-8) these 
propositions were prepared by the Council and Congre­
gation; see also Plunket-Dunne MS. p. 867; Historical 
View, pp. 1057-9.
2 Gilbert (Bellings), VI, pp. 31-2.
3 T.C.P., XIX, pp. 162-7.
^ Historical View, p. 1061.
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hardly have expected an early reply. Even so, in reply
to Preston and O ’Neill’s ultimatum, he revealed no signs
of weakness. By what authority, he wanted to know, did
they make their propositions
This negative response ought to have been the
signal for the attack on Dublin but Preston, fortunately
for Ormond, still could not bring himself to co-operate
with O ’Neill. His obstinacy so angered Rinuccini that
he contemplated the desperate expedient of arresting him
2
on a charge of treason. At this point Clanrickard rode 
into Preston’s camp.
Ormond had given Clanrickard little encouragement.
If Preston made reasonable proposals, which he doubted 
anyway, he would be interested only if there were a com­
plete submission to Clanrickard.^ To Digby he expressed 
himself even more grudgingly. It was dangerous as well 
as useless to go among the Confederates. Even if Preston 
were, after all, to be mediate, he "should neuer bee 
able to draw my party to listen to reason, your lordship 
appeareing in the busines^". He must in any case wait
^ Nov. 4, T.C.P., XIX, p. 188; Add. MS., 42,063, p. 181. 
9 Corw. (IiA  ^ I i , p.H-ar? .
5 Carte, VI, p. 453; B.M. Add. MS., 42,063, p. 178.
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and see what Parliament intended to do.^
V/hen, on November 11, Clanrickard joined Preston
2
at Lucan, where Preston had arrived on November 9th,
the two Confederate armies v/ere encamped side by side,
their two generals regarding each other with bitter 
%
distrust. At first Clanrickard apparently tried to 
placate the Nuncio who was staying at Preston’s H.Q.
He was confident, he said, that Ormond would be amenable 
to terms provided that troops were sent to England.
But as the only security for good terms was Clanrickard’s 
own word, the Nuncio remained unimpressed. He pointed 
out that they could scarcely be expected to continue 
negotiations with Ormond while Ormond was also nego­
tiating with Parliament. If Ormond would dismiss the 
Parliamentary Commissioners, however, they would reconsider 
the position.^ Clanrickard replied that he had no idea 
of the state of Ormond’s negotiations with Parliament
^ Nov. 10, Carte, VI, pp. 452-3- 
2 Com.Rin., 11, p. 425 - 
 ^Embassy, p. 227-
^ Clanrickard’s proposals, T.C.P., XIX, pp. 222-3; Add. 
MB., 42,063, pp. 181-2.
5 Embassy, p. 228: T.C.P., XIX, p. 218, p. 219; B.M.,
Add. MB. 42,063, p. 182.
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but that in any case, he could not be expected to break 
off his negotiations with Parliament on the strength of 
a mere promise.^
In the meantime, intelligence had been brought to 
Preston’s tent, where the two generals were holding a 
council of war, to the effect that Parliamentary troops 
had entered Dublin. Fearing a plot to trap his army,
o
O ’Neill instantly raised the siege. In panic the 
Council also departed next morning. Rinuccini, however, 
decided to remain with Preston in spite of the fact that 
he, too, might be the intended victim of a plot.^
During the next few days, Clanrickard offered two 
further sets of proposals.^ Rinuccini made his own 
comments on them but even after Preston had said that his 
own word would suffice he insisted on referring for a 
decision to the Supreme Council after v/hich he now set 
off in pursuit in order to bring them back. Rinuccini 
continued to insist upon complete freedom for religion 
and retention of the Churches. He put it to Clanrickard 
that if Ormond refused these terms Clanrickard should
1 Ibid., p. 183.
 ^Aphor. Disc., p. 132; Embassy, p. 227.
5 Com. Rin., II, p. 429; see below p.S^7^.
4 Embassy, p. 216, pp. 228-9; T.C.P., XIX, p. 225;
Hynes, pp. 117-8; Add. MS. 42,063, pp. 183-4*
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take the Confederate oath.^ Clanrickard apparently- 
refused and the Nuncio continued on his way to Kilkenny.
In the meantime, Preston and a number of his senior 
officers had agreed to accept Clanrickard’s proposals, 
provided they v/ere expressed in writing, and to break 
with the Council if necessary.^ Apparently two fears 
had deterred Preston and his friends from accepting terms 
First, that Ormond’s hostility to their religion was so 
great that he would oppose any concessions which the King 
should make. Secondly, that the Scots, in whose hands 
the King was a prisoner, would insist on any agreement 
being disavowed. Clanrickard sought to allay their fears 
by undertaking to obtain irrevocable guarantees from the 
King, the Queen and the Prince of Wales. He also assured 
them that Ormond would be obliged to carry out any in­
structions given to him.^
The terms which he pledged himself to procure v/ere 
generous. All Acts of Parliament restricting the freedom 
of the Catholic Church were to be repealed. Until a 
free Parliament could be summoned and the King was once 
again a free agent, the Confederates were to retain all
1 Gilbert, VI, p. 156; Com.Ein,, II, p. 450; Add. MS., 
42,065, p. 184.
^ Digby to Ormond, Nov. 16, Carte, VI, pp. 455-7.
^ Historical View, pp. 1061-4.
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the ecclesiastical property in their possession. Then 
it would be a matter for Parliament to resolve. In the 
meantime, a Roman Catholic Lieutenant-G-eneral and Catholic 
generals should be appointed to command the armies in the 
field. For his part, Clanrickard swore to fight for these 
concessions and to declare irrevocably for the Confeder­
acy if he did not obtain them by September 1st in the 
following year.^
Rigby, who was standing in the background directing 
2
Clanrickard and who had been v/amed to keep out of 
Dublin where Ormond was optimistically waiting for news 
from the Scots, ^  was elated at this development ; it was 
something to have won over Preston's army. He had ob­
viously abandoned, at least temporarily, his plan to go 
to Prance and was as full of enthusiasm as ever, even 
proposing that an attempt be made to kidnap Owen Roe and 
the Huncio.^
1 The Marquis of Clanrickard’s Engagement, C.S.P.I., p. 5 41; 
T.C.P., %IX, pp. 222-3; B.M. Add. MS. 42,063, p. 186; see 
also the 'Engagement' of Preston and his officers (ibid.,
p. 185).
2 Clanrickard to Ormond, Hov. 19, Carte, VI, pp. 460-2;
see also ’*The Lord Rigbyes Declaration upon my ingagem^ the 
19th of Hovemb. 1646" (B.M., Add. MS. 42,063, P* 188); see 
also Clanrickard’8 detailed justification of his 'Engage­
ment ’ (ibid., pp. 188-90).
 ^Ormond, to Rigby, Hov. 12, Carte, VI, p. 453.
4 Rigby to Ormond, Nov. 13, ibid., pp. 454-5; same to same, 
Hov. 13, T.C.P., XIX, p. 261, recommending that Ormond’s 
horse vigorously pursue O'Heill so that he could not 
"gather heade againe"^ same to the same, Nov. 16, Carte, 
VI, pp. 455-7.
579
But, as usual, Rigby was counting on success to
soon, for Preston had consented only on condition that
a garrison - he suggested three regiments - be admitted
into Dublin. It was also necessary that Ormond should
declare his approval of Clanrickard’s proposals and issue
the requisite commissions to Clanrickard and Preston
without delay.^ For some reason both Rigby and Clanrick- 
2
ard assumed that they had Ormond’s backing in what they 
arranged, but in fact Ormond disliked the whole business^ 
and refused to give Preston his commission unless he sub­
mitted to the Ormond Peace. At this moment he was en­
gaged in the delicate operation of getting rid of the 
Parliamentarians without giving offence to the Dublin 
Protestants. He expressed his feelings about Preston 
with pointed strength; he would not venture to lose 
Protestant support "for soe incertaine a party as you 
deale with. ■-
Ormond’s curt reply/angered Rigby. Immediately he 
inquired why Ormond could not send a kind and civil
^ Same to the same, Nov. 19, ibid., p. 462.
^ Clanrickard to Ormond, Nov. 19, ibid., pp. 460-2; he
had in no way compromised himself.
 ^This may be inferred from Rigby’s letter of November 19th.
^ Carte, VI, p. 463*
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letter to Preston and suggested that Clanrickard*s
commission at least should be despatched at once. He
warned that the army could not be held together unless
committed to action fairly soon.^ Before Ormond could
reply he had dashed off an even angrier letter in vi/hich
he pointed out that if Ormond had objected to Clanrickard’s
handling of the situation he should have made his viev/s
clear long before this. Already the army was beginning
to suspect that they were to be rejected and Preston
2
that he had been used as a dupe.
Quite obviously this was yet another occasion on 
which Ormond, reluctant to make an irreversible decision, 
had allowed himself vaguely to support Rigby’s scheme 
without being clear what it entailed and resenting having 
to deal at all with the Confederates. He now defended 
himself on the grounds that, as he had been very busy 
trying to get rid of the Parliamentarians, he had not 
heard nev/s of what Clanrickard and Preston had agreed to 
until November 18th. Now he had to object to the part 
assigned to him in the agreement for several reasons; 
the necessity of publicising Clanrickard’s assurance*, 
the implication that he approved of Clanrickard’s engage-
^ Ibid., pp. 466-7.
^ Nov. 22, ibid., pp. 467-8.
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ment when he diô. not do so; the admission of Preston’s 
forces to the garrison. As for the amendment concerning 
the Pope, this was monstrous. ^
Equally obviously, Rigby and Clanrickard were 
bitterly c o n v i n c e d  that Ormond had rene^ec^his promise 
of s u p p o r t R i g b y  was appalled at his letter and as 
good as accused Ormond of behaving dishonourably.^ Clan­
rickard was also dismayed and complained of having lab­
oured so hard in vain. Ormond’s failure to send a civil 
letter to Preston had done irreparable harm and ruined 
their chance to destroy O ’Neill. Nonetheless, despite 
their genuine hurt and consternation, both were still 
trying to hold Preston, but Rigby w a r n e d  that only a 
few days of respite were left.^ Clanrickard still 
believed that all vmuld turn out well if Ormond would 
consent to obey all c o m m a n d s  f r e e l y  sent by the King 
or from the Queen, the Prince of Wales and Rigby, in
^ Ormond to R i g b y ,  Nov. 2 3 ,  ibid., p p .  4 6 8 - 7 1 .
^ Cf. Clanrickard’s retrospective note (P.M., Add. MS. 
42,063, p. 194): " .... & b y  some unwillingnes to have
us come to Rublin wee were in doubt he was inclined 
rather to some treaty w"th the parlement commissioners 
then w ”^^ G-en: Preston and his party."
^  I b i d . ,  p p .  4 7 1 - 7 .
4  Ibid., Clanrickard to Ormond, Uov. 2 4 ,  ibid., p p .  4 7 7 -  
8 ;  B . M . , Add. M S .  p p .  1 9 3 - 4 .
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descending order, and reject all commands issued by 
the King under duress.^
Suddenly, at this point, Ormond made a volte-face.
He explained that the form in which he had received 
Clanrickard’s engagement had led him to believe that he 
was committed personally to impossible conditions. Now 
understanding that this was not the case, he would 
instantly send a commission to Clanrickard and a letter
p
of authority to Preston. ^  True to his word, he wrote 
to Preston expressing the hope that he would see him 
soon and bidding him yield obedience to Clanrickard.^
And to Clanrickard he gave the assurances requested on 
the 25th.^ Ormond was probably being truthful when he 
claimed that he had misunderstood Clanrickard’s pledges 
on his behalf but it is doubtful if this were the main 
reason for his change of heart. It is much more likely 
that it was inspired by the departure of the Parliamentary 
Commissioners from Dublin, with v/hich it happened to 
coincide to the very day !^
^ Nov. 24, Carte, VI, pp. 478-9- 
^ Nov. 25, ibid., pp. 479-80.
^ Nov. 25, ibid., pp. 481-2; B.M., Add. MS., p. 196.
^ Nov. 26, Carte, VI, p. 483; B.M., Add. MS., p. 195-
5 Ormond reported the imminent departure of the Commiss­
ioners in a letter to Clanrickard dated November 25th,
Cav^ ,Vl,P* 479.
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The Parliamentary Commissioners had arrived in 
Dublin on November 14th to discuss the terms of surren­
der.^ Immediately afterwards, news must have been 
received of O ’Neill’s hasty withdrawal. There is no 
corroboratory evidence but Ormond was obviously much 
less anxious to come to terms when he saw that the threat 
to Dublin had been removed. He was quite willing to 
play off Parliament against the Confederates so long as 
he could surrender in the last resort to the former. 
Fortuitiously, the Commissioners were not empowered to 
be generous and he was able, no doubt sincerely, to 
find two good reasons for breaking off discussions with 
them. First, they had not obtained the King’s directive 
that he should surrender as he had requested.^ Secondly, 
they refused to give a pledge not to interfere with the 
lives and property of those Catholics who had remained 
loyal.5 In their turn, the Parliamentary Commissioners 
found Ormond difficult. ^In the report of their failure
"for that the Lord of Ormond hath insisted upon 
several exceptions most of the overtures made 
unto him, and upon the whole hath given his 
positive refusal."4
1 Lord Lieutenant and Council to the King, Nov. 28, 
T.C.P.,'KIK, p. 344.
^ Ibid.
^ Plunket-Dunne MS., p. 877; Carte, VI, p. 537.
4 C.S.P.I., p. 543.
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It is almost certain that the breaking-off of the dis­
cussions with the Parliamentary Commissioners was the 
direct cause of Ormond’s sudden decision to support 
Digby and Clanrickard in their intrigue with Preston.
The acrimony of the past few days forgotten, Ormond, 
Digby and Clanrickard conferred together. Afterwards 
Ormond informed Preston that he would admit some of his 
troops into the garrison and proposed that they should
meet on the following day.^ This meeting did not take
2
place because Ormond promptly fell ill, genuinely or 
feignedly, and could not attend. Instead, he apparently
2
arranged to see Preston at Castledermot as soon as possible.
Ormond’s inability to see Preston at the agreed time 
had unforeseen consequences, for as in the weeks following 
the proclamation of the Ormond Peace, Preston now began 
to waver. Even when signing the ’engagement’ with Clan­
rickard he had not been fully prepared for a clean break 
with the Council and the^Nuncio. Thus, he had explained 
to some of the ’Irish Lords’ how he had struggled to 
keep the army together for six weeks without pay, how 
O ’Neill had withdrawn from the siege without notice, and 
how the best thing was to submit to the Peace on fair
^ Nov. 26, ibid., pp. 482-3*
2 Gilbert (Bollings), VI, pp. 43-4.
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terms.^ This was followed by letters to the Council, the 
Mayor of Kilkenny and, curiously enough, Owen Roe O ’Neill,
urging acceptance of the Peace and, in the case of the
2
Council, a reply to Clanrickard’s proposals.
Once again belying his reputation for intransigeance 
and showing himself to be more of a statesman than his 
critics, Owen Roe agreed to accept Clanrickard’s proposals 
if Rinuccini and the Council would do likewise.5 in fact, 
they did not do so. This was scarcely surprising.
Though Rinuccini and Clanrickard had conferred and corres­
ponded on amicable terms, and though each indeed gained 
the false impression that he might even convert the other 
Clanrickard had in the end to say that he, too, would 
dearly like to see the Catholic faith flourishing as 
Rinuccini desired but that it was not feasible for 
reasons which he expounded at great length.  ^ Consequently, 
it was a foregone^ conclusion that Clanrickard’s proposals
^ C.S.P.I., pp.542-3.
2 IIov. 24, ibid., p. 542; Com.Rin., II, p. 446.
5 Aphor.Bisc., p. 132.
^ Com.Rin., II, p. 429; Embassy, p. 234; Digby to 
Ormond, Kov. 19, Carte, VI, p. 462.
5 Com.Rin., II, p. 430; Carte, VI, pp. 463-6; B.M., Add. 
MS. 42,063, pp. 191-3. The Runcio replied quite courte­
ously but rejected all of Clanrickard's arguments (B.M., 
Add. MS. 42,063, p. 193).
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would be rejected. Formal rejection was announced by 
the Supreme Council on November 24th. It left no room 
for compromise. In the first place, Clanrickard had 
no authority and, in the second, even if he had, his 
engagements were inadequate from the point of view both 
of the Church and the army.l The Council simultaneously 
coldly accused Preston of having brought on his own 
troubles and ordered him to obey the properly invested 
authority.^
For once Preston was prepared to stick to his guns 
but Ormond’s failure to meet him as arranged, whatever 
the reason given, left him a prey to uncertainty. At
any rate through one of his officers he informed Ormond
that news of Ormond’s unwillingness to receive his troops 
into the garrison changed everything. Most of his offi­
cers now preferred to take no action pending the summoning 
of a General Assembly and the outcome of its debate. If 
Ormond still wished to conclude an agreement, he had 
better make haste.  ^ During the next few days the quarrel 
between the Council and Preston came to a head. Rin­
uccini issued a decree of excommunication against anyone
1 C.S.P.I., pp. 546-7; Gilbert, VI, p. 158.
^ C . S . P . I ., pp. 544-5.
^ Gol. Butler to Ormond, Rov. 30, T.C.P., XX, p. 133•
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who should join with Preston in supporting Ormond,^ 
the Council ordered Preston’s army to disperse,^ and 
efforts were made to bring Preston to Kilkenny.^
In the meantime, Ormond had recovered from his 
illness. He decided, reluctantly, to join Preston as 
requested in Butler’s letter. He would meet him at 
Castledermot and there issue commissions to himself and 
his o f f i c e r s W h i l e  Ormond was on the march-out, 
Preston was in Kilkenny allowing himself to be dissuaded 
from keeping the rendezvous. Consequently, when Ormond 
arrived at Grangebegg he received a letter sent by 
Preston to Clanrickard in which Preston wryly observed 
that as his soldiers were not "excommunication proof"
1 Com.Rin., II, pp»45^l-^-
2 jLhifi l -
^ Supreme Council to Predton, Dec. 4> C . S.P.I., p. 553; 
Bp. French to Preston, Dec. 4, ibid., p. 554.
^ Ormond to Preston, Dec. 2, T.C.P., XIX, p. 347.
Ormond’s distaste for the business was expressed in a 
letter he wrote to "a certain officer from lucan" 
(Plunket-Dunne MS., p. 878): "That I may leave no means
unattempted to prevent the ruine of his Majesty’s affairs 
whilst I have an hand in them, I have undertaken an 
expedition whereunto I was invited by a considerable 
party of the Irish. But I confess I go rather to leave 
them for ever inexcusable if they should faile me, than 
that I have any assured confidence of performance. Such 
are the impressions their former failures have left in
me. "
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he must bow to the Clergy and rely on a satisfactory 
outcome to the forthcoming d.ebate in the General 
Assembly. He asked Ormond not to bring his army out 
of Dublin and still insisted that he stood by his engage- 
ment.l A short time later he pinned the blame for his 
failure on his officers because they had refused to join 
with Ormond. ^
Ormond, Digby and Clanrickard were all enraged by 
this turn of events,  ^ although Clanrickard continued, to 
correspond with Preston.^ Digby proposed to pay a visit 
to Prance so as to obtain supplies and throw discredit 
on the Nuncio.5
As for the Nuncio himself, rightly convinced that 
Preston could never be trusted, he sought to end his 
attachment to Ormond once and for all. At his prompting, 
Preston was forced to declare his reasons for withdrawing
^ Gilbert (Sellings), VI, p. 44; Preston to Clanrickard, 
Dec. 8, C.S.P.I., pp. 555.-6; see also Historical View, 
p. 1065-
^ Carte, VI, pp. 485-4-
^ Clanricliard bitterly accused Preston of breaking his 
agreement; Add. MS. 42,065, pp. 197-8.
^ Digby asked Clanrickard to obtain letters from leading 
Catholics confirming that most of their co-religionists 
opposed the Nuncio’s policy (Add. MS. 42,063, p. 201).
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from his engagement to Clanrickard^ and to sign a formal 
statement of reconciliation with 0 'Reill.2
By this time Rinuccini had recovered the grip vhich, 
to some extent, he had lost in the days immediately 
following the raising of the siege of Dublin. During 
that period of uncertainty he had accepted two proposals 
made by the Bishop of Perns and Nicholas Blunket rsæër 
which he later came bitterly to regret.^ One v/as to 
convene a General Assembly to decide definitely whether 
the Ormond Peace should be rejected, the other to release 
those Ormondists who had been put in prison at the time 
of his triumphant return to Kilkenny in September.^
Prench and Plunket both deprecated extreme courses and 
no doubt submitted their proposals as a sensible and 
democratic way of determining what should be done. Their 
moderate outlook obscured for them the fact that by now 
the Ormondists and Rinuccini were irreconcilable.
4 Dec. 22, T.C.P., XIX, p4 405; Gilbert, VI, p. 167.
o )
Com.Rin. pp. 476-7; Embassy,^509-
^ In his report on his ill-starred embassy to Ireland 
he was to blame all his subsequent troubles on the adop­
tion of these proposals (ibid.).
^ Ibid., p. 510.
Chapter XIV
T h e  a b o r t i v e  m i s s i o n  o f  W i n t e r  G r a n t ,
J a n u a r y  -  J u l y ,  1 6 4 7 .
A f t e r  t h i s  l a t e s t  e x a m p l e  o f  P r e s t o n ’ s  i n c o n s t a n c y  i t  w a s
i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  O r m o n d  s h o u l d  r e v e r t  t o  h i s  p l a n  o f  s u r r e n d e r
t o  t h e  E n g l i s h  P a r l i a m e n t .  T h e r e  w a s  o n l y  o n e  r e a s o n  f o r
h e s i t a t i o n .  H a v i n g  p u t  o f f  h i s  d e p a r t u r e  f o r  s o  l o n g  h e  m i g h t
a s  w e l l  w a i t  a n d  s e e  w h a t  t h e  o u t c o m e  o f  t h e  f o r t h c o m i n g
d e b a t e  a t  K i l k e n n y  w o u l d  b e .  I n d e e d ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  C l a r e n d o n ,
h e  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e  A s s e m b l y  w a s  b o u n d  t o  b e  s o  c o n s t i t u t e d
a s  t o  c o n d e m n  t h o s e  w h o  h a d  r e j e c t e d  t h e  t r e a t y . ^
W e l l - /
U n u s u a l l y  a t t e n d e d  f r o m  t h e  o u t s e t  t h e  7 t h  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y  
o f  t h e  C o n f e d e r a c y  s a t  f r o m  J a n u a r y  1 0 t h  u n t i l  A p r i l  4 t h .  B y
o
a l l  a c c o u n t s  i t  w a s  a  n o i s y  a n d  h e a t e d  s e s s i o n  w i t h  b o t h
N u n c i o i s t s  a n d  O r m o n d i s t s  d e t e r m i n e d  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e i r  r e c e n t
p o l i c i e s .  E a c h  s i d e  h a d  a p p a r e n t l y  t r i e d  h a r d  b e f o r e h a n d  t o
o b t a i n  t h e  r e t u r n  o f  i t s  o w n  s u p p o r t e r s ,  a n d  w h e n  t h e  m e m b e r s
h a d  c o n v e n e d  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  a  n u m b e r  o f  e l e c t i o n s  k a â  w a s
3
h o t l y  d i s p u t e d .
1 .  H i s t o r i c a l  V i e w , p . 1 0 6 5 ;  s e e  a l s o  O r m o n d  t o  C l a n r i c k a r d ,
J a n . 8 ,  C a ± t e , V l ,  p . 4 8 9 .
2 .  G i l b e r t  ( B e l l i n g s ) , V l , p . 2 ;  E m b a s s y , p p . 2 4 4 - 5 .
3 .  G i l b e r t  ( B e l l i n g s ) , V I , p . 1 ;  s e e  a l s o  C l a n r i c k a r d  t o  O r m o n d ,
J a n . 8 ,  C a r t e , V I , p . 4 9 0 ;  C o m . R i n . , l l , p . f ^ ' t r .
Congregation was suinmonecl to meet on or before the opening
day of the session and turned up at full strength.
Rinuccini was determined that ecclesiastical policies
should be adopted and to this end he wished to ensure
clerical solidarity and to present the Assembly at the
1
outset with a clear-cut statement of aims. ‘ accordingly^
a statement of the conditions judged to be nec^essary for
the security of religion was released on January 10th
?
in time for the official opening of the Assembly.
At about this time there also appeared under the
authority of Rinuccini the first part of a pamphlet -
the second part appeared later on in the year - by
Dr. Walter Enos, treasurer of the diocese of Ferns, which
recounted with copious documentation the clergy’s reasons
for having rejected the Ormond Treaty. This is without doubt
the most authoritative statement of the views of the Old
which /
Irish and the Church it is possible to come by. The sub-title
pithily summarised its main cpntents:
"In whieh survey it is proved by notable 
observations on some of the said articles, 
that the said Peace is destructive of the 
Catholique Faith, disadvantagious to His 
Majesty,pernicious to his Catholique 
subjects, and favourable onely to 
rebellious Parliamentary Heretiques" 5
1. Considerations upon the future Assembly, Dec.30 /Embassy,
pp.237-9.
2. Gilbert,VI, pp.171-2.
3. Ibid., pp.311-433.
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T h e  a l l - i m p o r t a n t  d e b a t e  o n  t h e  O r m o n d  T r e a t y  d i d  n o t
b e g i n  u n t i l  t h e  e n d  o f  t h e  f i r s t  w e e k .  R i n u c c i n i  i n t e r v e n e d
e a r l y  w i t h  o n e  o f  h i s  m a g i s t e r i a l  s p e e c h e s .  H e  h a d  l i t t l e  t h a t
w a s  n e w  t o  s a y  a b o u t  t h e  c l e r g y ’ s  m o t i v e s  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h e
t r e a t y  b u t  m a d e  o n e  i n t e r e s t i n g  a n n o u n c e m e n t .  T h e  c l e r g y  h a d
t a k e n  o v e r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  o u t  o f  s h e e r
n e c e s s i t y  a n d  n o t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  c o n s i d e r e d  i t  a n  a d j u n c t  o f
t h e i r  e c c l e s i a s t i c a l  f u n c t i o n .  N o w  t h a t  a  g e n e r a l  a s s e m b l y  h a d
b e e n  c o n v e n e d  t h e y  w i l l i n g l y  s u r r e n d e r e d  t h e i r  a u t h o r i t y  a n d
h e  p e r s o n a l l y  r e s i g n e d  f r o m  t h e  o f f i c e  o f  p r e s i d e n t .
C o n s t r u c t i v e l y ,  h e  p r o p o s e d  t h a t  t h e  a s s e m b l y  a n d  t h e  c l e r g y
s h o u l d  a g r e e  a s  t o  t h e  r e l i g i o u s  c o n d i t i o n s  w h i c h  s h o u l d  f o r m
t h e  b a s i s  o f  a n y  p e a c e  a n d  t h a t  a  n e w  o a t h  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n
s h o u l d  b e  d e v i s e d  b i n d i n g  e v e r y o n e  t o  s t a n d  f r r m l y  b y  t h e m .
A s  u s u a l ,  h e  r e m i n d e d  t h e m  o f  t h e  p a p a l  s u p p o r t  t h e y  w e r e
p r i v i l e g e d  t o  e n j o y ,  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  M a s s a r i  w a s  a l r e a d y  o n
h i s  r e t u r n  j o u r n e y  f r o m  R o m e  w i t h  s u p p l i e s . ^
The counter-offensive against the Nuncio was led by 
2
B e l l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  F r e n c h  a g e n t ,  D u m o u l i n , g i v i n g  c l o s e  s u p p o r t .  
L i k e  a l l  t h e  F r e n c h  e n v o y s  t o  K i l k e n n y ,  D u m o u l i n  l o o k e d  u p o n  
R i n u c c i n i  a s  a  p u p p e t  o f  t h e  S p a n i a r d s  w h o ,  i f  t r i u m p h a n t  o v e r  
t h e  O r m o n d i s t s ,  w o u l d  t u r n  I r e l a n d  i n t o  a  v a s s a l  o f  S p a i n .  I t
1 .  C o m . R i n . , 1 1 ,  p p . 4 9 7 - 5 0 0 ;  E m b a s s y , p p . 2 4 1 - 4 .
2 .  T h o s e  w h o  h a d  b e e n  i m p r i s o n e d  w e r e  g r a n t e d  p e r m i s s i o n  t o  
a p p e a r  b e f o r e  t h e  A s s e m b l y  a n d  p l e a d  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h e i r  
p a s t  a c t i o n s  ( i b i d . ,  p p . 5 1 0 - 1 1 ) .
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was therefore essential to preserve the strength of the 
Ormondists and, if possible, to restore good relations between 
Ormond and the Confederacy. Thus having played an active part 
in furthering the Ormond Treaty, Dumoulin was now bent on 
salvaging it. In a speech to the Assembly on January 19th, at 
which he presented his credentials, he declared that Mazarin 
and Louis XIV had approved of the Ormond Peace and, indeed, 
that the King had been surprised by the clergy’s resolutions 
at Waterford.^
However, Rinuccini was able to produce a letter from 
the Papal Nuncio to Prance, Cardinal Dagni, dated November 20th, 
1645, stating clearly that the French Court could only
countenance a treaty which provided for the security of the
2
Church. Dumoulin retorted with an "expostulation", as Rinuccini
put it, to the effect that Louis XIV would consider rejection
3
of the peace inexcusable. Oddly enough. Dumoulin believed 
this to be the truth,_and yet all doubts on this score would 
seem to have been dispelled when Geoffrey Barron returned 
from Prance after the peace had in fact been rejected and 
vouched for Bagni’s statement.^
Through Bellings the Ormondists struck at what 
appeared to be the Nuncio’s least vulnerable flank by alleging 
that he was frustrating the Pope’s own intentions. Bellings
1. T.C.P., XX, p.99; Gilbert, VI, pp.173-6.
2. Embassy, p.249.
3. Ibid.; Gilbert (Bellings), Vll, p.6; Gilbert, VI,pp.176-7.
4. Embassy, pp.250-1; in his narrative Sellings accused 
Barron of suppressing contrary evidence (Gilbert, Vll, pp.6-7).
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attributed to the Pope in the course of an audience given 
Be
him when he was in Rome - an audience of which Pr. Wadding
had been a witness - the observation:
"that it was no wonder your King should not 
think it safe for him to grant the conditions 
publicity, which we demanded, lest he should 
lose his party in England; you might make use 
of his connivance." 1
According to Bellings a number of the clergy accepted his 
2
testimony but Rinuccini claimed that it made little impression.
Certainly it had no effect on the final issue.
Despite the frenzy attributed to them by Bellings and
despite controlling a comfortable majority in the Assembly,
the clerical party were reluctant to condemn their opponents
out of hand. Indeed, they refrained from casting a
straightforward vote against the peace since this in itself
would have been an implicit censure. The clergy also rejected
Scarampi’s advice that if the annulment of the peace were
not resolved as a distinct and preliminary issue they should
take no further part in the proceedings of the Assembly.^It
is true that they could afford to be magnanimous, true also
that in the opinion of Rinuccini - for one - the underhand
practices of the treaty-makers had been laid bare to the 
5
public eye; nevertheless, had they been really vindictive
they would not have spared the Ormondists national humiliation.
1. Rinuccini reported the Pope’s statement thus: "...and if 
unable to secure public security to be content with a secret 
one." Embassy, p.251.
2. Gilbert, Vll, p.4.
3. Embassy, pp.251-2.
4. TTOTT, pp.246-7.
5. Ibid., p.246.
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As it was, a committee was appointed to work out an acceptable 
compromise.
The General Assembly formally revoked the Ormond Peace
on February 2nd. Simultaneously, those who had arranged it
were absolved from blame,^only 12 dissentient votes being
2
cast out of a possible 300. It is far from easy to decide
whether it is Rinuccini or Bellings who gives the more
accurate account of the proceedings leading up to this
compromise. Presumably Rinuccini deserves more respect because
his account dated from within a few days of the debate whereas
Bellings wrote over twenty years later. It was also Rinuccini’s
clerical party which commanded the majority vote and could
therefore arrange or prevent a compromise.
In Dublin, Ormond had been impatiently waiting for news
of the crucial vote. So far as he could, he had tried to
influence the course of the debate and at least to obtain
accurate reports by sending Taaffe and Barry to Kilkenny under
%
safe-conduct (provided by the Confederacy after some delay)
/
ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a truce of one month 
in return for a subsidy of £l,OOO.^But the Assembly had 
firmly refused his envoys a hearing until they had voted for
5
or against the Ormond Peace.
1. Gilbert, VI, pp.177-8.
2. Embassy, p.248.
3. Cf. Plunket to Ormond, Jan.25, T.O.P.,XX, p.120; Gilbert, 
VI, p.173.
4. Ibid., pp.172-3.
5. Embassy, p.248.
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When news of the Assembly’s unfavourable decision
at last reached him, Ormond wrote instantly to the Parliamentary
Commissioners accepting their latest terms.^He had little
choice. His most recent instructions from the King had been
to surrender to Parliament rather than to the trish and there
was no means of communicating with the King to ascertain
whether or not he had changed his mind. Moreover, since
learning of Preston’s treachery the Dubliners had refused to
2
contribute any more to the upkeep of his army. Apart from 
these considerations he was extremely angry. As he wrote to 
Barry on Pebr4ry 12th, he would invite no further propositions 
from ’’those people’’
At the same time he was in no position to resist a 
second assault on Dublin.^It was necessary, therefore, to 
arrange a truce in order to hold off the Confederate armies 
while he thrashed out the final settlement witht the 
Parliamentary Commissioners. Since he was hoping to take his
5
army out of Ireland as part of the bargain,the negotiations 
might take some time. This is the sole explanation of his 
intermittent correspondence with the Confederacy during the 
next five months before he finally quitted the country. And 
yet, such was the apathy of the Confederacy that, however 
grudgingly, they consented to several renewals of the truce 
and made no plans to encircle Dublin.
1. Feb.5, T.C.P.,XX,p.158.
• Gilbert, VI. pp. 182-5.
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After the resolution rejecting the Peace had been 
carried, the proposals for securing Catholic interests drawn 
up by the clergy and published on the opening day of the 
Assembly were tabled and debated^ Initially, they were under 
nine heads and amounted to a guarantee of complete freedom 
for the Catholic Church in Ireland. Appointments to bishoprics 
and livings were to continue as under the present dispensation. 
The clergy should keep the property in their present possession 
as well as any further property they should acquire pending 
a national settlement. Vfherever Catholics outnumbered 
Protestants they should occupy ÿhe Churches and everywhere 
their priests should be entitled to receive the customary 
tithes from Catholic landovmers. Colleges and Universities 
should be founded according to the rules of the Church. A new
oath of association should be devised binding everyone to
c!
3
2
abide by these proposals. The substance of these lerical
conditions was finally reduced to five articles.
The Ormondists, despite their recent humiliation,
/
managed to diminish the effect of this oath by forcing through 
two major amendments: first, that it should not rule out the
arrangement of a compromise by the Assembly over the churches
4. As he informed the King on February 19th (T.C.P.,XX, p.207), 
Dublin and the other garrisons must fall to whomever attacked 
them first. He also appealed to Inchiqin for 50 barrels of 
powder (ibid., p.170).
5. Digby was to negotiate for the services of the army abroad by 
authority of Ormond’s commission. Ibid., p.205.
1. According to Rinuccini (Embassy, p.252) they were accepted
after lengthy discussion. In fact, they were drastically changed.
2. T.C.P.,XX,p.65;Gilbert,Vl,pp.l71-2;Com^Rin,ll,pp.510-13;&dWvr
3. To Rinuccini ’ s regret they excluded provision for a 
Catholic viceroy. Rinuccini to Pamphili, Mar.4, Embassyÿp725T7
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and church property in Protestant hands; and, secondly, that
the right to stick to or depart from the clergy’s articles be
reserved to the Assembly.^ It was also significant that when
the Assembly came to discuss the faculty of appointing to
vacant sees and benefices they questioned the procedure that
had been adopted in 1642. Claiming that the presentation of
bishops was one of the royal prerogatives they were pledged
to preserve, they proposed that-rsdaeuld presentations should
rest henceforward with the Supreme Council, the archbishops
and the chapters. Rinuccini stood out against this proposal
but thought it politic to refer their supporting arguments
to Rome, where, he felt sure, no sympathy would be shown to 
2
them. As he himself must have been fully aware, the ulterior 
object of this proposal was to take away the right of 
appointment from the Pope and therefore, in practice, from 
himself.
Rinuccini was rapidly losing the initiative. Proof of
this came when the question of reopening negotiations was
/
raised by some members of the Assembly. Naturally, Rinuccini
wished to see a second attack launched against Dublin without
%
delay and Ormond expelled from Ireland. Somewhat illogically, 
the opposition urged as against- this the necessity of making
1.Com. Rin., i\,
2.Rinuccini to Pamphili, Mar.l, Embassy, pp.253-6.
3 .Com.Rin., ^
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a truce, if not a general agreement with brmond, so as to
prevent him from surrendering to Parliament. Despite having
reason on his side, Rinuccini was compelled to yield, for
they refused otherwise to register a vote in support of the
clergy’s proposals concerning the security of church interests]"
His only satisfaction was that he managed to modify the
conditions to be submitted to Ormond in such a way as to
make it difficult for Ormond to accept them.^
Other signs appeared of the reviving influence of the
Ormondists. Thus an attempt to impeach Preston for his part
in hindering the attack on Dublin failed completely.^Again
Rinuccini himself had to admit that although the new oath
of association was taken without demur, each interpreted it 
particular/ 
in his own way.
Having first agreed to extend the truce from February
20th until March 13th, the Assembly delegated Barron and
Fennell to convey their propositions to Dublin. Their terms
were as follows:- 4
i. Each side should retain its present quarters, 
ii. Both sides should fight against the common enemy, 
iii. Dublin should be secured against the Scots as well 
as Darliament. 
iv. There should be religious freedom and security of 
life and property for Catholics dwelling within 
Ormond’s quarters.
' -  V .  No one should be permitted-to remain in Ormond’s 
___________ quarters who refused to accept these conditions.______
1. Ibid.,
2. Ibid.,
3. Order of the General Assembly, Jan.13, C.S.P.I., p.585; 
Articles against General Preston,Feb.8, Gilbert, Vll, p.336;
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vi. The Confederacy would contribute to Ormond’s
expenses and allow him to collect his rents from 
his estates. 1
Ormond, now in the thick of negotiations with Parliament
2
and in touch also with the Scots, had no intention of treating
these conditions seriously. He had been informed already that
%
Parliament would accept his surrender and was on the point
of handing over his son and several others as hostages pending
a definitive agreement and the occupation of Dublin by
4Parliamentary troops. None the less, he pretended to discuss 
the proposals and asked such questions as: what quarters 
would they allow him; did they want an actual merging of 
forces or was each side to prosecute the war against the
common enemy on its own account? On March 5th he promised
;a 
6
5
an answer to the two deleg tes and a few days later asked
them for more information.
Time passed and the promised answer was not given. In 
the meantime, the Confederacy had consented to a further 
prolongation of the truce for a fortnight, three weeks, or
7
a month, as Ormond should decide. Eventually, Plunket, on 
the Assembly’s behalf, reminded Ormond of his promise and
1.Gilbert,VI, pp.iS2x4oc pp.185-6.
2.Propositions for reconciling the Scots in Ireland, T.C.P., 
XX,p.149; Monro was to be given a title and an estate.
3. CarK, U\j
4# TI\ov.A.> -5^ '
5.Ormond’s questions to the delegates, Gilbert, VI,pp.186-7; 
his promise to give an early answer, ibid., p.187.
6.This may be inferred fro a letter which Pennell wrote to
Ormond on March 18th, T.C.P..XX,p.301; Gilbert,VI,pp.190-1.
7.For the documents authorising further extensions of the 
truce see Gilbert, VI, pp.182-4; pp.187-8;pp.189-190.
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requested a prompt reply by his messenger.^
Ormond still withheld his answer for two more days and 
then attributed his long silence to the difficulty he had 
experienced in mastering their propositions. In any case,
o
he was obliged positively to refuse them.
This was too off-hand even for the Ormondists - if
3
Rinuccini reported accurately -, especially as definite 
intelligence was by now being received of the measures 
being taken for the capitulation of Dublin.^ It was now only 
too plain that Ormond had merely pretended to examine their 
proposals in order to gain time for his other plans to mature. 
Consequently, for a short time relations between Kilkenny 
and Dublin were peremptorily suspended. Yet no attempt was 
made by the Confederacy to anticipate the entry into Dublin 
of the first wave of Parliamentary troops. Indeed, there 
was no semblance of any strategic thinking throughout this 
critical period.
Relations between Ormond and the Confederacy might 
never have been resumed but for two unexpected events: the 
arrival in Ireland of an envoy from the Queen with instructions 
for Ormond to try again to reach a settlement; the emergence 
of difficulties in the negotiations with Parliament.
Paradoxically, the Queenb Mëgêenger found the Confederates_____
1.Mar.18, Gilbert, VI, pp.191-2.’
2.1bjld., p.192; T.C.P. ,XX, p.313.
3.Emmassy, p.264.
4.Ibid., pp.264-5.
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much more obliging than Ormond. In fact, though embarrassed 
by the refusal of Parliament to accept his terms for 
surrender and constrained thereby to hold on to Dublin long 
after he had intended to depart, Ormond never seriously 
contemplated a rapprochement with the Confederacy.
B o t h  t h e  l ^ r e n c h  g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  H e n r i e t t a  M a r i a  h a d
been taken aback by the repudiation of the treaty. Even so,
there was no inclination to berate the clergy for their
obstinacy, but rather an earnest desire to admit there had
been errors all round and to try again. For several good
reasons, Mazarin was particularly keen that the Irish should
g o  t o  C h a r l e s *  r e s c u e .  H e  w a s  a f r a i d  t h a t  t h e  I n d e p e n d e n t s
n o w  i n  c o n t r o l  o f  E n g l i s h  p o l i c y  w o u l d  e f f e c t  a n  a l l i a n c e
with Spain; he could expect no more levies out of Ireland
until the island had been pacified; and finally, he wished
to prevent Ireland from falling under the domination É of
t h a t  s u s p e c t e d  f r i e n d  o f  S p a i n ,  t h e  P a p a l  N u n c i o ,  R i n u c c i n i .
H e  s e e m s  a l s o ,  h o w l e r ,  t o  h a v e  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  n o  s e t t l e m e n t
was possible without the clergy’s co-operation. Hence his
policy was to encourage the re-opening of negotiations with 
1
O r m o n d  w h i l e  s h o w i n g  s y m p a t h y  f o r  c l e r i c a l  a i m s .  H e  s e n t  o u t
1. There can be no doubt that France urgently desired a 
settlement. Despite his set-back at the hands of Rinuccini 
Dumoulin implored Ormond to resume negotiations (Feb.13, T.
O.P., XX, p.194). On the other hand, Dumoulin was, so to 
speak, an Ôrmondist (Cf. his letter to Mazarin, Feb.7, 
Gilbert, Vll, pp.307-9).
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De La Monerie to pursue this policy early in March.^
There are extant several allegedly inspired reports 
from the Irish agents in Paris on the subject of Henrietta 
Maria^ s intentions but these cannot be taken on trust since 
they contain several obvious inaccuracies and are sometimes 
contradictory. Yet certain facts are clear; that the Queen 
and the Prince, sincerely desiring an accommodation, were 
prepared to go most of the way to meeting the Confederates* 
demands; that they did not wish to see Dublin surrendered 
to the Parliament; that they were on the point of sending
2
an agent with instructions for Ormond to recommence discussions.
At any rate, there is no question that the Confederates
gained the impression, or rather had the impression
reinforced, that the Queen and the Prince were not
unsympathetic to their aspirations. They were also encouraged
to feel friendly to the Queen’s expected messenger.
This messenger was Father George Leyburn, travelling
under the seasonal nom de guerre of "Winter Grant". Leyburn
/ % 
has left a detailed account of his mission.-^Moreover,
considered as a whole, the various* instructions and messages
with twhich he was entrusted provide a fairly clear picture
of the hopes and plans of Henrietta Maria and her circle at
this time. Leyburn, who belonged to an old Catholic family in
1. Rinuccini to Pamphili, Mar. 25, Embassy, p.266.
2. Tyrell to Rinuccini, Feb.5, Com.Rin., ll,pip5c4‘Shme to the 
same, Mar.7, ibid., p.Slo ; Oliver Fitzwilliam to the Supreme 
Council, Feb.9,Gilbert,VI, pp.179-80; same to the same, Feb.25, 
ibid., pp.181-2.
3. The Memoirs of George Leyburn, London,1722.
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Westmor;^land, had been appointed one of the Queen’s chaplains 
in 1630*Shortly after the beginning of the civil war he 
was imprisoned in the Tower and detained there until 1645.
Upon his release he joined the Queen’s household in Paris 
and soon became a trusted adviser. This was the second .time 
the Queen had sent him to Ireland on her behalf. His mission 
was important for its own sake but it also throws more light 
on the activities of royalist agents in general. The kinds 
of written instructions he received, the obstacles that 
sprang up in his path, the way he began to play an outstanding 
part in Irish affairs on his own initiative, all are strongly 
reminiscent of the experiences of Glamorgan, Antrim, ^igby, 
Fitzwilliam and Daniel O ’Neill.
His written instructions, signed in the Prince’s name 
as well as that of the Queen, were divided into two parts, 
namely, completely secret and conditionally secret. The 
latter bade him make dll possible speed to Ireland where he 
was to report to Ormond and Digby and deliver letters and 
instructions. He was to express their full realisation of 
the tragic state of the King’s position as well as their 
appsaxamsE appreciation of the dangers threatening the loyal 
Protestants in Ireland. They were desperately anxious to 
promote a better understanding between the Royalists and the 
Confederates in order that their armies could be combined 
for an attack on the common enemy in the North and thence 
for the King’s relief in England. Leyburn was to show Ormond
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a letter which they were sending to the Nuncio and the clergy 
but to stress the fact that neither this letter nor indeed 
any communication from Paris was to be regarded as anything 
more than an expression of opinion, "much less as any positive 
Direcctions". It was up to the Lord Lieutenant to heed or 
dismiss their opinions as he saw fit. Similarly, it was for 
him to decide whether to make use of Leyburn’s ov/n services. 
Significantly, in the light of the vagueness of the King’s 
commissions to Gfmend- Glamorgan, Leyburn’s subordinate 
position was explicitly laid down:
"...As likewise, you shall vary from and pursue the 
rest of your Instructions in such Manner, and only 
in such manner, as the Lord Lieutenant shall think 
fit, and in all other Things, you shall govern
yourself according to the Advice and Orders of the
said Lord Lieutenant."
If Ormond should decide to send Leyburn to Kilkenny, 
Leyburn was to inform all parties there of the Queen’s 
keenness to see them reach accord with Ormond:
"as well by Our Mediation with the King in their 
Behalf (as there shall be Cause) as otherways 
in what we may. "
He was also to impress upon them how timely immediate
assistance to the King would be, how they would gain in honour
as well as materially by it, and how serious the damage to
the Church would be if the divisions in Ireland continued
to prevent a combined assault on the common enemy. Lastly,
he was to seek out those leading Confederates who were
willing to agree to peace on moderate terms and let them know 
how much their continued efforts to further it would be________
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appreciated and what honourable rewards they might thereby 
obtain for themselves. To a few influential people he was to 
deliver personal letters signed by the Queen and the Prince 
In his secret instructions he was commanded to deliver 
14 blanks to ^rmond, six signed by the Queen, six by the 
Prince, and two signed jointly the Queen and the Prince 
jointly. These Ormond was to "fill up" in any way beneficial 
to the King’s service that he pleased, particularly with 
regard to accelerating a settlement with the Irish. Should 
it occur to him to despatch Leyburn or any other delegate 
to Kilkenny, he would be authorised to:
"fill up one or more of the said blanks signed 
by Us in the Nature of a Commission, Letters 
or Instructions, with such authority Prom Us,
and in such manner as he shall thinic fit; and
that he would accordingly, insert the Name of 
such Person or Persons, as he shall think fit 
to be joyned with you in this employment from 
us. "
Leyburn was to tell Ormond that having received news
of the King’s virtual imprisonment in Newcastle they had held
/
a conference to decide what should be done to assist him. In
particular, they had discussed the proposal put forward by
Digby in the preceding year that the Prince should go to
Ireland and had resolved that once peace had been declared
there he should indeed do so. Their long-range plan was
for the Prince to unite Ireland and lead an expedition against
England. It was important that Digby should inform them as
soon as possible what he thought of this project. If he_______
^ • Leyburn,pp.2-5.
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approved of it,he was to begin making the necessary 
preparations.
Leyburn’s final instruction was to apprise Ormond of
an operation proposed by the Earl Of Crawford on Montrose’s
behalf, the object of which was the recovery of England by
means of an invasion from the Highlands. Forgetting
apparently that the Prince was supposed to be going to
Ireland they announced that he would lead the attack in
person. The operation would only receive their approval,
however, if Ormond considered it to be . . ... nracticablepracTicaDXe
and if Ireland could be pacified in the meantime so that 
it,too, could assist the King. In any case, during the next 
few months Digby should encourage the Irish to send all 
possible aid to Antrim’s contingent in Scotland.^
Leybufn left Paris on March I6th with the intention
of going to Dublin by the quickest possible route. He was
2accompanied by the Earl of Crawford who was bound for 
Scotland. At Orleans he heard a report that Ormond was 
deeply engaged in negotiations with Parliament. This planted 
in his mind the fear that Ormond might have surrendered 
Dublin and departed for some inaccessible place before he 
could see him. He asked the Queen what he should now do.
1. Leyburn,pp.5-9.
2. Crawford was friendly with Glamorgan to whom he wrote 
that both the Queen and the Prince wished to come to Ireland 
and would like Glamorgan to persuade the clergy and the 
nobility to invite them by letter. Rinuccini to Pamphili,
Mar.2, Embassy, pp.256-7. Nothing came of this proposal 
presumably because Rinuccini withheld his approval.
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In view of the limits imposed by his initial instructions 
the advice given by the Queen gave him remarkable latitude.
If Dublin had already capitulated or were being besieged when 
he got to Ireland, he was to go straight to Kilkenny, deliver 
his several messages and assure the Confederate government, 
that, as the King’s service and devotion to the Catholic 
Church were the Queen’s dearest concern, she most passionately 
desired to hear that peace had been arranged. She was 
prepared to do anything which might conduce to their 
satisfaction.^
On April 7th or thereabouts Leyburn landed at Waterford 
only to find that the General Assembly had just been dissolved. 
Geoffrey Barron informed him that the dissolution would have 
been postponed had his mission to Ireland been made known,------
Leyburn was disappointed for whereas the Assembly possessed 
the power to make or undo a treaty, the Supreme Council had 
only the authority to, negotiate. It is to be noticed that 
Leyburn had obviouslÿ set off on his mission with the 
unfounded optimism that seemed to infect all agents to Ireland.
At Waterford, Leyburn spent several days trying to 
communicate with Digby who was supposed to be hiding nearby. 
Eventually, rather than give offence to the Council, he made 
the journey to Kilkenny. There he was introduced to the 
Council by Geoffrey Barron, with whom he had become friendly
in Paris. He explained why he had come to Ireland. The Queen
1. Henrietta Maria to Leyburn, Jermyn to the same, Mar.19, 
Leyburn, pp.10-11. Carte (111,p.302) ignored this change of 
instructions having previously stressed Leyburn’s subordination 
to Ormond.
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longed for peace, not just for the King’s sake, but for the
good of the Catholic Church and the Irish people. In the
absence of a peaceful settlement, Catholicism in Ireland was
bound to be destroyed - unless that is they were counting
upon a miraculous intervention by God. It was precisely
because leyburn was a Catholic that she had sent him as her
agent. All he required from them for the present was a safe-
conduct to enable him to pass through their lines and deliver
his instructions to Ormond. Evidently favourably impressed,
the Council readily supplied him with a pass. ^
On the following evening Leyburn met Ormond in Lublin
Castle. As he handed over his packet of letters, he observed
somewhat curiously that ijtthese would better express the
"Civilities" from the Queen and Prince than any words of
his own. For the rest, he could say nothing until he had
2
deciphered his own instructions. Even so, he did add that
Ormond’s instructions would reveal the confidence placed in
him by the Queen and the Prince, a confidence which:
/
"no reports could shake, though we had Y/eekly 
News of Treaties with the Parliament, for the 
Delivery up of those Places under his Command."
This was an intentionally ironic remark since Leyburn believed
that Ormond’s negotiations with Parliament had reached an
advanced stage
1. Leyburn, pp.11-13.
2. It is to be presumed that Leyburn’s secret instructions 
were in cipher and that he had been commanded not to decipher 
them until he had seen Ormond.
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Ormond may have resented Leyburn*s manner, judging from 
the sense and tone of his reply:
"That Confidence shall never deceive them, and 
that he, who had ventured himself, his Wife, 
and all his Children in the King’s Service, would 
make no Scruples of venturing or casting away 
one Son, when there shall be Cause (this he 
spake because his Son was then hostage with 
the Parliamwnt)l yet if there be Necessity, he 
should give up those glaces under his Command 
rather to the English Rebels than the Irish 
Rebels of which opinion he thought every good 
Engli shman was." 2
To Ormond’s palpably indignant defence of his actions, Leyburn
did not return even a conventionally disarming answer.
Their brief meeting reads, in fact, like a passage of 
arms. It may well habe been a reflection of the suspicion 
being harboured at Saint Germain that Ormond was not as 
vigorous in working for peace as he ought to be, and, for 
his part, Ormond’s suspicion that the Queen disliked him 
and tried to undermine his authority. There was too a clash 
of basic principles. English Catholics such as Leyburn, 
who was by no means a sycophant of Rome, could not understand 
how Ormond came to prefer dealing with the English Puritans 
rather than with the ïrish Catholics. Leyburn’s inability 
to grasp the reasons for Ormond’s preference did not denote 
any lack of national pride, for he was just as English in his 
outlook as Ormond himself, but an aversion for Puritanism
as unreserved as that of brmond for the Roman Church.__________
1. Leyburn’s own interpolation.
2. Leyburn, pp.13-4.
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Apart from introducing "Y/inter Grant" Henrietta Maria’s
letters to Ormond merely contained an expression of confidence
in his conduct of affairs.^ On the other hand, the Prince’s
letter revealed an urgent desire for peace in Ireland. Thus
while disclaiming first-hand knowledge of the current
situation and any intention of interfering with Ormond’s
management of it the Prince firmly stated:
"it is very evident to mee that a peace there is 
absolutley necessary to the King’s affaires in 
his other kingdomes."
As convincing proof that he meant to be taken seriously, he
promised to underwrite anÿ arrangement which Ormond should
make and to fulfil any engagements to which Ormond should
p
see fit to commit him.
Jermyn’s letter disclosed that at Holmby House the 
King was being denied the right to communicate with the
outside world. His position was well-nigh hopeless since 
the sort of terms being offered by his captors were entirely 
unacceptable. The only solution was the immediate 
pacification of Ireland.
How could Ormond turn a deaf ear to this insistent 
chorus demanding a treaty with the Irish? Without much 
difficulty, it appeared. Whether cynically or in good faith
1. T.G.P.,XXl,p.25; Carte,VI,p.503; Gilbert, VI,pp.312-4.
2. T.G.P.,XXI,p.28; Carte, VI,pp.504-5.
3. T.G.P.,XXI,p.26; "By this your Ex^nce seeth under what neede 
wee are of the Peace of Irelande it being the only thinge in 
humaine appearance capable of yeilding help or remedye to the 
present distresse or hopes of a future recoverie."
612
he decided to act as though his three correspondents were 
sincere when they deferred to his superior grasp of the 
Irish situation and continued with his preparations for the 
surrender of Dublin. He may have concluded also that the 
urgent tone informing their letters had been injected for 
dramatic effect. Y/hat is more, if Clarendon reported 
correctly, he could also weigh against the promptings from 
Paris a secret order from the King himself to hold on to 
Dublin and his other garrisons for as long as possible but 
to surrender finally to Parliament rather than to the Irish.^
After deciphering his instructions, a labour which owing 
to his lack of practice took two days, Leyburn reported back 
to Ormond. At this meeting he delivered the 14 blanks which 
Ormond was to use at his own discretion.
On returning to his lodgings Leyburn foung Digby 
waiting for him. Digby explained that he had just arrived 
in Dublin, having put off his departure for Prance in order 
to see what fruits Leyburn’s ^ mission might bring forth. On 
the following day Leyburn had intended to meet Ormond at 
dinner but beforehand he was summoned by Digby who had a 
message for him from Brmond. He was to return immediately 
to Kilkenny and persuade the Council to renew for three 
weeks more the existing truce, then about to expire.
1. Historical View, p.1069. It may be that this secret 
instruction was connected with the arrival of a messenger
from the King which Lord Lambart reported to ^rmond on 
January 7th ^T.C.P.,XX,p.86).
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Before leaving Dublin, Leyburn called at the Castle in
order to obtain a draft of the proposed renewal of the truce
with brmond*s signature and to ascertain if there were any
further orders for him. There was visible again a marked
rancour in the conversation with Crmond which follov/ed.
Leyburn pointedly inquired what he was expected to reply if
the Confederates should say that Ormond only wanted to
prolong the truce in order to give time for Parliamentarian
troops to disembark at Dublin. Ormond answered that he
would send fresh orders if the situation changed. When
Leyburn then asked what he was to do with the letters for
the Nuncio and the other distinguished persons at Kilkenny,
Ormond told him to seek Digby’s advice.^
That same night Leyburn set off for Kilkenny in the
company of Digby who advised him to deliver all his letters
to the addressees concerned. On the way a messenger overtook
them with the news that Ormond was prepared to guarantee
that no Parliamentary troops would be admitted into Dublin
/
during the period of the extended truce. However, Leyburn
was to try to obtain the extension without mentioning this
guarantee and tm insist, in any case, that it should not be
2
publicly made known. Again, Clarendon explained Ormond’s 
change of mind; he was dissatisfied with the counter-proposals
1. Leyburn, pp.14-5.
2. Dublin Castle, Apr.15, teyburn, pp.15-7; T.C.P.,XX,p.379
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1
of the Parliamentary Commissioners. This was probably true.
Ormond was bound in honour to secure a promise of favourable
treatment for loyal Catholics but could not persuade the
2
Commissioners to commit themselves.
At Kilkenny, Leyburn first discussed the situation with 
the three French agents, Dumoulin, Talion and De La Monerie 
who, in pursuance of Mazarin’s new policy, were trying to 
break off Ormond’s talks with Parliament so that a fresh attempt 
could be made to arrange a treaty with the Irish. Presumably 
with their concurrence Leyburn put Ormond’s request for a 
renewal of the truce to the Supreme Council. Vfhile demurring 
at three weeks the Council agreed that an extension of the 
truce was desirable. For their part, they would consider six I
months as an appropriate period, provided that Ormond would 
allow no Parliamentary troops into Dublin in the meantime. As 
they saw it, this was an essential precaution since, as Leyburn 
had foreseen, they suspected Ormond of only wanting a brief 
respite in order to give the first Parliamentary contingent
time to arrive. ^ _______ _______________________________________ ______
1. Historical View, p.1071.
2. Of. Further instructions for the Earl of Roscommon, Mar.16, 
"...Thirdly you are to desire that such Papists who have constanti; 
adhered to the Protestant Party may have like assurances for 
their lives, libertyes and estates as the Protestants."T.C.P.,
XX, p.281.
3. De La Monerie had arrived at Kilkenny during the second week 
in March bearing a letter from Mazarin to Rinuccini. Mazarin 
complained of the dearth of recruits for the French service. 
Embassy, pp.266-7; Com.Rin., yMf ■ ^ (*4-
4. Rumour was rife that Ormond had committed himself irrevocably 
to Parliament. FromGalway. for example, a priest, Fr. Anthony 
Gearon, informed Preston that Ormond had signed an agreement on 
February 24th in which he promised to hd(d the Confederates at 
bay by continuing negotiations with them (C.S.P.I., p.608).
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Leyburn promptly informed the Lord Lieutenant of the 
Council’s counter-proposal and announced his own intention 
of remaining at Kilkenny while awaiting further commands.^
He - for one - was not anxious apparently to find himself 
in Lublin at the same time as Roundhead soldiers.
Leyburn now delivered his letters from the Queen. That 
to the Nuncio and the clergy requested their co-operation 
in arranging terms with Ormond. It also contained the 
statement that she had given full authority for the clergy’s 
interests to be secured. On being assured verbally by Leyburn 
that Ormond was not irrevocably commited to the capitulation 
of Dublin, Rinuccini, though decidedly sceptical, consented 
to a discussion between him and the bishops.
While this discussion was taking place. Talion brought
a new proposal from Ormond, namely, to prolong the truce for
ène"^monfè.^and^%Ëereâ?^er to renew it at monthly intervals
jjjfor the period of six months stipulated by the Confederacy;
it should also be kept secret. The Supreme Council were only
prepared to consider this suggestion on condition that
2
negotiations for peace were resumed.
At this point, letters were intercepted on their way 
from Ormond to Barry, Taaffe and Clanrickard. These revealed 
that Dublin might be surrendered even before final terms had
1. Leyburn, p.16.
Rinuccini to Panzirolo, May 12, Lmbass#, pp.279-81.
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been settled with Parliament.^ Leyburn seized the opportunity 
to spur the Council into re-opening negotiations with Ormond.
He argued that Ormond must be hard pressed and begged them 
to draft fresh proposals for him to take to Lublin. The 
Council might well have retorted that Ormond had been playing 
them false and could not be trusted. Instead, they fell in 
with Leyburn’s suggestion.
The same propositions were approved as had been placed 
before Ormond by Barron and Pennell only two months previously. 
On the face of it, this seemed absurd but, as Leyburn noted, 
Ormond had not rejected them on their merits but because 
they were not signed by all the members of the Supreme 
Council. Moreover, on this occasion the Council framed a 
declaration in support of their proposals:
"In our humble and dutiful Desires to preserve 
Lublin, and other places under the Lord 
Lieutenant’s command for his Majesty; laying 
aside all Misunderstandings, though we are 
obliged to stand by our Propositions voted in 
the General Assembly, upon which we are still 
positive to insist :Nevertheless We are s±±i± 
ready to make good the Propositions for an 
Accommodation delivered to his Lordship by 
Geofrie Baron and ^erard Fennel, Esquires: 
and in Order to an honourable peace in this 
Kingdom, upon Knowledge of his Lordship’s 
Exception’s to the said Propositions, or any 
of them, we will take the same or any other Overture 
into further due Consideration, so far as 
may conducé to his Majesty’s Service and 
Preservation of the Confederate Catholicks 
and their Religion. And we do in his Majesty’s
1. Embassy, pp.287-8; ^eyburn p.17.
2. See above pp. ù?oo,
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Behalf, make tender to his Lordship’s of our 
Services and best assistance to maintain 
Lublin, and the said other Places against the 
Parliament, and other his Majesty’s Enemies.
Unto this we desire his Lordship’s Answer 
with that Expedition that the Weight and 
Exigence of Affaires do require." 1
In the event, Leyburn neither saw Ormond nor even
entered Lublin, but delivered the Confederate proposals to
Ligby. Ligby, in turn, passed them on to Ormond and shortly
brought back his answer. It was uncompromisingly harsh. To
the suggestion that both sides should attack the common
enemy while retaining their separate governments, Ormond
retorted - irrelevantly - that they should first subject
themselves to His Majesty’s commands; it would be time enough
then to consider the security of Bublin and the other
garrisons.As far as he could see, their remaining proposals
applied to a truce rather than to a peaceful settlement. Even
so, if he were to receive a specific request for a truce, he
would give it his consideration. He added that they had
insisted in a previous paper upon the necessity of obtaining
the approval of a majority in the Assembly. If their desire
for peace was genuine, they would be well advised to free
themselves from this obligation in view of the Assembly’s
2
practice of demanding impossible terms.
Ligby reported verbally that Ormond was determined 
not to treat again with the Confederacy unless the last
1. Leyburn,pp.17-9; T.C.P.,XXI, p.25.
2. Leyburn, pp.20-22; T.C.P.,XXI, p.62; Gilbert (Bellings), 
VI, p.199.
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Assembly were first recalled and made to submit to any
agreement which might be concluded. Struck by Ormond’s
seeming intransigence, Leyburn inquired why no use had been
made of the blanks and instructions sent by the Queen. Ligby
observed inconsequentially that the Lord Lieutenant was
wiser. Leyburn took this to mean that Ormond was reluctant
to undertake negotiations with the Confederacy without
a new commission from the King, his former commission having
expired with the conclusion of the first ^rmond Peace. This
did not deter him from reproaching Ormond and pointing out
2
what a sorry account he would have to gibe the Queen.
Unable to acknowledge Brmond’s negative answer as
final, Leyburn urged that he be given some counter-proposals
to take back to Kilkenny. On his own initiative Ligby drew
3up a memorandum for presentation to the Supreme Council.
The Supreme Council was in session at this time in
Clonmel.^ Vifhen Leyburn joined them there, he asked that a
sub-committee be formed to discuss Ligby’s propositions. To
/
this committee, which consisted of Muskerry, the Bishop of 
Limerick and Nicholas Plunket, he presented a draft of the 
proposals :
"i. If you do intend a submission of the whole 
Catholick Party to his Majesty’s Authority.
1. Beyburn, p.22.
2. May 16, T.C.P.,XXI, p.17.
3. Having first given the memorandum to Sxgky Leyburn, Ligby 
requested it back and asked him to memorise its contents
instead. Leyburn subsequently prepared a draft from memory.
4. Now restored to its original complement of 24. 8ec b c l o w ^ ^
618
"il. If you intend to do it by going on the 
Foot of the former Peace, the only way which 
in Possibility is left, either for your 
Security, or any Body’s else, that is to deal 
with you; the King’s Condition being such as 
it is."
iii.If for such Agreements as either are in the 
Marquis of Clanrickard’s Engagement, or such 
further Advantages as may be obtained from the 
Queen and Prince, you will take such Security 
as may be reasonably devised, and will give the 
like for what coneerneth you.
iv. If you be not enabled of yourselves to go thro : 
with a Peace, you will, when it shall be reasonably 
proposed, accord to the calling of an Assembly.
V .  If you will presently in ^ r d e r  to this, 
send to obtain a Cessation from Month to Month 
for six Months, one Month only to be known, or 
reasonable conditions for both parties; one 
whereof I suppose on my Lord’s Part will be, 
such an Enlargement of his Quarters, as may serve 
for the reasonable maintenance of his men, in 
Case there be a Breach with the Parliament; 
which Quarters shall be secured to be restored if t 
there be Cause; during which Cessation, things 
may be negociated in France, with the Queen and 
Prince; mutual Securities agreed on, and my 
Lord have time to disengage himself.
vi. If you will trust me, and one or two persons 
more that you shall think fit, with the Entrance 
into the Manage of this Business, as long as 
there shall be Reason to keep it secret.
vii. Lastly, if you will proceed on these 
Grounds speaking generally; then I will do my 
best to bring all This to pass, and have Reason 
to be Confident I shall perform it." 1
Plunket objected that nothing could be done on this
basis since the Assembly had voted against the ’former peace’
and the Nuncio had excommunicated all its adherents. Like
all the Royal ambassadors Leyburn was not easily downcast.
1. Leyburn, pp.23-4.
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The decision of one Assembly could be reversed by another.
As for the Nuncio, he had denounced the treaty not because 
it was intinsically bad but because it did not do enough 
for the Church. Once he could be persuaded to see that the 
interests of the Church were not to be neglected, he would 
lift the sentence of excommunication.
The commissioners appointed from time to time by the
Confederacy to deal with the Royalist representatives were
dogged if nothing else. With Parliamentary foot rumoured to
be already in Dublin, with Ormond himself virtually
inaccessible, they were still prepared to consider respectfully
a set of proposals put forward by a self-appointed arbitrator
on behalf of a discredited and hunted minister. But what
o/
words could describe the monumental patience and frebearance 
of the Supreme Council? For, having examined the report of 
their sub-committee, they told Leyburn that although it was 
unusual "to treat with a Person that showed no Kind of 
Commission or Authority", they had so much confidence in 
his personal ability and were so anxious for peace that they 
had composed a reply to his propositions.
They were unable to give him the draft at once but 
if he would accompany the Bishop of Clogher to Kilkenny it 
would there be delivered to him.^In fact, they had sent the 
draft to Rinuccini for his approval.
1. Leyburn, pp.24-5
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The Council then decided to summon all its absent
members in order that a pesitive resolution for or against
a truce might be adopted. Rinuccini and the bishops were
invited to attend at the same time.^
Rinuccini had already made clear his opposition to a 
2
truce. Unless Ormond guaranteed the same terms for the
Church as the Queen, there was no point in dealing with him.
Indeed, the most sensible plan would be to seize Dublin from
him and hold it for the King. One of the Council’s arguments
in favour of a truce was their military weakness. His
urge them/
unconvincing counter to this was to put an end to their
internal hackb-itxng, the basis cause of their weakness, and
to rely on the supplies which Massari was bringing back from
3
Rome.
As he journeyed towards Kilkenny, Leyburn must have
felt much less buoyanÿ than usual for apart from Rinuccini’s
declared opposition to the truce he was apprehensive of
meeting him on personal grounds. Once before they had clashed
/
and Rinuccini had gone so far as to start a process against 
him.^ Moreover, had he but known it, Rinuccini had been 
forewarned against him by Scarampi, who had recently succeeded 
at last in sailing away from his thankless tour of duty in
1. Com.Rin., 11, p(> Gog.-3
2. Cf. ’’I have no greater desire than to see an end put at
to these negotiations since they keep the
whole island in suspense; and I am convinced that the truces
which have been made from time to time, have been the ruin of
the whole affair. ’’ Rinuccini to the Nuncio in Spain, Apr. 26, 
Embassy, pp.274-5.
3. Com.Rin.,11,
4. See above pp.453-4.
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Ireland. From Paris Scarampi reported on March 30th that 
"Winter Grant" had been sent to Ireland in order to compel 
the Irish to obey Ormond. Ormond’s negotiations with the 
Irish were designed to mask-his transactions with Parliament. 
Scarampi was manifestly misinformed in view of Ormond’s utter 
disinterest in reopening negotiations with the Confederacy. 
Nevertheless, Rinuccini almost certainly accepted his report 
as nothing less than the truth.^
At Kilkenny, the Bishop of Clogher saw the Nuncio 
before Leyburn and gained the impression that he would be 
uncooperative. Even so, Rinuccini greeted Leyburn himself 
with the surprising observation that it was not a treaty to 
which he objected but a truce, for the series of cessations 
that had been arranged with Ormond had been "the Reasons 
why the Irish Affairs had no better progress". At this very 
moment, for example, Ormond only desired a respite in order 
to give time for the Parliamentarians to relieve him.
In Leyburn’s opinion a truce was the necessary
preliminary to peace since ^ t would take time, first, to
transmit any religious conditions agreed upon to Henrietta
Maria for her approval, and,secondly, to convene a General
Assembly go legalise the final settlement. As for thw landing
1. Embassy, pp.279-81; ibid., pp.288-9; ibid.,pp.290-1. 
Scarampi enclosed some propositions from the Queen which had 
also been sent to "Y/inter Grant". In brief, these would have 
empowered the Queen and the Prince of Y/ales to nominate the 
members of the Supreme Council and to present to vacant sees 
during the King’s captivity. Either Leyburn did not receive 
them or refrained from producing theip, since Scarampi was 
the only person who ever referred to them. In any event,
Rinuccini flatly disapproved of them.
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of Parliamentary troops, this could be prohibited in the terms 
of the truce. And once Ormond had given his wotd he could be 
trusted "infallibly" to keep it.
Seeing that Leyburn himself had been shocked by Ormond’s 
determination to surrender to Parliament, these were brave 
words. And, indeed, Rinuccini instantly replied that Ormond 
was deceitful. As a result of further conversation Leyburn 
inferred that Rinuccini was not "my Lord Lieutenant’s friend". 
Before they parted, leyburn gave vent to his annoyance. He 
warned Rinuccini not to obstruct the Supreme Council’s attempt 
to secure peace in case disaster came of it for which he would 
have to bear the blame. At this, Rinuccini promised to give 
him an answer on the foMowing day; in the meantime, he would 
write to the Council.
At the second meeting, Rinuccini announced that the 
Council had consented at his suggestion to defer their 
decision for a fortnight. To Leyburn’s vexation he justified 
this deferment on the grounds^ that it was preferable for a 
decision to be arrived at jointly by the Council and 
Congregation and it would take time to assemble all the 
clerical representatives. He further suggested that Leyburn 
should explain the reason for the delay to Ormond. Leyburn 
pointed out that even a fortnight’s deferment might well be 
fatal, for he knew on good authority that Parliamentary ships 
were only waiting for a favourable wind before putting into
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Dublin harbour. Once troops had been landed, it would be too 
late.^
Looking back over the years, Leyburn blamed Rinuccini 
for the failure of his mission. In his opinion, the Nuncio 
may have been sincere in wishing to consult with the clergy 
but his main object was tp prevent agreement between the 
Council and Ormond. Indeed, he was prepared to "run any Hazard
p
rather than accord with my Lord of Ormond".
Although trying to be just Leyburn condemned the Nuncio 
more than he deserved. All his awareness of being the 
spokesman of the Old Irish and his past defence of church 
rights compelled Rinuccini to consult clerical opinion. After 
all, if he allowed the Council to take a decisive step towards 
agreement with Ormond without reference to the clergy, it 
would be tantamount to admitting that the clergy had exceeded 
their jurisdiction in nullifying the Ormond Peace. The fact 
that the Council raised no protest against the deferment is 
surely significant. Presumably its members also recognised 
the need for national concord^ Lastly,when the clergy eventually 
met at Clonmel to examine Leyburn's proposals, they quicklÿ: 
decided to leave a decision to the Council. Perhaps they 
believed it safe to do so since Ormond had committed himself 
too far to Parliament to be able to retract, but notwithstanding
1. Leyburn, pp.26-7.
2. Leyburn was struck by the bitterness of Rinuccini’s dislike 
for Ormond "against whose person, I found in the Nuncio, Great
Animosity". Ibid., p.28.
3. Embassy, p.295.
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it is difficult to accuse them of being obstructive.
But even if the clergy had been wilfully hostile, it 
is questionable whether Rinuccini’s insistence upon deferring 
an answer made the slightest difference to the outcome. It 
requires two parties to sign an agreement and all the evidence 
indicates that even if the Confederates had for once papered 
over their disunity Ormond was no longer prepared to deal 
with them. Leyburn himself had felt constrained to remind him 
of the Queen’s instruction to surrender to the Irish rather 
than to Parliament.
Nor did Leyburn sufficiently appreciate that he had no 
assets except personal energy and resourcefulness. Ormond had 
shown by the frigid reception he had accorded him that he 
would not tolerate the meddling of an agent representing 
Saint Germain. Thus his only support came from Ligby who was 
now regarded on all sides as an unprincipled adventurer.
By express messenger Leyburn apprised Ligby of the 
unexpected delay. Passing through one of his more responsible 
moods, Ligby returned a sober and well-reasoned reply.
Leyburn’s endeavours at Kilkenny were his principal concern. 
If only the Confederates would be sensible, he was sure he 
could do much good. He approved of the forthcoming meeting 
of Congregation and only regretted that a general assembly 
was not to be convened at the same time. Then followed perhaps
1. Cf. Qrmond to Parliament, Apr.22, T.C.P.,XV11, p.121.
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the wisest comment yet made by a royalist leader on the
subject of negotiations with the Confederacy;
"...for I can never hope to extract any 
Usefulness out of this Kingdom, but by an 
unanimous and entire consent of the 
Catholick Party, to whatever Settlement 
shall be made."
He then referred to an important new proposal which Owen Roe
1
O ’Neill had put forward.
Owen Roe saw only too clearly that the Parliamentarians
would treat the occupation of Dublin as the first step towards
the conquest of Ireland. He decided therefore to make a 
conciliatory approach to Brmond through his nephew, Daniel.
If Ormond would be willing to observe a truce of two months, 
he in his turn would honour a truce of one year and meanv/hile
p
work for a permanent settlement. Although favourable to the 
proposal - no doubt out of his high regard for O ’Neill’s 
integrity as against that of the politicians in Kilkenny - 
Ormond had to insist upon the initial truce of two months 
being arranged within 14 days. ^
Ormond’s desire to obtain agreement to a short truce 
had been explained unti|now, as Rinuccini rightly guessed, 
by the need to hold the Confederates at arm’s length while
he arranged for the surrender of Dublin to Parliament. On this
occasion, however, he was only concerned to avoid a situation 
in which he would be vulnerable to a legitimate Confederate
1. Leyburn, pp.28-9.
2. Historical View, p.1071.
3. Ibid.; Gilbert (Bellings),V11,p.19.
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attack and yet unable to count on relief from England. The 
Parliamentary troops were likely to arrive in about 14 days 
and he dar^not risk putting off their disembarkation in case 
they should suspect treachery and turn back. In other words, 
the Confederates had to commit themselves irrevocably to a 
truce within the fortnight.
Presumably appreciating Ormond’s problem, Owen Roe 
hastily despatched Daniel to Kilkenny with instructions to 
recommend to the Council that pending a definitive settlement 
"my Lord Lieutenant should have governed by Assistance of 
the Confederate Council in their Quarters, until the Peace had 
been perfect".^He also asked the Bishop of Clogher to second 
the proposal. Unfortunately, Daniel O ’Neill v/as arrested when 
he got to Kilkenny before he could present Owen Roe’s 
proposals.
According to both Clarendon and bellings Daniel was 
imprisoned so that the Council could avoid having to take note
o
of what Owen Roe had to suggest. This may well have been their
motive, but it is important to establish that it was not their
intention to make sure of wrecking any plan aimed at
reconciliation with Ormond, as one modern historian has 
2
assumed. This is evidenced by the fact that Leyburn was 
allowed to visit Daniel and, at his request, to put the 
proposals to the Council. They then refrained from adopting
1. Leyburn, p.30.
2. D.P.Cregan, "Daniel O ’Neill, a Royalist Agent in Ireland, 
1644-50", in I.H.S., ii, no.8, pp.408-9.
them on the reasonable plea of owing prior attention to the
study of the proposals brought by Leyburn himself.^
In higby's view, 0 ’heill*s proposal scarcely merited
consideration unless the Ormond Peace was first given general 
2
recognition. Then and then only would it be permissible for 
the Confederates to govern in their ov/n quarters pending 
consent to the conditional religious concessions which had 
been requested.
Pigby had obviously decided that the Parliamentary 
troops would have landed in Dublin before the Confederates 
made their decision known, for he referred to his hopes of 
suborning a number of them. There would be a grave risk 
involved, however, and he must have some prepared bolt hole 
in case of emergency. The Confederates should be persuaded to
3
promise him sanctuary.
e
The Congregation destined for Limerick forgathered
instead at Clonmel at a somewhat later date than Rinuccini
had agreed to. Leyburn was summoned at once and told that
/
they rejected peace was dead. It could never be resuscitated 
since the clergy and "People of the whole Nation" had condemned 
it once for all.^ Leyburn could only give the careworn reply
that Ormond would negotiate on no other basis but recognition
and that they had nothing to fear for their religion because
1. Leyburn, p.50; Gilbert (Sellings),V11, pp.19-20.
2. Only adherence to the peace could"restore them to the Quality 
of such Subject as the King’s Lord Lieutenant can joyn with".
5. Digby to ^eyburn, Leixlip, June 5, Leyburn, pp.28-9.
4. It was so little concerned with things spiritual that God’s 
name was not once invoked.
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church interests would be satisfied by other means. ^
At this point, Digby reported the ominous news that
Parliamentary Commissioners had landed at Dublin with 600
horse and 800 or 900 foot and were demanding the immediate
surrender of the city. Unless he received a favourable reply
to his proposals within five days there would be no point in
replying at all-r "besides, this place will grow too hot for
me". Once more he pleaded for a safe-conduct to enable him
to discuss the situation with the Supreme Council. And again
he referred to his far-fetched scheme of suborning the "better
Part of the Parliament Forces". If the Confederates v/ere
reasonably disposed, he desired Leyburn to let him know whether
2
their armies were in a fit state to march suddenly.
Leyburn apprised the Council of Digby’s letter and 
subjected its members to a lengthy harangue. Swift and positive 
action was called for since already two days of the five days’ 
grace given them had sped by. Although he had been in Ireland 
for two months and had brought them assurances from the Queen 
and the Prince that they need not fear for the future of 
Ireland or their religion, he had yet to see any positive 
advantage accruing to the Crown from their protestations of 
loyalty. At this lamentably late stage the only way of 
saving the King would be to submit to the authority of the 
Lord Lieutenant. There was, unhappily, so little evidence
1. Leyburn, p.50.
2. June 8, ibid., pp.50-51.
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of a sincere desire to do so that he was determined to leave
■)
Ireland as soon as possible and report failure to the Queen.
The Council waK evidently jolted into action by such
plain speaking for within two hours they had prepared their
answer. It was their firm intention to submit the whole of
Catholic Ireland to the King’s authority. As soon as they
had ascertained the exact details of the conditions that were
to be annexed to the Ormond Peace, they would convene a 
a/
Generl Assembly for the purpose of obtaining its approval of
a definitive agreement. They were willing to subscribe to a
system of mutual security pending the passing of appropriate
legislation in a national parliament, and to sign a truce of
two months. Furthermore, if there were concrete evidence of
a breach between Ormond and Parliament, they would discuss
the possibility of his extending the area under his control in
order to enable him to feed his troops.They would negotiate
with a view to the definitive agreement with the King, trusting
2
Leyburn to manage the business with the Queen and the Prince. 
With their answer they included a draft of the sort of
terms for a truce they had in mind. This would have obliged
Ormond to prohibit the further entry into his garrisons of
Parliamentary troops and to withhold assistance from the
Scottish and Parliamentary troops at present in Ireland. Leyburn
hastily made his way to Ballyconnon, some twenty miles from
1. Leyburn, pp.35-4.
2. Ibid., p.54.
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Dublin, and from there, evidently filled with a sense of urgency
he sent the Confederates' counter-proposals and draft for a
cessation to Digby.^
Hardly had his messenger departed when he received a
letter from V/alsingham, Digby’s secretary, containing the
warning that Ormond intended to surrender irrevocably to
Parliament if he had not heard from the Confederates within a
2
few days - and favourably at that! This letter was quickly
followed by another, which, after breaking the news of the
King’s removal to Holmby House, concluded:
"For God’s Bake make haste to come or write to 
us your Irish Decrees; now they may make 
themselves and us happy if they will but comply 
a little." 5
From Digby himself a third letter came two days later.
Because Ormond had been in desperate need of moral 
support, he had returned surreptitiously to Dublin Castle and 
there he now was.The Confederates’ answers to his proposals 
were so much more reasonable than any they had made previously 
that he would risk his life to secure a suspension of the 
surrender to Parliament in order to give further negotiations 
time to bear fruit. By the time he had received a safe-conduct 
from the Confederates he was confident he would have settled 
the business of the truce. It would be a good plan if the 
Confederate forces were to threaten Trim, but they must not be
1. Leyburn, p.55.
2. Leixlip,June 12, ibid.,pp.55-6.
5. Ibid., p.56.
631
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These letters cheered leyburn. The King's affairs had 
taken a turn for the better. The Army would be more benevolent 
than the Presbyterian party with which '^rmond had been 
conducting negotiations. Now surely Ormond would be loath to 
lay down his office in the absence of fresh instructions from 
the King. Thus hopeful, Leyburn wrote to the Council, saying 
that hÈs mission prospered, requesting a pass for Digby and 
suggesting that Preston’s army be stood to for emergency 
action.
Two Says^îSÇej^^greed to do as he asked. At about the
same time V/alsingham wrote urgently for Digby’è safe-conduct.
#
Both Confederate armies should be ordered to march; O ’Neill’s
to Trim, Preston’s to Naas and Maynooth. But they should draw
2
no nearer to Dublin.
Immediately Leyburn replied that Preston was ready to
march as directed. Digby welcomed the news but pointed out
that O ’Neill’s co-operation ,was also urgently required. Somewhat
dramatically but nevertheless feelingly Digby emphasised the
crucial nature of the present situation:
"Let no private Animosities, or particular 
interest or Design, divert 0 ’Neale from the 
Work, nay, nor delay him; for if this Moment 
of Time be lost it will be for ever irremediable: 
Therefore, do you, and let the Council lay all 
Strength to perswade him to it; if he refuse, 
the Ruin and Desolation of Ireland, and his 
Nation will be his Guilt:This is the Place where
1 .  J u n e  1 7 ,  L e y b u r n ,  p . 5 7 .
2 .  I b i d . ,  p . 5 8 .
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"the Parliament will lay the Ground of the 
War, and it will prove an irresistible 
Torrent, to drown the Kingdom without 
Remedy, unless they be weeded out now 
presently. If these Garrisons were taken in, 
and the L^ish Armies lodged in these 
Quarters, the Parliament would soon be 
starved, and reduced to Nothing that Way, 
if neither the Peace took, nor Dublin were 
taken. These Parliament Ambassadors have 
already sent into Denmark for 40000 Barrels 
of Rye, and indeed to block the Érish 
Harbours out of Hand, to prevent all Supply 
of Ammunition from them. They may here 
perceive how great a Storm hangs over them; 
yet, if they will but engage their two 
Armies together in the Work, and resolve 
secondly, and heartily to embracethe 
^^eans, with its Appendances ; and if they will 
send a full, and unquestionable Pass 
speedily, all will yet do well; that 
otherwise, any of that trifling will make 
fall to Nothing. Be not startled at anything 
you shall hear of the Lord Lieutenant, who 
hath given them the Power of the Army, and 
keeps the Sword and ^astle for five weeks; 
in which Time and less, all must be done 
that will be, with and by the Irish. I rest.
Yours,&c. The inclosd is for General Preston; 
let me hear what you have done, and hope from 
0 ’Neale." 1
On the next day Digby’s secretary joined Leyburn, Digby 
having decided he must keep in the closest touch with
Walsingham brought a letter /of credit "written in Lemons, not
to be read until it was warm." His oral report was so long
that Leyburn thought it advisable to record it in writing. It
is fortunate that he did so, because it would be impossible
otherwise to ascertain exactly what had been happening in
Dublin.
The Parliamentary Commissioners had arrived in Dublin on
1. Leixlip, June 20, Leyburn, pp.59-40. Though written in 
Walsingham’s hand, this letter was obviously dictated by Digby
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June 7th, that is to say before the Confederates had replied
so favourably to Digby’s proposals.They quickly agreed to
even those conditions which Ormond had expected to provide him
with a pretext for delaying the surrender of the city. They
also brought with them sufficient troops to man most of the
city's defences.Moreover, they were able to supply the whole
garrison while ^rmond was not. In these circumstances,
Ormond informed Digby that he had no choice but to fulfil
his engagement.
Finding letters of no avail to dissuade him from this
step, Digby had stolen into the Castle by night, in so doing
arousing a great hue and cry. he had then prevailed upon
Ormond to avert the surrender by pretending to doubt the
validity of the Commissioners* credentials and by expressing
with/
dissatisfaction the assurances given for his own and his
dependents' safety. Unless they would leave the Castle in his
possession for five weeks, he declared he would fight to
defend it. To this condition the Commissioners reluctantly
/
agreed but they insisted suecessfully upon the instant 
surrender of the militia. The official articles of surrender 
were signed by both parties on June 19th, Ormond being 
committed by them to evacuate the Castle on July 28th.
When Digby showed him the Confederates' proposals for a 
truce he was impressed by their conciliatory tone but wary of 
becoming involved in another round of negotiations. Before he 
could even consider extricating himself from his commitment to
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Parliament, certain precautions must first be taken:
• I
i. The Parliamentary troops now in Dublin should be cut 
off from supplies and driven into a position where they 
must ask Ormond to remain. This would provide a suitable 
period of time for negotiating with the Irish, 
ii. Talion must also be given time to return from Prance 
with money and supplies which he was expecting. These 
would enable him to rebuild his own army and to overcome 
the Parliamentarians, most of whom had formerly served 
under him.
iii. They must suborn some of the Parliamentary commanders,
iv. The Confederates must seize all the outlying 
garrisons and "distress the city',' so that the Parliamentary 
Commissioners would be compelled to request a truce.
When they did so, the Confederates must insist upon 
regarding Ormond as the official authority.
Walsingham told Leyburn he was to inform the Council of
the menacing plans being laid by Parliament. Their army
intended to make its main effort in Leinster under cover of
diversions in Ulster, Munster and Connaught. Arms had been
ordered from Denmark anS^E5@\50G^had been set aside for the
Irish campaign. All the harbours in Ireland were to be blocked.
made to /
The Confederates must be realise that this was their last
chance. Soon Ormond would quit Ireland and they would lie at
the mercy of the all-powerful Parliament.
/
Y/alsingham then explained what the Confederates were 
expected to do. They must wait for word from Ormond and then 
appear in strength before Dublin ready to overpower the 
Parliamentary garrison. They must also immediately agree to a 
truce whenever Ormond asked them to do so.
On Digby's behalf Walsingham then descended to details.
When the Confederate armies had moved into position, additions |
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to the Ormond Peace would he discussed. Meanwhile, they must 
consent to the Peace in principle and acknowledge Ormond's 
authority as Lord Lieutenant. O'Neill must he pressed into 
service if at all possible. In any case, Preston,with about 
10,000 foot and 2,000 horse, must place himself at the 
disposal of Ormond and Digby. In all this there was need for 
absolute secrecy. ^
Leyburn was rather disappointed by Walsingham's involved
report. Only three days previously he had asked the Council
for Digby's safe-conduct on the strength of Digby's assurance
that a truce would be soon arranged. Now Digby seemed uncertain
Leyburn also wondered how he could manage the Council along
the lines proposed without a definite commission.
When Leyburn returned to Kilkenny on June 25th, the
Council were already re-installed there. Contrary to Leyburn's
dismal expectations they were ready to fall in with all
Digby's wishes except one - they saw no need for O'Neill's
services. Leyburn insisted that O'Neill's co-operation was
/
essential in view of the Parliamentary strength, especially in 
cavalry. But he insisted to no avail "so much did thèir hatred, 
for to Nothing else can I ascribe it, to the old Irish, over- 
ballance their reason." ^
As for the Nuncio, whether or not he preferred to see 
Parliamentary troops in royalist garrisons rather than endure
1. Walsingham's report, Leyburn, pp.41-6.
2. Ibid., p.47.
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continued presence of Ormond, he also opposed the use of
O'Neill. O'Neill himself was keen enough and desisted from 
an attack on Sligo in expectation of being called. Indeed,
kg,
certain gentlemen from Connaught told Leyburn that ii/would 
write personally to O'Neill, O'Neill would march on receipt 
of his letter. Leyburn decided not to follow their advice 
for fear of offending the Council.^
Meanwhile, as Preston was mustering his forces^ Ligby 
enjoined him through Leyburn to lose no time in marching 
towards Lublin. ^ Apparently communications tk between Digby 
and Leyburn then broke down,for almost a fortnight later 
Digby wanted to know urgently why there was no news. "The 
Distractions in England are grown to so great a Perfection, 
that it is believed really the King is in London, and the 
Parliament dissolving." They must hasten the advance on 
Dublin and send his safe-conduct at once.^
By the time Digby had heard from Leyburn, he was 
already protesting that a splendid opportunity had been 
missed. The Parliamentary troops in Dublin had mutinied. If 
only the Irish had been quartered within eight miles of the 
city, as they should have been, they could have occupied it.'^
1. Leyburn, pp.47-8.
2. The original correspondence between Leyburn and Preston at 
this time is preserved in Trinity College,Dublin. Cf. Leyburn
to Preston, T.C.D., E.3.11,f.169; Breston to -^eyburn,ibid.,f.170; 
see also Leyburn, p.48; Preston's instructions, T.C.D.,E.3.11.,
3. Walsingham to Preston, Leyburn,p.49. f.l71.
4. July 3,ibid., p.49.
5. July 4,ibid., pp.49-50.
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Ligby repeated his complaint in a letter to Preston. 
But for the divisions among the Irish surely his army would 
have advanced near to Dublin by this time. Had the army 
done so, they would have captured most of the garrison 
troops or "have forced the Commissioners to have put back 
all theirs, into the hands of the Marquis of Ormond". Even 
now, it might not be too late if the troops were on the 
march within a week. He then warned them that they would 
rue continued inaction:
"... when the Affairs of England shall have 
resettled my Lord Lieutenant here, without 
your Hejp,which is confidently believed 
before the time prefixed for his quitting 
will be; then your Armies will be ready to 
march and make War upon him,however that you 
see Things now omitted here, that might 
enable us to preserve Ireland from Calamities 
that threaten it. The Pressures for your 
Advance are renewdd now in the only Minute 
of Time for you to Advantage your selves, 
and to merit from the King at one time."
With this letter of mixed threat and cajolery Digby
enclosed a draft which Preston was to sign and send to Ormond.
/
Its object was to account for the projected march beyond "the 
Limits of the Confederate Catholick Quarters". Preston was 
to assert that he understood that '^rmond was no longer in 
command, the "Parliamentary Rebels" having seized unlawful 
possession of Dublin. He was also to express regret at the 
unfortunate misunderstandings that had arisen since the 
proclamation of the peace and to vow te adherence to any 
treaty or truce which should be arranged in the King's
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interests. All he required in return was an assurance that 
Ormond still exercised authority in the King's name. Digby 
provided the Council with a copy of his draft for Preston 
in order that it might be printed and circulated.^
Preston's army now marched towards Dublin. At Naas 
they encountered a powerful force of Parliamentarians. There was
some skirmishing but no decisive action. Leyburn insinuated
2
that Preston allowed himself to be needlessly intimidated.
Then came an urgent m e s s a g e  from Digby. So near was
the time when Ormond must surrender his sword that it might
be necessary to use force to achieve their ends. He and Ormond
would only resort to force, however, on condition that the
Confederates solemnly agreed to a truce of three or four
months, during which period authority as well as conditions
for a treaty might be obtained from the King. In England, he
added, things were going well.-^
Meanwhile, the Council had received a report that
Ormond had admitted several companies of foot into the Castle.
/
In consequence, when Leyburn asked for the assurances 
requested by Digby, they naturally accused ^rmond of deceiving 
them, hastening to add that they did not impute deceit to 
Leyburn himself.Shortly afterwards the Bishop of Limerick 
sent their considered reply to his various requests.^ Preston's
1 .  W a l s i n g h a m  t o  P r e s t o n , J u l . 1 5 , £ e y b u r n , p p . 4 9 - 5 3 .
2 .  I b i d . ,  p . 5 3 .
3 .  J u l . 1 5 ,  i b i d . , p . 5 4 .
4 .  L e y b u r n  l o s t  t h e  B i s h o p ' s  l e t t e r  b u t  r e t a i n e d  a  c o p y  o f  
t h e  d i g e s t  o f  i t  w h i c h  h e  h a d  s e n t  t o  W a l s i n g h a m .
b39
army, which was strong enough to dispense with O'Neill's 
support, had duly been ordered to march. Unfortunately, two 
events had occurred since they had first received the 
propositions which made it inadvisable to take any other 
action for the time being. The first was Ormond's surrender of 
the militia - of which they had certain knowledge - and the 
entry of enemy troops into the Castle. The second was the 
change in the King's condition. Obviously fresh instructions 
would be sent to Ormond which they must wait to hear.
Evidently the Council were convinced of Ormond's 
double-dealing. Nonetheless, with tongue in cheek, they 
claimed finallji thaÿ they had answered the propositions fully 
and favourably and that they would be prepared to play their 
part when:
"my Lord was reinvested with his former power, 
to which End he should command the Assistance 
of the Army when he pleased."
Their distrust was not confined to Ormond. Poor Digby
was also suspect. Thus they found a subtle pretext for
/
refusing to issue his safe-conduct. They were so appreciative 
of his usefulness near Brmond that they did not want to 
give him any encouragement to leave before everything had 
been settled. However, if through some mishap he was forced 
to escape, they would shelter him.^
The Council then took precautions against Ormond's 
expected treachery. Preston was ordered to destroy “the enemy's
1. Leyburn to V/alsingham, Jul.18,pp.55-7.
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harvest^and warned against Digby or any like him that went
p
"double wayes". At the same time he must "cozen" the cozener.
Leyburn conceded the reasonableness of the Council's
position. Even so, he must have been distressed. A few days
later Digby reported the imminence of a settlement in England
as /
"but so much to the King's Advantage was hoped". The 
Parliamentary Commissioners had discovered the details of the 
transactions between them. It was urgent that Leyburn should 
come to see him at Leixlip; it would be quite safe.^
At Leixlip, on the following day, July 24th, Digby gave 
Leyburn exact news. The Parliamentary Commissioners knew all 
about their plans, had arrested Barry and Taaffe and demanded 
entry to the Castle as security from ^rmond. Ormond had 
promised to surrender possession on July 28th, but Digby 
believed it would still be possible to arrange something even 
after Ormond had departed. Leyburn was far from hopeful but 
agreed to go on negotiating with the Confederates.
Leyburn joined Preston - who was very depressed by 
Ormond's surrender - and told him he still thought it possible 
"to introduce the King's authority amongst them on conditions 
to their liking". Then, accompanied by De La Monerie, he went 
to keep a rendezvous with Digby and Taaffe. Digby asked him
to rejoin Preston and to-procure a meeting with Nicholas
1. Jul.“'13, T.O.P.,XXI, p.187.
2. N.d., July, ibid.
3. LeybuBHT Jul.19, Leyburn, pp.57-8.
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Plunket and the Bishop of Perns, who had been appointed 
commissioners to the army, so that "a new Foundation of our 
Business" might be laid. Though taken aback when Leyburn 
approached them, Plunket and Perns promised to see Digby on 
the following day
The meeting did not take place, however, because 
news was received that Michael Jones was marching against 
Preston. Upon this, Digby returned to Leixlip and Taaffe and 
Leyburn hurried to Kilkenny. Leyburn apparently tried tm 
dissuade Preston from confronting Jones. "But my Lord of 
Ormond's Action had rendred Preston and the rest so distrustful, 
as they believed everything the less, because it came from 
any they conceived to have been of the P a r t y . A n d  so, Preston 
prepared for what was to be a shattering defeat.
3
Ormond had sailed for England on July 28th, handsomely 
recompensed for his duplicity according to his critics. They 
are less than fair. It has been noticed before that Ormond 
always tried to protect his own material interests, but there 
is no positive evidence that he placed them before those of 
the King on this or any other occasion. The thought of deserting 
the King never entered his head and he continued to work on 
his behalf during his short time in England. His critics, past 
and present, are misled by the fact that he went on dealing
1. Leyburn, p.59.
2. Ibid., p.60.
3. He arrived at Bristol on August 2nd (T.O.P.,XXI, p.236).
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with the Confederates long after he was irrevocably committed 
to the Parliamentarians. At the meanest level this conduct 
could be defended on grounds of realrpol i tik . But, in any case, 
he did not want to correspond with the Confederacy and made 
his position pretty clear. It was not he but Digby and Leyburn 
who fed the Supreme Council with hopes of a last-minute 
agreement.Moreover, rightly or wrongly, he had no faith in the 
word of the Confederates and nothing they said or did during 
this period was calculated to change his mind.
To defend Ormond’s essential integrity is not to 
condone his policy. That the Confederates were untrustworthy 
was no justification for surrendering to Parliament on such 
unfavourable terms. The King had gained nothing thereby. The 
loyal Catholics whom he had sought to protect from reprisals 
were soon to feel the whip. As for the army which he and 
Digby were to take to Prance, it never materialised.
His departure from Ireland marked the end of the King’s 
official government in Ireland. It also brought the Confederacy 
and Parliament face to face.
Chapter XV
The Second Ormond Peace,August,1647 - January.164-9.
It might have been expected that Ormond's 
departure from Ireland would unite the Confederates, for 
no longer cog.ld one party argue that it was their duty to 
co-operate with the King's representative in Ireland.
Even when presenting a united front. Catholic Ireland 
vfould be hard pressed to prevent itself from being 
subjugated by the relentless Puritans. Yet, so bitter was 
the anirnostty between the Ormondists and the Nuncioists 
that they could not bring themselves to bury their 
differences.
By this time the Ormondists v/ere past envisaging
independence for Ireland, let alone fighting for it. Under
no circumstances would they take any action which might
/
result in the Ulster Irish exercising national authority, 
for fear of being swamped by their greater numbers. They 
also realised that the adoption of a national policy would 
involve accepting the leadership of Rinuccini, at least for 
the immediate future, and this, too, was something they 
could not tolerate. Consequently, for the time being, the 
majority of them had no policy except that of drift. A few.
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however, never ceased to think in terms of collaborating 
with the Royalists.
Thus, the Nuncio had soon to recognise the appalling
truth that Ormond's exit from Ireland which he had
struggled so hard to achieve was not after all the key
to national unity. The Irish Catholics did not now see
themselves pitted against hertics in a holy war^as, in the
1
first flush of exultation^he hoped they would. On the 
contrary, he found it progressively more difficult^to
hold together the party of his own creation. During the 
next year his authority was weakenôd, his censures ceased 
to intimidate, until at last he found himself all but 
isolated in an unfriendly country. It was by no means his 
fault. The Confederacy, which had been based on a shaky 
coalition of interests even at its foundation, had not the 
strength to survive a crucial test.
Ominous signs .were visible at once. On August 8th at 
Dongan's Hill, Preston allowed himself to be outmanoeuvred 
and badly mauled by the Parliamentary commander, Michael 
Jones. Inchiquin rampaged at will through Munster. There 
was no attempt to rally forces for a counter-attack, and 
no exuuse for imaction except lack of morale. Though money 
and equipment were short, the situation was in reality far
1. Embassy, p.302; see also ibid.,p.311.
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from desperate. O ’Neill’s army was intact and the 
Parliamentarians had yet to build up to a strength which 
would justify a large-scale offensive operation. In any 
case a rift between Parliament and the Scots was by no means 
unlikely. In spite of these facts, it was decided to rely 
upon external aid and to place the kingdom under some 
foreign protector.
In order to choose a suitable protector writs were 
issued for the election of members to attend a General 
Assembly, the eighth to date. The opening of the session^ 
happened to coincide with the news that the main Confederate 
army under General Taaifè had suffered a crushing defeat 
at the hands of Inchiquin. The effect of this was to 
strengthen rather than weaken the position of those who 
wished to resume relations with the Crown. For the time 
being, however, they had no need to disclose their intention 
because it seemed certain that conditions would work in
i
2
their favour.
/
To begin with, only nine out of 73 delegates from Ulster 
were able to attend, while Minister and Connaught were also 
below full strength.^ Secondly, a scheme to reform the 
working of the administrative machinery, v/hich was put
1. Nov.12 - Dec.24.
2. Rinuccini had no difficulty in forecasting what they 
intended to do; cf. his report to Cardinal Panzirolo, 
Nov.5, Embassy,pp.328-9.
3. Com.Kin.,11,p.Tg? ; Embassy,p.343.
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forward on the opening day of the session and immediately
accepted, operated to their advezkage. This scheme was
designed to ensure both that the orders of the executive
should be obeyed - it is obious that in the past such orders
had often been ignored - and that the Supreme Council
should function efficiently. It stipulated that a General
Assembly be convened at least once a year and applied the
doctrine of collective responsibility to the decisions of
the Supreme Council.^
The third reason why circumstances were bound to favour
the Ormondists was that in practice the only alternative
to working with the King was to work wi th some other monarch
2
and obviously none could De found. The Assembly considered 
and rejected offering the protectorship to Prance, to Spain, 
and to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, but it was decided 
finally that in the first instance an attempt at 
reconciliation should be made with Charles I through 
Henrietta Maria and the grince of Wales. Rinuccini disliked 
this proposal but he could do nothing about it. Indeed, 
since it was out of the question to hope 'for united and
1. Orders of the General Assembly,Nov.12,1647, Gilbert,VI, 
pp.208-225.
2. Por the sake of efficiency the task of selecting a 
protector was given to a committee of the Assembly. 
Rinmccini to Panzirolo,Nov.24, Embassy, p.333.
3. Sellings explained that the King could not be approached 
directly because he was under close surveillance in the 
Isle of Wight. Gilbert, VII,p.36.
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independent Confederate action to gain control of 
Ireland, he had no alternative policy to suggest. The only 
thing he could do was to insist that any terms relating to 
a religious settlement must be referred to His Holiness 
for his sanction. Hence the Assembly resolved to send two 
delegations, one to Paris and one to Home.
With little dispute Nicholas Plunket and the bishop 
of Perns were nominated as the delegates to Home. The 
choice of delegates to Paris, however, brought the Assembly 
to the verge of dissolution. The Crmondist majority elected 
three delegates, Muskerry, Geoffrey Browne and the Bishop 
of Clogher, Ever Macmahon. A fiery-tempered man and a 
loyal ally -of the Nuncio, the Bishop declined the 
nomination in the belief that the Ormondists were trying 
to get a vigorous opponent out of the way - although he 
was able to put forward other valid reasons for refusing. 
Congregation endorsed his refusal but the Assembly by a 
special vote ordered him to accept the nomination. When 
he still firmly refused, fifty deputies declared the union 
terminated and stalked out of the chamber; others had to 
be discouraged from following them.
At this stage both sides realised that they had 
reached the moment of no return. Accordingly a motion to 
to punish the bishop was shelved and the Earl of -Antrim 
was elected in his place.^ As it tumèd out, this compromise
1. Embassy, pp.339-42; Com.Hin., II,pp.794-61
only postponed the final parting of the ways.
Plunket and Perns were to ask the Pope to help them 
in arranging a settlement with Henrietta Maria and to 
assure him that they would insist on obtaining security for 
the Church. If the Pope were to disapprove of the sort
of conditions the Queen offered, they were to ask for funds
with which to continue the war. In the last resort they 
were to beg him to become their protector. Vftiatever the 
Pope's decision, it was to be conveyed to their agents in 
Paris.^
Einuccini suspected that Plunket and P'erns were being 
instructed to paint the condition of Ireland in such sombre
colours that the Pèpe would feel compelled to advise
2
acceptance of the Queen’s terras. In order to dispel this
impression he submitted several reports to Rome on the
state of Ireland. The gist of these was that the Confederacy 
was far from desperate; O ’Neill was ready and able to deal 
with the parliamentarians; /all that was required was money 
and supplies. He suggested that the Pope should either become 
Ireland’s protector or, if that were not practicable, 
obtain for the Confederacy the protection of someone else.
He also emphasised the fact that the delegates to Paris 
had no power to act before they had received his comments
1. Embassy, pp.359-62; see also ibid.,p.364.
2. Ibid.,p.355.
on the requests of Plunket and Perns.^
Rinuccini was convinced that the main object of the
o
Ormondists was to bring back Ormond to Ireland. He was 
right to suspect them but did so for the wrong reason.
Two of the delegates to Paris, Muskerry and Browne, indeed 
represented the Ormondists and also carried secret 
instructions. At this time however, they had no expectation 
oF Ormond's return. In Paris, they were carefully to 
avoid mentioning their demands for religion, because to do 
so v/ould be to invite a rebuff. Instead, they should 
assure the Queen that most of the Irish were still loySl 
to the King - although it had to be admitted that there was 
a faction which was plotting to surrender Ireland to a 
foreign power. If only the Princd (sic) would come in 
person to Ireland, bringing with him money and supplies, 
the opposition could easily be suppressed.
Of course^ the official instructions of the delegates 
had to chime with those of/the delegates to Rome. Thus, they 
they were to request the French King to mediate with 
Henrietta Maria. In the event that their negotiations with
her came to nothing, they were to invite Louis XIV to________
1. Ibid., pp.359-62.
2. Although "No one spoke of the return of the Viceroy, on 
the contrary many protested they would never permit it." 
Embassy, p.520; see also ibid., p.343.
3. 0arte,III, pp.350-1.
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become their protector.^
They were to inform Henrietta Maria that they were not
authorised to discuss religious matters until they had
received word from the Pope. As to things secular, they
were to demand suspension of Po^niings Act while a free
parliament enacted the terms of the Ormond Treaty and
certain amendments to those terms - including a general act
of oblivion and a guarantee that the most serious effects
of the plantations of Ulster, Leix and Desmond should
be ameliorated by legislation or in the common law courts.
Finally, they were to ask the Queen to try to secure foreign
aid on their behalf and to assure her that, should they
be compelled to seek such aid themselves, no disrespect
2
to the Crown would be intended. )
V'/hile the balance of power at Kilkenny was chojiging 
in favour of the Ormondists, events in England and Prance 
were shaping in such a way as to make possible the return 
of Ormond to Ireland. Shor-^ly after his arrival in England 
Ormond was granted permission to visit the King at Hampton 
Court. At the beginning of their meeting he offered to 
resign his commission as Lord Lieutenant but the King 
refused to hear of it. Then, after narrating the events 
leading up to his departure from Dublin, he assured the
1 .  Gilbert, V I , p p . 2 2 6 - 7 .
2 .  I b i d . ,  p p . 2 2 8 - 3 1 .
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King that he had taken precautions to safeguard the
Royalist interest. He v/as keeping in touch with certain
people V'/ho could be trusted to prevent Parliament from
gaining absolute control.^
Ormond was doubtless referring to the activities of
2
Digby, Glanrickard, Taaffe, and Leyburn. These four,
though shocked by Preston's defeat at Donga's Hill, had
continued to make plans. Digby, who had at last obtained
his safe-conduct and could quit the country at any time
he pleased, had obviously concerted some sort of plan with
Taaffe, whom he informed on August 20th:
"...and I do stedfastly rely also upon my Lord 
Dillons and Sir James Dillons adhering to our 
fortunes in case we cannot succeed in the ways 
now proposed of uniting this party to His Majestie's 
Authority..."3
Prom a second letter, dated August 31st, it is clear that 
Digby intended to use Taaffe's army to regain control 
over the Confederacy for the Ormondists. In this letter, 
he requested Taaffe to attract as many Ulster and Munster 
men to his colours as he could and to avoid any major 
action in which there seemed a risk of defeat. Taaffe was 
to be rewarded for his services with supreme command of 
the Irish armies. If- the attempt to rally the peace party
1. Carte,III,pp.332-3.
2. Both Clanrickard and Taaffe had been asked by urmond 
himself at his departure from Ireland to look after 
the Royalist interest. Gilbert (Bellings), VII,pp.33-4.
3. Com.Rin., Hj j^ ycrG >
failed, ligby had a second string to his bow - Taaffe and
1
he should take the army abroad into foreign service.
Neither plan came to anything. Digby made two 
proposals to the Supreme Council, which they rejected, 
and decided that it was time to find fresh employment 
elsewhere for his inexhaustible talents. He left for 
France in about the middle of September.
Before leaving he asked leyburn to remain behind, 
since he was the only person left in Ireland who could 
work for the King. At first, Leyburn refused, but he 
agreed to stay if Digby would change his request to a 
direct command. Digby did so and leyburn then joined 
Olanrickard at Kilkenny. Just before the Assembly met in 
November he proposed that the Nuncio should accept a 
viceroy of the Queen’s choosing and "obtain from him all 
the concessions needful for religion." Rinuccini, who 
had forgotten his former poor opinion of leyburn and now 
took him for an honourable ipan, agreed, provided the 
appointee were a catholic and the safeguards for the
3
Church upon which he had always insisted were guaranteed. 
Olanrickard also supported these provisions in expectation 
no doubt of becoming viceroy himself, but there is no
1. Com.Rin., il,
2. Embassy, p.316; see also, Digby to Ormond, Caen,
September 19/29,Carte, VI, p.346:"...and had not I likewise 
ammused the fooles in my passage by Kilkenny v/ith such 
discourses as might raise hopes of my being usefull to
them in their distressed condition, I dow not beleeve 
I ever should have - escaped their'hands ;..."
3. Embassy, pp.329-30.
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evidence that Leyburn took any steps to inform the Queen 
of his cronversation with the Nuncio.
No further part was played by Leyburn in Confederate 
affairs. He remained in Ireland until March 1648, 
residing most of the time in Galway, and then set sail for 
fence accompanied by another ambassador to the Confederacy 
who had offered his good offices in vain, the Earl of 
Glamorgan.^
It had also been the intention of Olanrickard to leave 
Ireland at the same time as Ormond. But the rapid disen­
chantment of ,the Confederates with their absolute freedom
led him to change his mind. Rinuccini made one more
2
abortive attempt to win him over. He still refused to
comnit himself.
There seems no doubt that in spite of Digby’s
departure Taaffe was determined to keep his army intact,
in case it could be^instrumental in restoring the
royalist interest. He allowed Inchiquin to range freely
/
about Munster inflicting great damage without giving him
3
battle. Nor is there any question that he and others of 
like mind, such as Muskerry, never ceased to urge a 
rapprochement with the King. Hardly a month had passed 
since Ormond’s departure from Dublin when Sir Maurice 
Eustace informed him that all the Dalesmen together with
1. Leyburn,p.61.Though ordered from France in November to
teturn,Leyburn decided to stay pending a definite 
order from Digby. This came in March.
2. Embassy.nn.322-3.
3.Ibid.,p.325.
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Muskerry, Mountgarret, Taaffe, Preston and Bagnall,
among others, "were ready to submit under the late peace,
with the moderate exercise of their relj.gion."^
It was with some justification, then, that Ormond
assured the King that the royalist cause in Ireland was
not quite dead. As for Charles, he was still juggling
with several schemes even in extremis. Having first
explained his hopes of a favourable outcome to his -
negotiations with the Army he told Ormond what he must do
if they Wlould fail after all. Like most of Charles’
negotiations they soon did. Charles turned again to the
Scots who recommended that Ormond should return to Ireland
and make common cause v/ith the Ulster Scots against 
2
Parliament.
Ormond started at once to prepare the ground for his 
return. Through some unknovm channel he gleaned the news 
that Inchiquin was restless and contemplating a break with 
Parliament. Here v/as an ur^expected opportunity. If a 
truce could be arranged between Inchiquin and the / 
Confederates and he could effect his own return, it would 
be possible to create a combination of forces large 
enough to smash the Parliamentarians. So, before leaving 
England for Prance, where he had to go to escape the
1. Oct.8, Gilbert, VI,p.206.
2. Carte, III,pp.532-5;ibid.,p.359.
attentions of Parliament, now very suspicious of his 
intentions, he despatched his old friend Barry to Munster 
to spy out the land and to try to extract from Inchiquin 
a guarantee of support
Barry arrived in Munster and found Inchiquin 
instantly amenable. Arrogant, able and touchy, Inchiquin 
was by nature a lone wolf. He had deserted the King in 
1644 mainly because he was offended by the tactless 
appointment of Lord Portland to the Presidency of Munster, 
but on balance he was still a monarchist, if anything 
but a cavalier. His brother, Christopher O ’Bryan, was a 
loyal Confederate as were many of his relatives and 
towards the end of his life he was to become a catholic 
himself. But what influenced him most was the victory of 
the Independents in ±Jngland. They, too, had treated him 
tactlessly and he disliked taking their orders. He 
preferred rather to; ally himself with the Scots Presbyterians 
and the Confederacy with a ;view to restoring the King to 
power..
Prom Inchiquin, Barry went straight to Kilkenny with
the news of a possible truce. It is to be assumed,also,
that he meewdr to inform old acquaintances of Ormond’s
1. Ibid., p.540; ibid.,p.555. According to the Commentarius 
( lit, p'7o) Ormond sent Barry from Paris. In fact,
Barry was in Ireland before Ormond had even left England.
d :pd
plan to return. ^
At first sight Inchiquin’s offer might have appeared
the crudest effrontery in view of his notoriously brutal
treatment of Catholics during the previous seven years.
Only six months previously his troops had sacked Cashel,
putting women and children to the sword. Yet his offer
was clearly genuine, and at a time when the Confederates
were apprehensively waiting for the start of Jones’
Spring campaign, it had much to recommend it. Though a
butcher, Inchiquin was very efficient. The military picture
would be transformed if he not only ceased his operations
against them but also applied his remarkable talents and
furious energy to combating Parliament. To the Ormondists
in particular he promised salvation when all seemed lost.
Nor could Rinuccini easily spurn his offer for during the
period of personal triumph after the declaration of the
Ormond Treaty he himself had drawn up proposals for such 
2
a truce. ^
And so, on March 1st, the Council asked Inchiquin to
3
provide a safe-conduct for their commissioners. In reply, 
Inchiquin submitted v/hat were considered to be impudent 
conditions to one of the nominated commissioners.
Dr. Pennell.'^ None the less, negotiations were begun.
1. Carte, III,pp.558-9; Com.Rin., III,p.70.
2. Com.Rin.,111, pp.80-2.
5. Ibid., pp.70-1.
4.Ibid., p.73.
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At first non-committal,^ Rinuccini, at the time
residing at V/aterford where he had gone to meet Mas sari,
2
shortly expected back from Rome, took a strong stand 
against the truce when he heard of Barry’s comings-and- 
goings at Kilkenny. This could mean only one thing. There 
was a conspiracy afoot to bring back Ormond-so that he 
could create.more mischief-and to revive the Ormond Treaty. 
Once again he must fling all his resources into the fight
3
against weakness and self-interest, he decided against 
returning to Kilkenny in spite of pressing invitations 
from the Council but finally went back there in order to 
sustain the morale of his friends. ^
The negotiations with Inchiquin,like all negotiations
5
in which the Confederates engaged, were protracted. In 
consequence, almost three months were to pass before 
agreement was finally reached. Moreover, they were kept 
going in spite of the violent quarrel which raged between 
the Council and Rinuccini yid despite the doubts afflicting 
most of the Councillors.^
The controversy was carried on for the most part by 
letter and unilateral declarations. There is no point in
1. The Council continued to believe that Rinuccini was at 
least acquiescent until the negotiations were well under way.
2. Embassy, p.523.
3. Ibid., pp.376-9.
4. Ibid., p.524.
5. It is possible to follow the negotiations in detail in the 
Commentarius, a diary of them having come into the hands
of the authors (Com. Rin., III, p.70).
6. Even Taaffe ha3"Tefused to declare for the truce. Barry 
also reported that only 5 Councillors were steady (Carte, 111,
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labouring the arguments of both sides} For Rinuccini 
it was unthinkable that they should ally themselves with 
the heretical persecutor of the faith. Relying upon the 
breach that had opened between the 3cots and the Independents, 
he wished the Confederates to join forces with the Scots^ 
and to march against Inchiquin rather than with him. On 
strictly moral grounds - allowing that his motives were 
unaffected by expediency - he v/as doubtless in the right, 
but, as the Ormondists viewed the position, this was no 
time for being high-minded. In the event, it became clear 
that many v\rho had stood by the Nuncio in the past thought
3
the same way, including, significantly, six of the bishops.
So it was, that Rinuccini found it necessary to slip 
away secretly from the city to which he had once returned 
in triumph, rather than be present when the abhorrent truce 
was proclaimed! As before, when his authority had been
1. Gilbert (Sellings), VII, pp.39-52, pp.53-68; see also the 
Council’s reasons for desiring and Rinuccini’s for opposing 
the truce (Embassy, pp.387-91;.
2. As long ago as January 5th Rinuccini had pointed out to 
Panzirolo the advantages of uniting the Scots and O ’Neill’s 
army (Embassy, p.357). He mentioned the same proposal again 
on February 24th (Com.Rin., III, p.73). To his regret he 
had approved a truce with the Scots in a letter to the 
Council dated March 1st (Plunket-Dunne MS. pp.519-20).
3. Gilbert (Sellings), pp.57-8.
4. There was a mystery connected with Rinuccini’s flight from 
Kilkenny. Rinuccini apparently believed that there was a 
plot to assassinate him (based on a reportbbrought to him by 
a Carmelite, Embassy, p.524), and so slipped away in secrecy. 
The Supreme Council obviously thought that he was play-acting 
in order to have a good excuse for his departure (Gilbert 
(Sellings) VII, pp.69-70).
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challenged, he intended to resort to his trusted weapons 
but this time he did so in vain. Through over-use his 
censures had lost their coercive pov/er. In consequence, 
not only his inveterate opponents but many others too were 
now prepared to brave excommunication and interdict rather 
than abandon a policy which they believed to be necessary.
On April 27th Massari, acting on the Nuncio’s in­
structions, had arranged for a clerical decree against the 
truce to be posted on the church doors in Kilkenny! It had
had little effect. Nor v/hen Rinuccini had assembled the
2
bishops and published a declaration against the truce had the 
Council been sufficiently intimidated to break off the 
negotiations.
The Inchiquin Truce was finally arranged on May 22nd,
3
Inchiquin having already declared for the King. The truce
was to last until November 1st. In the meantime, normal
relations were to be restored betvæen Inchiquin’s territory
and that of the Confederates. Inchiquin gave a pledge that
/
there would be no interference with Catholics in the practice
of their religion. For their part, the Confederates agreed
4
to contribute towards the maintenance of Inchiquin’s army.
1. Cctw. ^ \A- , ill, -
2. Embassy, pp.525-6.
3. April 3. Inchiquin had been forced to show his hand 
much sooner than he intended (of. Barry to Ormond, April 6, 
T.C.P., XXII, p.38)^
4. T.C.P., XXII, p.62; Gilbert, VI, pp.235-9.
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Rinuccini received the news at Maryborough where he
had joined O ’Neill. . His immediate reaction was to issue a
decree of excommunication against all who should support
the truce! The Council retaliated by appealing to Rome
2
against the sentence, and by forbidding the clergy to
3 „
punish subjects for adhering to the truce. Hut events 
did not follow the same pattern as after the publication of 
the Ormond Treaty. Then, the majority of the people had 
supported the Nuncio. This time he found himself dependent 
on a minority and opposed even by some of the bishops!
Phelim O ’Neill and Alexander Macdonn^ll acknowledged 
the truce. So also did Olanrickard who had played a part 
in arranging it. Indeed, on June 10, after seven years of 
neutrality, Olanrickard declared common cause with the 
Confederacy. Preston naturally supported the truce but 
whereas in the past his allegiance had been of dubious value 
it seemed fairly safe to assume that he would not waver 
this time. ^
The stage was now set for the revival of the royalist 
cause in Ireland. All that was missing was a leader and,
1. T.C.P., p.69; of. "Rinuccini’s censure of 27 May 1648"
Ire.Theol.Quart., XVIII, pp.322-37, (October, 1951).
2. T.C.P., XXII, pp.72-8.
3. Ibid., p.79. This was a prohibition of questionable 
validity.
4. 8 out of 25 according to his own report. He had the 
support of Ov/en Roe O ’Neill - although O ’Neill had no intention
of follov/ing hiDi blindly r Antrim, the Franciscans (cf^
C.Mooney, "Was Wadding a Hatriotic Irishman" in Father Luke 
Wadding, p.36) and a large number of Augustinians and 
Dominicans (cf. Embassy. pp.532-3)r
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as Rinuccini had correctly foreseen, there was little
question who that leader would be.
Ormond had arrived in Paris towards the end of March.
He was cordially received by the Queen, who had already
indicated her wish to forget the ill-feeling of the past^,
and was just in time to take part in the negotiations with
the three-man delegation from the Confederacy. All three
delegates presented their instructions to Henrietta Maria
who at once referred them to Ormond for his opinion. He
noticed that there was no mention of religious demands and
advised the Queen to offer no counter-proposals until these
had been particularised. It was also essential to make
it clear that "his will not admitt of the Popes
2interposition betv/ixt him. and his subiects." .
Skilfully taking her cue Henrietta Maria refused to give
a plain answer to the delegates on the grounds of their ov/n
silence on the subject of religion and the general woolliness
of their proposals. However, she claimed to be sufficiently
/
encouraged by their expressions of loyalty to feel justified 
in sending a plenipotentiary to Ireland to negotiate a
5. Plunket-Dunne MS. p.532; Gilbert (Sellings), VII, p.100. 
(from previous page.).
1. Henrietta Maria to Ormond, Sep.22, 1647, T.C.P., XXI, p.278; 
see also Prince Charles’ Letter of approval, Oct.5, 1647,
Carte, VI, p.548.
2. April 5, T.C.P., XXII, p.57.
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settlement with them!
All this was dumb show. Ormond had already unfolded 
his plan to return to Ireland and had described his 
expectations of Inchiquin. Ihrthermore there were 
private discussions between Ormond, Muskerry and Browne, 
of which ^Antrim was kept in ignorance. During these 
talks, Muskerry and Browne disclosed their secret instructions 
and Ormond announced his intention of returning to Ireland.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Muskerry and Browne obligingly 
concurred with the Queen’s proposal to send a plenipotentiary.
p
They then prepared for their return journey7
Antrim was highly dissatisfied, however. On his own 
account he had never abandoned hope of beooming Lord 
Lieutenant, and he could scarcely approve of what was a 
transparent scheme to restore Ormond to his old office.
1. Ibid., May 13, Gilbert, VI, pp.231-2.
2. Rinuccini was sent a remarkably accurate account of this 
intrigue by a correspondent in Paris. One part of it read: 
"It is agreed that those two commissioners with Taaffe and 
Inchiquin, shall convince and join together with all Presby­
terians in Ireland against ^ the Catholickes, and especially 
against the clergy, and those adhere to them, to force them 
to receive the viceroy, Ormonde will come after." This was 
not exactly accurate but Rinuccini was bound to believe it.
In some way the letter eventually came into Olanrickard’s 
possession, among whose papers it was found by Boilings 
(Gilbert, VII, p.101).
3. Another old pretender to the office, the Earl of Glamorgan, 
now Marquis of Worcester, also appeared in Paris about this 
time with hopes of promotion undimmed. Before his final 
departure from Ireland Rinuccini had provided him with 
several testimonials from which it is evident that he hoped
to be formally appointed viceroy (of. Embassy, pp.319-20).
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Besides, he was to some extent pledged to act on the Nuncio’s 
behalf in collaboration with a certain Abbé Crelly, who had 
been sent by the Nuncio to restrain him from acting recklessly 
and to thwart the plans of Muskerry and Browne! In his 
opinion, the Queen’s reply was therefore unsatisfactory and 
they must obey the instruction which they had been given to 
stay in Paris until the Pope had made known his decision.
When Muskerry and Browne still persisted in returning home,
p
he announced his intention of staying behind.
By the time Muskerry and Browne had got back to Kilkenny 
in July, it had been considered safe to name Ormond as the 
Queen’s plenipotentiary. The Council decided to summon a 
General Assembly for the purpose of drawing up the propositions 
to be submitted to Ormond upon his arrival. This was the 
constitutional function of the Assembly, but in any case the 
Council was probably thanlcful for the opportunity of scotching 
the rumour that they were clandestinely negotiating a 
settlement;
"Tiie war between the Opmondists and the Rinuccini ans
4
was now all over the kingdom." The Nuncio had retired to
1. Cf. Rinuccini to the Nuncio in Prance, Feb.3, ibid., 
pp.368-9; same to Panzirolo, Feb.5, ibid., pp.369-70.
2. Hill, p.333.
3. Cf. the Declaration of the bupreme Council, July 7, T.C.p., 
XXII, p.94. They will accept no terms save those agreed by 
the Assembly "avoyding the calumn bruited ag^ them to the 
contrary."
4. Plunket-Dunne MS. p.545.
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Galv\^ ay so as to be in a position to leave the country at a
moment’s notice if an emergency should arise. When he
summoned a national synod of the clergy for August 15th
with the intention of trying to influence the people over
the heads of the Supreme Council, as he had done after the
Ormond Treaty had been announced, the Council retaliated
by prohibiting it! They also prescribed the supporters of
2
Owen Roe O ’Neill. According to Rinuccini, about half the
members of the Council had walked out as a gesture of loyalty
to the clergy, but this was scarcely to his gain since they
were promptly replaced by fervent Ormondists.^
Although they had driven Rinuccini back on to the
defensive, the Ormondists realised that they could not maintain
the pressure in the absence of Ormond. His presence among
them soon became a matter of vital concern. Inchiquin was
also uneasy and sent Ormond a stream of letters, each more
urgent than the last, pointing out the need for haste!
It is difficult to explain why Ormond took such a long time
/
to prepare for his return to Ireland. As early as June 3
1. Declaration of July, T.C.P., 1X11, p.107; Embassy, p.406.
2. T.C.P., XXII, p.115.
3. En^assy;, p. 534. It seems pretty certain that a number of 
Councillors were opposed to the truce ; cf. Inchiquin to 
Ormond, May 29, Carte, VI, p.550.
4. The first one was on May 29, ibid., p.549. It was in 
August, hov/ever, that he became seriously alarmed; cf., for 
example, his letter of Aug.19, T.C.P., XXII, p.121; see also 
Ormond to Jermyn, bep.30, Carte, VI, p.562.
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he had instructed a certain Captain Phil Roche to inform
Inchiquin that he was being held up for want of a ship^ and
yet he did not even leave Paris until August 11th. Part
2
of his trouble v/as lack of money for it was essential that
upon landing in Ireland he should provide funds for making
up the arrears of pay due to Inchiquin’s army. But there
must have been other reasons.
It is easier to explain his delay after leaving Paris.
Then he held back for reasons beyond his control. First
he could not find a ship and then when he did there was an
error in navigation by the captain and the ship ran aground.
As a consequence, he did not set sail until the end of October!
Meanwhile, deputies had been arriving at Kilkenny.
The primary object of the ninth General Assembly, which sat
from September 4th until January l?th, 1649, was to discuss
the conditions under which they should collaborate with
Ormond. Adherents of the Nuncio, who included among their
number the Earl of Antrim, by now returned from France"^,
/
did not attend, v^ith the result that the Assembly was
1. Ibid., p.84.
2. Of. Ormond to the Prince of Wales, Aug.31, ibid., p554.
3. Carte, III, pp.384-5.
4. Cf. Plunket-Dunne MS., pp.538-40.
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scarcely above half strength} Despite Rinuccini's
command to stay away, eight of the bishops took their 
2
seats.
The Assembly tried further to assert its authority 
by issuing a peremptory attendance summons to all absent 
members under pain of being proscribed as traitors!
Again, to counter the charge that they were about to 
betray their faith, they issued a proclamation on September 
14th swearing to safeguard church interests and to stand 
by all the enactments of previous assemblies! This v/as 
followed by two further proclamations aimed at destroying the 
power of Owen Roe O ’Neill; the first proclaimed O ’Neill 
himself a traitor^ the second ordered all his supporters 
to submit or to be declared traitors also!
They also launched the most vigorous attack yet made 
against the Nuncio. Despite his censure of May 27th, the 
clergy were called upon to swear obedience to the Assembly 
under pain of being imprisoned or exiled. The Bishops 
were not to be obeyed until‘d they themselves obeyed the 
Assembly. Religious superiors who refused to conform
1. Only three members attended from Ulster, Com.Rin., III, 
p.605; Connaught was also poorly represented, ibid., p.579.
2.Rinuccini to Panzirolo, Oct.10, Embassy, pp.422-3; Com.Rin., 
III, pp.599-602. According to the Commentarius 12 bishops 
eventually attended (ibid., p.692) but of these only 9 
signed the peace treaty.
3. Gilbert, VI, pp.279-80.
4. T.C.P., XXII, p.144.
5. Ibid., p.177.
6. Ibid.
6 6 7
would be replaced by the Assembly’s nominees! Finally, 
on October 19th the Assembly curtly informed Rinuccini that 
they were sending a formal accusation against him to Rome?
Accompanied by the Earls of Roscommon and Oastlehaven 
Richard Butler and the ubiquitous Daniel O ’Neill, Ormond 
landed at Cork on September 29th! He promptly sent 
Castlehaven to Kilkenny to announce his arrival and notified 
Blake, President of the Assembly, that, having authority to 
negotiate a treaty, he was going to take up residence at 
his house at Carrick^ and there await their proposals^ 
Simultaneously, he published a statement for the benefit 
of Inchiquin and the Munster Protestants to the effect that 
he would do nothing to damage the Protestant faith and that 
their return to the King’s service erased the memory of 
past differences! Thereupon he went to Carrick House 
where he was greeted by a reception committee from the
Q
Assembly led by the Archbishop of Tuam? No more tactful
1. Com.Rin., III, pp.606-10.
2. Gilbert (Bellings), VI, pp.294-300.
3. Carte, III, p.387.
4. Memoirs, p.73.
5. Cf. his reasons for residing at Carrick; Ormond to Taaffe, 
Carte, VI, pp.563-4.
6. Oct.4, T.C.P., X X I I ,  p.192; Gilbert, p.282.
7. Carte, III, pp.390-2.
8. Embassy, p.457.
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way could have been devised to illustrate the changed times.
In his painstaking way Ormond had already asked the 
King to confirm his commission in case doubt might be cast 
on his legal standing - after all, his original commission 
had technically lapsed. In order to make his position 
still more secure he now asked the King to send approving 
letters to Taaffe and Inchiquin}
Prom England^ Charles, now engaged once again in tortuous 
negotiations with Parliament, contrived to warn Ormond to
p
ignore rumours of an impending agreement. Upon receiving
intelligence of the renewed relations with the Confederates
Parliament tried to secure the King’s disavowal of Ormond.
Charles cleverly avoided doing so by pointing out that as
he had already relinquished control of Irish affairs to
them it was scarcely his responsibility to issue)(^a statement.
Although the avowed Nuncioists had absented themselves
from the Assembly, the Ormondists continued to fear a national
reaction in Hinuccihi’s favour. Thus Taaffe warned Ormond
that to delay would be dangerous. John Walsh urged the
need for speedy action while the Assembly was so favourably
composed and only hoped that the plea for delay^made by
several members who wished to avoid any commitment until
A
the delegates to Rome had returned, would be ignored.
1. Carte, III, pp.388-92.
2. Oct.10, Carte MS., 63, f .52; the King sent another letter 
on October 28th (ibid., ff .66-8). See also Carte,III,pp.388-9
3. T.C.P., XXII, p.187.
4. Ibid., p.188.
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Dr. Fennell thought it important that Daniel O'Neill should 
make an effort to win over his uncle} Edmund Butler 
reported a rumour that a Cardinal was being sent by the Pope
p
to ruin Ormond’s mission. Ormond himself informed Jermyn 
that the Confederates were in a mood to treat, hut that 
all would yet be lost if supplies were not soon received
3
by Inchiquin’s array.
On October 9th Blake congratulated Ormond on his return 
and informed him that peace commissioners would be sent to 
Garrick within a few days} He wrote too soon, for trouble 
arose when it came to the election of commissioners. Among 
the twelve nominated was one bishop. In protesting against 
the bishop’s inclusion Taaffe pointed out that Ormond had 
consistently refused to negotiate in the presence of a 
prelate, but was howled down for his pains! It was yet 
another sign of the changing climate, however, that Ormond 
decided not to object.
1. T.C.P., XXII, p.193.
2. Ibid., p.159. ^
3. Ibid., p.224.
4. Ibid., p.205; Gilbert, VI, p.283.
5. Muskerry was among those selected but begged to be excluded 
from the list which consisted finally of the following:
Taaffe, Westmeath, Upper Ossory, Phelim O ’Neill, Myles O ’Reilly, 
Talbot Burke, Geoffrey Browne, Bonough 0 ’Callaghan, John Walsh, 
Richard Barnewall, Bir Robert Talbot, and the Archbishop of 
Tuam.
6. Taaffe to Ormond, Oct.11, Gilbert, VI, pp.283-6.
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A Goïïiinittee of Instructions was appointed to act as an 
intermediary between the Assembly and the Commissions; to 
make reports to the one and to give instructions to the other! 
Formal propositions were presented to Ormond on October
2
17th, a month’s extension of the truce with Inchiquin having
previously been arranged so as to allow a reasonable period
3
for negotiations. Ormond warned that he would need time to
consider them,^ Then, almost a week later, he asked the
Commissioners if they had power to modify any of their 
5demands. They replied that any major amendment would
have to be referred back to the Assembly!
Even this short delay had alarmed the Assembly which
went in dread of a surprise attack by O ’Neill. And so,
7
having first urged Ormond to make up his mind quickly,
they invited him to reside at Kilkenny in order that his
discussions with the commissioners need not be slowed down
8by references back to the Assembly. Ormond accepted
1. Ibid., p.284.
2. The Commission from the Assembly was dated Oct.16, T.C.P., 
XXII, pp.247-50; Gilbert, VI, pp.288-9; the propositions are 
printed in Gilbert, ibid., pp.290-3.
3.Blake to Ormond, Oct.13, T.C.P., XXII, p.233; Ormond to 
Blake, Oct. 15, ibid., p. 241. There v/ere to be several 
renewals of the truce before peace was finally declared.
4. Gilbert, VI, pp.293-4. The message was delivered by Lane.
5. Ibid., pp.301-2; T.C.P., XXII, p.270.
6. Ibid. p.273; Gilbert, VI, pp.302-2.
7 . Mountgarret to Ormond, Oct.26, T.C.P., XXII, p.287;
Gilbert, VI, p.304.
8. Blake to Ormond, T.C.P., XXII, p.291; Gilbert, VI, pp.304-5
1their invitation.
The remarkable feature of these negotiations v/as that 
both sides were bargaining from v/eakness. Ormond had no 
resources of his own whatsoever and the Assembly could not 
have resisted an incisive attack by O ’Neill. Indeed, for 
months the Confederates had been relying upon "Murrough of 
the burnings" to protect them from O ’Neill. Not that 
there was any guarantee that Inchiquin could - or would - 
defend them effectively in the event of their being attacked. 
A'hat was really saving them was the forbearance of O ’Neill, 
who continued to be more open-minded than they would ever 
be themselves. O ’Neill was too upright a man ever to 
appreciate to the full the malice governing the actions 
of others. Thus he had felicitated Ormond by letter on 
his return and expressed the hope that he would not be
overlooked in the good conditions which, he understood,
2
the Queen was prepared to offer. He had also requested 
the Assembly to receive a delegation from him to discuss 
Ulster grievances, only to have his proposal summarily
3
rejected.
Ormond took exception to the C onimis si oners ’ first 
proposals which amounted to a repetition of the Glamorgan 
concessions. The Commissioners presented amended peoposals 
on November 17tht but he was unable to examine them at once
1. Gilbert, VI, pp.305-6.
2 .  O c t . 1 3 ,  T . C . P . ,  X X I I ,  p . 2 3 4 .
3. Taaffe to Ormond, Oct.11, Gilbert, VI, p.285.
4. Ibid., VII, pp.133-4.
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owing to a sudden outbreak of mutiny in Inchiquin’s army 
with which he was forced to deal. From the start Inchiquin 
had expected trouble of this sort. News of the defeat of 
the Scots in England, he had informed Ormond on October 25th, 
had incited some of his officers to declare their support of 
the Independents! Ormond adjourned discussions with the 
commissioners so as to go to Inchiquin’s assistance at Cork. 
In the meantime, the Assembly passed a resolution forbidding
p
any member to leave Kilkenny.
Ormond was apparently so disturbed by what he found at 
Cork that, for a second time, he asked the Prince of Wales 
to come to Ireland at once and to send the fleet to Southern
3
Ireland. And yet, the mutiny v/as suppressed in under a 
fortnight! Ormond always overestimated the seriousness 
of the troubles with v/hich he had to deal!
During his absence from Kilkenny, Plunket and French 
returned from Rome. Contrary to Rinuccini’s expectations 
they went straight to Kilkenny to report to the Assembly 
and hot to Galway to confer with himself! Nor had the 
Pope felt able to provide the aid and comfort for which
1. T.C.P., XXII, p.282; see also Inchiquin’s address to His 
Soldiers, Nov. 10, where he referred to ’’a revolted party of 
horse officers who are labouring to betray this noble army 
into the hands of the Independents. ’’ (Gilbert, VII, p. 132.)
2.Nov.20, ibid., p.144.
3. Nov.27, ibid., pp.149-50.
4. Com.Rin., III, p.659.
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he had hoped. While finding it impossible to give formal
sanction to any treaty arranged with a heretical prince,
Innocent had refused to specify the religious conditions
upon which the Confederates must insist. Moreover, without
apportioning the blame to one side or the other, he had made
it plain that he was displeased by the appearance of a
national split. He had not been able even to provide 
1
any money.
French did not help to improve matters for the Nuncio 
by reporting that certain members of the Curia had criticised 
him for being too quick to resort to spiritual sanctions,
)ocx.c,\C
and by bringing^with him a brief addressed to the Supreme
Council in which the Pope, ignorant of Rinuccini’s irrevocable
break with them, exhorted the Irish Catholics to bury their 
2
differences. There was also a letter for the bishops which, 
in defiance of the Nuncio, French delivered to the minority
3
in Kilkenny. As if he had not damaged the Nuncio’s prestige 
sufficiently, French also allowed it to be known that he was 
the bearer of a letter from Cardinal Roma to the Nuncio'^in 
which the Cardinal deprecated the Nuncio's use of the penalty 
of excommunication. In brief, the embassy to Rome which 
had been Rinuccini's counter to the pro-Ormondist delegation
1. Cf. Sir Richard Blake to Sir Robert Lynch - Mission to 
Rome, Nov.25, Gilbert, VII, pp.146-8; see also Bellings to 
Ormond, ibid., pp.148-9.
2. Com.Rin., III, pp.665-6.
5. I ^
4. Com.Rin., III, pp.685-6.
674
to Paris, proved to be his undoing, for it now seemed
that the Pope on the whole favoured a settlement with Charles I
The eyes of waverers were opened!
In fact, while feeling that Rinuccini had been less 
than diplomatic in his handling of the political situation 
and imprudent to make such free use of ecclesiastical 
weapons, the Pope had never intended to detract from his 
authority. At the very time when Kilkenny was abuzz with 
the criticisms voiced in Rome a letter was on its way to 
Rinuccini from Cardinal Panzirolo approving of his recent 
actions, especially of the censure of May 27th which was the 
principal grievance of his opponents. Unfortunately, 
this letter did not come into the Nuncio's hands until 
December 12th and by that date people had been so impressed 
by French' 8 reports that it was impossible to influence 
them to think differently!
French himself was quite unaware of the damage he 
was doing to the Nuncio's reputation. It had always been 
his concern to stter between "^ the Ormondists and the Nuncioists 
in the hope that they might eventually be reconciled. The 
time had now come for that reconciliation to take place!
1. Plunket-Dunne MS. p.960: see also Bellings to Ormond, 
Gilbert, VI, pp.147-9.
2. Com.Rin. , III.'", p.682.
3. No one believed that he had actually received the letter; 
cf. Embassy, pp.444-5.
4. The part played by Nicholas French in promoting the second 
Ormond Treaty is described in detail by P.J. Corish in 
"Bishop Nicholas French and the second Ormond peace" in I.E.S., 
VI, pp.83-100.
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Encouraging the Nuncio in his militancy was obviously the 
last thing to do. Hence his successful attempt to convey 
the impression that opinion in Rome was in favour of 
compromise. That, even so, French did not intend to 
harm the Nuncio is shown by the fact that he made vain 
efforts to reconcile him and Ov/en Roe O ’Neill v/ith the 
Supreme Council.
Shocked and saddened by the cordial welcome accorded 
Ormond and the vicious attacks made upon him by the Assembly, 
Rinuccini had at first contemplated immediate departure.
On second thoughts he had considered it his duty to remain, 
since his presence might deter the Ormondists from signing 
an agreement before the delegates had returned from Rome.
The decision of Plunlcet and French to go to Kilkenny and the 
report they had given of their mission came to him therefore 
as a crushing blow. He declined French’s invitation to 
come south to Kilkenny for a discussion with the frigid
2
rebuke that he wished first tp hear his report from Rome.
And when French asked all the bishops to convene at Kilkenny 
so that they could be informed of the contents of the papal 
letter to them! Rinuccini told the bishops they were under 
no obligation to attend! Receipt of Panzirolo’s letter
1. Com.Rin., III, p.667.
2. Ibid., p.671.
3. Ibid., p.675.
4. Ibid., p.668.
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on December 12th afforded him the comfort of knowing that he
had not been deserted by the Curia, but he seems to have
realised that though truth was on his side it was no longer
possible for him to make an effective impact on the negotiations
at Kilkenny. So he contented himself with informing French of
the nature of Panzirolo*s letter.^ In any case, he had driven
himself so unsparingly for the past three years that his
2vitality was now spent.
French also failed to reconcile O ’Neill. In an amiable 
letter he begged the Bishop of Clogher to persuade O ’Neill 
to support the negotiations. Ormond also lent a hand by sending 
Daniel O’Neill on a good-will mission to his uncle. Owen Roe 
was far from unwilling to grasp the extended olive branch 
but felt compelled out of loyalty to insist that the Nuncio 
should be invited to take part in the talks with Ormond.
Ormond refused to consider this stipulation. So it was that 
O ’Neill was excluded'from the benefits of the treaty. Antrim 
was also excluded because he too refused to be reconciled.^
The treaty negotiations were not resumed until December 
19th when Or mond delivered his belated reply to the 
Confederates’ last proposals. The long delay was not the fault
1. Ibid., p.675.
2. Cf. the resigned tone of his letter to French, Dec. 18,
ibid., p.676.
3. Nov. 26, ibid., p.690.
4. Ormond to O ’Neill, Nov.21, Aphor. Disc.,l,pt.ll, pp.753-4; 
O ’Neill to Ormond, ibid., pp.753-4.
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fault of the Confederates. For once, they wished for a quick 
result. Inchiquin*s soldiers had been accustomed for so many 
years to living rough and taking what they found that it was 
proving impossible to prevent them from committing outrages in 
Confederate quarters^ In consequence, it was desperately 
important to remove the need for thÊ$r presence. The delay
2
was also due to some serious sickness which affected Ormond.
The proposals which had been submitted to Ormond by
the Confederate Commissioners on November 17th were primarily
concerned with the four religious articles tacked on to the
new oath of association at the clergy*s instigation in February,
1647. In a nutshell, these articles amounted to a demand
that the Catholic Church should enjoy exactly the same status
that it had enjoyed under the last Catholic King, Henry VII,
and that all the churches and lands in the clergy* s possession
at the present time should be retained. Obviously these terms
were grossly excessive in the opinion of ^rmond. Thus in his
reply he agreed that the penal laws against Catholics should
/
be repealed but would give no assurances regarding church
property or clerical jurisdiction beyond saying that neither
would be interfered with pending the summoning of a free
U
Parliament and the expression of his Majesty*s pleasure.
This reply marked a great advance from the times when
1. Cf. Boilings to Ormond, Nov. 26,Gilbert, Vll, p.149; Blake 
to Ormond, Nov.25, ibid., p.146.
2. 0rmond to Blake, Dec.19, ibid., p.155; Carte, 111, p.405.
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Ormond had refused even to take note of such claims but it
afforded no consolation to the bishops, who were perfectly
aware that in practice they were being asked to waive their
claims for the Church. Nor were they reassured when a
committee of the Assembly was appointed to study Ormond * s
2
reply in detail, for in addition to themselves it consisted 
of thirteen laymen who could, if they so wished, outvote them. 
For the time being, however, there was to be no friction. The 
Committee reported to the Assembly that Ormond * s reply was 
unsatisfactory.
At this, the Assembly instructed its Gommittee to arrange 
a meeting with Ormond for the purpose of trying to reduce the
3
gap between them. This meeting took place on the evening of
December 20th. On their side, the Committee attributed to
Ormond the authority to guarantee that the clergy would not
be disturbed either in the possession of their present livings
4
or in the exercise of their religion. This was obviously their
way - under pressure from the bishops - of extracting some
/
kind of legal support for the Church* s position since 1641. 
Evidently alive to their object Ormond pretended to discern 
no difference between what they were now insinuating he should
5
do and what he had agreed to do already.   ___________________
1. ' '/I f I r-
2. T.C.P.,XXlll,p.34; Gilbert,Vll,pp.154-5.
3. T.C.P.,XXlll,p.38; Gilbert,Vll,pp.156-7.
4. T.C.P.,XXlll,p.40; Gilbert,Vll,pp.157-8.
5. T.C.P. ,XXlll,p.46; Gilbert,V u , p.159.
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A further exchange of views followed in which Ormond 
re-stated his position and the Committee repeated their
p 1
demands on behalf of the clergy. It was now clear that 
Ormond was inflexible. Thus the lay members of the Assembly 
were forced into a position where they must reconcile 
themselves to failure or drop the clergy's claims for security 
altogether.
In effect, the decision lay with the bishops. The
Nuncio's party alleged that the bishops at Kilkenny were
exploited by the Ormondists who first lured them to the city
in order to prevent the Nuncio from organising an effective
opposition and then set up a committee in which the bishops
were in a minority so as to give the impression of consulting
clerical opinion while being in a position to outvote its
representatives. It is doubtful if the bishops were in fact
so gullible and almost certain that their views were not
ruthlessly overridden. All the signs indicate that they went
to Kilkenny precisely because they deplored the civil strife
/
of the past few years and recognised the need for compromise 
with Ormond. Moreover, it is odd that the Committee should 
have so faithfully reflected their opinion if the Ormondists 
really intended to outvote them.
This is not to claim that the bishops were satisfied .
1. Of. T.C.P., XXlll,pp. 45,57-8; Gilbert,Vll,pp. 160,163, 164-5; 
see also the article by P.J.Corish,op.cit., where, for once, i 
there is a complete account of the negotiations between Ormond
and the Confederacy on a particular occasion.
2. It is qite plain that Crmond had to take into account the 
unyielding attitude of Inchiquin's army (cf. his argument that 
the word "jurusdiction" had been omitted in the Articles of 
Cessâtion,T.C.P.,XX111,p.58.).  :
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with the turn taken by the negotiations or that a strong party 
in the Assembly were impatient of delay. Even so, it would 
seem that a decision would have been indefinitely postponed 
had not Inchiquin sent news to Kilkenny of the break-down 
ofy? negotiations between Charles and the Army and the consequent 
threat to the King's life.^This news undoubtedly sobered 
the whole Assembly. But its main effect was to give the 
convinced supporters of peace an excellent opportunity to 
carry the main body of the Assembly with them. Accordingly, on 
December 28th,the Assembly agreed to rest satisfied with 
Ormond's non-committal answers to their four propositions 
concerning religion and to place their hopes in "the clause
of further reference to his majesty's gracious favours and
2
further concessions."
It was only now that a clash arose with the bishops
who felt naturally that they had been left with no safeguards.
The Assembly sought to justify their resolution by arguing
that they had been bound to adhere to the four propositions
/
not under any circumstances whatsoever but only "to the utmost 
of their power"; they considered that in the present case they 
had stained their adherence to the uttermost and were 
therefore entitled to decide that the time had come to waive 
the propositions. The bishops were highly displeased with
t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n ^ a n d  g a t h e r e d  t o g e t h e r  t o  d e c i d e  w h a t  t o  d o . _ _ _ _
1 .  C a r t e , 1 1 1 , p . 4 0 7 .
2 .  T . C . P . , X X 1 1 1 ,  p ; 7 2 ;  G i l b e r t ,  V l l ,  p . 1 7 1 .
5 .  T . C . P . , X X I 1 1 .  p . 7 7 ;  G i l b e r t , V l l ,  p p . 1 7 2 - 3 .
4 .  C f . N i c h o l a s  - t r e n c h  t o  t h e  N u n c i o ,  D e c .  3 0 ,  C o m . R i n . , 1 1 1 , p . 6 7 8 .
A few of them considered it wrong to yield to the Assembly's 
decision and wondered if they should not transfer their 
support back to the Nuncio. Others, including grench, 
regretfully decided that they could not re-open the old 
division at this stage. ^ Their view prevailed. Nevertheless, 
the bishops continued to insist upon the preservation of 
their jurisdiction.
For once, Ormond departed from his practice of never 
going back on a "final offer" and intervened with a timely 
concession. He would, he said, accept the interpretation 
of his authority to recognise the Church's right to jurmsdiction 
which was implicit in the draft presented to him on December 
21st.^
No more serious obstacles remained. A few problems
arose concerning the interim government which was to be set
0
up but these were ironed out with the help of InchiqjtLn who 
was brought in on the final stages of the negotiations by 
Ormond. Knowledge, as they believed^ of the Dope's favourable 
attitude, Owen Roe's refusal"^to desert the Nuncio, the 
depredations of Inchiquin's men, fear of the imminent build-up 
of Parliament forces, above all concern for the King's life, 
these were the considerations which had helped to make up 
the deputies'minds.
Formal approval of the peace was delayed by the Assembly
1. Walsh, Irish Remonstrance, pp.614-5. Fr^ Corish (op.cit.) 
may have overestimated the part played in this debate and
indeed in all these negotiations by Nicholas French.
2. S^ e- alfocvit .
3. Carte,111,p.407.
vo^
until January I6th.^ With a fine display of ceremony the
treaty itself was ratified by Ormond sitting in state in
Kilkenny Castle on January 17th. Immediately, the Confederacy
was presumed to have ended its existence.
Opinions as to the generosity of the second Ormond
Peace varied according to the affiliations of the observer.
Protestants generally were hostile. Ormond himself admitted:
"I shall confess that the terms must have bin 
something more unreasonable than I should have 
stuck at after the sight of the Army's 
Remonstrance..." 3
Inchiquin, the Ulster Scots and a good number of Irish
Catholics gave it a grateful but far from ecstatic welcome.
Nine of the bishops published a letter in its favour.^ Both
Rinuccini and Owen Roe naturally condemned it.
The Confederates had gained by comparison with the
first Ormond Treaty, though Ormond had been careful to insert
a conditional clause affecting the implementation of the
whole settlement. No longer were Catholics to be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the Anglican church nor would they be
compelled to take the oath of supremacy. The Irish Parliament
1. Gilbert, Vll, pp.179-80.
2. Cf. the speeches of Ormond and Sir Richard Blake,ibid.,pp.180
—4.
3. Ormond to Lord Lanerick,Jan.21,T.C.P.,XXlll,p.l83.
4. Gilbert, Vll,p.213. Among the bishops was Nicholas Drench.
How differently he viewed the treaty after the Restoration:"It 
is remarkable that the Deace was concluded in a time, when the 
Irish Nation was in a most flourishing condition, having Armies 
in the field, and most of the Cities and great Towns in their
possessions, and more than three parts of the Kingdom under 
their command, when they were courtedby the Parliament of Eng-
1%^, ^i^^ollicited by some neighbouring Potentates..." (op.
was to be independent of the two houses of Parliament in 
London. But the vexed questions of ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
and the ownership of Church lands were to be shelved until the 
King's pleasure could be made known.^
In retrospect, it could be seen that the treaty had 
been arranged too late. Por the Irish Catholics, it was little 
short of being the disaster its hostile critics claimed it to 
be. The alliance with Ormond failed to save them from the 
cruel punishment of Cromwell. Nor did the government of 
Charles II see fit to honour the terms of the treaty.
Assured of 2,500 foot and 1,500 horse Ormond proudly
O
invited the Prince of Wales to Ireland. He never came.
In England, Charles I had barely a fortnight to live.
It is doubtful if he ever knew that peace had been proclaimed 
at last in Ireland.
/
1. Gilbert, Vll, pp.184-211.
2. Cf. Ormond's memoranda for the Queen of England and Charles 
Prince of Wales, Jan.26, ibid., pp.227-32. By coincidence the 
Prince had written at about the same time saying that he was 
willing to join Ormond (Jan.21, ibid., p.217j. Unhappily for 
Ormond, he never did so.
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Conclusion.
The organised Irish Catholic movement did not long 
survive Charles I. Ormond proved to be curiously inept as 
commanding general and O'Neill was not reconciled until it 
was too late. In consequence, the Confederates were no 
match for the ruthlessly efficient army sent over from 
England.
% e n  Cromwell had done with the Irish Catholics, they 
were much worse off than they had been on the eve of the 
Rebellion. Nor was their grim condition ameliorated by 
Charles II despite the terms of the second Ormond treaty.
Their decade of independence had gained them little but grief.
And yet, the Rebellion might have brought substantial
benefits if^^ïhey had onl^ formulated a definite policy and 
pursued it consistently. Their primary object should have 
been to prevent the English Parliament from becoming so 
powerful that it could invade Ireland and destroy them.
And they should have realised that this presented them with 
a simple choice: either to assist Charles with all their 
strength so that he might overcome Parliament or to leave 
Charles to his fate while they concentrated upon making 
the island impregnable.
To be of value, support for Charles I had to be 
unqualified, ungrudging and prompt. There was no point in
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opening negotiations unless they were prepared to send an 
army to England while he still disposed of effective forces. 
In turn, this involved trusting Charles to improve their 
condition as subjects and Catholics when the war was over 
and abandoning the special claims of the Church and the 
dispossessed Ulstermen.
Renunciation of the English Monarchy called for great 
courage but it was the only way to recover full freedom for 
the Church and to obtain justice for the dispossessed.
It involved seeking aid from the Catholic rulers of Europe, 
eliminating the Irish Royalists and transforming Ireland 
into a giant fortress. Incidentally it obviated the need 
for trusting the word of Charles I.
In the event, the Confederates neither supported 
Charles wholeheartedly nor declared their independence but 
simply drifted where the pressure of events led them. The
blame for this aimless policy lay principally with the 
Ormondists.
/
Given that Charles I was trustworthy, the postulate 
of their case, it was dangerous to waste time trying to 
extract from him concrete guarantees which he dar^not give. 
They had to put their doubts behind them and sweep aside 
the protests of the opposition. It was their characteristic 
hesitation rather than his own lack of drive which caused 
Glamorgan’s mission to founder. VVhen they did finally steel
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themselves to take up the King's cause, Rinuccini arrived 
on the scene and wrecked their plans. The Ormondists had 
to wrestle with many problems, they were, on the whole, 
intelligent and civilised, they were also far from being 
mere slaves to self-interest, but when all has been said 
in their favour, they were not men of action. This proved 
to be a fatal deficiency.
Rinuccini's advocacy of the total conquest of Ireland 
including the Royalist sector - the implication of his 
policy despite any claims to the contrary - was based on 
the assumption that to put their faith in Charles I was 
foôlish. Having helped him to crush the Puritan movement 
what was their assurance that he would keep his promises?
He was compelled to correspond with them in secret precisely
(Xbecause he dare^not estrange his own advisers, his Lord Deputy,
the Irish Council and the Irish Protestants. V/ould not these
antagonists be even more intolerant when no longer menaced
by Parliament? The very most they could hope to secure was
/
religious sufferance and the humiliating status of second- 
class citizens.
On the surface Rinuccini's case was strong. But he 
overlooked the human factor in Anglo-Irish relations. The 
majority of the New Irish could never bring themselves to 
renoLince the English Crown. That they were allied to it 
by selfish ties may have been regrettable but did not alter
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this central fact. Rinuccini seemed to think that it did. 
Consequently he tried to impose his policy by force and only 
succeeded in destroying national unity. He also made the 
mistake of underestimating the strength of insular feeling 
in Ireland and so overreached the authority which an 
ultramontane bishop could afford to exercise. A more subtle 
and less inflexible man might have enjoyed more success.
Instead of exacerbating the ill-feeling that already
existed between the Old and the New Irish, Rinuccini should
have emphasised the importance of solidarity. He should
never have used ecclesiastical sanctions to ônP<ffctce what
were in fact political decisions. In the long run, he would
have deserved most praise if he had eschewed political action
altogether, fortified the Irish Catholics in their faith,
and encouraged them to aid Charles I. For even though
Charles could not be trusted and were doomed to defeat even
with their help, they would have fought and lost as one
nation and earned some measure of gratitude from Charles II
/
and a good number of Englishmen.
The Confederates were not alone responsible for the 
disaster which befell them and Charles I. There were 
serious faults on the Royalist side as well.
Charles himself was not lacking in insight. He saw 
clearly enough the potential value of Irish aid and, unlike 
his advisers, recognised the fundamental loyalty of the
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Irish Catholics to the English Monarchy. Moreover, being 
unable to give them, reasonable satisfaction at the official 
level, he shrewdly realised he must make them an offer in 
secret. But, as in other fields, he failed to act with 
determination and consistency. He also had to pay a heavy 
penalty for the doubts as to his integrity which were inspired 
by his record of vacillation. Had he acquired a reputation 
as a man of high principle there is no question that the 
Confederates would have approached negotiations with him in 
a more frank and optimistic spirit. Indeed, they might 
have given him immediate aid and taken his word for future 
concessions. As it turned out, however, he incurred the 
odium of negotiating with Roman Catholics while reaping 
none of the possible benefits.
Nearly all the King's advisers appreciated the need 
for Irish assistance but none was prepared to pay for it.
The Irish must give all and ask for little or nothing in 
return. Some of them, notably Ormond, were antipathetic 
to Roman Catholicism as a creed, preferring Puritanism in 
the last resort as less objectionable. Others, such as 
BigBy, were not disposed to risk their reputations by 
appearing to yield to Catholic pressure until it was too 
late. Thus, the King was forced to act alone and to employ 
private agents like Glamorgan. Another consequence of 
their uncompromising attitude was to make the Confederates
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all the more reluctant to rely upon the King's unsupported
promise of concessions.
The actual negotiations did little damage to Charles'
position in England. But by absorbing the time and energy
and dissipating the constructive capacity which its government
should have devoted to operating and perfecting the
theoretically admirable political system that had been
devised they destroyed the Confederacy. Arguments over
(t
the terms to be put to Charles also p r e d a t e d  open conflict
between the Hew Irish and the Old Irish. Of course this
division already existed. But if the two groups had been
compelled to preserve a united front in face of the threat
of attack from England for two or three years - not just for
ten months - it might have been bridged.
In his recently published work Professor Coonan
described the Confederacy as though it were essentially a
glorious episode in Irish history tarnished by the selfish
scheming of the Hew Irish. This description does not fit
/
in with the facts. The only splendid thing about the 
Confederacy was its inception. Its military achievements 
were undistinguished with the honourable exception of O'Neill's 
victory at Benburb. From the outset there was a marked lack
of religious fervour, as Rinuccini quickly discovered. And
how far from glorious was its political history - virtually 
the account of the negotiations with Charles I. It was a 
catalogue of malicious intrigues, pettifogging debates and
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missed opportunities.
No one emerges with entire credit except perhaps 
Owen Roe O ’Neill. For all his intolerance, it is impossible 
not to admire the high-mindedness, courage and style of 
Rinuccini. Ormond, too, impresses with his remarkable 
imperturbability, but at the same time arouses v/onder that 
one so rigid and unenterprising could have commanded so 
much obedience, affection and respect. There are also the 
individualists who found so much scope in Ireland for their 
particular talents - the flighty yet essentially loyal Antrim, 
the irrepressible and ubiquitous Daniel O ’Neill, and the 
intelligent, conscientious Leyburn; above all, George Digby, 
that curious mixture of the serious man of affairs and the 
unscrupulous, theatrical adventurer, and Glamorgan, the 
slightly absurd but attractive knight-errant. Only Charles 
I could have employed such an odd collection of men and only 
the unreal political atmosphere at Kilkenny could have 
inspired their fantasies.
The whole history of the Irish connexion with England 
was overcast with sadness and feelings of frustration and 
resentment. It was a pity, therefore, that the seventeenth 
century experiment in freedom failed. But many Irish 
Catholics had yet to learn that the tie with England had to 
be snapped once for all if they were not to remain the 
inhabitants of a depressed and exploited colony.
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It was also ironic that the experiment failed because 
the Irish Catholics could not bring themselves to disown 
the unhappy cause of Charles I. For Charles would have lost 
the war with Parliament even if they had sent him all possible 
aid as soon as he asked for it. During the period when their 
large-scale intervention might have tilted the balance in his 
favour he was either reluctant to use them or unwilling to 
agree to their minimum terms. In any case, the utter waste 
of the Irish Royalist army which landed in the North-West 
in November, 1644, gave clear warning that even 10,000 Irish 
troops might make the crossing to England in vain.
/
J.H. Hound and the Glamorgan Treaty ^
Hound’s object was to show that Charles never 
authorised Glamorgan to arrange a treaty with the Confederacy. 
The commission dated March 12th which Glamorgan had produced 
as his authority had been forged.
He began his attack on the commission by assigning no 
fewer than five pages to proving that the letters which 
Glamorgan claimed to have received from the for
transmitting to the Pope and the Nuncio^were transparent 
forgeries. He would seem to have justified this oblique 
approach on the grounds that Glamorgan invoked this 
correspondence to the Nuncio as carrying equal weight with 
the conmiission of March 12th - as though Glamorgan might have 
said,"I realise that the warrant is not utterly convincing 
by itself but here is independent confirmation". It is to be 
assumed that Hound intended the reader to infer that if it 
could be proved that Glamorgan had forged a document of 
the same importance as the commission, it could also be taken 
that he had forged the commission itself. This is to drag a 
red herring across the trail. Round was failing to observe the 
estimable rule which he claimed for the modern historian and 
denied to his predecessors - the rule of distinguishing
carefully between/^which were demons!^ably false and others
—   ri------------:—  --------
"Lord Glamorgan's Treaty" in/Peerage and Family History,
PP * 396—434. A
2. See above pp.420-4.
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which might be genuine. Thus it by no means follows that
because Glamorgan forged the two letters in question, he
forged the commission as well.
In any case, is it quite certain, as Round scornfully
asserted, that the letters were forged? Lingard stated that
the originals were preserved in the Vatican archives and
that they were written in the King’s own hand.^ Round also
invoked Rinuccini’s misgivings about these letters but these,
it is hoped have been accounted for here already. He also
agreed with Gardiner that the date of the letter to the Nuncio
was an unlikely one, for on April 30th,1645, all negotiations
were being handled by Ormond. Why then this separate attempt?
Charles ’ well-lcnown liking for dealings along more than one
channel surely nullifies this particular objection.
Furthermore, there is positive evidence that Charles
had communicated with the Nuncio (either by letter or verbally
through Glamorgan) before July 7th,1646. On that date, he
wrote to Glamorgan:
"... so that let what will happen, you cannot 
doubt but that I shall keep to all the instruct­
ions and promises made to you and the Nuncio". 3
Ordinarily it might be possible for Glamorgan’s critics to
add this letter to his long list of forgeries but not on this
occasion. For the letter also contained the comment :"Therefore
in referring you to Digby about the negotiations...". It is
1. See above pp.422-3.
2. See above pp.421-4.
3. Embassy, p.185.
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difficult to envisage any occasion when Glamorgan would have
wished to insert such a comment in a letter he had forged for
the Nuncio's benefit. Given that Charles had then communicated
previously with the Nuncio, why should it not have been in
a letter dated April 30th,1645?
Round’s sharpest weapon against the commission was the
1
existence at Badminton of a draft in which:
"Three months after his head was cut off,Charles... 
urges "His Holiness" to place faith in(Glamorgan 
now) the marquis of Worcester, ’omnium 
subditorum nostrorum optime merito’".
The implication is onlÿ too obvious. This was one of Glamorgan’s
experiments in forgery and, as usual, he was being rather 
2
clumsy. It is impossible not to take Round’s point. And yet, 
what purpose could have been served by such a forgery? Above _ 
all, when was the draft written ? Was it necessarily Glamorgan’s 
own work?
Round then turned to the commission itself. Accepting 
the signature as undeniably authentic, he held that the body 
of it had been written without the King’s knowledge and 
contrary to his wishes. It is useful to follow his argument 
step by step.
In the first place, Glamorgan comes before us as a man 
gravely suspect, his two letters to the Pope having been
fabricated on blanks and his two commissions of 1644 having
1. The draft ends,impossibly, as Round sààd, "Datum apud 
curiam nostrara pene carcerem in Insula de Wight,20 Aprilis 1649". 
(H.M.C.R.%11,9,P.53).
2. Op.cit., 410.
been complete forgeries.^ It has been shown above, it is hoped, 
that this charge is by no means substantiated; it may therefore 
be questioned whether it is"antecedently probable that he 
(Glamorgan) would concoct this warrant if he found it essential 
for his purpose".
Next, he challenged Gardiner’s opinion that the 
commission was governed by Glamorgan’s instructions of January 
2nd, and, indeed, there is no doubting the correctness of 
his contention that the commission of March 12th supersedes 
that of January 2nd. The fact does not, however, advance the 
argument in hand and seems to have been included rather to 
continue his exposition of Gardiner’s carelessness.
1. Apart from the commission of April 1st ( see above Chapter V), 
Glamorgan claimed at the Restoration to have received a patent 
dated fey 4th, conferring upon him the dukedom of Somerset.
There is a transcript of this patent among the Carte Papers 
in the Bodleian (Carte MS.,129,fo.349). Dircks ascribed this 
patent to March 4th, 1646 (21 C.l. ) (op.cit. Me also
stated that the original had been preserved at Badminton.
Hound (Peerage and Family History? p.380) quoted from Dircks’ 
transcript without apparently noticing this curious date.
Gardiner inspected this patent at Badminton and observed, 
as Anstis had once pointed out to Carte, that the word "primo" 
had been added to the date in different ink. At first, he 
presumed this addition had been inserted by Glamorgan in order 
to gain credence for his story when trying to claim the 
dukedom in 1660 (E.H.R.,11, p.703).. Later on, Gardiner decided 
that the patent had been attested formally by the Crown to 
avoid the question of precedence over the first Marquis of 
V/orcester who was also given a patent conferring the same 
dukedom in January,1645 (E.H.R..Ill,p.125; see above pp.206-7). 
Round proved conclusively to his own satisfaction that the 
patent had been forged ("Lord Glamorgan’s Dukedom" in Peerage 
and Family History,pp.367-95).
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Round further implied that it is highly suspicious that
the commission should purport to be given:
"under our signet and royal signature",
when it is impressed with the King’s pocket signet only. As
Digby and Nicholas both instantly remarked, it lacks the
impress of the signet proper, always in the charge of the
King’s secretary, yet it is this signet only. Round averred,
which can be referred to in the words ’our signet’.^But is
it really certain that Charles could not possibly have given
Glamorgan such a commission without getting the impression of
the signet upon it? If Glamorgan was to be used as a secret
agent, the King was hardly likely to consult either Nicholas
2
or Digby and consequently could not use the signet. It is also
k
a singular fact that both Ni^las and Digby were to show every 
sign of believing in Glamorgan’s innocence. For instance, 
scarcely a month after publicly accusing Glamorgan of treason 
Digby wrote to Walsingham, his secretary:
"...I must not conclude without telling you,
That I believe the accident here of my Lord 
Glamorgan and my party in his prosecution, 
will at first have allayed me much with your 
friends the Babylonians.3But when matters 
shall be rightly understood, you may assure 
them. That if His Majesties service had not 
obliged me to it, yet in relation to their 
Preservation, I ought to have done it ...
As for the peace of the Kingdom, I make no
1. On October 10th,1643, the King had commanded that no warrant 
should be valid unless signed by a secretary of state ( Oal. 
Glar.S.P.,I,p.244); see also "His Majesty’s instructions and 
warrant to me , when he was pleased to deliver the custody the
Privy Signet",Aug.7,1641,Nicholas,op.cit..p.135. . . • ^
2. Or would Round have argued that every time the m n g  desired
to issue instructions of which he knew his secretary's disapprove^ 
he simply borrowed the signet from theml 
The Frçrllsh Catholics.
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"question but shall suddenly be brought to a 
happy conclusion;and my Lord Glamorgan not 
disabled by anything, that is done, to serve 
the King in what he hath means to do." 1
Shortly afterwards, reporting an encounter with
Glamorgan when en route for France, Digby wrote:
"Here at Waterford I haye mett with my lord of 
Glamorgan, whome I finde (as hee hath reason) 
a very sadd man, and withall highlye incensed 
against mee#But for this latter part, I beleeve 
his good nature, and the reasons which I have 
gi©en him, have well settled him in a good 
measure of kindness..." 2
For the rest, Digby’s references to Glamorgan were 
usually ribald. Nonetheless, it is scarcely possible to infer 
from these two extracts that he seriously believed Glamorgan 
to be guilty.
As to Nicholas, correspondence passing between him and 
Clarendon on the subject indicates that he was at least 
doubtful of the King’s innocence. Moreover, at the Restoration, 
he seems to have replied favourably to Glamorgan’s request 
that he support his claim to the dukedom of Somerset, a claim 
be it remembered which was based on Glamorgan’s alleged 
contribution to the royal cause in the years 1644 and 1645.
One would have expected Nicholas to reject his application 
out of hand.
Then Round turned to a question of English usage. When
assuring Ormond in his letter of January 50,1646, that he had
1. Digby to Walsingham, Dublin, Jan.17,1646, "Three Letters 
Intercepted by Sir.T.Fairfax" (London,1645-6),B.M.102.B.7.
2. Digby to Ormond,Apr.7,1646, Carte, VI, p.369.
t>y«
not granted Glamorgan power to act independently, the King 
used the expression "upon the faith of a Christian". Now,
Round 0 ontinue d ,
"in the warrant of 12 March Mr. Gardiner’s own 
facsimile makes him’promise (in)1 the worde of 
a Kinge and a Christian’. Is it credible that 
Charles himself, or even an English secretary, 
could perpetrate this blunder? But if the warrant 
was written by a ’Romish Priest’ for Glamorgan, 
he might have easily made a slip suggested by a 
Latin idiom." 2
As to the verbal slip being ascribable to a ’Romish priest’,
what evidence is there to show that Glamorgan’s amanuensis,
although a Catholic priest, was not English? When we check
Round’s source, we find that it is Birch’s Inquiry,^ that
Birch himself is quoting another author who produces no
reference to support his statement, besides being hostile to
Glamorgan.^ Furthermore, Round also cited the following
quotation from Birch:
"The writer of the Nuncio’s Memoirs is indeed 
of opinion, that the body of the King’s letter 
to the Nuncio of the 30th of April,1645, was 
in the handwriting of the Earl og Glamorgan’s 
Secretary..." 5 /
without noticing apparently that over the page Birch suggested
that this secretary may have been an Englishman, Edward
Bosden.^
1. Round’s italics.
2. Op.cit., p.417.
3. Op.cit., p.330.
4. The author was Carte who used this description in a review 
of L.Neale’s History of the Puritans.
&. Op.cit., p.333.
6. Ibid., p.334. On at least one occasion Bosden carried an 
important message from Glamorgan to the King (see above p.329).
Now it is presumably reasonable to assume that Glamorgan 
- or the King? - dictated the wording of his commissions 
himself, since we must believe otherwise that his secretary 
fabricated them for his approval. If this secretary ware 
English, how then did he come to take down or copy "in" for 
"upon"? Presumably because he made an insignificant slip which 
anyone, Romish priest or not, might sometimes make.
The rest of Round's case was circumstantial. It may 
be summarised under six heads. These will be considered one 
by one.
First, Glamorgan was "fantastic, ardent, feather-brained",
full of wild shemes, incredible promises and colourful
exaggerations of his past achievements. These characteristics
1
support the view that he would falsify his powers.
It is undeniable that Glamorgan's contemporaries found
him romantic. Rinuccini - for one - thought him somewhat
sanguine. But, even so, many people credited him with practical
ability. Thus, he was appointed military commander of South
/
Wales, commissioned to raise Irish troops, given supreme 
command of the Confederate forces and accepted by the Irish 
as Lord Lieutenant apparent.It is also noteworthy that 
Professor Lodd# with his special knowledge of Glamorgan's 
career in Wales described him as energetic and resourceful. 
Perhaps, therefore, the opinions of those contemporaries who 
belittled him should not be taken as reliable evidence. After
1. Op.cit., p.418.
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all, he was a Catholic of distinction and all his detractors 
were Protestants. It is not intended to suggest %• this 
defence that Glamorgan was an outstanding leader and 
organiser - merely that the picture of him as an incompetent 
poseur is unconvincing.
It is only fair, however, to record that Round cited 
two particular examples of his habit of exaggeration, and, 
indeed, of telling untruths. To begin with, there were these 
four statements:
i. Letter to the i^uncio dated February 6th urging the 
necessity of sending "without the least delay, 3,000 men to 
succour Chester", while "the other seven thousand soldiers (of 
the ten thousand) need not be sent till they had communicated 
with the King".
ii. -L'ebruary 8th. Letter to Ormond boasting "Myself alone 
having, by the interest and goodwill of the Nuncio, gained 
this point, that .three thousand soldiers are to be sent to the 
relief of Chester; and t^-morrow or next day he is to have the 
chief management of that proposal in the General Assembly".
iii. February 23rd. Letter to the King: " I am now at 
Waterford, providing shipping immediately to transport 6,000 
(sic) foot; and 4,000 foot are by May to follow them".
iv. February 28th. Letter to Lord Hopton:"that the ten 
thousand men are designed for his Majesty's service, six (sic)
1. It may be that Glamorgan's social manner was less
flamboyant than his literary style - the provenance of most of 
the suoseqÈnt appreciations of nis character.
thousand of which are ready for transportation". ^
Round singled out two discrepancies from these extracts. 
The Nuncio did not support the proposal as claimed by 
Glamorgan in his letter dated February 8th (ii), only doing 
so after Glamorgan's abject submissions on February 16thgJ and 
19th. Secondly, "there is (in these instances) that incorrigible 
bombast, that vainglorious exaggeration, which seems inseparable 
from everything he writes or (in his forgeries) makes others 
write about himself and his performances".
On the first point, it is true that the Nuncio did not 
press the General Assembly for the despatch of troops until 
February 21st. But, on the other hand, there is no evidence - 
certainly none adduced by Round himself - to prove that the 
Nuncio did not, as Glamorgan stated, agree to their despatch 
on the 7th. It is to be noted that for the his facts and his 
chronology in respect of this episode Round drew upon Birch 
who in his turn was quoting from the Commentarius. Now, it so 
happened t Rinuccizii that Rinuccini reported to Rome on 
February 13th (sic) that "Glamorgan had "frankly made his 
choice and submitted himself to my wishes". His previous 
report was dated January Ist.^As he did not specify when 
Glamorgan had made his submission, it could easily have been 
on February 7th, On the same date also Rinuccini may well have 
consented to sponsor the despatch of troops.
1. Op.cit., pp.424-5.
2. Ibid., p.425.
3. Embassy, p. 117.
4. Ibid., p. 108.
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As to the second claim to have had 6,000 troops in 
readiness when, as Round presumed, the provision of only 3,000 
had been sanctioned, why did Glamorgan repeat the larger 
number in letters to so many people? In particular, why 
should he have informed Vice-Admiral von Hasenduncke that
6.000 were ready to sail,^since Hasenduncke was one of the 
seamen who were to provide shipping for the expedition and 
would require exact information. The fact is that whereas 
only 3,000 troops were to be sent to Chester in the first 
instance, the Confederacy had agreed to raise 6,000 of the
10.000 troops which they were to furnish in all. There are
2
many references to bear out this claim.
The second of Round's six circumstantial points was
that Glamorgan's particular religion led him to act in accord-
%
ance with the doctrine of "the end justifies the means''.^
This would seem a gratuitous innuendo. Roman Catholics in
England were neither more nor less disposed than members of
other creeds to rationalise the measures taken to propagate
/
their faith. What is to be said, for example, of the conduct 
of both sides in Montrose's campaigns or of Cromwell's 
god-fearing Roundheads in Ireland? In any case, G-lamorgan's
1. C.S.P.I.,p.439.
2. A proclamation was issued by the Supreme Council on March
9th declaring that shipping was ready for 6,000 men (It was
drafted by G-lamorgan in his capacity of supreme commander but
the Council would never have permitted its publication if it
had contained a serious misstatement.). (Gilbert,V,pp.267-9;
A Light to the Blind,ff.130-3 - giving the date as March 3rd;
Sellings recorded that warrants had been issued for 6,000 men 
to muster at the ports immediately after the peet Assembly had
gone into recess,that is, immediately after March 4-th (Gilbert,
devotion to Rome was matched by his fervent loyalty to 
Charles I. he would never wittingly have risked damaging 
Charles' cause.
Round continued v/ith a negative point. Charles can be 
accusedin only one instance of "shuffling in the matter of 
Glamorgan's powers" and even then not seriouslyVfhis was in 
his official communications to Ormond and the Council on
p
first hearing of Glamorgan's arrest. Here it is not necessary
to consider Round's defence of some of the incriminating
locutions that occur in these letters but rather to point out
that far from being an isolated example of 'shuffling', this
is but one of four. Thus, there was Charles' repudiation of
the Glamorgan title despite his own frequent use of it, his
lame prevaricating letters to his wife, and his strange
5
letter to Glamorgan himself.
Fourthly, Glamorgan did not "run straight" in some of
his letters. Round mentioned two occasions when Glamorgan
played Ormond false: when he wrote to him after signing his
peace treaty on August 25th without referring to it and
while pretending that he was occupied with furthering the
public negotiations; and, again, on Novemfeër 28th,1646, when
he protested his allegiance to Ormond at the very time when
4
V, p.13); there were also several references to 6,000 troops 
being ready in Ormond's correspondence (cf. Col.Flowers to 
Ormond, Mar.31, T.C.P.,XVll,p.21; Muskerry to Ormond,Apr.3, 
ibid., p.34. ^ '
3. Op.cit.,p.418.
1. Ibid., p.419.
2. See above pp.467-9 where these letters are discussed.
3. See above p.470 ff.
I Wi-
he was plotting to supplant him as Lord Lieutenant.^ Here is
yet another instance of a conclusion being drawn from the
very premise in dispute - that Charles did not authorise
Glamorgan to act independently of Ormond. For,if on the
contrary he did give him secret instructions, it was because
he despaired of success through the agency of Ormond.
In the fifth place. Round commented upon the discrepancy
between the number of documents printed by Dircks from the
Badm^inton collection and the number subsequently included
in the H.M.C. report made by J.A.Bennett.At least those
missing from the report ought to be seen before we accept
2
them as authentic.
This is obviously true but it is difficult to see 
how Round's argument is thereby advanced. For one point is 
clear. If Bennett omitted them deliberately, it was not
because he considered them to be forged but because they
%
seemed unimportant.^
Finally, Round turned his attention to the letter 
dated 20 July,164-6 and he^aded Newcastle which Glamorgan 
claimed he had received from the King. ^ Two statements in this
1. Op.cit.,pp.426-7.
2. Ibid., pp.427-8.
3. It is in fact virtually certain that Bennett saw only the 
documents which he included in his report. All sorts of 
questions then suggest themselves. Were the missing documents 
withheld from him? Or had they been destroyed? If so,by whom 
and when? Why? The present writer asked the Duke of Beaufort 
if he might examine the family papers. His Grace replied 
cryptically that it would be a waste of time. And there for
a time at least the matter must rest.
4. See above pp.547-50.
I K J - J
letter struck him as incredible: the statement that
"If you can raise a large sum of money by pawning 
my kingdoms for that purpose, I am content you 
should do it; and if I recover them, I will fully 
repay that money...";
and the second statement that:
"And tell the Nuncio that if once I can come into 
his and your hands, which ought to be extremely 
wished for by you both, as well for the sake of 
England as Ireland, since all the rest, as I see, 
despise me, I will do it". 1
As to the first statement,Round posed several questions to
which he implied there could be no valid answer. Who was to
act as pawnbroker? Who would loan a 'large sum’ on the strength
of a private letter? Y/hy seek a pawnbroker in Ireland when
the King’s recognised agent was the Queen in Paris? But why
so much insistence on reference to a ’pawnbroker’ as though
the King would have had anything more definite in mind than
that Glamorgan might obtain a loan from private persons with
the promise that the King would repay them at some future date? 
also/
Round was forgetting the vast sums which Glamorgan had
obtained for the King in the past. As for asking the Queen, he
had done so already. Had she not been trying for years to
raise money for him, even to selling and ’pawning’ her
jewellery? Charles, as has been seen, was capable j6f using
any number of agents to carry out his schemes.
VYith regard to the King's going to Ireland, Round
argued that if he wished to go anywhere it was to France and
that in any case Charles could never have risked joining the 
1. Round quoted from Dircks (p.174).
I uu
Nuncio for fear of uniting all M s  enemies in the three
kingdoms. The first objection scarcely merits serious
attention. Round himself quoted from Gardiner:
"On the 8th (guly) he wrote to Ashburnham that 
he believed himself to be lost unless he could 
escape to France before August", ^
without noticing apparently that this would have been an
even more desperate step than escaping to Ireland. Disappointed
of aid from the Scots, Charles had temporarily surrendered
to despair. To one correspondent he might describe escape
to France as his only hope, to another he might mention
Ireland. But whatever he wrote at this time could not be
regarded as the result of considered thought.
Paradoxically the second objection is based on the
assumption that Charles still expected to recover his throne
by playing off the Scots against Parliament. No doubt the
assumption is correct. It is also true that Charles could
scarcely have wished to give the appearance of negotiating
with the îrish Catholics. But it does not follow that he
/
did not wish to use Ireland as a bolt-hole if his strategy 
failed. Indeed, it was characteristic of Charles to indulge 
in two apparently conflicting sets of negotiations at the 
same time.
1. Op.cit., pp.431-2,n.
7U7
One final comment upon Round's case against the commission
is called for. In the course of a most searching inqiry he
made no attempt to disprove that Glamorgan had been given
blanks bearing the King's signature and the impression of the
pocket signet. Indeed, although he nowhere stated so explicitly,
he implied that Glamorgan filled in these blanks with instruction
ns which purported to issue from the King but were in fact
concocted by himself.
Now at one stage in his argument Round criticised
S.R. Gardiner for taking the authenticity of the March 12
commission as read, stating "But that is precisely the
question that we have to discuss". The same comment can be
made in respect of his ovm treatment of the blanks. For what
was the King doing giving blanks to the "fantastic, ardent,
1
feather-brained" Glamorgan ? It was an uncommon practice.
Glamorgan's judgement is alleged to be unsound. At the very
least, it may be assumed perhaps that they were intended for
use as commissions to the officers of the expeditionary force
/
to be raised by Glamorgan - which seems to confirm the
1. There are a few examples. George Leyburn conveyed a number
of blanks from the Queen and Prince of Wales to Ormond in
1647. Cf. also Charles II to tir. Secretary : Nicholas:
"Mr.Secretary Nicholas, I have given the bearer his
dispatch, and have signed all the Commissions with 
fifty-three blanks v/hich I desire you to fill up 
as you shall have occasion, there are two 
commissions for the Marquis of Hertford, that if 
one should miscarry the other might serve..."
(B.Nicholas,op.cit., p.251; Diary and Correspondence of John 
John Evelyn,F.R.S., ed. William Bray, London,n.d., p.823).
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belief that Charles' expectations of his incompetent 
subordinate were surprisingly high. Would it not have been 
more sensible to give him warrants such as he claimed to 
have received rather than turn him loose on Ireland with 
a sheaf of signed blanks? Even if it be granted that the 
King verbally warned Glamorgan that his powers were limited, 
the issuing of these blanks exposes him as reckless and 
foolish.
That Charles had nothing with which to reproach Glamorgan 
may perhaps be deduced from the following letter which 
Henrietta Maria wrote to him from Saint Germain on May 20,1648:
"Nous Henriette Marie de Bourbon Reyne de la 
Grande Bretagne avons par l'ordre du Roy notre 
très honore Seigneur et Mary fait deMvrer es 
mains de notre très cher, et bien am^ cousin 
Edouard Somerset, Comte et Marquis d'Worcester, 
un collier de rubis contenant dix gros rubis 
et cent soicante perles enchassees et enfil'ées 
en ore entre* les dits rubis, comme aussi deux 
gros diamans l'un appelle Saucy et 1&'autre le 
Portugal, confessans qu'outre les très grandes 
devenses faites par luy, pour ledit Roy notre très 
honoré Seigneur, il nous a encore fourny trois 
cens soicante et d/x mil livres tournois outre 
ses tres“^ grands services qu'a ce present mesure 
il nous fait qui sont au moins d'égalé consequence, 
au regard de quoy nous faisons scavoir que le 
dit collier et diamans sont totalement pour en 
dispé^ser par lui soit par vente ou engagement 
sans que nous ou aucun en notre nom puisse en 
faire aucune demande, rechercher ou troubler 
aucune personne qui achètera ou ou prestera 
argent sur lesdits joyaux cy dessus nommer,en 
témoignage de quoy nous avons signé et fait 
mettre notre seel royal a cette présente en 
notre Cour a St Germain en Baye ce jourdhuy 20 
May mil six cens quarante huiet." 1
1. H.M.C.R.,X11, app.lX,p.31.
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